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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an analysis of the discursive construction of a controversial medical
condition (Myalgic Encephalomyelitis) and how it has been made sense of, in and
through the discourse of medical scientists, general practitioners, and M E sufferers.
Various kinds of text and talk are analysed from the perspective of discursive
psychology, arguing that versions of reality are a product of participants' constructive
and dialogical practices. (I include my own text as an example of this.) The analysis of
scientific texts, illness narratives, diagnostic narratives, and M E self-help group
discussions, show how explanations about the status of M E and its causes are
embedded in accounts of the identity of sufferers, the nature and status of medical
explanation, and the competencies of medical practitioners.
There is a sense in which the controversial topic of this thesis provides an ideal forum
for examining both lay and professional reasoning practices about illness, in a context
where the 'objective' world of 'medical facts' threatens to disintegrate into merely
subjective points of view. One of my concerns has been to show how the participants
themselves orient to, and manage this 'reality disjuncture' by means of a variety of
discursive devices.
The main body of the thesis addresses this problem through issues such as: the
significance of diagnostic labels, different models of medicine, and the relevance of
mind and body in explanations for illness. Finally, there is an analysis of the narrative
constructions of M E sufferers and GPs, to show how psychosocial 'evidence' is used
to warrant the speaker's interpretation of illness as either a mental or physical
phenomenon.
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CHAPTER ONE : An Introduction
This thesis is about a 'mystery illness', and how it is constituted in and through the
discourse of participants in my study, and in the field of 'M E' research. For the time
being, I will introduce the term 'M E' as an abbreviation of the term myalgic
encephalomyelitis, and indicate that this is a controversial medical category. As with
all controversies, there is, by (participants') definition, more than one version of
reality. Any attempt to define M E would therefore implicate me in producing a
version of my own, and thereby entering the debate as a participant. My purpose in
this thesis is not to produce yet another contribution to the question, 'What is M E?'
Thepoint of theroject is rather to leave the privilege of definition and sense-making
to the participants themselves, who manage this as a practical activity.'
Taking M E as a participants' topic allows me to contribute something to the
understanding of how different versions of reality are constructed in talk about illness,
and what kinds of concerns are made relevant by both lay and professional people in
and through their discourse. My analysis of text and talk in later chapters addresses
itself to exactly these issues.
The first task of this introductory chapter is to set my topic in the more general context
of a social constructionist approach to the study of health and illness, and medical
discourse. Second, I shall outline the background and theoretical approach of
discursive psychology that I intend to apply in the construction of this thesis and the
analysis of data. Third, I shall outline the project itself, and the kinds of discourse that
have been treated as data for analysis. Finally, I shall provide a synopsis of the thesis,
in which I provide an analyst's gloss on the version of reality that this thesis has
constituted. In certain parts of the text of the thesis I have appropriated and anticipated
the voices and commentary of others to accomplish some analytic and rhetorical
1 Starting with chapter two, in which I construct a "plausible history of M E", where my aim is to show
how the participants in the field of medicine and social science have constructed M E as a mystery
illness and a medical controversy.
business relevant to both the content and the form of the text as a constructed version.
My use of such 'alternative literary forms' in parts of the thesis, is indicated in the
synopsis at the end of this chapter, where I call attention to their (de)constructive,
reflexive, and dialogical properties.2
Health and Illness as a General Context
Although I shall focus on the specific topic of M E, my intention is to make a much
more general contribution to the understanding of the discourse of health and illness,
and medicine. Therefore, the analysis of talk about M E is used as a forum for the
discussion of more general issues that are likely to be made relevant in any kind of
discourse about health and illness, and medicine. Before I go on to discuss the
theoretical and analytical approach taken in this thesis, I shall first outline the general
distinction between traditional realist, social constructionist, and discursive
approaches in terms of the concepts of 'disease', 'illness' and 'sickness' and the
relationship between them.
It is usual for social scientists to distinguish between the terms 'disease', 'illness', and
'sickness', where
Disease is something that physicians diagnose and treat [...] it can be said that disease refers
to pathological changes in the body [...] Illness can be taken to mean the experience of
disease [ ..] a way of being for the individual concerned [...] Sickness can be defined as a
social condition that applies to people who are deemed by others to be ill or diseased. It refers
to a a particular status or role in society and is justified by reference to either the presence of
disease or to the presence of illness (Eisenberg, 1977). (Radley, 1994: 3)
Alan Radley points out how the different terms are each related to a different
'conceptual focus', respectively; the physical body, individual experience, and society,
which are the business of biomedicine, psychology, and sociology. Thus, 'disease' is
something physical, 'illness' is experiential and thus the subject matter of psychology,
and 'sickness' makes sense as a category where people have 'diseases' and experience
2 "Alternative literary forms, used in SSK* analysis (e.g., Ashmore, 1989; Ashmore et al, 1989;
Ashmore eta! 1991; Latour, 1980; MacMillan, 1995, 1996; Mulkay, 1984, 1985; Pinch and Pinch,
1988; Stringer, 1985; Woolgar and Ashmore, 1988), reflexively display SSK's concern with the
construction of knowledge, and exemplify the way that the analyst's/author's claims are inextricably
embedded in the textual forms she uses to present such knowledge." (MacMillan, 1966: 6) (* footnote
to footnote 2: SSK stands for Sociology of Scientific Knowlege).
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'illness' in the context of cultural meanings and in relationship to other people, social
duties and obligations.
From a traditional realist perspective, the phenomenon of 'disease' is potentially
discoverable by the scientific techniques of biomedicine. There are observable 'signs'
and symptoms that can be described and interpreted within the framework of medical
knowledge about disease and its categories. The experience of 'illness' is also treated
as a discoverable phenomenon, albeit with a lesser ontological status, 3 which is
available to the social science researcher through the reports of its sufferers. However,
the social status of 'sickness' is negotiated in terms of the cultural meanings of bodily
signs and symptoms, and the extent to which such phenomena are deemed to be a
sufficient and legitimate justification for opting out of social duties and obligations.4
In other words, "we need to look beyond the experience of the individual patient to
understand how the term 'sickness' relates to the public awareness and designation of
disease." (Radley, 1994: 4).
Alan Radley claims that as soon as we start to consider the separation of the physical
body, from individual experience, and society in terms of a conceptual distinction
between the categories of 'disease', 'illness', and 'sickness', it becomes clear that the
separateness is merely an artefact of different theoretical perspectives. The distinction
between the three has been constructed and is used "to justify the different interests of
social science as compared with medicine" (ibid: 5). What this accomplishes is to
assert that "the concepts of biomedicine cannot define the field of interest for a social
science approach to the topic"(ibid: 5).
3 Phenomenological enquiry in the social sciences has often been regarded as having a lesser scientific
status than its positivistic counterparts, since its findings are based on the interpretative work of
analysing participants' subjective reports. Nonetheless, from the realist point of view, the findings of
phenomenological enquiry refer to an objective reality that exists beyond a participant's subjective and
distorted interpretation.
4 Parsons (1951a; 1951b) has referred to this withdrawal from the normal demands of everyday life as
the adoption of the 'sick-role'. From a functionalist perspective in sociology, Parsons defined sickness
as a form of deviance from the social norm of health. Sickness is seen as a threat to the social order, and
the work of medical practice is to act as an agent of social control by policing access to the sick role and
helping people to get well as soon as possible.
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From the social constructionist perspective, therefore, the distinction that is
traditionally made between the social and the biological appears much less clear cut.
Social constructionism derives from the approach of Berger and Luckmann (1966)
who contested the idea that social reality exists independently of our constructive
practices. The theoretical stance of social constructionism therefore challenges the
notion that there is any such thing as the prior reality of disease. Alan Radley
illustrates this latter point with the following example of the menopause as a socially
constructed disease.
This 'deficiency disease' can be seen to be the product of medical definitions, and of certain
social assumptions. These suggest that women's biological condition associated with
ovulation is linked to their youthfulness, attractiveness and hence their social worth.[...] the
initial case for oestrogen therapy was based on its known effects on bone condition and the
possibilities of it preventing atherosclerosis ('furring' of the arteries). Kaufert and McKinlay
(1985) point to this as implying that once women had passed through the menopause, and
produced less oestrogen, they were then considered to be in a state of oestrogen deficiency.
This effectively turned the menopause into (i.e. constructed it as) a 'deficiency disease', and
hence into something that physicians are obliged to treat. The development of replacement
therapy was the necessary condition for this to occur, tying it into a conception of the
menopause as a reduction in women's psychological and social worth. This was required to
justify its use, in spite of several contrary indications about the treatment's long-term effects.
That is to say, the isolation of a reduction in oestrogen among women after the menopause is
not enough to make this variation into a disease. (Radley, 1994: 29)
Another example that Radley cites to illustrate the social constructionist approach is
coronary heart disease which started to appear in the official statistics as a cause of
death only in the 1920's (Bartley, 1985). This is interpreted as partly due to changes in
the way that doctors attributed the causes of death specifically to degeneration of the
coronary arteries, rather than to general arteriosclerosis as they had previously done
(Radley, 1994). This linking of the mortality figures to a specific pathology of the
coronary arteries provided the ground for theories about risk factors in heart disease,
such as diet, physical activity, and lifestyle, and therefore, it follows, a justification for
medical intervention in the way people live their lives.
One further example can help us to understand how medical knowledge can be
understood as a socially constructed phenomenon. In his study of haemotologists in
hospital settings in Britain and the U.S.A., Paul Atkinson (1995) analysed the
everyday talk of practitioners, and how they produce and represent medical
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knowledge. Atkinson's discussion of the 'clinical gaze' (Foucault, 1973) points out
how "the body of the patient is rendered legible via a detailed scrutiny of its
constituent parts" (Atkinson, 1995: 61). The 'clinical gaze' is a way to read the body
and its signs and symptoms as a kind of text, where the clinician's reading is based on
medical techniques and anatomical knowledge, and is privileged over other kinds of
accounts, such as the patient's own interpretation of bodily feelings. Atkinson (ibid:
70) demonstrates, however, that this medical 'reading' of the body is by no means
clear cut or straightforward:
the expert (primary physician, specialist, laboratory scientist) acts as a practical
phenomenologist. He or she is concerned, as a matter of everyday work, with the nature of
appearances and the production of descriptions.[...] Observations are not self-evident to the
'uninitiated'. In the absence of a conceptual framework and a descriptive vocabulary there is
no socially shared 'observation': there is no agreement as to a stable world of phenomena.
Atkinson goes on to analyse the discursive processes by which medical trainees are
taught by experienced practitioners, to 'see' and interpret 'blood pictures' under the
microscope, in a context where shared knowledge and the visual recognition of objects
is a practical, collaborative, and interpretative accomplishment. The argument that
Radley and Atkinson develop is that medical knowledge is not neutral, but has always
been, and is ongoingly constructed within the framework of the social, cultural and
discursive context. On the other hand, the social constructionist position does not
necessarily imply a disagreement with medicine's categories and practices, only that
there is no bottom line non-constructed criterion against which to measure them
(Edwards, Ashmore, and Potter, 1995).
The upshot of the social constructionist position as this relates to the concepts of
'disease', 'illness', and 'sickness', is that definitions of disease have to be seen as a
product of cultural contexts and the social processes of constructing knowledge. Since
that is the case, the experience of 'illness' is to some extent dependent on such cultural
and social definitions. For example, as implied above (Radley, 1994), the experience
of the menopause as a 'deficiency disease' for which women should be given medical
'treatment', only makes sense in the context of certain cultural and social definitions.
Furthermore, the social sanctioning of 'sickness' is dependent upon what is treated as
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a warrantable claim to have a disease or an illness experience. So what is treated as a
legitimate 'sickness' is likely to vary historically, and between different cultures
according to prevailing notions of what counts as bona fide medical knowledge.
It was pointed out earlier, that the distinction that is commonly made between the
categories 'disease', 'illness', and 'sickness', can be seen as a product of the
theoretical divisions that have been constructed between the biological, the
psychological and the social. In other words, these have been constituted as the focal
analytic concerns of academic disciplines. However, I shall demonstrate, in this thesis,
that they are also concerns that people orient to in their commonsense talk about
health issues. In other words, the biological definitions of disease, the personal
experience of illness, and the social and moral context of sickness, are precisely the
topics that participants in discourse about health and illness are concerned to manage
in and through their accounting practices.5
The nature of this position, and its analytical application can be elaborated by
outlining the general approaches of discourse analysis (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter
& Wetherell, 1987) and more specifically, discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter,
1992; Potter, 1996; Edwards, 1997).
Discursive Psychology
The main theoretical areas that have influenced the development of a discursive
psychology approach have been summarised by Edwards and Potter (1992: 27) as
follows: The relationship between knowledge and language use in linguistic
philosophy (Austin, 1962; Wittgenstein, 1953); a functional approach to language in
speech act theories (Grice, 1975; Searle, 1969); the study of members' everyday sense-
making practices in ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984); the
application of ethnomethodological principles to the analysis of mundane
conversations in conversation analysis (Atkinson and Heritage, 1984; Button and Lee,
5 For example, in chapter two, the question of whether M E is a disease entity is precisely what is at
issue for the participants in the controversy. Also, in chapter six, the question of defining a disease
entity is the very issue that is at stake in a narrative of personal illness experience.
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1987; Levinson, 1983; Sacks et al, 1974); the study of scientists' discursive practices
in the sociology of scientific knowledge (Ashmore, 1989; Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984;
Potter and Mulkay, 1985); the application of this kind of discourse analysis 6 to the
social psychology concept of attitude (Potter and Wetherell, 1987), to the analysis of
memory accounts (Edwards and Potter, 1992), to the analysis of racist discourses
(Wetherell and Potter, 1992), and to the analysis of topics such as categorisation,
emotions, narrative, and shared knowledge (Edwards, 1997). Another area of influence
has been the post-structuralist focus on the reality constructing nature of text in
cultural and literary theory (Barthes, 1974; Derrida, 1977b; Shapiro, 1988).
In order to explain how discursive psychology is applied in this thesis, I shall elaborate
three of the main influences that are referred to above. These are, the study of
scientists' discursive practices in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK); a
functional approach to language, and ethnomethodology.
Scientists' Discourse, and a functional approach to language.
Gilbert and Mulkay's (1984) study of scientists' discursive practices focused on the
discourse of bioenergeticists whose specialty was an interest in oxidative
phosphorylation. This refers to "the formulation of a complex molecule called ATP
(adenosine triphosphate), which plants, animals, and bacteria use as a means of
moving and temporarily storing energy within the cell." (ibid: 18) Gilbert and
Mulkay's analysis departs from previous sociological work on science, which had
sought to demonstrate a discrepency between the orthodox view of scientists as neutral
and disinterested, and the social realities 'revealed' by sociological research (ibid: 1).
They cite, as an example of this, Blissett's (1972) study of the role of politics in
science, where the point was to show how political manoeuvring is a routine aspect of
6 The kind of discourse analysis applied by Potter & Wetherell (1987) can be distinguished from
another form of discourse analysis that treats discourses as historically evolved constructions that exist
in some kind of abstract but structural form (e.g. Foucault, 1980; Parker, 1992). Wetherell & Potter
(1992: 90) point out that "One of the dangers of this view is that the social practices of discourse often
disappear from sight altogether. ..Discourses become seen as potent causal agents in their own right, with
the processes of interest being the work of one (abstract) discourse on another (abstract) discourse...In
contrast to this, we wish to place much more emphasis on discourse as social practice, on the context of
use and on the act of instantiation."
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the process of scientific enquiry that directs scientific perception and helps to
determine whether or not a scientific theory will be accepted. Blisset's justification for
making this claim was drawn from scientists' interview talk and written accounts , in
which the scientists gave descriptions of such political activity. These statements were
counted, by Blisset, as consistent evidence that accurately describes the social reality
of science as a political activity.
This kind of analysis is typical of a more general kind of qualitative research, where
participants' discourse is treated as a descriptive resource to illustrate the version of
social reality that the analyst has chosen to endorse. Any variability in the participants'
discourse is either ignored, explained away as the product of inaccuracy or bias, or
managed by claiming privileged insight into what was really meant. As Gilbert and
Mulkay (1984: 10) put it, "It is proposed in this line of argument that sociologists can
tell good from bad accounts of action and belief; and that they do so by acquiring tacit
craft skills which enable them to assess the veracity of different kinds of account."7
Gilbert and Mulkay's approach is distinct from this in the sense that it treats
participants' discourse as topic, not resource, and language as functional rather than
merely descriptive. From this view, there is taken to be "a strong connection between
the form and substance of discourse, on the one hand, and the social situation in which
discourse is produced, on the other hand" (ibid: 7). It is therefore argued that the
similarity between different statements that participants make is likely to bear some
relationship to a similarity in their social contexts of production. For example, Gilbert
and Mulkay showed how scientists use two functionally distinctive interpretative
repertoires to give an account of their actions and beliefs in different social situations;
the formal, and the informal. The empiricist repertoire and the contingent repertoire
(as Gilbert and Mulkay termed them) were found to be used by scientists to construct
asymmetrical accounts of truth and error.
7 The original endnote in Gilbert & Mulkay (1984) reads: "Collins is the most enthusiastic advocate of
this kind of approach in the sociology of science. See his 'Respondents' talk and participatory research',
a paper given at the University of Surrey Accounts of Action Conference, December 1981. For a
general discussion of the craft element in social research, see C. Wright Mills, The Sociological
Imagination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959."
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Empiricist and Contingent Repertoires
The empiricist repertoire employs a way of speaking that obviates agency and
promotes the notion of objectivity. It is the kind of formal writing that appears in
experimental reports. 8 Gilbert and Mulkay showed how an 'empiricist repertoire' was
commonly used by scientists in making factual claims and in support of favoured
theories. First, it is full of impersonal grammatical constructions such as, 'it was found
that', 'evidence has emerged from', or 'results suggest that', which minimises
subjectivity. Second, as a rule, theory develops from empirical data, rather than
preceding it (e.g.`facts show that'). Third, laboratory work is described according to
recognisably standard scientific methods and procedures (e.g."mitochondria were
prepared by the method of Wong", ibid: 44).
On the other hand, error accounts must be managed by scientists as a matter of routine,
even though, within the canons of scientific method, errors should not occur in the
first place. In practice, Gilbert and Mulkay found that a 'contingent repertoire' was
typically used by scientists in more informal settings, and interview talk, where
appeals to the personal context- motive, bias, speculation and intuition, and also the
social context of research (that are normally excluded from scientific reports),
functioned to account for error, discredited findings, and particularly in making
reference to the work of rival laboratories.
The two repertoires constitute competing accounts of scientific practice and discovery,
such that if they appear together, a contingent repertoire is likely to threaten the
legitimacy of an empiricist repertoire, and the truth of scientific findings. But error and
truth, disagreement and consensus must also co-exist in the processes of
scientific practice, and scientists made use of a 'Truth Will Out' device (TWOD),
which functioned to manage these competing concerns and reinforce the idea that
8 And also in much of this thesis. For example, in the preceding paragraph where I have written the
sentence "The empiricist repertoire and contingent repertoire were found to be used by scientists to
construct asymmetrical accounts of truth and error.". The use of this kind of grammatical form deletes
the authors, Gilbert and Mulkay, as agents of the discovery of the two repertoires making it sound as
though the repertoires were just there waiting to be discovered.
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despite temporary setbacks, disagreements, and glitches, that are attributable to human
error, scientific empiricism will itself eventually prevail.
Jonathan Potter (1996: 155-158) has given some examples of the use of an empiricist
repertoire outside the realms of the scientific community, where the factual grounds of
reports and the objectivity of claims are important participants' concerns. For
example, in news reports, constructions of impersonality (e.g. It is believed that'), and
fact agency (e.g. 'facts show that'), are in common use. Latour (1987), and Pomerantz
(1984) have also shown how in the context of controversy, people are concerned to
provide a technical basis to support their truth claims. Clearly then, an empiricist
repertoire, as a collection of fact constructing devices, has a wider application than to
strictly scientific settings, and it certainly warrants more than a passing mention here,
in this thesis. First, because such devices can be deployed by both lay and professional
people to construct 'out-there-ness' 9 , secondly because the topic of my research relates
to medical talk, where traditional empiricism is the canonical discourse of medical
science, and thirdly because my topic is an unresolved medical controversy, where the
very issue at stake is the ontological status of 'the mystery illness'. Of course, the
implication of this claim is that a contingent repertoire is the other side of the coin in
both lay and professional reasoning practices, where it can be drawn on to make
relevant the subjective and constructed nature of people's claims and accounts in a
way that undermines their factual basis.
Discourse as Social Action
It is useful next to explicate some of the features of discursive psychology, in which a
central claim is that discourse is analysable as social action, rather than as a way to
find out about internal (cognitive) or external reality. The 'discursive action model'
has been suggested as a "conceptual scheme that captures some of the features of
participants' discursive practices" (Edwards & Potter, 1992: 154) and therefore
focuses on action rather than cognition. Memories are treated as accounts, or versions
9 This term is used to refer to the discursive construction of an external objective reality that exists 'out-
there' independently of people's constructive activities.
10
of what happened, that are produced "on and for occasions of talk" and "may perform
social actions-in-the-telling" (Edwards, 1997:266). This is a functional approach to
language, where accounts and descriptions are not seen as merely representative of an
external social reality that exists prior to people's descriptions. Causal attributions and
descriptions or reports are taken to be linked together in people's accounts as a
discursive activity, where speakers attend to issues of blame and accountability, rather
than accounts being interpreted as evidence of people's internal cognitions, or being
evaluated for their truthfulness or accuracy.
From this view therefore, factuality is itself a participants' concern. It is constructed in
people's accounts by means of a variety of discursive techniques, one of which is an
empiricist repertoire. The possibility of denial is itself oriented to in the way that
reports are rhetorically organised to undermine possible alternative versions (Billig,
1987). This is not necessarily to imply that an objective and recoverable social reality
lies beyond the rhetorical organisation of people's versions, but rather to claim that
such versions are all we have. In other words, they are constitutive of social reality,
and they work to dismiss other versions of social reality in the context of everyday
talk.
One of the points made earlier was that in traditional qualitative research, variability in
participants' accounts is typically accounted for by the analyst by means of appeals to
inaccuracy, or bias. In other words, the participant may not be giving a truthful,
accurate, disinterested account. One of the conclusions of Gilbert and Mulkay's study
(and those which look at non-scientific settings) was that the empiricist repertoire
functions as a set of fact-constructing devices, whereas a contingent repertoire can be
drawn on to construct accounts as inaccurate, or in some way subjective and
motivated. It can therefore be argued that the traditional qualitative analyst is doing the
same thing as Gilbert and Mulkay's scientists; bolstering their own version of a
'reality beyond the talk' in terms of an empiricist repertoire, and using a contingent
repertoire to challenge the validity of anything that confuses or contradicts their own
selected and formulated version of social reality.
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Accuracy and Bias, as Participants' Concerns
On the other hand, a discursive psychology approach treats factuality, accuracy, and
stake and interest, as participants' concerns, rather than as a methodological problem
for the analyst to solve. For psychology in general and for the qualitative approach
specifically, the accuracy of people's accounts is an important analyst's concern. This
threatens to undermine the validity of any kind of research that treats language as a
representation of a reality that exists beyond the account. From a realist point of view,
the problem would be to establish how far people's memories of events are accurate
representations of that reality. Robinson (1990: 1173) attends to this almost as an
apologia l ° in the introduction to his paper on illness narratives:
Personal accounts of illness are often viewed with considerable ambivalence as a research
resource. On the one hand they provide a density of texture, a depth of personal meaning, and
an insight into the experience of illness not readily available through other means. On the
other hand these very qualities seem to make any systematic, valid and reliable attempts to
create generalisable propositions difficult, if not impossible.
Robinson's comments here orient to the difficulty of finding a systematic way to get
from people's accounts to events and experiences. However, from the perspective of
discursive psychology, the accuracy or truthfulness of an account is not something that
the analyst needs to be concerned to establish." From a relativist view, constructed
versions are all we have to work with. So from the viewpoint of discursive
psychology, factuality and authenticity are relevant only as a discursive
accomplishment in the construction of an account, or as participants' concerns that are
sometimes the topic of their talk.
However, that is not to agree with Robinson's concern that systematic analysis is
impossible. There are many discursive devices, which have been identified by
different authors in discourse and conversation analysis, that are commonly used by
participants in mundane everyday talk to accomplish factuality. Jonathan Potter (1996)
has written a comprehensive review of fact-constructing devices, some of which will
I ° Of course this apologia works discursively to disarm precisely such a critique of qualitative research.
ii Unless of course the account is their own! Discursive psychologists obviously employ exactly the
same fact-constructing devices as everyone else in writing their texts and contructing arguments. What I
mean to emphasise is that discursive psychology does not seek to discover a reality beyond the talk.
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be explicated in the later chapters of this thesis as an ongoing activity in the process of
analysing participants' discourse. However, for the purposes of this introduction, I will
provide a couple of examples that might help to clarify the rationale of discursive
psychology.
Memory as a Social Practice
Remembering (and not remembering) can be seen as a social practice (Middleton &
Edwards, 1990), rather than more or less accurate accounts of mental representations.
Any account of past events is an occasioned discursive activity, that accomplishes
rhetorical work. However, in the following example of John Dean's testimony to the
Watergate committee, (taken from Edwards & Potter, 1992: 45-46), the accuracy of
recall is analysable as a participant's concern.
Dean:.. . I've told you I'm trying to recall. My mind is not a tape
recorder. It does recall (0.3) impressions of conversations very well,
and the impression I had was that he told - the - he told me that
Bob had reported to him what I had been doing. That was th- the
impression that very // clearly came out.
Gurney: In other words, your - your whole thesis on saying that the
President of the United States knew about Watergate on September
15 is purely  an impression, there isn't a single shred of evidence that
came out of this meeting.
(Slightly simplified from Molotch and Bogen, 1985: 281)
One of the analytic points made by Edwards and Potter (1992) about this extract is that
it appeared in the context of "a series of turns where he [Dean] had found difficulty in
answering questions" (ibid: 46), where Dean was working to emphasise both the
accuracy of his memory, and also its limitations. He was thereby able to disclaim
accountability for the apparent inadequacy of some of his previous answers, whilst at
the same time warranting the essential accuracy of his testimony. Thus he claimed it
was the "impressions of conversations" that he remembered very well, even though his
"mind is not a tape recorder". This combination constructs "a cooperative concern for
truth and accuracy" whilst leaving "some scope for 'plausible deniability' (Bogen and
Lynch, 1989: 203).
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A display of cooperative concern with the accuracy of memory, and 'plausible
deniability' is also a feature of interview talk, as the following two extracts illustrate.
Extract 1 (MHS/ Dr Evans)
22.MHS	 have you seen any patients in your practice with M E?
23.Dr Evans = mm
24.MHS	 = yeah? (.) can you describe a particular case that you had ?
25.
26.Dr Evans ri:ght er (.) that's why I was going to get these notes out
Extract 2 ( MHS/Dr Evans)
260.Dr Evans you do find people, who really, you think (.) probably haven't
261.	 got M E at all (.) they've got something else (.) [en]
262.MHS	 [mm] have you
263. got any patients like that?
264.
265.Dr Evans I can't think of any off the top of my head (.) but yes there certainly
266.	 have  been
In extract 1, Dr Evans' response at line 26 displays his cooperative concern to describe
the case as accurately as possible by using the case notes to enhance his memory. Later
in the interview (extract 2, line 260) he makes a general claim, which could be heard
as a perjorative comment about some of his patients, who (immediately before this
extract) he has described as people who "simply fall out with their previous doctor and
join a new practice which may be us". These are patients whom he argues "probably
haven't got M E at all", but they claim that they have. When pressed for more specific
detail, Dr Evans responds at lines 265-266 with ; "I can't think of any off the top of
my head (.) but yes there certainly have been".
Here, the device of not being able to remember any specific details without some kind
of memory aid, displays a concern to be co-operative, accurate and truthful, but also,
in the context of having made a potentially contentious claim, allows him a rhetorical
space for 'plausible deniability'. If he has given no detailed description of cases that he
knows well, his claim cannot be easily contested, and if he cannot remember "off the
top of my head" (line 265), nor can his comments be easily followed up by the
interviewer.
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Stake Management
One of the concerns that participants attend to in telling their version of events, is that
their description might be contested. For example, someone may construe them as
'having an axe to grind', or having something to gain by constructing one version of
events (rather than another) as factual. 12 In the giving of an account, particularly a
controversial one, there is always the possibility of having one's version denied or
queried on the grounds of stake and interest. 13 This is very evident in the context of
the courtroom, where the famous line attributed to Mandy Rice-Davies 14 , 'he would
[say that] wouldn't he?' was used to discredit as motivated, a testimony that had
challenged her own.
The dilemma of stake and interest is not, however, restricted to the context of the
courtroom. In ordinary conversation also, participants attend to the possibility that
their version of events may be dismissed as motivated. They attend to this possibility
in their talk by means of either a device that Jonathan Potter (1996: 125) has termed
'stake inoculation', or alternatively by 'stake confession'. Both are constructed to
manage the imputation of stake or prior motive. The following example from an
interview with a general practitioner on the topic of M E illustrates how 'stake
inoculation' works.
Extract 3 (MHS/Dr Turner/ 69-81)
12 Certain approaches to narrative psychology that give a 'nod in the direction of rhetoric', construe
people in this way themselves. For example, Reissman's (1990) analysis of an illness narrative,
"Strategic uses of narrative in the presentation of self and illness: A research note." which points out the
rhetorical context of the discourse, but rather than looking in detail at the actions that discourse
performs in the illness narrative, she interprets the data in Goffman's terms of 'self presentation' and the
strategic choice of genre and forms of narrative that enable the participant to accomplish 'impression
management'.
13 Social scientists do this when they examine the replies of participants for bias and distortion. For
example, Reissman's (1990) analysis of an illness narrative uses the notion of rhetorical structure to
attribute a 'motive' to the participant: that of presenting a particular view of himself to the interviewer.
The difference between this and a discursive psychology approach is that the latter looks at the actions
that discourse performs, rather than construing those actions as in some way motivated. A discursive
analysis has no need to make inferences about the internal psychology of the individual, since these are
the very topics that are attended to by participants in their talk. In other words, stake and interest is a
concern that participants manage in their discourse rather than bias being a problem for analysts to
solve.
14 Mandy Rice-Davies was a witness for the prosecution in the notorious court case of 1963, where
John Profumo and other leading public figures had become implicated in a scandal involving
prostitution and espionage. The remark was made in response to having her own version of events
denied by a defence witness (in Edwards and Potter, 1992).
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69.MHS
70.
71 Dr Turner
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
I mean what do you make of the whole M E thi:ng?
I was very sceptical initially, I have to say, for a while it seemed to
be y'know this decade's thing, and went along the same sort of lines as
Total Allergy Syndrome and things like that, which ultimately became
pretty well discredited (.) er as diagnoses and so I think initially, I think
it was seen as this year's trendy illness to have (.) er and people that
read about it, knew about it, developed it, sort of thing, that was my
original scepticism (.) about ten years ago it received that sort of
treatment, however I think it probably is an entity, a diagnostic
entity, a disease entity (.) whether or not it's post viral (.) whether it's a
slow virus or whatever (.) er (.) er (.) is still under debate, but as I say I
tend to think of it now as a disease entity
The interesting thing to notice about this extract is Dr Turner's response to the
interviewer at line 71, "I was very sceptical initially". This signals to the listener that
Dr Turner might at one time have had a prior motivation to categorise M E as a
dubious kind of condition. At lines 72-76, he lists some grounds for his "original
scepticism"(line 77). But later, at lines 78-81, he makes a statement about his current
approach that contrasts with his former position (and that of other doctors); "however
I think it probably is an entity, a diagnostic entity, a disease entity.. ."(lines 78-79).
This makes available the implication that Dr Turner's current position on M E is
based on rational grounds, that were previously unavailable, rather than being based
on some kind of prior prejudice that he has. On the contrary, his "or i ginal scepticism"
has somehow been overcome. In this case, the 'stake innoculation' works to foreclose
the possible suggestion that Dr Turner is someone who had an prior interest in
recognising M E as a disease entity, even whilst others in the medical profession were
sceptical, or that he was in the first place easily duped by "this year's trendy
illness"(line 75).
'Stake confession' is another way to manage the dilemma of stake and interest in the
giving of a version of social reality. An example of this appears in footnote 18 (this
chapter), where I call attention to my own interest as a member of the self-help group,
and I refer to my personal involvement with two close family members who have
suffered from M E. As Jonathan Potter points out, "confessing stake shows that the
writer is live to its relevance and is not trying to dupe the readership. It may also work
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as a display of honesty and objectivity; the author is someone who can stand outside
his [her] interests and is well aware of their distorting potential. In this sense it is
disarming." (Potter, 1996: 130).15
Ethnomethodology
Ethnomethodology, the study of mundane practices for producing and making sense of
everyday social life, was founded by Harold Garfinkel (1967), and is one of the main
roots of both SSK and discursive psychology. What distinguishes ethnomethodology
is that it does not adopt a position on the accuracy of those sense-making practices, but
rather analyses them as they are used in situ as a practical activity, or as Heritage puts
it, "some of the ways in which the world is rendered objectively available and is
maintained as such" (Heritage,1984: 220). The approach of 'ethnomethodological
indifference', parallels SSK's emphasis on 'methodological relativism', where the
point is to avoid buying into a particular version of scientific truth or social reality.
The question of how "actors come to know, and know in common, what they are
doing" (Heritage, 1984a: 76), in other words, how they construct and maintain a sense
of orderly reality, is central to the ethnomethodological approach. Garfinkel (1967)
reformulated Mannheim's tenninology 16 to refer to this process as the 'documentary
method' in which
Not only is the underlying pattern derived from its individual documentary evidences, but the
individual documentary evidences, in their turn, are interpreted on the basis of 'what is
known' about the underlying pattern. Each is used to elaborate the other. (Garfinkel, 1967:
78)
In other words, the underlying pattern is constituted in and through the accumulation
of instances that are worked up as such by the actors themselves.
15 Of course by making this remark I am not claiming to 'stand outside my own interests' in writing this
thesis. Indeed, the point is that my text (like any other account) is analysable as a version. And, of
course, the more we are conscious of the functions of stake management, the less effectively disarming
it is likely to become!
16 Mannheim proposed that the 'documentary method' involves the search for "an identical homologous
pattern underlying a vast variety of totally different realisations of meaning" (Mannheim cited in
Garfinkel, 1967c: 78).
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There are, however, occasions when that sense of a definitive orderly reality threatens
to disintegrate into different versions of the world, or points of view. Melvin Poliner
(1987) referred to these as 'reality disjunctures'. In his study of mundane reasoning in
traffic courts, he analysed the discursive methods by which people managed to resolve
such disjunctures, and reinstate the existence of an objective reality beyond people's
competing versions. The procedures that he identified function in the same way as
Gilbert and Mulkay's 'contingent repertoire', such that disjunctures are explained
away as being a product of differences in individual perception and interpretation, or
discrepant, incomplete or distorted reporting. In this way, members are able to sustain
a recognisably factual and objectively real world.
There is a sense in which the controversial topic of this thesis provides an ideal forum
for examining precisely those kinds of mundane reasoning practices, in a context
where the objective world of medical scientific facts threatens to disintegrate into
merely subjective points of view. In other words, the controversy surrounding M E
constitutes just such a 'reality disjuncture', and how that is constituted and managed as
a practical activity by both lay and professional participants, is the project of this
thesis.
The Project
In later chapters I shall treat all kinds of discourse on the topic of M E as analysable
data. I have included in this; a selection of academic literature on M E, naturalistic
data from M E self-help group discussions 17 , `officar reports on M E, and interview
data with ten M E sufferers and ten general practitioners, which was collected
specifically for the purposes of this study. I initially approached the M E sufferers
through a support group, where I became both a member and a researcher. 18 My access
to general practitioners was negotiated in different ways; some were referrals by
17 By 'naturalistic data' I mean that this is discourse that was not 'set up' for the purposes of research. I
was able to gain access to the data since the M E group tape record (and sometimes video-record) their
sessions with visiting speakers as a matter of routine. The purpose of this is to make a 'library' available
to housebound members of the support group.
18 My status as a member of the group relates to my own experiences as a caregiver with two close
family members who have suffered from this debilitating condition. (See page 16 of this chapter for a
discussion of the rhetorical work of 'stake confession'.)
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patients, others were referrals through personal contacts, and the rest were negotiated
by sending letters (followed up by telephone calls) to doctors' surgeries in two
different counties.
My purpose here was to treat interview data as a dialogue about M E between two
interlocutors (both researcher, and participant), rather than to use the participants' talk
as a way to discover a reality beyond their accounts, such as the events of an illness,
patient's beliefs, doctor's attitudes, or the relationship between doctors and their
patients. Although the interviews were collected for the purposes of research, they are
treated as 'naturalised' data, in the sense that the interaction between researcher and
participant is treated as integral to the object of analysis, and the researcher's questions
and comments are also treated as data to be analysed. (For a further discussion of the
'naturalisation' of data, see Potter and Wetherell, 1995; Edwards, 1997). The analysis
of such data will therefore use the analytical techniques and rationale of discursive
psychology, to examine the kinds of actions that discourse petforms in the contexts of
interviews, academic literature, and official reports.
As I pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, taking M E as a participants' topic
allows me to contribute something to the understanding of how different versions of
reality are constructed in talk about a 'mystery illness', and what kinds of concerns are
made relevant by both lay and professional people in and through their discourse. My
analysis of talk and text, in later chapters, addresses itself to exactly these issues:
for example, the biological or medical definitions of disease, the experiential
dimension of illness, and the question of what counts as disease or illness in the first
place.
A (foot)note on reflexivity
In case it was overlooked the first time, perhaps I should introduce footnote 2 (this
chapter) into the main text:
Alternative literary forms, used in SSK* analysis (e.g., Ashmore, 1989; Ashmore et al, 1989; Ashmore
et at 1991; Latour, 1980; MacMillan, 1995, 1996; Mulkay, 1984, 1985; Pinch and Pinch, 1988;
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Stringer, 1985; Woolgar and Ashmore, 1988), reflexively display SSK's concern with the construction
of knowledge, and exemplify the way that the analyst's/author's claims are inextricably embedded in the
textual forms she uses to present such knowledge." (MacMillan, 1966: 6) (* footnote to footnote 2: SSK
stands for Sociology of Scientific Knowlege).
MacMillan coins the phrase "alternative literary forms" (ALFs) to re-work the notion
of 'new literary forms', initially used by Ashmore, 1989; Mulkay, 1984, 1985;
Stringer, 1985; and Woolgar, 1983. These refer to "reflexive textual forms which are
used to highlight the construction of knowledge." (MacMillan, 1996:15).
At the beginning of this chapter I have indicated my own use of ALFs in certain parts
of the text, where they work to (de)construct my own version as reflexive, highlight its
intertextual properties, or display the `rhetorico-responsive' nature of discourse
(Shotter, 1993b). The latter refers to a feature of talk or text that has been discussed by
theorists such as Mikhail Balchtin (see for example, Morson and Emerson, 1990: 131),
who has argued that a single utterance is dialogical in the sense that it embodies
`addressivity' to an actual or imagined Other. This feature of text and talk has also
been discussed by Michael Billig (1987), who has pointed out how accounts are
organised so as to dismiss alternative or contrastive rhetorical positions. I have
indicated my use of alternative literary forms in the chapter outline below. They
constitute a form of analysis which can not only highlight the textual and dialogical
construction of reality, but can also make explicit the alternative 'voices' that are
implicit in a single utterance, account or argument.
A Synopsis of Chapters
The main body of the thesis has been organised in three parts that are glossed here as
follows:
Part One: The Construction of M E
CHAPTER TWO: The Construction of a Medical Controversy is designed to
serve several purposes. It provides an introduction to the topic of M E and gives a
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background history to the controversy that surrounds it. Rather than writing a
straightforward historical review of the literature, I have drawn attention to the
reflexive implications of doing this at the beginning of a thesis that purports to analyse
how M E is discursively constructed as a controversial category by the participants
themselves. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the social constructionist approach
challenges the assumption that either 'natural' or social phenomena have an existence
prior to our own constructive practices. A review of literature can be argued to
perform exactly such a construction of reality, both in its choice of content, the form
of text, use of the empiricist repertoire, and the way that it obscures some of its
intertextual features.
The advantages of piecing together a 'dialogue' in the way that I have in chapter two,
is that it calls attention to the constructive processes that are normally obscured in the
craft of writing such a review. The extracts included in the chapter are quotations
(albeit selective) from articles and letters that have appeared in medical journals,
rather than being my own gloss on what the authors have to say. This allows me to
treat the literature in the medical journals (and the correspondence that addresses it) as
empirical data to be analysed, just as the interview data that is analysed later in the
thesis using the approach of discourse analysis. Of course, this does not mean to say
that by doing this I have managed to produce a `versionless version' of events - on the
contrary, I have obviously selected what to include. The point is to call attention to my
version as a version that is constructed using the same kinds of discursive techniques
as the participants use. One way that I celebrate this symmetry of versions in chapter
two, is to draw on Rachael Jenkins' (1991) historical literature review of "The
recorded history of M E" as a reflexive commentary device, in parts of the text, in the
chapter heading, and in the footnotes.
One of the analytic and rhetorical advantages in appropriating the 'voices' of
participants to piece together my chapter is that an analysis of their discourse allows
me to identify their concerns and use them, as an analyst's narrative 'scene-setting'
device, to justify the subsequent chapters of my thesis. The literature is analysed as
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data in an ongoing dialogue between participants, where the nature of the 'mystery
illness' is itself a topic. As pointed out earlier, the construction of the dialogue is itself
part of my analysis. Otherwise, my purpose is neither to enter the debate as a
participant, nor to privilege one version over another, but to analyse the discursive
techniques of constructing M E.
In other words, I can claim that what the controversy amounts to has been constructed
by the participants as the juxtapositioning of alternative versions of reality, such that
the nature of the 'mystery illness' can be formulated in terms of either the mind, or the
body, or possibly a more integrated combination of the two. The later chapters address
this concern with mind and body, and also some of the other participants' concerns
that are at stake in the `dialogue'; for example, the labelling process, the management
of 'reality disjunctures' in accounting for illness, the use of different models of
medicine, and the categories of mind and body, and the relationship between them.
Part Two: Discursive Resources in a `strugggle for
authorship'
CHAPTER THREE: Labels and Things takes the participants' concern with
diagnostic labels as its topic. Issues of definition and nomenclature have been
problematised in recent 'official' reports, and in the past medical literature, and review
articles, where authors have attempted to define their terms of reference. The chapter
looks at the way that labels and their meanings are the topic of discourse as well as
being deployed as part of that discourse.
CHAPTER FOUR: Repertoires of Mind and Body takes up the relationship
between mind and body, as a participants' concern in the 'M E controversy', and also
as a more general concern in medical discourse. The chapter aims to examine the
rhetoric of mind and body by looking at the different 'models of medicine' that have
been written about by practitioners and researchers in the fields of medicine, social
science, and psychiatry. Rather than being conceptualised here as explanatory models
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that have provided a framework to guide doctor's diagnostic thinking and practice,
these are reformulated as explanatory repertoires that can be deployed variably by both
lay and professional participants in the rhetorical context of their accounting practices,
to accomplish particular kinds of discursive business. In this chapter I have used an
'alternative literary form' to petform the construction of my text as a dialogical
practice, rather than merely presenting the product of construction. This mirrors the
dialogical practices involved in the construction of chapter two, and also serves to
explicate some of the central theoretical concerns of chapter four.
CHAPTER FIVE: The Authorship of Meaning in 'Mind and Body Talk'
analyses how the categories of mind and body, and the relationship between them is
ongoingly constituted in and through the activity of talking about CFS and M E. In this
chapter, I argue that the very separateness of the categories of mind and body, in talk
about illness, itself signifies their indexical usefulness as discursive resources. The
accusation that there has been a 'failure to challenge dualism' (which is a metaposition
taken by some writers in both the literature on M E and in the discourse of 'official'
reports) is re-considered in the context of the discursive utility of the separate
categories of mind and body as resources to manage sickness as a practical realm of
accountability.
In chapter five I point out that personal accountability is built into the assumptions of
psychosocial explanations for illness, and also the medical interventions deemed
appropriate for its successful management. The norms of the 'sick-role' are re-worked
here from the perspective of ethnomethodology, as a resource to make patients'
actions accountable in relation to health and illness issues. The categories of mind and
body are conceptualised as being primarily constituted and deployed in and through
the activity of such everyday accounting practices, and in the second place as an
analyst's distillation of these commonsense categories, re-formulated as philosophical
dualisms and psychosocial theories of health.
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The analysis of data in this chapter focuses on how the categories of mind and body
are constituted variably in talk, how these constructions work in situ to construct or
delete agency, and thereby avoid or implicate personal accountability. The variability
of mind/body constructions is seen here as constituting a rich resource for the
management of accountability as a practical activity in talk about illness. The
authorship of meaning is taken up as both an analyst's concern, and a participants'
concern in this chapter. In one section of the chapter I use the reflexive device of a
'fictional' dialogue to explore the implications of the ethnomethodological insistence
on the indexicality of meaning. In the latter part of the chapter I analyse a piece of
dialogue recorded at an
M E self-help group meeting, to show how participants orient to the meaning of terms
such as mind and depression in their 'struggle for authorship of the illness'.
Part Three: The Narrative Construction of Illness
CHAPTER SIX: The Narrative Construction of 'Self' and IVI E examines the
relationship between attributional discourse and moral accountability in the context of
an M E illness narrative. First I provide some background on the different forms of
narrative analysis that have been applied to psychology and social science. My purpose
here is to show how the approach of discursive psychology, differs from these other
approaches and can make a contribution to our understanding of medical talk, and the
analysis of illness narratives. I have used the device of a courtroom metaphor in this
chapter, to organise my analysis of an illness narrative in a way that shows how
Angela and Joe construct 'a case for the defence' of Angela's illness as physical and
real. Psychosocial information and a biomedical 'theory of M E' have been woven
together in a co-implicative way in their account, to produce a particular version of the
illness and the identity of the sufferer.
CHAPTER SEVEN: Doctors' Cases, Patients' Stories: The psychosocial
repertoire as a flexible resource goes on to analyse doctors' case narratives
about their patients, and compares these with patient's stories about their illnesses. In
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chapter four, I described two different models of medicine, the biomedical, and the
biopsychosocial, which I reformulated as interpretative repertoires that can be
deployed as a discursive resource, rather than being cognitive models that guide the
doctors reasoning and diagnostic practices. I argued that these repertoires are deployed
by both professional and lay people alike in constructing claims about the nature of
illness, the identity of its sufferers, and the skills of medical practitioners to diagnose,
treat, heal, and advise.
In chapter seven I argue that doctors' case narratives can be analysed in the same way
as patient's stories about their illness. More specifically I work to show how
'documentary evidence' of a psychosocial nature, and the underlying pattern that it
points to, are aligned in a co-implicative way that functions to make a particular
interpretation of the patient's illness available, whilst dismissing other possible kinds
of explanation. My analysis in this chapter focuses on three kinds of participants'
concerns that are common in the case narratives of doctors, and in the illness
narratives of patients. These are; 'before and after' stories, a concern with 'where the
story starts', and the process of categorising people as mentally or physically ill.
CHAPTER EIGHT: An Analyst's Gloss provides an outline summary of the main
analytic conclusions of the thesis, explores how these can challenge and extend
existing approaches to the study of health and illness, and suggests some directions for
further research and also some implications for medical practice.
The thesis concludes with a dialogical postscript, in which the participants (nearly)
have the last word.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Construction of a Medical Controversy.
"This chapter aims to introduce the reader to the recorded history
of ME, including the early epidemics, the development of the
concept, and the realisation that endemic cases also existed; to the
debate about whether it is an 'organic' or `hysterical' illness and
to the importance of placing all diseases within a multiaxial
framework of aetiology and host response; and to the development
of present day nomenclature and diagnostic criteria. It is not
exhaustive, which would have taken a whole book in itself, but I
have tried to bring to the interested reader's attention some of the
key literature on ME [...] and to set the scene for the other
contributions in this book..."
Rachael Jenkins (1991: 3).
The demands of this chapter are to provide an introduction to my topic that displays
my knowledge of the field, to raise some problems, and to give a background context
for the later analysis of data. I could approach this by writing a review that traces the
"recorded history of M E" (Jenkins, 1991: cited above). But the problem with writing
such a recorded history is how to manage the reflexive dilemma of authorship that is
inherent in the social constructionist approach to analysis taken in this thesis. The
social constructionist approach has its roots in the work of Berger and Luckmann
(1966), who argued that reality is constructed by a range of social processes and
therefore that knowledge cannot be seen as the product of discovering objective,
natural phenomena that exist independently of our constructive practices. One of the
consequences of taking this approach is that authors become implicated in a tu
quoque' , 1 which means that in the process of analysing the constructive practices of
others, they are themselves engaging in the business of constructing their own version
of reality.2
 A second (and related) implication is the necessity of adopting a position
of methodological relativism with respect to the status of scientists' claims about the
nature of reality. In other words, rather than adopting any particular version of what is
1 This translates as 'you also' (Ashmore, 1989), and can be used to criticise an argument that might
appear to be self-refuting. Also, according to Ashmore, "countercritical tu quoque arguments attack the
negative or critical arguments of the opponent by claiming that these criticisms also, or perhaps only
apply, reflexively, to the opponent's own claims and positive arguments." (ibid: 172).
2 See Katie MacMillan's footnote (MacMillan, 1996: 25); "As Woolgar hinself suggests (1988: 23),
the social scientist `produces knowledge claims about the production of knowledge claims', and in
doing so 'aims to explain how explanation is done, to understand how understanding is produced.' See
also Pollner (1991)."
true and what is false, the social analyst should rather take a symmetrical approach to
analysing what is constructed as truth, and what is constructed as error.
The advantage in taking this approach to the social study of science can be highlighted
with reference to the comments of Harry Collins in the field of the Sociology of
Scientific Knowledge (hereafter, SSK). Collins (1985) has pointed out how
established scientific knowledge appears like a 'ship in a bottle', such that it is
difficult to see how it came to be constructed in the first place. In contrast, the study of
an ongoing controversy such as M E, has the advantage that the nature of scientific
knowledge itself is precisely what is at stake in participant's accounts, and therefore
the constructive practices are likely to be more evident.
My aim in this chapter is to show how M E has been constructed as a medical
controversy by the participants who have written about it. In theory, the controversial
nature of M E should make it easier to adopt a relativist stance. However, I have
already become implicated in a reflexive dilemma, 3 since I (and not the participants)
have chosen a name for my topic, and I have already defined 'it' as 'a medical
controversy' and then accused the participants of constructing 'it' as such. In my own
defence I quote from the introduction to the CIBA Foundation's symposium on
chronic fatigue syndrome, in which Kleinman and Straus (1993: 1) give their account
of the aims of the conference:
The aims were to provide a forum for debate among different and even contending
perspectives on CFS and to grapple with the many different challenges that make this
condition ambiguous and controversial. Undertaking this symposium was an uncertain
venture. The Foundation is accustomed to reasoned dialogue along lines of established
findings. CFS research, however, is beset with uncertainty and riddled with inconsistency.
Nevertheless, in order to call attention to my own constructive practices (and thereby
at least acknowledge the tu quoque in advance of my critics4), I have chosen to
3 "And you have already defined it as a 'reflexive dilemma' and not as a 'reflexive pleasure'..."
Mushakoji (1997: Personal comment ). Evidently I had approached reflexivity as if it were a 'problem
to solve', or possibly the 'the monster of reflexivity' that Woolgar (1982; 1988b;) refers to as a
'methodological horror'. On the other hand perhaps I could 'celebrate' reflexivity (Ashmore, 1989), or
construct it as an opportunity to 'have my cake and eat it', which according to MacMillan (1996: 42) is
"as good a definition of reflexivity as you can get".
4 Which of course works to disarm just such criticism.
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formulate this chapter as a kind of textual 'dialogue' s in which I appropriate the voices
of the participants to piece together a "plausible history of scientific developments".
the notion of a "plausible history" is taken from the writing of Gilbert & Mulkay,
(1984: 18-19) who presented an outline of the history of bioenergetics, compiled from
interview data with several leading bioenergeticists. They acknowledged that this
historical account was but a possible version of the field, but point out that "this
'weakness' cannot be remedied by relying instead on other kinds of data. Other
versions of the history will remain both possible and plausible."(ibid: 33-34).
Similarly, in the introduction to the CIBA Foundation symposium on Chronic Fatigue
Syndrome, Kleinman and Straus point out that: "This was not a consensus conference, but
rather an occasion to press distinctive approaches, and to explore the implications of present
knowledge for future directions. There was no single version of the history of the syndrome."
(Kleinman and Straus, 1993: 2, my emkasis).
My version will therefore necessarily be a selective textual construction, using extracts
from contributions to the literature and correspondence in some of the main medical
journals6 , which will allow me (as analyst) to make the claim that I have identified
what participants treat as concerns from the discourse itself!
In the narrative of my thesis, this chapter also does the work of a 'scene setting
device', which reflexively attends to its own constructive work in doing that business.
'Scene-setting' is here conceptualised as being a narrative device that works
rhetorically to construct an author's adequate grounds for giving a particular version of
events.8 (See Edwards, 1997: 264). In constructing the following "plausible history", I
will necessarily have to begin my story somewhere, at a particular place and point in
5 My use of the term 'dialogue' refers here to the intertextuality inherent in the development of a field
of lierature and knowledge, and also to the notion of addressivity (Bakhtin, [in Morson & Emerson,
1990: 131] ), and the "rhetorico-responsive" nature of discourse (Billig, 1987; Shotter, 1993b ). The
notion of a dialogue also refers to the relationship between the main text, the reader and the footnotes,
which intervene as the "reflexive next turn" (MacMillan, 1996), variously offering bits of 'neutral'
information, analytic comment, or (like a Greek Chorus) a nod in the direction of irony.
6 The two main ones used here, The British Medical Journal, and The Lancet, were chosen because
they are the ones to which most general practitioners are likely to have access.
7 There is an important distinction here between participant and analyst concerns, that is central to the
approach of ethnomethodology, and also discursive psychology. (See Schegloff, 1997, for a discussion
of this.)
8 See also this chapter, page 26, where I appropriate Jenkins' introduction to her "recorded history of
ME" in order to "set the scene for the other contributions in this book..." . See also chapter 7, this thesis,
where I analyse doctors' scene-setting practices in the narrative reconstruction of a diagnosis.
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time (say for example, in summer 1955, at the Royal Free Hospital in London). This of
course means that the parameters will already be more or less set to exclude the telling
of a different kind of narrative. 9 For example, I might have appropriated Rachael
Jenkins' version of 'where the story starts', (cited at the beginning of my story of this
chapter). In her article, she goes on to claim:
The first recorded epidemic occurred among the doctors and nurses of several hospitals in
Los Angeles, USA in 1934. (Jenkins, 1991: 4).
A "Plausible History" of M E (in multiple 'voices' 10).
A new virus?
This narrative begins in the summer of 1955 when the following announcement
appeared in The Lancet under 'Public Health'.
Extract 1: Outbreak at the Royal Free.
"At the Royal Free Hospital in London during the past four weeks 83 of the nursing staff, 5 of
the medical staff, 11 of the ancillary medical staff, 8 of the students, and 22 of the domestic
staff at Gray's Inn Road and Liverpool Road have had what was initially referred to as
"glandular fever". But as the outbreak has progressed, so many unusual features have been
observed that it is now difficult to sustain that, or any other diagnosis. A preliminary
statement has been issued for the guidance of practitioners who may encounter similar cases.
In this outbreak there is an involvement of lymph-nodes liver and spleen with in most cases,
signs and symptoms of encephalomyelitis or polyneuritis [...] On clinical grounds it seems
doubtful whether this is an outbreak of infectious mononucleosis [...] laboratory tests have
failed to support a diagnosis of infectious mononucleosis [...] The studies that are in progress
may establish that the infection is due to a known virus or its variants, but it is possible that a
new virus is involved."
The Lancet. August 13. 1955, p.351
This initial announcement introduced the outbreak as one of an "unusual infection"
that was first mistaken for glandular fever (infectious mononucleosis) and later, on the
grounds that clinical testing proved negative, was attributed to "a known virus or its
9 This activity minors a rhetorical move that is explicated elsewhere in this thesis as a discursive device
used by participants in the construction of an illness narrative. See for example, 'Angela and Joe's
narrative' in chapter 6; also chapter 7, "Where the story starts" in doctor's case re-constructions.
i° In the following textual construction (and these footnotes), the analyst celebrates her attempt to 'have
her cake and eat it'; (or should I rather say) she presents her version of 'how ME has been constructed,
by participants, as a medical controversy', and reflexively, how her version attends to its own
constructive work in doing that business. The author builds up the factuality of her narrative by
'allowing' the participants to speak for themselves (MacMillan, 1995). This is a rhetorical move to take
the empirical 'high ground' with respect to the analysis of how the participants themselves construct 'the
controversy' as being exactly that.
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variants" or "a new virus". The following year, nine months later on May 26, 1956,
four articles appeared in The Lancet. The first was written by a Physician and a Senior
Registrar at the Infectious Diseases Department, Royal Free Hospital, London.
Extract 2: Encephalomyelitis resembling Poliomyelitis.
"In the summer of 1955 cases of encephalomyelitis simulating poliomyelitis appeared in
North-West London. The general picture and the results of investigation, however, have
shown that a diagnosis of poliomyelitis is untenable; pareses unaccompanied by wasting,
tendon-reflexes generally unaffected or exaggerated, sensory disturbances, normal
cerebrospinal fluid, and electro-myographic studies which fail to reveal any evidence of
neuronal degeneration indicate a different aetiology and pathology. Similar outbreaks have
been reported from Adelaide (Fellow 1951), Coventry (MaCrae and Galpine 1954) and
Durban (Cheetham, personal communication). The obscure infection responsible for an
epidemic among the nurses of the Royal Free Hospital, Gray's Inn Road (see Lancet 1955)
was probably of a similar nature. It is probable that the outbreak in Iceland in 1948
(Sigurdsson et al 1950) was an aberrant form of poliomyelitis, as the spinal fluid proved
abnormal in every instance in which it was examined.
We describe here 8 cases, variously notified as meningitis, poliomyelitis and pyrexia of
unknown origin, which occurred between April 1 and October 31, 1955."
Ramsay, A.M.& O'Sullivan, E. The Lancet. May 26 1956, p.761-4.
Ramsay and O'Sullivan refer here to the outbreak of 1955 as an "obscure infection"
which is now being likened to, and also distinguished from, poliomyelitis. The
construction of an infectious disease phenomenon is grounded in references to the
initial diagnoses of meningitis, poliomyelitis, and pyrexia, which are here being re-
defined in situ. Comparative links, made between this "obscure infection" and earlier
outbreaks' l in Britain and around the globe, serve to construct the existence of a
discrete identifiable disease phenomenon, and these reported cases as examples of it.
The next contribution was written by the resident Medical Officer of Health at the
Manchester Royal Infirmary:
Extract 3: Further Outbreak of a Disease Resembling Poliomyelitis.
"From time to time since 1948, outbreaks have been reported of an illness which in many
respects resembles poliomyelitis, but which differs from poliomyelitis in its epidemiology, in
the mildness of the illness itself, in the high proportion of normal cerebrospinal fluids (c.s.f.)
found, in the absence of any detectable virus, and in the frequent psychological changes
(Sigurdsson et al, 1950, Pellow, 1951, Acheson 1954, MaCrae and Alpine 1954, White and
Burtch 1954). I report here another such outbreak - a very small one - because it may help to
II These authors trace the origin of their story to 1948.
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establish the existence of a disease which has been graphically, if somewhat negatively
named "not poliomyelitis" (Lancet 1954).
The patients in the present series were previously fit young soldiers, of whom all but 1 lived
in the same barrack block in Berlin. The 1 exception was an orderly, who, having nursed the
other patients, was himself a close contact. Although the numbers involved were small -7
cases only - the disease was clear-cut and the outbreak explosive, the last case being taken ill
only eight days after the first. [...] When the first case was seen, with headache, limb pains,
photophobia, neck stiffness, and an abnormal c.s.f., non-paralytic poliomyelitis was
diagnosed with a fair degree of confidence, and the illness was notified as such; and the 2nd
case a day later, with normal c.s.f., was again regarded as poliomyelitis. When, however, all
the cases appeared, none with persistent paralysis and only 1 with abnormal c.s.f., it was clear
that this diagnosis could no longer be entertained."
Sumner, D.W. The Lancet, May 26 1956. pp. 764-766.
In this report Sumner works up his grounds for claiming the existence of a separate
disease by emphasising its similarity to and difference from poliomyelitis. It was so
similar to poliomyelitis that this was initially "diagnosed with a fair degree of
confidence". But pathological differences later made it clear that "this diagnosis could
no longer be entertained". In other words, the disease exists as such by virtue of not
being something else; it had been "graphically, if somewhat negatively named 'not
poliomyelitis' (The Lancet 1954)."
In order to make a claim about the factual existence of a new disease entity, the
authors of extracts 1, 2, and 3, need to show that they are knowledgeable scientists
whose claim is based on sound empirical evidence, rather than personal interest, or
speculation. They all make use of a discursive pattern commonly used by people who
are reporting unusual or paranormal experiences. This has been glossed in Sacks
(1984; 1992) and Wooffitt (1992) by the clause 'at first I thought, but then I realised'.
In extracts 1-3, the authors formulate the first assumption (at first I thought, X) as a
fairly ordinary one; the disease was sufficiently like polio, or glandular fever to be
initially "diagnosed with a fair degree of confidence". This presents the authors of the
papers as ordinary and rational medical practitioners, who were initially looking for a
known medical explanation for illness, rather than perhaps as scientists who might
have been interested in contributing to the field of virus research. These initial
mundane accounts work to construct the later 'realisation' that there might be a new
and strange disease phenomenon, as something that just happened as a result of
empirical facts contradicting the initial diagnosis.
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These accounts were followed by an article in The Lancet by the Director of the
Institute for Experimental Pathology, and a Clinical Neurologist in Reykjavik, Iceland.
Extract 4: Clinical findings six years after outbreak of Akureyri Disease.
"In 1948-9 there was an extensive epidemic of 465 cases simulating poliomyelitis in the town
of Akureyri in northern Iceland (Sigurdsson at al 1950) [...] Faeces were treated for
poliomyelitis virus and for Coxsackie virus, but no virus was found. Since 1950 several
outbreaks have been described which very much resemble Akureyri disease (Pellow 1951,
Acheson 1954, MaCrae and Galpine 1954, White and Burtch 1954, Gear 1955). The
symptoms and epidemiological behaviour of these infections are hardly sufficiently
characteristic to enable all these various outbreaks to be classified together before
information on their specific cause is obtained. However, it seems very likely that these
epidemics constitute a nosological entity, but the relationship, if any, to poliomyelitis remains
obscure. Several workers besides ourselves have attempted to isolate an infective agent from
this type of case, but nobody seems to have succeeded so far. [...] There is increasing
evidence that a previously unrecognised infection has presented in various parts of the world
during the past seven years [...] we suggest that this condition be called (as in Iceland)
Akureyri disease rather than (as some call it) Iceland disease until a more appropriate name
can be suggested when we know more about its cause and the anatomical basis for the signs
and symptoms which characterise it".
Sigurdsson, B. and Gudmundsson, K.R. The Lancet May 26 1956, pp.766-767.
A caveat is offered here by Sigurdsson and Gudmundsson by which the similarity of
the outbreaks to each other is queried at the same time as it is reinforced. The criteria
for categorising illness phenomena as similar to one another is here predicated on
"isolating an infective agent" and explaining how it works. On the other hand, these
outbreaks look like a "nosological entity" which is a "previously unrecognised
infection" that has "presented in different parts of the world during the last seven
years". Note also how the proposal that "this condition be called (as in Iceland)
Akureyri Disease", not only constitutes "this condition"as an actual object of
reference, but also reinforces the notion of Its'similarity to an outbreak in Iceland
which had earlier been categorised as an "aberrant form of poliomyelitis" (extract 2).
The following editorial appeared in the same edition:
Extract 5: A New Clinical Entity?
"A study of the available material in group 2 shows sufficient common ground to suggest
that this is a new clinical entity which may be expected to appear again here or elsewhere in
the late summer and autumn. From the purely practical standpoint it would be useful to have a
name for this syndrome.[...] The objection to any but a purely descriptive name for a disorder
without a known cause or established pathology are obvious. For this reason, the term
"benign myalgic encephalomyelitis" may be acceptable.[...] It remains to identify this
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syndrome more precisely; but we believe that its characteristics are now sufficiently clear to
differentiate it from poliomyelitis, epidemic myalgia, glandular fever, the forms of epidemic
encephalitis already described, and, need it be said, hysteria."
The Lancet May 26 1956. p.790.
The possibility of heterogeneity is raised here by a sub-categorisation of outbreaks,
where the common ground between only certain outbreaks (those in "group 2") is
emphasised. The "new clinical entity" is also ambiguously referred to as a
"syndrome", and a "disorder without a known cause or established pathology", as if to
open up a 'rhetorical space' for differential outcomes. Even so, an entity, syndrome or
disorder implies a discretely separate phenomenon. Again the issue of an appropriate
name is raised; and the term "benign myalgic encephalomyelitis" is suggested as being
a "purely descriptive name", rather than one that might implicate a specific cause. This
could be heard as a distancing move from Sigurdsson's suggestion of "Akureyri
Disease", which has associations with some form of poliomyelitis virus. The Lancet
stresses that although the "syndrome" has yet to be identified, it can already be
differentiated from "poliomyelitis, epidemic myalgia, glandular fever, the forms of
epidemic encephalitis already described, and, need it be said, hysteria."12
In September of the same year a Medical Registrar of the Royal Victoria Hospital,
Boscombe in Hants, wrote the following:
Extract 6: Benign Encephalomyelitis.
"Several cases have been described of an apparently new disease affecting the central nervous
system. The two cases reported resemble in many respects this type of encephalomyelitis. [...]
These two cases not only resemble one another closely but also in many respects those
described by Ramsay and O'Sullivan (1956).[...] It is suggested that the disease was closely
allied to recent outbreaks at the Royal Free Hospital and elsewhere. "Benign subacute
encephalomyelitis" is suggested as a generic term for this group of diseases."
Jelinek, J.E. The Lancet September 1956. p.494-5.
Here, an "apparently new disease" which is a "type of encephalomyelitis" that
resembles the Royal Free outbreak and others like it, becomes reformulated as a
heterogeneous "group of diseases" and named "benign subacute encephalomyelitis".
12 Evidently it did need to be said (as a rhetorical device to define the claim that it didn't as
unassailable and obvious)!
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After this there were several more references to outbreaks of "encephalomyelitis" in
The Lancet and the British Medical Journal in 1957.
Extract 7: Benign Myalgic Encephalomyelitis
"Reports have lately appeared of several outbreaks of acute paretic illness of which four
occurred in Britain and the term "benign myalgic encephalomyelitis" has been suggested for
this condition (Lancet 1956). [...] We report here 7 further cases which arose sporadically in
the Coventry area in 19564..1 These 7 cases, though resembling those seen in the outbreak of
"poliomyelitis-like illness" in Coventry in 1953, were less severe than some in that year. The
kaleidoscopic clinical picture did not hide their similarity to each other. [...] The anomolous
clinical picture and negative or minimal laboratory findings in some instances aroused
suspicions of hysteria. Against this is the cumulative weight of such considerations as the
underlying consistencies in the clinical picture, the local prevalences, the lack of general
correlation with the hysterical temperament, the pyrexia of some patients and the abnormal
electromyographic findings. The latter are of particular value in confirming the presence of an
organic lesion (Lancet 1956)."
Galpine, J.F.& Brady, C. The Lancet. 13 April 1957, p757-8.
Again, this account from Galpine and Brady emphasises the similarity of the 7 cases
that they report here, with other "outbreaks of acute paretic illness" I3 , and an outbreak
of "poliomyelitis-like illness" in Coventry in 1953 (see Galpine & Brady, 1954,
extract 2). The authors use of the name suggested by The Lancet in 1956 (extract 5),
further specifies these 7 cases as examples of the same recognisable phenomenon.
The author of extract 7 (and the previous author's) grounds for grouping these cases
together as examples of the same disease are warranted here by formulating that the
resemblance between the cases is so strong as to offset the "kaleidoscopic clinical
picture", which might ordinarily be taken as prima facie evidence for making
distinctions between them.
The question of hysteria is addressed again by the authors of this report who describe
the clinical picture as both "kaleidoscopic"and also "anomolous". The use of these
terms works to construct the collection of clinical signs and symptoms as incongruous,
or inconsistent with any known medical condition. Combined with the lack of positive
scientific evidence for the existence of a pathogen, this "in some instances aroused
suspicions of hysteria". The authors dismiss this interpretation by pointing out an
underlying pattern that linked cases to one another; that it usually occurred in people
13 Paresis is defined as "partial paralysis, affecting muscular motion but not sensation" (Concise
Oxford Dictionary, Seventh Edition: 744)
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who had no history of psychological illness; and that the cases were associated with
fever and "abnormal electromyographic findings", which are cited as clinical evidence
for an "organic lesion".
The following three accounts appeared in the October edition of the British Medical
Journal in the same year.The first report (extract 8) is authored by the Medical Staff of
the Royal Free Hospital, and refers to the events of August 1955 documented earlier
by the Lancet (extract 1); the second report (extract 9) refers to a later outbreak in
1956; and the third account (extract 10) is an editorial article that appeared in the same
issue of the British Medical Journal.
Extract 8: An outbreak of Encephalomyelitis in the Royal Free Hospital Group,
London, in 1955.
"On July 13, 1955, a resident doctor and a ward sister on the staff of the Royal Free Hospital
were admitted to the wards with an obscure illness. By July 25 more than 70 members of the
staff were similarly affected, and it was plain that there was in the hospital an epidemic of a
highly infectious character, producing amongst other things manifestations in the central
nervous system [...] Between July 13 and November 24 292 members of the medical, nursing,
auxiliary medical, ancillary, and administrative staff were affected by the illness, and of these
255 were admitted to hospital [...] The clinical picture has been drawn on 200 of the cases
admitted to hospital, in which the diagnosis seemed certain and the records complete [...]
laboratory investigations gave no aid to diagnosis [...] extensive investigations with the help
of outside laboratories have failed, so far, to reveal either an infective agent or a causative
factor. The relationship of the outbreak in the Royal Free Hospital Group to similar epidemics
reported in recent years from almost every quarter of the globe is discussed."
The Medical Staff of the Royal Free Hospital. British Medical Journal. October 19, 1957: 895-904.
Extract 9: An Outbreak of Acute Infective Encephalomyelitis in a Residential
Home for Nurses in 1956.
"A small outbreak of acute infective encephalomyelitis is described in a residential training
school for nurses. Of 38 individuals resident and at risk 7 developed the disease."
Geffen, D. & Tracy, S.M. (Medical Officer of Health and Deputy Medical Officer of Health to the
Metropolitan Borough of St. Pancras) British Medical Journal, 19 October, 1957, pp. 904-6.
Extract 10:
"A number of outbreaks of an illness in which encephalomyelitis is a prominent feature and
which, in the early stages, could be confused with poliomyelitis have recently been observed
in different parts of the world. From published reports it is clear that no clue to the cause has
yet been obtained, so that any assumption that such outbreaks are of the same aetiology is
purely hypothetical. Nevertheless, in many of the outbreaks the clinical and epidemiological
pattern is so similar that it seems justifiable at the present to consider them as a clinical
entity.
British Medical Journal. October 19, 1957. p.927-8.
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This next article, by a Physician at the Infectious Diseases Department at the Royal
Free Hospital, London, was published on December 14, 1957.
Extract 11: Encephalomyelitis in North West London. An endemic infection
simulating poliomyelitis and hysteria.
"Sporadic cases of encephalomyelitis simulating poliomyelitis in North West London in 1955
(Ramsay & O'Sullivan 1956) formed the background to the sudden explosive outbreak of an
unknown infection of the central nervous system among the staff of the Royal Free Hospital
Group (Compston 1956, Richardson 1956, Dimsdale 1957, Crowley et al. 1957„ British
Medical Journal 1957).[...] All the patients, whether with or without neurological
involvement, have shown two characteristics and very insistent sequelae: (i) Proneness to
fatigue [...] (ii) Emotional lability [...] it is quite understandable that a neurologist seeing
these patients with their bizarre jumble of neurological signs and emotional disturbance is
likely to diagnose hysteria [...] Nevertheless it constitutes a grave injustice to diagnose
hysteria in these cases without recognising that the condition is organically determined."
Ramsay, A.M. The Lancet. December 14, 1957. pp. 1196-1200.
And later, in 1957, the Journal of Hygiene published an article by members of the
Bacteriology Department of the Royal Free Hospital School of Medicine.
Extract 12: Epidemiological Aspects of an Outbreak of Encephalomyelitis at the
Royal Free Hospital, London, in the Summer of 1955.
"In the latter half of 1955, The Royal Free Hospital Teaching Group, with a total of about
3500, experienced an epidemic of an obscure illness which affected more than 300 people.
More than half the cases occurred in July and August. Between 13 July and 24 November,
255 people were admitted to the Royal Free Hospital, while the remainder were either nursed
at home or admitted elsewhere.[...] The epidemic invited comparison with those simulating
poliomyelitis which have occurred during the last decade in Iceland (Sigurdsson,
Sigurjonssen, Thorkelsson & Gudmundsson, 1950), New York (White & Burtch, 1954),
Adelaide (Pellow, 1951), Middlesex Hospital, London (Acheson, 1954), Coventry (Macrae &
Galpine, 1954) and Durban (Hill, 1955).
Crowley et al. (1957). Journal of Hygiene. vol. 55, pp. 102-122.
In April, 1959 the following articles in The Lancet further documented outbreaks of a
mysterious/obscure illness simulating poliomyelitis.
Extract 13: Epidemic Myalgic Encephalomyelopathy. The Durban Outbreak.
"In February, 1955, towards the end of a Durban summer, a disease, superficially resembling
poliomyelitis, occurred amongst the nursing staff of Addington Hospital (Hill 1955).[...] The
Addington Hospital outbreak resembled epidemics in other parts of the world. The significant
characteristics were the closed nature of the epidemic; its onset, the acute infection occurring
concurrently with poliomyelitis; the disseminated lesions; the tendency to relapse; the
permanent sequelae; and the psychiatric concomitants.[...] It was also significant that the
outbreak, as in the case of the Royal Free Hospital (Medical Staff of the Royal Free Group of
Hospitals 1957) followed a hot dry summer, and was associated with a poliomyelitis
epidemic. The above facts would lend support to the theory that the condition is infective,
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closely related to poliomyelitis, and of virus origin. [...] A disturbing feature in our cases has
been the psychiatric changes. These have been fully described by Fellow (1951) in Adelaide,
and White and Burtch (1954) in New York. They have occurred both in patients with a
psychoneurotic diathesis and in stable, emotionally mature individuals. Some of these have
displayed features remarkably akin to hysteria. Despite various hypotheses, this disease
remains a mystery."
Hill et al (1959) The Lancet, pp 690-693.
Extract 14: Benign Myalgic Encephalomyelitis. An outbreak in a Nurses' School in
Athens.
"In June, 1958, an obscure neurological illness, involving 27 cases, spread epidemically in the
Queen Frederica School for Midwives, which is attached to the Alexandra Maternity
Hospital.[...] The disease had many features in common with those in several other outbreaks
recorded in the past decade (Sigurdsson et al. 1950, Acheson 1954, Macrae and Galpine
1954, White and Burtch 1954, Alexander 1956, Medical Staff of the Royal Free Hospital
1957, Shelokov et al 1957). These outbreaks have been regarded as representing a new entity-
benign myalgic encephalomyelitis (Lancet 1956) or epidemic neuromyasthenia (Shelokov et
al. 1957). On the Continent such an epidemic was described in Denmark by Fog (1953).
Three outbreaks in Switzerland between 1937 and 1939, then thought to be of atypical
poliomyelitis, were probably, according to Gsell (1958), of a similar nature.f...] Although
hitherto no viral or bacterial agent has been isolated, the contagiousness of the syndrome
strongly suggests an infectious (probably viral) aetiology."
Daikos et al. (1959) The Lancet pp. 693-696.
Extracts 8-14 variously raise the issues that participants in the earlier accounts have
constructed as being the centrally important concerns. These can be identified as:
• the infectious nature of the illness
• its similarity to poliomyelitis
• the similarity of various outbreaks to one another
• the lack of laboratory evidence to support the claim for a specific organic aetiology
• the incidence of psychological sequelae and the question of hysteria
In April 1959, the first review article since the Royal Free outbreak, appeared in the
American Journal of Medicine.
Extract 15: The Clinical Syndrome Variously Called Benign Myalgic
Encephalomyelitis, Iceland Disease and Epidemic Neuromyasthenia.
"The purpose of this article is to review a number of obscure outbreaks of paralytic illness,
the majority of which were at first confused with poliomyelitis but which were later
differentiated on clinical and epidemiological grounds.[...] The outbreaks will be compared,
and the basis for the view that they constitute a clinical entity will be discussed. [...] It is
significant that the first review of the syndrome under discussion was entitled, "Not
poliomyelitis" (Lancet, 1954, 2:1060); the second, "A New Clinical Entity?" (Lancet, 1956,
1: 789.). in later articles entitled, "Epidemic myalgic encephalomyelitis" (British Medical
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Journal, 2: 927, 1957.), "Benign myalgic encephalomyelitis" (Galpine, J.F. 1958), and
"Epidemic neuromyasthenia" (Shelokov et al, 1957; Poskanzer et al, 1957), the authors
considered themselves on sufficiently strong ground to describe and name the syndrome. This
sequence indicates that the first and minimum requirement in the definition of an entity is the
essentially negative one of showing that the syndrome is not an unusual manifestation of a
disease already recognized. Later, as evidence accumulates, it may be possible to define the
disorder in positive terms.[...] The question of hysteria has been raised in five outbreaks
(Gilliam,1938; Sigurdsson et al, 1950; Fog, 1953; The Medical Staff of the Royal Free
Hospital, 1957;Clinical Meeting of the Natal Coastal Branch, 1955) and by Galpine and
Brady (1957) and Ramsay (1957) in the discussion of their endemic cases. Most authors agree
that hysterical manifestations have occurred in a few patients (Gilliam, 1938; Fog, 1953;
Ramsay, 1957), particularly in the later stages (The Medical Staff of the Royal Free Hospital,
1957), but none has ever felt that it has contributed significantly to the pattern of the
disease.[...] The mental symptoms which are a constant feature of all the outbreaks are not
typical of hysteria.[...] symptoms are more consistent with cerebral damage than with
hysteria. Many years ago Von Economou (1931) stressed the ease with which the mental
symptoms of encephalitis may be confused with those of psychoneurosis. [...] In its epidemic
form the illness is distinctive and therefore has a rightful place in medical literature as a
clinical entity. Its epidemiological features suggest that it may be an infection. However, in
the absence of any pathological evidence it remains uncertain whether it is due to a single
agent or to a group of related agents.[...] The wisdom of naming a disorder, the nature of
which cannot at present be proved, and which may be due to more than one agent, is
debatable.[...] It is unlikely that an adequate term will be found until fresh evidence is
available. In the meantime "benign myalgic encephalomyelitis" may act provisionally as a
rallying point in the current list of medical literature for patients with the clinical features
already described."
Acheson, E.D. (1959). American Journal of Medicine, pp. 569-595.
Acheson's review summarises the findings of other authors and formulates the
concerns of participants in the field as the question of definition and naming of a new
disease entity, and the question of what part (if any) is played by hysteria in the cause
or perpetuation of the illness. His review points up the close relationship between
medical entities and the social processes by which they are defined and agreed. This is
formulated as being a problem of demonstrating sufficient grounds for the
categorisation of a new disease, such that:
• "the first and minimum requirement in the definition of an entity is the essentially
negative one of showing that the syndrome is not an unusual manifestation of a
disease already recognised."
• even though "Later, as evidence accumulates, it may be possible to define the
disorder in positive terms."
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Acheson also makes certain equivocal claims with respect to the issues raised by other
authors, for example:
• that the illness ("in its epidemic form") is distinctive as a clinical entity (even
though it is not possible to define it as such in positive terms)
• that it may be due to an infective agent or a group of agents
• that the mental symptoms that were common to all of the outbreaks are not typical
of hysteria, even though they are easily confusable with psychoneurosis
• and therefore, even though he questions the "wisdom of naming a disorder, the
nature of which cannot at present be proved", he suggests that the currently used
name (benign myalgic encephalomyelitis) should "act provisionally as a rallying
point in the current list of medical literature"
The "uneasy spectre of hysteria"
In her more recent historical review article, Rachael Jenkins (1991: 13) glosses the
research conclusions on the question of hysteria as follows:
The question of hysteria had been raised in several epidemics, including the Los Angeles
outbreak, and most authors agreed that hysterical manifestations occurred in a few patients,
particularly in the later stages, but none felt that it contributed significantly to the pattern of
the disease. However, illness with a selectivity for young women and few positive laboratory
findings often raises the uneasy spectre of hysteria. Epidemic hysteria has been recognised for
many centuries as a particular hazard in institutions containing women or female adolescents.
So an alternative version of this history would actually begin many centuries ago,
rather than at the Royal Free (1955), where my narrative begins, or else in Los Angeles
(1934), where Jenkins claimed "the first recorded epidemic occurred". Apparently,
however, Jenkins did not (at any point in her review) see fit to make any evaluative
comment on the historical construction of a normative relationship between young
females and epidemic hysteria. She could have mentioned that the very origin of the
term 'hysteria' inherently implicates women in a specific tendency to psychiatric
illness.
Hysteria and the feminine are closely related in Western thought. There is a tradition of
women as dominated by passion, ruled by their bodies, and essentially irrational
(Fortenbaugh, 1975; Phillips, 1984; Spelman, 1983)4..1 Hysteria owes its name to the causal
theory of antiquity which implicated the womb (Gr. hystera, cf. Veith 1965). The uterus was
a sort of "wild animal" that moved within the body in response to sexual frustration or other
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privations. Floating or pressing upward against the stomach, liver or diaphragm, the uterus
gave rise to the myriad symptoms of hysteria.(Kirmayer, 1988: 70)"
The suggestion of hysteria is picked up again in the following two extracts. In 1961 a
small epidemic (extract 16) and two isolated cases at the Infectious diseases Unit, St.
George's Hospital,(extract 17), were reported in the same edition of The Lancet.
Extract 16: Benign Myalgic Encephalomyelitis in Newcastle upon Tyne.
"In 1955 an obscure illness appeared among members of the medical, nursing, auxiliary
medical, ancillary, and administrative staff of the Royal Free Hospital, London [...] The
present report describes a small epidemic in late 1959 in St. Mary's Training College for
teachers in Newcastle upon Tyne.[...] 46 out of about 200 students in the college were
affected and 2 of the resident staff. [...] The signs and symptoms were those observed in other
outbreaks- initial headache, fever, myalgia, muscular weakness and emotional lability. In the
severe cases the course of the disease was lengthy with repeated remissions and relapses. [...]
Emotional upset was sometimes so great as to suggest hysteria. [...] The cases occurred in a
completely random fashion. No males were affected. All the available evidence suggests that
benign myalgic encephalomyelitis is an infection but this cannot be confirmed at present."
Hope Pool et al. (1961) The Lancet pp.733-737.
Extract 17: Myalgic Encephalomyelitis
"So-called "benign encephalomyelitis" generally arises in well-defined epidemics. Isolated
cases are sometimes suspected, but are usually mild and in the absence of pathognomic signs
defy definite diagnosis. [...] These two patients had illnesses, which, in pattern and natural
history, resembled those in the Royal Free Hospital group outbreak of encephalomyelitis
(Medical Staff of the Royal Free Hospital 1957) and the Durban epidemic of myalgic
encephalomyelopathy (Hill et al. 1959). [...] This illness is probably commoner than is
usually realised and mild sporadic cases may easily be labelled as hysteria, glandular fever, or
myalgia."
J. Lewis Price (1961) The Lancet pp.737-738.
Extract 16 draws attention to the suggestion of hysteria, the randomness of the cases,
and also points out that "no males were affected". In extract 17, it is suggested that
since "so called benign myalgic encephalomyelitis" arises in isolated cases as well as
epidemics, and that it might often be difficult for doctors to identify and therefore
might easily be misdiagnosed as hysteria, glandular fever, or myalgia. This provides
an acccount for why the illness is said to more commonly arise in well-defined
epidemics rather than sporadic cases. And (in a circular way) sporadic cases, by
definition, do not conform to the pattern of how M E arises, and can therefore be
misdiagnosed.
14 See also Richmond (1989) for a further discussion of these issues.
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The Question of Hysteria - revisited
"In 1970, two young psychiatrists, McEvedy and Beard, re-examined the case notes of
patients from the Royal Free epidemic of 1955..." (Jenkins, 1991: 20).
Extract 18: Royal Free Epidemic 01 1955: A Reconsideration
"Summary: From a re-analysis of the case notes of patients with Royal Free disease it is
concluded that there is little evidence of an organic disease affecting the central nervous
system and that epidemic hysteria is a much more likely explanation. The data which support
this hypothesis are the high attack rate in females compared with males; the intensity of the
malaise compared with the slight pyrexia; the presence of subjective features similar to those
seen in a previous epidemic of hysterical overbreathing; the glove-and-stocking distribution
of the anaesthesia; and the normal findings in special investigations. Finally, a deliberate
attempt by one of the authors to produce an electromyographic record similar to that reported
in Royal Free disease was successful [...]
The year after the epidemic, a leading article appeared in the Lancet entitled "A New Clinical
Entity?". In this article the name "benign myalgic encephalomyelitis" was proposed for Royal
Free disease and certain similar illnesses (Lancet, 1956). When the medical staff at the Royal
Free Hospital wrote their account of the outbreak (Medical Staff, 1957)- referred to hereafter
as the Medical Staff report- they also described the illness as an encephalomyelitis. The
nature of the infective agent was admitted by all concerned to be obscure, but considerable
definition was claimed for the clinical syndrome. To quote the end of the Lancet article, "we
believe that its characteristics are now sufficiently clear to differentiate it from poliomyelitis,
epidemic myalgia, glandular fever, and the forms of encephalitis already described, and, need
it be said, hysteria."
The concluding words seem to us non sequiturs. The case for hysteria was not examined in
the article; indeed it received no consideration apart from this summary dismissal. In our
opinion the case is a good one, and the purpose of this paper is to obtain a fair hearing for it.
Firstly we present the findings reported from the epidemic and then our interpretation of
them." McEvedy, C.P. & Beard, A.W. British Medical Journal. January 3, 1970. pp.7-11
This piece by McEvedy and Beard constitutes a response to The Lancet editorial that
appeared in 1956 proclaiming a "new clinical entity"(extract 5). The authors of extract
18 object to the cursory dismissal of an explanation of hysteria which was specifically
manifest in the rhetoric of "need it be said" (in extract 5). They continue here, in an
attempt to counter that dismissal, to provide epidemiological evidence for the high
attack rate in females (10.4%) compared with males (2.8%); they also gave a list of
subjective symptoms (headache, weakness, dizziness, nausea, pain in back or
abdomen, pain in chest or neck, feeling of panic, vomiting) that they claimed were
common features of both the Royal Free disease and also of what they described as a
'schoolgirl epidemic of hysterical overbreathing' (Moss and McEvedy, 1966). Finally,
some of the most empirically convincing pieces of clinical evidence (electromyograph
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records) reported by earlier authors (e.g. Galpine & Brady, 1957) to support their
claims for an organic lesion, were called into question by a successful, deliberate
attempt to reproduce a similar result. McEvedy and Beard claim that "In practice it is
quite easy to obtain this type of trace by encouraging one's rigid outstretched arm to
tremble."(1970: 10).
The following review article by the same authors appeared in the same issue of the
British Medical Journal. It addresses the same outbreaks as Acheson's review (extract
15) and again reaches a different set of conclusions about the causes of the illness.
Extract 19: Concept of Benign Myalgic Encephalomyelitis.
"Summary: The reports of the 15 recorded outbreaks of benign myalgic encephalomyelitis
have been reviewed and in one instance the original data studied. We believe that a lot of
these epidemics were psychosocial phenomena caused by one of two mechanisms, either
mass hysteria on the part of patients or altered medical perception of the community. We
suggest that the name "myalgia nervosa" should be used for any future cases of functional
disorder which present the same clinical picture.
Acheson (1959), in a review article on benign myalgic encephalomyelitis, enumerated 14
epidemics that he considered belonged in this category. A fifteenth has been reported since
(Daikos et al, 1959). The term "benign myalgic encephalomyalitis" was proposed in 1956
(Lancet, 1956), so the dozen outbreaks before this date have received the label
retrospectively. The outbreaks, however, have so many features in common that the case for
regarding at least the epidemic form of the illness as a unitary phenomenon is a very fair one.
In the preceding paper (McEvedy and Beard, 1970) we have presented the evidence for
regarding one of the most striking epidemics in the series-the Royal Free Hospital outbreak of
1955- as an hysterical phenomenon. Can this formulation be applied to any or all of the other
14? After looking at the published reports on these epidemics (which we review below with
our comments), and in one instance studying the original clinical data, our conclusion is that
two mechanisms are at work, both psychosocial. We believe that between them they account
for the phenomenon of benign myalgic encephalomyelitis."
[...]
As there seems to be a total lack of objective evidence in support of the view that in cases of
benign myalgic encephalomyelitis the brain and spinal cord are the site of an infective,
inflammatory disease process, we would suggest that the name be discarded. Even if the view
that the symptoms are hysterical is not accepted, it would seem prudent to shorten it to
"benign myalgia". Our own inclination is for "myalgia nervosa" on the analogy of "anorexia
nervosa." This could serve both for the epidemic illness and for any isolated cases of
functional disorder which conform to the same clinical picture."
McEvedy, C.P. & Beard, A.W. January 1970, British Medical JournaL pp.11-15
This re-interpretation of the Royal Free (and the other 14 outbreaks) in terms of "mass
hysteria on the part of patients", and "altered medical perception of the community"
was offered in the absence of "objective evidence" for "an inflammatory disease
process"(extract 19). The authors argue that although there was not a strong case to
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defend claims for the existence of a new disease entity, the alternative explanation of
hysteria, had not been given serious consideration (extract 18). They present their first
article (extract 18) as a 'case for the defence' of a diagnosis of hysteria, with the aim
of obtaining "a fair hearing for it".
"However they [McEvedy and Beard] unfortunately did not go on to examine the reasons
which had led earlier observers ultimately to reject the hysteria hypothesis, and which have
been discussed earlier in this chapter." (Jenkins, 1991: 20)
The potential for their contribution to be taken as controversial and perjorative is
constituted by McEvedy and Beard in the discussion section of the first paper as
follows:
Extract 19a.
"Many people will feel that the diagnosis of hysteria is distasteful. This ought not to prevent
its discussion, but makes it worthwhile to point out that the diagnosis of hysteria in its
epidemic form is not a slur on either the individual or the institution involved. Whereas it is
true that sporadic cases of hysterical disability often have disordered personalities, hysterical
reaction is part of everyone's potential and could be elicited in any individual by the right set
of circumstances. The ocurrence of a mass hysterical reaction shows not that the population is
psychologically abnormal but merely that it is socially segregated and consists predominantly
of young females."
(ibid: 10-11)
The authors manage the potential for a hostile response in two ways. First, by
normalising the category of "hysterical reaction" as something that is "part of
everyone's potential" given the right circumstances; and second, by attributing the
cause of a hysterical reaction in this case (and epidemics in general) to situational
rather than individual (or institutional) ones; that is, "the right set of circumstances".
These circumstances were constructed in the first article as gendered:
Extract 19b.
"Characteristically epidemic hysteria occurs in populations of segregated females- in girl's
schools, convents, and among female factory hands. 15 At the Royal Free, as at any other
hospital, the female population is segregated to a very considerable degree." (ibid: 9)
15	 •This footnote appeared in the original article. "The literature is surprisingly thin. Specific instances
are (for girl's schools) Schuler and Parenton (1943), Tan (1963), Moss and McEvedy (1966), McEvedy
et al. (1966); for convents Huxley (1952); for factory hands Kerckhoff and Back (1968)." (So the claim
that "Characteristically epidemic hysteria occurs in populations of segregated females", is actually
based on one-off case studies, whereas the use of the terms "characteristically" and "occurs" work
discursively to script up the phenomenon as being a more general or typical pattern, of which the Royal
Free [or any other predominantly female institution] may be an example.)
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...and in the second article as being linked to a more general medical concern with the
threat of paralytic poliomyelitis.
Extract 19c.
"...all illnesses not immediately diagnosable as something else were regarded as "query
polio". In our view the "epidemic" was an artefact due to an altered medical perception of the
community. The corollary to this view is that the syndrome which characterised the patients
after admission was due to: (1) a rising anxiety level on the part of the patients who were
under threat of paralysis, and (2) a concentration of medical examination on the central
nervous system." [...] We think that the 14 patients [in the Middlesex hospital outbreak of
1952 (Acheson, 1954)] became a homogeneous clinical group only after admission, and that
the symptoms then produced were due to a preoccupation with poliomyelitis on the part of
both doctors and patients. (ibid: 13) 
What is interesting in McEvedy and Beard's account is how the nature of an epidemic
is being defined as a social construction. They view the "epidemic" as "an artefact due
to an altered medical perception of the community". In other words they are claiming
that the categorisation of the cases as similar was constructed by doctors having prior
expectations which guided their diagnostic practices.
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The Eye of the Storm
On the topic of hysteria, despite their (paradoxically rather provocative) attempts to
anticipate and counter such a response 16, McEvedy and Beard's articles "elicited a
storm of protest" (Jenkins, 1991: 20) in the Correspondence section of the next issue
of the British Medical Journal (January 17, 1970), under the heading; Epidemic
Malaise. This took the form of several 'eye-witnessed' reports."
Extract 20.
"Sir,- I have read with interest but incredulity the papers by Drs. C.P. McEvedy and A.W.
Beard (3 January, p.7).
I am a general practitioner in North London, and the epidemic of benign myalgic
encephalomyelitis which occurred there between the autumn of 1964 and the summer of 1966
was mainly in my practice. I saw about 370 patients of whom at least 20 were seriously ill
and a high proportion of whom have not been restored to their previous good health.[...]
Psychiatric disturbance was not observed if an early diagnosis was combined with bed
rest.[...] It is my hope that the views expressed by Drs. McEvedy and Beard will not be taken
seriously, especially as the implied diagnosis of "hysteria" to a seriously ill patient can cause
acute distress and prolong the illness indefinitely [...] if a diagnosis of "hysteria" is even
hinted, the patient experiences a profound loss of confidence in his medical advisers.
Restoration of confidence may take months. It is essential to treat this disease seriously, and
to give strong reassurance and encouragement in the difficult period when the patient is
learning to "come to terms" with his disability.-I am, etc.,
Betty D. Scott.
Extract 21.
"Sir,- I regard the conclusions of the Royal Free epidemic (3 January, p.'7) as nonsense. Many
of these girls were known to me. Illness was alien to their nature. [...] Take another look at the
Royal Free. I'm sure the adage "what we know we recognise" applies here. In the meantime I
advise those of us who have to deal with epidemics in institutions: don't be hasty in calling in
the psychiatrist, but first read the small print in your chapter on the central nervous system.-I
am, etc.,
B. Judge.
"One writer with postgraduate experience in psychiatry and infectious diseases had been a
clinical student at the time of the Royal Free epidemic (Gosling, 1970). She made a number
of telling points."(Jenkins, 1991: 20).
16 See extract 19a. where the category of gender is drawn on to define the social circumstances
surrounding the epidemic.
17 See Geertz (1988) on "I-witnessing" and the textual construction of eye-witnessed reports in
ethnography. (Which I insert here to show how the participants themselves use the device of eye-
witnessed reports to challenge the footing of other people's accounts.)
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Extract 22.
Sir,- I am glad that Drs. C.P. McEvedy and A.W. Beard have had the grace to say that their
opinions (3 January, p.'7), on the Royal Free Hospital epidemic of 1955 are their own, as their
paper is an example of the errors that one is apt to make in retrospective assessments of case
notes made by people one doesn't know well. It also betrays considerable lack of historical
awareness of the situation obtaining at the Royal Free Hospital at that time and of the full
history of the epidemic.[...] Anybody who believes that the female population of the Royal
Free Hospital was segregated just doesn't know the Free. I can only think that Drs, McEvedy
and Beard must have led a very sheltered student life.[..] Nobody who really knew the
physicians who looked after most of the cases would ever suggest that they would overlook
hysteria in the differential diagnosis of an obscure and bizzare illness, and indeed the
tendency would have been to put this higher on the list for students and nurses than for the
general population.[...] As psychiatrists, Drs. McEvedy and Beard should be aware that a
diagnosis of hysterical illness should be made on positive grounds of finding evidence of both
primary and secondary gain, and not just on negative grounds of not being able to explain the
symptoms in another way...
Paula H. Gosling.
In the last three extracts, McEvedy and Beard's reinterpretation of the Royal Free
Disease as 'mass hysteria' is challenged by three contributors who ground their
entitlement to speak with authority, on their own direct experience. 18 Betty Scott
(extract 20) bases her entitlement to speak on her personal experience with an
epidemic of about 370 patients in her medical practice; B.Judge cites an acquaintance
with some of the victims of the Royal Free epidemic, and Paula Gosling claims that
McEvedy and Beard's claims about hysteria make no sense if taken in the context of a
detailed knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the Royal Free tpidemic (which
of course she herself goes on to display in making the following claims:
• first, they betray a "considerable lack of historical awareness of the situation at the
Royal free Hospital at that time"
• second, "anybody who believes that the female population of the Royal Free
Hospital was segregated just doesn't know the Royal Free"
18 The entitlement to epistemological warrant is discussed in Potter (1996) with reference to the work of
Harvey Sacks (1992), Whalen & Zimmerman (1990), and Widdicombe & Wooffitt (1995). Category
entitlement provides a speaker with a warrant to knowledge about a particular domain. For example,
being a doctor provides a warrant for being able to speak with authority on medical matters, and being a
patient provides a warrant to speak about personal experience of illness. The writers of extracts 20, 21
and 22, are all medical practitioners who can claim to have been personally involved with victims of the
Royal Free epidemic, and to have personal knowledge of the hospital, the doctors, and the
circumstances surrounding the outbreak. Their accounts might therefore be taken to carry more
epistemological authority than the account of researchers who had only re-interpreted the documents
nearly twenty years after the event, as in the case of McEvedy & Beard.
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• and third, "Nobody who really knew the physicians who looked after most of the
cases would ever suggest that they would overlook hysteria", particularly given the
tendency to "put this higher on the list for students and nurses than for the general
population". On the contrary, it is argued that the physicians of the Royal Free
would have had a prior inclination to look for precisely such an explanation.
On the other hand, McEvedy and Beard are accused of making errors and omissions,
such as:
• not carrying out good science
• specifically "making retrospective assessments of case notes made by people one
doesn't know well"
• and not finding evidence of the "primary and secondary gain" that is considered
necessary for a diagnosis of hysteria.
Gosling's comments thus work to undermine McEvedy and Beard's contribution as
being contingent on 'their own opinions', since it was a re-analysis of the data,
undertaken twenty years after the event, rather than being based on personal
involvement with empirical investigation at the time of the epidemic. Their claims are
construed as based on little or flimsy evidence, and therefore not to be taken seriously.
In the same issue of the British Medical Journal, a general practitioner wrote in to
point out that:
Extract 23.
Most astute practitioners have observed diseases which were not described in the textbooks.
However, the clinical features of some of these, such as 'drop attacks', epidemic myalgia, and
hand, foot and mouth disease have now become clear and well-known, and I would agree that
one should hesitate before attributing any unaccountable bizarre syndrome to hysteria
because the entity does not fit any disease mentioned in present medical books.(Hopkins,
1970)
"This advice is as important today as it was then." (Jenkins, 1991: 21)
The last two contributors to the correspondence page (B.Judge,extract 21; and
P.Gosling, extract 22), also cautioned against the folly of making the category of
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hysteria a 'diagnosis of exclusion'; that is, "not being able to explain the symptoms
any other way". In her (1991) review article, Rachael Jenkins later goes on to make the
observation that:
Sex ratios in illness are a fascinating study, and can provide important epidemiological clues
to the origin of disease. But it is nonsensical to suggest that any disease which is more
common in women is therefore likely to be hysteria on those grounds alone. Many physical
diseases are more common in one sex than another, and sex ratios often change, reflecting
changes in the frequency of important aetiological factors.[...] MS is more common in women
and its cause is unknown, although the organic pathology is well documented.
A "fruitless dichotomy"?
In the same issue of the British Medical Journal, Gill (1970) made an appeal for a less
dualistic framework to understand the illness.
Extract 24.
Can we not acknowledge that there is never one cause for a patient getting ill? Virus and
hysteria are with us always, and the wise doctor never thinks in terms of 'either or'.
(Gill, C.H. 1970: 299)
Twenty one years later, Jenkins (1991: 30-31) made a similar observation:
Many doctors tend to oscillate uneasily in the 'either or' framework, i.e. either there is an
organic disease present, or the patient is psychologically ill. McEvedy and Beard (1973)
regrettably only proposed the two alternatives of definite physical illness or definite
psychiatric illness, without taking a more coherent multiaxial approach to the Royal Free
patients, and this fruitless dichotomy of organic versus functional has greatly hampered
research on ME (David et al., 1988). Abnormality may of course be present on any of the
physical, psychological, social, personality and illness behaviour axes, and the presence or
absence of abnormality in one axis does not preclude its presence or absence on another axis
(Balla, 1985). Thus there is a major logical fallacy in the diagnostic approach, unfortunately
all too common, that takes the view that a constellation of symptoms, where no physical
abnormality has been demonstrated, must be psychological in origin. It may or may not be so.
Physical abnormalities may be present but undetected. For example, several conditions
previously regarded as hysteria are now thought to have an organic basis, including
spasmodic torticollis, blepharospasm and writers' cramp (Lloyd, 1986). Therefore it is vital to
diagnose psychological abnormality, not on the negative grounds of absent physical
abnormality, but on the positive grounds of the presence of psychological phenomena, and to
place the psychological phenomena in their multiaxial framework (Jenkins et al., 1988a). Such
a scheme has been proposed for use in general practice (Jenkins et al., 1988b).
Yet another letter, in the May 16, 1970 issue of the British Medical Journal suggested
that a reversal of the reasoning, that had previously described the mystery illness as
being caused by hysteria, might be more appropriate.
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Extract 25
The articles of Dr. C.P. McEvedy and A.W. Beard (3 January, pp-7 and 11) are of
considerable concern because of the author's contention that benign myalgic
encephalomyelitis (epidemic neuromyasthenia) is a phenomenon related to mass hysteria or
to altered medical perception in the community. Their erroneous conclusions about this
illness may impair future investigations of similar outbreaks.
It is apparent that the authors failed to do their homework, and demonstrated a surprising lack
of information about the principles of epidemiology and of psychiatry. [...] The question of
mass hysteria has been considered by the authors of most papers relating to this disease and in
each instance has been discarded for a number of reasons- namely, (1) cases occurring within
the same household are varied in their features and course; (2) separate illnesses appear at
random intervals instead of simultaneously; (3) epidemiologically, the consistency of course
and similarity of symptoms despite the variety of people and communities that were affected
make hysteria unlikely. The disease is consistent from outbreak to outbreak in different
countries, different years and different peoples. (4) The mental symptoms of depression,
emotional lability, impaired memory and difficulty concentrating are consistent with organic
disease as compared with the shallowness and indifference of hysteria. (5) Muscle pain is a
striking feature of most outbreaks. It is clear that sporadic cases of this disease cannot be
readily identified. It is only in the epidemic form that the distinctive epidemiological features
allow characterisation.
Instead of ascribing benign myalgic encephalomyelitis to mass hysteria or
psychoneurosis, may I suggest that the authors consider the possibility that all psychoneurosis
is residual deficit from epidemic or sporadic cases of benign myalgic encephalomyelitis?
D.C. Poskanzer, M.D.
Department of Neurology
Harvard Medical School
Poskanzer's contention that McEvedy and Beard's conclusions about M E are
"erroneous" is contructed here by accusing them of not doing rigorous, competent
research, claiming that they "failed to do their homework, and demonstrated a
surprising lack of information about the principles of epidemiology and psychiatry".
This is contrasted with the "authors of most papers" who have already discarded the
diagnosis of hysteria "for a number of reasons" which he then goes on to list as a set of
general research conclusions. Rhetorically this display of information-giving serves as
a sharp contrast to the 'ignorance' imputed to Evedy and Beard, whose views are
formulated here as marginal to the agreed consensus, and based on incompetent
research.
Reinstating myalgic encephalomyelitis
In 1978 a Leading article in the British Medical Journal gave a summary update that
re-constituted current perspectives and problems relating to M E as follows.
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Extract 26: Epidemic myalgic encephalomyelitis
"Outbreaks of the paralytic disease known as epidemic myalgic encephalomyelitis have
puzzled doctors all over the world in the past 30 years. One of the best known of these
epidemics was that at the Royal Free Hospital in London in 1955, which affected more than
300 people. Most outbreaks tend to occur in the summer, young adults are predominantly
affected, and the incidence is higher in women. The evidence suggests that infection is spread
by personal contact, and young hospital personnel seem particularly at risk.[...] The clinical
outcome may take any of three courses: some patients recover completely, some follow a
relapsing course, and some are permanently incapacitated.
At a symposium held recently at the Royal Society of Medicine 19 to discuss the
disease and plan research there was clear agreement that myalgic encephalomyelitis is a
distinct nosological entity. Other terms that have been used to describe the disease were
rejected as unsatisfactory for various reasons: the cardinal features show that the disorder is
an encephalomyelitis [...] The adjective epidemic is correct, since most cases occur in an
epidemic, but the disease may be endemic, and sporadic cases may occur.
Some authors have attempted to dismiss this disease as hysterical, but the evidence
now makes such a tenet unacceptable. Some purely psychiatric symptoms may well occur,
particularly in patients entering the chronic phase. No doubt, too, in an epidemic some
hysterical persons will simulate the symptoms of the disease. Nevertheless, the organic basis
is clear [...] At this symposium more evidence was produced to support the organic nature of
the disease. [...] A perplexing finding, suggesting the possibility of a persistent virus
infection, was the ability of lymphocytes from patients to proliferate and survive in vitro for
up to 19 weeks.
We still know nothing about the nature and cause of epidemic myalgic
encehalomyelitis, but outbreaks are still ocurring."
Leading Article, British Medical Journal, 3 June, 1978, 1436-7.
In this update we see the original claims for an organic explanation of the illness,
myalgic encephalomyelitis, being reinstated as authoritative and legitimated by
reference to a consensus of findings at a symposium of the Royal Society of
Medicine. There was "clear agreement that myalgic encephalomyelitis is a distinct
nosological entity", furthermore M E is cited here as the preferred term, and is referred
to as "a paralytic disease", "an infection", "an encephalomyelitis", and "possibly a
persistent virus infection". However, some of the central claims in this article were
subsequently contested in the following issue of the British Medical Journal (June 24,
1978: 1696).
Extract 27: Epidemic myalgic encephalomyelitis.
Sir,- I disagree with the view you express in your leading article (3 June, p 1436) that the
many epidemics you cite compose a single nosological entity. Outbreaks in hospital staff
apart, these miscellaneous episodes and others described at the Royal Society of Medicine
may well have been as diverse aetiologically as they were geographically. Nor do I agree that
19 The proceedings of the symposium on "Epidemic neuromyasthenia. 1934-1977" at the Royal Society
of Medicine were reported later in the November 1978 issue of the Postgraduate Medical Journal.
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the Royal Free Hospital outbreak has now been proved to have been a form of encephalitis.
[...] There seems to have been a failure to realise how suggestible people are when they are ill
or anxious.
In a letter to The Times entitled "Vapour or virus" Sir Francis Walshe stated: "Epidemics of
mass hysteria have punctuated history and doubtless a few centuries ago were attributed to
witchcraft or demoniacal possession on evidence not less than that now evoking the mystic
chant of the word `virus.'..." Though the Royal Free outbreak was a sorry affair compared
with dancing madness, the classic form of mass hysteria, ataxia, vertigo, fits and prostration
were common to both. Nowadays the vapour or virus, or whatever the devil it is, seems to be
most at home in nurses' homes (in "centres of excellence" particularly). Anyone who wants
to know if Walshe's statement could be pertinent to the Royal Free epidemic should not be
content with your leading article: he should study the evidence for himself.
H G Easton
Clinical Department of Infectious Diseases
Ruchill Hospital,
Glasgow
In extract 27 the 'hysteria version' is again being re-constructed and works to
undermine the grounds for the claims made in the Leading article (extract 26). Dr
Easton implies that the author of the article misrepresents the empirical evidence,
which is otherwise there for anyone to 'study for himself'. He also makes use of a
contingent repertoire to undermine the premises of the claims made in extract 26. That
is, he claims that the term 'virus' is being misappropriated in a more or less
superstitious way without any evidence to support the claim. This is constructed as
being analogous to the way that attributions of witchcraft and possession were used as
explanations of mass hysteria a few centuries ago.
On July 15, 1978 (p. 202) the following response to Easton's letter was published.
Extract 28: Epidemic myalgic encephalomyelitis.
Sir,- from Dr H G Easton's letter (24 June, p 1696), I can only conclude that he ignored all
the evidence at the symposium on myalgic encephalomyelitis at the Royal Society of
Medicine that did not fit in with his theories. If he had stayed to the end, when a vote was
taken, he would have found himself the only person present still in favour of the "conversion
hysteria" theory. [...] Dr Easton's "vapour and virus" remarks are hardly worth serious
attention. Failure to isolate a virus does not rule out the possibility of a viral illness...[...] I
would suggest that before putting pen to paper again he talks to some of the nurses (who have
never been adequately followed up) permanently disabled as a result of the Royal Free
Hospital outbreak. He might then discover how much unnecessary anguish the "conversion
hysteria" theory had added to their mental and physical suffering. [...] Dr Peter Behan said at
the symposium that he thought the disease was an immunological reaction triggered off by a
virus. It would be helpful if more doctors, instead of pursuing outdated theories, seized the
ample opportunities which study of this illness offers for research, a point which you rightly
make in your leader. Celia Wookey, Edgeware, Middlesex.
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In this extract, Celia Wookey employs a contingent repertoire to construct Dr Easton's
account as motivated, misinformed, and prejudiced. On the basis of his comments in
extract 27 she concludes that Dr Easton had a prior motive to ignore evidence "that
did not fit in with his theories". Her grounds for making this claim are the observation
that he did not even stay until the end of the symposium to listen to the evidence, so
therefore he is willfully misinformed. He is in any case, the only one who still believes
that "outdated theory", and so he cannot be taken seriously.20 Wookey then moves to
take the moral high ground vis the effect of such theories on sufferers. She puts Dr
Easton on the wrong foot by formulating his 'ignorance' as "unnecessary"and
therefore charging him with culpable negligence. She implies that he is not merely
clinging to an outdated theory, but that he is actively "pursuing outdated theories" and
setting his prior prejudices against all the available counter evidence. She suggests that
he should take note of the anguish that this line of theorising has caused by talking to
some of the victims, and perhaps contribute some useful research instead of wasting
opportunities. Wookey's letter (extract 28) works to counter Dr Easton's earlier
dismissal (extract 27) of the content of the Leading article (extract 26). In fact these
three extracts appear to employ the same argumentative positions that were originally
taken up earlier in the debate; particularly in extracts 5, 18, 19, 19a, 19b, 19c, and the
responses to these in extracts 20, 21, 22, 23 and 25.
"Altered medical perception" and the social construction of epidemics
In 1980, an article by May et al in the 'Community Health' section of The Lancet, re-
raised the question of "altered medical perception" as a factor in defining epidemics.
Extract 29: Personality and Medical Perception in Benign Myalgic Encephalomyelitis.
"In an outbreak of benign myalgic encephalomyelitis in a girls' school all the residential
pupils, both those affected and those unaffected, were investigated. Special virological tests
were essentially negative, but it seemed that a few girls had had a viral infection.
Psychological testing showed that among younger girls the patients were more neurotic than
the others. Girls with various disorders were found to have been classified as having the same
disorder, because of what has been called altered medical perception."
May et al, The Lancet, November 22, 1980.
20 "However, since the McEvedy & Beard papers were published, the standard psychiatric teaching,
and indeed often the standard medical teaching, has been that ME is primarily a functional illness,
namely hysteria." (Jenkins, 1991: 25)
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This occasioned the following response in the correspondence section of the next
edition:
Extract 30: Was it Benign Myalgic Encephalomyelitis?
"Sir,- The disease described by Dr May and others (Nov. 22, p.1122) is barely recognisable as
myalgic encephalomyelitis.Although the symptoms were 'severe and recurrent, lasting up to 8
weeks' no girl had symptoms during the following term, which militates strongly against the
diagnosis of myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME)...In 1969 21 , it was suggested that ME should
only be diagnosed if neurological and muscle signs were found.[...] It is obviously essential to
investigate mysterious diseases by psychological as well as physical tests, as May et al did.
However, the diagnosis of myalgic encephalomyelitis should be restricted to patients with
much more objective evidence of ME than was shown in the patients described. Two classic
outbreaks of ME with many patients experiencing severe symptoms, and relapses were
described in The Lancet in 1959.22
C.S. Goodwin. The Lancet. Jan. 3, 1981.
Dr May and his colleagues replied to Dr Goodwin's letter as follows:
Extract 31
"Sir,- Dr Ramsay and Dr Goodwin believe that we are unjustified in describing the illness we
reported (Nov. 22, p.1122) as benign myalgic encephalomyelitis. We would like to assert that
the symptoms in the girls' school closely parallel those in all the main reported outbreaks.[...]
We have not suggested that there have been no organic diseases in the outbreak we described,
or in former outbreaks, but we have suggested, and do so again, that outbreaks or 'epidemics'
are more than simple aggregates of cases of (benign) myalgic encephalomyelitis or epidemic
neuromyasthenia, and so on, not least because "altered medical perception" causes a variety
of disorders to be lumped together.[...] It may be idle to dispute over precise (or rather
imprecise) nosological terminology; we maintain that we are describing the same
phenomenon as Ramsay and others."
May et at. The Lancet. Jan.3, 1981.
This correspondence again 23calls attention to the social processes by which medical
categories are identified and agreed (or dismissed). An epidemic is defined in terms of
medical agreement that individual cases are part of the same phenomenon; and in the
case of M E, being part of the same phenomenon is what has allowed it to be easily
identified as M E in the first place. It is precisely the circularity of this definition that
makes sense of the claim that isolated, sporadic cases would be difficult for doctors to
spot, and also that doctors are more likely to "lump different illnesses together" under
21 Adamson, J.R. (1969) Epidemic neuromyasthenia (cont). New England Journal of Medicine, 281:
789.
22 See extracts 13, and 14; the Durban and Athens outbreaks.
23 See also extract 15.
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epidemic conditions, where epidemic conditions are themselves constructed by that
very process of 'lumping together'. In extract 31, May et al call attention to the
process by which M E, in this and other cases, might become an artefact of "altered
medical perception". Goodwin's response to this (cited in extract 30) is to separate
ME as a diagnostic entity from the phenomenon that May describes, and in a
distancing manoeuvre Goodwin distinguishes between May's outbreak and the
"classic outbreaks" which are formulated here as severe and relapsing. So the
accusation (that is refuted in extract 31) is that May is not describing the same
phenomenon as the "classic outbreaks". The social processes of "altered medical
perception" are not being denied here, but the available implication is that there has
been a fundamental misconstrual of what defines M E in the first place.
Taking the theoretical 'high ground'
Over the next decade, there was an explosion of articles on M E that appeared in
different journals all over the world. 24 However, I have selected just a few articles
from the main medical journals that attend to the debate surrounding M E25 , as itself a
participants' concern. In other words I focus on those that have taken up a
metaposition in documenting the progress of the debate, in the sense that they continue
to formulate, re-formulate, and point up the issues (such as naming, diagnostic criteria,
and the debate about the causes of the illness) that previous participants had
constructed as being controversial in the first place.
For example, the following article appeared in the British Medical Journal in 1987:
24 Over the next decade, Bids Embase listed 1,171 publications under the keywords 'chronic fatigue
syndromes', which can be categorised in terms of their contributions to different disciplines such as
microbiology, psychiatry, immunology, neurophysiology, epidemiology, virology, etcetera.
25 Or CFS as it was increasingly referred to in the 1980's. (see chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the
significance of diagnostic labels and their use.)
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Extract 32: Royal Free disease: perplexity continues.
Epidemic neuromyasthenia, persistent myalgia following sore throat, Otago mystery disease,
Icelandic disease, and myalgic encephalomyelitis are just some of the names used for a
chronic debilitating illness presumed to be a sequel of viral infection. The medley of names
reflects the protean nature and worldwide distribution of the condition whose cardinal feature
is extreme exhaustion after exercise; this is usually acompanied by a range of somatic,
psychological, and 'flitting' neurological symptoms. The Myalgic Encephalitis Study Group,
formed in 1975, met last week at the Royal Society of Medicine to review the findings in the
70 or so suspected outbreaks and to discuss strategies for diagnosis and management.
Postviral fatigue sundrome or myalgic encephalomyelitis are the currently favoured names for
the illness, but in Britain a well known outbreak gave rise to the more familiar sobriquet,
Royal Free Disease. [...] The division between those who believe that the outbreak was
caused by an infection and those who favour a psychological explanation continues to echo
down the years.[...] Until recently most cases of postviral fatigue syndrome have been
epidemic. But since 1980 evidence that the illness may be endemic has accumulated.
Jane Dawson (Technical Editor, British Heart Journal) British Medical Journal, Feb 7,
1987.
The relevance of a division of opinion that "continues to echo down the ages" has
been a central participants' concern. Organic versus psychological explanations, that
can be traced right back to the start of this medical narrative 26, have been punctuated
only by Gill's (1970) appeal for a less dualistic framework to understand the illness
(extract 24). This appeal is expressed again in the following article that appeared in the
British Medical Journal in 1988, where the author questions the assumptions on which
the "acrimonious debate" is premised.
Extract 33: Postviral fatigue syndrome: time for a new approach.
" `Myalgic encephalomyelitis continues to provoke strong opinions in the medical press and
intense interest in the lay media, as it has for the past four decades. The condition, variously
named epidemic neuromyasthenia, Icelandic disease, benign myalgic encephalomyelitis, is
more appropriately referred to as the postviral fatigue syndrome. Clinical descriptions include
a vast array of symptoms and signs but the two main features that emerge are fatigue and
emotional disturbance. The condition may be epidemic or sporadic. In this paper we
reconsider some of the arguments surrounding the postviral fatigue syndrome and suggest a
starting point from which constructive knowledge may be gained.
The hysteria debate.
Published work has been dominated by acrimonious debate between those who view the
postviral fatigue syndrome as a narrow "organic disease"---namely, physicians concerned in
the Royal Free outbreak [see extract 8] and current sufferers---and those who follow the lead
of McEvedy and Beard in viewing it as "mass hysteria"[see extracts 18, and 19]. This sterile
argument continues to the present day, serving little purpose, based as it is on fundamental
misunderstandings. [...] Present controversy rests on a false dualism and an outdated
26 According to the author of extract 25 "The question of mass hysteria has been considered by the
authors of most papers relating to this disease and in each instance has been discarded for a number of
reasons..." Poskanzer (1970).
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separation of mind and body, and the shortcomings of these approaches are emphasised by
increasing knowledge of the biological abnormalities found in psychiatric disorders.
Hysteria itself is an outmoded diagnosis and is being replaced by the concept of "abnormal
illness behaviour." This takes account of the interaction between "organic" illnesses and
psychiatric symptoms and a more sensitive appreciation of how social factors govern the
presentation and outcome of illness. It is a better description of the often fraught interplay
between sufferers with the postviral syndrome and their doctors."
David et al, British Medical Journal, March 1988.
David et al move to take up a metaposition by construing the other participants in the
debate as having "outdated" ideas about the relationship between mind and body, and
the nature of disease itself. The "sterile argument" of an "outdated separation of mind
and body", referred to in extract 33, is developed further by H.G. Kennedy in a letter
to The Lancet, May 16, 1987: 1145, who points out the circularity of cause and effect
arguments that themselves work to blur such a sharp distinction. These two articles
can be seen as a move to transcend the "outdated" explanations and formulate one's
own contribution as premised on a more complex and sophisticated level of analysis
and theoretical explanation.
A "circular argument"?
Extract 34: Fatigue and Fatigability.
"...The differential diagnosis of patients presenting to physicians with fatigue can be found in
most medical texts, and to the usual list can be added the so-called "post-viral syndromes" of
fatigue. Some of these have evidence of recent viral infection and some have not. Whether
these cases should be classified with psychiatric disorders or with unusual immunological
defects has become a circular argument; physical illness can cause fatigue and depression but
depression can cause a wide variety of immunological defects which could in turn cause
physical illness.
H G Kennedy, The Lancet, May 16, 1987: 1145.
The authors of extracts 32 and 33 have also drawn attention to the epidemic or
endemic (sporadic) nature of the illness. According to the author of extract 32,
evidence for the endemic nature of the illness (as well as its epidemic nature) has
accumulated since 1980. One explanation that might be offered (if I felt inclined to
enter the debate as a participant 27) is that in the light of more specific guidelines,
27 My move to enter the debate as a participant is designed to call attention to the very distinction that is
usually made between the analyst and participant in discourse, and conversation analytic work (see
Schegloff, 1997). At this point in the text, I have adopted the 'natural attitude' and offered an
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sporadic cases were becoming easier for doctors to classify, or that the debate
surrounding this issue in the medical and popular press had called attention to the
diagnostic possibility of sporadic cases, for both doctors and their patients.
This kind of "altered medical perception" argument was used originally by McEvedy
and Beard (extract 19), except here I am applying it to how sporadic cases might have
become more easily definable as M E. For instance, in 1988 Lloyd et al drew on a
"working case definition" of "Chronic fatigue syndrome" which gave detailed
diagnostic criteria that any doctor could use as a guideline. 28 This kind of case
definition typically consists of, what Aronowitz (1992) refers to as a "Chinese menu"
style list of diagnostic criteria, outlining core signs and symptoms, and a lengthy
catalogue of optional variations.
Extract 35: What is Myalgic Encephalomyelitis?
Sir,- To improve our knowledge of the pathophysiology of myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME),
it is essential that only one name is used to describe the disorder and that reproducible
diagnostic criteria are agreed. Having reviewed the clinical and laboratory features of over
200 patients with well characterised ME, we agree with the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) that the best term is chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS). We have developed and
evaluated a set of diagnostic criteria after reviewing 100 patients with CFS diagnosed by a
characteristic history (especially muscle fatigue), a normal physical examination (excluding
the findings of lymphadenopathy, muscle tenderness, or pharyngitis), and negative
investigations to exclude other chronic infectious or immuno-impairing diseases.[...] The
CDC criteria require or recommend the exclusion of over thirty diseases by at least twenty
laboratory investigations, before the complex clinical criteria may even be considered. Our
criteria highlight the central positive features of the syndrome, supported where appropriate
by laboratory investigations. Patients with CFS may well be heterogeneous, but we believe
our criteria will define most of this population and that their disorder will have a common
pathogenesis.
Lloyd et al. The Lancet. June 4, 1988.
explanation for why evidence for the endemic nature of M.E. has accumulated since 1980. There seems
to be a blurring of the analyst/participant distinction in this case, since the social construction of a
disease entity is a concern that is common to both.
28 See also: Holmes et al. (1988). Chronic fatigue Syndrome: a working case definition. Annals of
Internal Medicine. 108: 387-89.
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Paradoxically the last sentence of extract 35 continues to point up how a heterogeneous
group of patients can be legitimately 'lumped together' according to a set of criteria
that define 'chronic fatigue syndrome' as a discrete diagnostic category. The following
extract also emphasises the point that although fatigue itself can be a symptom of
many medical conditions, the patient group who have been referred to as having
chronic fatigue syndrome is "almost certainly aetiologically and prognostically
heterogeneous".
Extract 36:Follow up of patients presenting with fatigue to an infectious diseases clinic.
In recent years there has been renewed interest in the causes and management of the symptom
of fatigue. Although fatigue is a symptom of many medical conditions, identifiable organic
disease is rarely found in patients referred to hospital with fatigue as a major complaint. The
fatigue is then considered to be "idiopathic." Clinical concern has focused on patients whose
fatigue is idiopathic, persistent, and associated with impaired physical and mental
functioning, who have been referred to as having a "chronic fatigue syndrome" if the fatigue
has been present for at least six months. The patient group thus defined is almost certainly
aetiologically and prognostically heterogeneous. Several more specific syndromes have been
proposed, including more restrictively defined chronic fatigue syndromes, postviral fatigue
syndrome, and myalgic encephalomyelitis. Although each has its advocates, none of these
specific syndromes has yet been shown to have a clinical utility.[...] In this report we present
findings from a large consecutive series of patients who presented with a major complaint of
fatigue to a single physician working in an infectious diseases clinic.[...] The functional
impairment of patients with the chronic fatigue syndrome is severe, but our results suggest
that the prognosis for functional recovery by two to four years after clinic assesssment is
good. Many patients remain symptomatic, however, and a significant minority remain
chronically disabled.[...] Patients who are functionally impaired are more likely to have an
emotional disorder, to believe in an infectious cause for their illness, to avoid alcohol, and to
be members of a self-help organisation..."
Sharpe et al. British Medical Journal. July 18, 1992, 305: 147-152.
This article, suggesting a link between membership of a self-help association and poor
prognosis, provoked a range of responses:
Self-help or "cherished beliefs"?
Extract 37.
Editor,- Michael Sharpe and colleagues' paper confirms what many clinicians have long
suspected- namely that the prognosis for those with a chronic fatigue syndrome who reach
specialist care is poor. The paper also suggests that membership of a self help organisation is
associated with a poor outcome. Although the authors emphasise that this association is not
necessarily causal, I fear that the self-help organisations may interpret this as another attack
on their credibility, which will further sour relations between the organisations and the
profession. What are the possible explanations for these disturbing findings? Sharpe and
colleagues suggest that patient's beliefs are an important mediator of disability, a view I
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share. An article written by a sufferer illustrates how this might happen: "These living viruses
are erratic and unpredictable. The prickly-edged ones pierce their way into the body cells. If
disturbed by the patient's activity they become as aggressive as a disturbed wasps' nest, and
can be felt giving needle-like jabs (or stimulating the nerves to do so)." It is easy to
understand how such beliefs, regardless of their scientific accuracy, amplify disability.
The situation is rendered more tragic as it now seems that the evidence on which
these beliefs (that persistence of enteroviruses in muscles is the cause of undoubtedly genuine
symptoms) is based is less than convincing.[...] Sharpe and colleagues' findings of a poor
prognosis should cause all those who advise patients with the chronic fatigue syndrome to
pause for thought and perhaps discard cherished beliefs...
Simon Wessely, British Medical Journal, 8 August, 1992. 305: 365.
First, Wessely works to disalign himself from any further souring of "the relations
between the [self-help] organisations and the profession", that might have ensued from
the statements in Sharpe's article. But then he goes on to make available the
implication that the link between functional impairment and membership of a self-help
group (documented in Shazpe's study, extract 36), might be due to 'inappropriate
beliefs' based on scientifically inaccurate information that may be available to
sufferers through "all those who advise patients with the chronic fatigue syndrome". In
other words, Wessely claims that patients are learning inappropriate illness behaviour
through being supplied with 'inaccurate explanations' for their condition.
Charles Shepherd of the M E Association responded to Sharpe's findings as follows:
Extract 38
Michael Sharpe and colleagues' follow up study of 177 patients with chronic fatigue of
uncertain origin raises several important unanswered questions, which require further
investigation. Factors such as a belief that their illness followed an infection, intolerance to
alcohol, and membership of a support group for patients with myalgic encephalomyelitis were
all associated with an adverse prognosis. Could it be that the authors had identified patients
belonging to a distinct postinfectious subgroup as many doctors maintain they do? [...] The
problem with any kind of research into the chronic fatigue syndrome is that, like backache, it
covers a large heterogeneous group of patients in whom physical, pyschological, and social
factors may be interacting. Researchers should therefore not be surprised to find that the
outcome varies considerably when the aetiology is not more clearly defined.
Charles Shepherd, British Medical Journal, 8 August, 1992: 365.
Shepherd recruits Sharpe's own findings to support the contention that M E is in fact a
separate organic entity, and that this group of patients are after all "a distinct
postinfectious sub-group". Sharpe's data is here being made sense of in terms of what
the M E Association had been saying for years; that there is a real distinction between
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M E and CFS. In other words, the outcome for this sub-group is poor precisely
because it is a more serious condition that does follow an infectious disease.
Extract 39
Editor,- Michael Sharpe and colleagues report that most patients with the chronic fatigue
syndrome rate contact with medical services as unhelpful or only slightly helpful. Many
sufferers turn to alternative health care, again with varied success. Such dissatisfaction with
medical care is well documented, and self-help organisations flourish to provide the support,
advice, and education that is not, or cannot be, provided by the medical profession; they
potentially fulfill an important role.
The authors conclude that for patients with the chronic fatigue syndrome membership
of a self-help organisation is associated with a poorer outcome (although whether members
were more functionally impaired at the outset is not known). Adopting coping strategies,
particularly with regard to exercise and "stress", and a belief in the persistence of a viral
infection are also associated with continuing disability.
Unfortunately, such advice continues to be offered to patients with the syndrome,
particularly by self-help organisations. It is to be hoped that all those caring for patients will
take note of Sharpe and colleagues' conclusions. Work with fatigued patients in primary care
(E. McDonald et al, paper in preparation) suggests that general practitioners have a central
role in preventing the longer term secondary disability described by the authors- by
acknowledging the distress caused by fatigue, limiting investigations and referrals to
specialist centres, prescribing antidepressants when appropriate, and encouraging
maintenance of activities. The patients in Sharpe and colleagues' study were receiving
secondary care, and possibly by then beliefs and attitudes to physical symptoms are already
engrained.
H Cope and A S David, British Medical Journal, 8 August 1992: 365.
Cope and David spell out the implications of Sharpe's findings for the future policy of
self-help organisations who are construed as currently contributing to the disability of
their members by offering 'unhelpful advice' about the management of the illness.
Stake management - "No one gains...least of all us"
A representative of the M E Association responded to these letters as follows in the
September issue of the British Medical Journal.
Extract 40: Self help organisation's advice on myalgic encephalomyelitis
Editor,- I should like to assure Simon Wessely that neither the ME Association nor ME
Action regards Michael Sharpe and colleagues' findings in patients with chronic fatigue as
another attack on its credibility. Nor do we see why the paper should "further sour relations
between the organisations and the profession."
As Wessely points out, the apparent relation between functional impairment and
membership of a self-help organisation at follow up does not mean that membership of such
an organisation is responsible for the impairment. Aside from the fact that the study did not
focus on myalgic encephalomyelitis, or on the work the ME Association does, Sharpe
60
reassured us that there was no evidence of a causal relation between membership of a patient
group and level of disability.
As regards the potential damage resulting from inaccurate information about myalgic
encephalomyelitis, it is worth emphasising that the quote that illustrates this came from
Nursing Standard and not from a magazine for patients. The British organisations have long
been unhappy with the way the media have portrayed the illness and reviewed existing
research, and it is often extremely difficult to get erroneous or biased information corrected.
Sometimes we get a right of reply , but usually we don't.
Finally, I wish to make clear that our current advice on exercise and stress is based on
sound scientific research, the recommendations of our medical advisors, and 50 years'
experience. Since our aim is to help patients it would be ridiculous for us to ignore good
research and to stick instead to outdated explanations, speculations, or even prejudice. No one
gains from such a narrow minded approach, least of all us.
The main reason why our beliefs tend to differ from those of Wessely and H Cope
and A S David is that the authors do not distinguish between myalgic encephalomyelitis and
chronic fatigue and we do. We see myalgic encephalomyelitis as more than "mental and
physical fatigue," and we have evidence that treatments that seem to help patients with
chronic fatigue do not always benefit people with myalgic encephalomyelitis (C Hickie,
conference "Unravelling the mystery," North Carolina, 17-18 November 1990).
Our cautious attitude may worry those who disagree with us, but a less critical
approach may lead to mistakes and we are anxious to avoid this.
M. C. Hume (M E Association), British Medical Journal, 12 September 1992: 649. 
First in extract 40, Hume works to formulate his response as not being a retaliation.
He accomplishes this by saying that (contrary to Wessely's comments in extract 37)
they (the M E Association) have not construed Sharpe's research as "another attack on
their credibility". This works to set up Hume's comments as being merely a
contribution to scientific debate rather than a response to what Wessely fears may be
construed Ps a personal attack that "will further sour relations between the
organisations and the profession.". Second, Hume distances the M E Association from
the 'inaccurate information' quoted in Wessely's article (extract 37), which can be
traced to a source other than the M E Association's magazine. Neither, he claims, is
the M E Association responsible for the media images of the illness, which may be
"erroneous" or "biased". The upshot is to portray the association's voice as being
misrepresented by its critics, whose comments are thereby discounted. Third, Hume
lays out the scientific grounds for the advice that the organisation gives to patients;
that is, "our current advice on exercise and stress is based on sound scientific research,
the recommendations of our medical advisors, and 50 years experience."
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This scientific approach is set out as a three part list against his own similar three-part
formulation of what the association stands accused by their critics. This he lists as;
• 'ignoring good research'
• 'sticking to outdated explanations'
• and "speculations, or even prejudice"
The imputation of prior motive is countered here by Hume. The association (which
exists "to help patients") surely could not wish to give unhelpful advice based on
outdated science, guesswork, and prejudice. Hume is here responding to, and
countering the inference, made available by Wessely in extract 37, that the association
dispenses advice on the basis of "cherished beliefs" rather than solid evidence.
Finally, Hume moves to take the high ground by pointing out that the policy of the
association is based on a fundamental difference of scientific opinion between
themselves and their critics; "the authors do not distinguish between myalgic
encephalomyelitis and we do". Their critics are thus construed as being less discerning
and precise than themselves; "a less critical approach may lead to mistakes and we are
anxious to avoid this."
A year later the following comments by Charles Shepherd of the M E Association,
work to legitimate some of the prior claims made by Hume, recorded in extract 40.
Extract 41: Description of ME revised in disability handbook
...the Disability Living Allowance Advisory Board has agreed to important changes to the
clinical description of myalgic encephalomyelitis in its "disability handbook." The next
revision of this will make it clear that myalgic encephalomyelitis is a separate clinical entity
from the chronic fatigue syndrome (although they have several features in common), is not
hysterical in origin, and can result in severe and permanent disablement. In common with the
tenth revision of the International Classification of Diseases the handbook will also refer to
myalgic encephalomyelitis as a neurological disorder...
Charles Shepherd (M E Association) British Medical JournaL 2 October 1993: 869.
...which was replied to by two "disappointed" members of the Disability Living
Allowance Advisory Board:
Extract 42: Description of ME in disability handbook.
Editor,- We were disappointed that Charles Shepherd considered that he was free to make an
unauthorised disclosure of part of a draft revision of the Disability Handbook's chapter on
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myalgic encephalomyelitis. [..] Shepherd's letter summarises selected parts of the draft's
text, but lacking completeness, may have misled readers.
We hope that the final text of the section on myalgic encephalomyelitis will provide a
balanced account of current knowledge about, and thinking on, the condition. It will probably
conclude that myalgic encephalomyelitis is a separate entity within the group of disorders
encompassed by the chronic fatigue syndromes and that some affected people remain
disabled, make little or no progress, or even deteriorate over time. The revised chapter will
also, however, provide information about the majority of people with myalgic
encephalomyelitis, in whom disablement is neither severe nor permanent.
Rodney Grahame and Mansel Aylward, British Medical Journal, 23 October 1993: 1071. 
This criticism displays a participant's concern with selective reporting, and also works
to call Dr Shepherd's integrity into question. First, the authors point out that he has no
authority to speak about a report that is only in draft form. The consequence of his
premature "unauthorised disclosure" is that his claims are based on an incomplete, and
therefore potentially misleading reading of the draft's text; "Shepherd's letter
summarises selected parts of the draft's text, but lacking completeness, may have
misled readers." Therefore, it follows that his comments can easily be discounted as
being his own selective (and extreme) version, rather than an accurate representation
of what will finally be written in the Disability Handbook. On the strength of this, Dr
Shepherd stands accused of failing to give a "balanced account of current knowledge".
M E or CFS: Same or different?
The debate surrounding the definition of myalgic encephalomyelitis as a discrete
diagnostic entity continues with an article by David and Wessely.
Extract 43: Chronic fatigue, ME and ICD-10.
The nosological status of fatigue syndromes continues to cause debate and controversy. The
inclusion in the tenth revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) 29 of
benign myalgic encephalomyelitis as a synonym for postviral fatigue syndrome (G93.3) under
Diseases of the Nervous System seems to represent an important moral victory for self-help
groups in the UK3° who promote the notion of myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME) despite
almost universal scepticism of the appropriateness and accuracy of this term among
neurologists.[...] It is regrettable that the term chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) was not
adopted since this avoids unsubstantiated pathophysiology implied by myalgic
encephalomyelitis and is neutral regarding aetiology. CFS avoids artifical separation between
mental and physical symptoms and treats them both as inherent to the syndrome...
29 World Health Organisation. International statistical classification of diseases and related health
problems, tenth revision, Vol 1. Geneva: WHO, 1992.
30 Shepherd, C. Description of ME revised in disability handbook. BMJ 1993; 307: 869. (see Extract
40)
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Anthony David and Simon Wessely, British Medical Journal, 13 November 1993.
This worked to marginalise "people who promote the notion of myalgic
encephalomyelitis" (such as M C Hume and Charles Shepherd of the M E
Association) from a consensus of "almost universal scepticism". David and Wessely's
move to take the scientific and theoretical high ground in recommending the "neutral"
term CFS which "avoids artificial separation between mental and physical symptoms"
was then challenged by two representatives of the International Federation of ME
Associations as follows:
Extract 44: Chronic fatigue syndrome or myalgic encephalomyelitis.
Sir,- Although we agree with David and Wessely (Nov 13, p.1247) that the term benign
myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME) is no longer accurate, we do not share their enthusiasm for
the suggested replacement, chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS). CFS means different things in
different countries. In Australia, it is synonymous with ME; in America, it covers several
disorders, including ME, chronic fatigue and immune dysfunction syndrome, giardiasis,
fibromyalgia, and masked depression, whereas in the UK it has become a dustbin diagnosis
for all cases of unexplained chronic fatigue.
In a sense, ME is to CFS what migraine is to headaches: it is much more disabling, it
is aetiologically more complex, and it is often more difficult to treat. The confusion between
ME and CFS has persisted because too much of the published information is incomplete and
unbalanced. For instance, many commentators have discussed the similarities between ME
and depression, but have failed to point out the differences.
A growing number of scientists feel that the term CFS is so misleading that its
adoption will hamper research, rather than help it...
Martin Arber & Anne Macintyre, British Medical Journal. 22 January 1994: 243.
In a similar move to the one employed by the authors of extract 42, who accused Dr
Shepherd's version of the description of M E in the Disability handbook of "lacking
completeness", Arber and Macintyre counter argue that the confusion and blurring of
M E with CFS is an artefact of "incomplete and unbalanced" published work which
fails to "point out the differences" between these two separate categories. The
usefulness of the term CFS is also called into question on the grounds of ambiguity, on
the grounds that its Australian, American, and UK counterparts do not use the same
definitional criteria. This argument effectively undermines David and Wessely's
adoption of the `neutral'term CFS as based on incompetent science. In the same issue
Sandra Howes points out that M E and CFS are distinguishable even by the criteria of
David and Wessely's own research!
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Extract 45.
Sir,- David and Wessely assert that ME and CFS are identical, but their own research has
clearly shown that they are not. David and colleagues have reported that of 77 patients with
chronic fatigue, 17 satisfied the Oxford criteria for CFS. Of these, only 4 (24%) people had,
or believed they had, ME. Another 2 so-called ME patients did not fulfill the criteria for
CFS.[..] Other research has also shown differences between ME and CFS (Oxford criteria).
For instance, ME is associated with more pronounced cognitive deficits, more evidence of
immune system abnormalities and a different pattern of cerebral hypoperfusion.
With respect to diagnosis, the new London criteria for ME might be more specific
than the Oxford guidelines, but they too avoid "artificial separation between mental and
physical symptoms". [...] Finally, I challenge David and Wessely's statement that the Oxford
criteria have "proven reliability". I am not aware of any research that supports this view, and,
indeed, the only published report on the subject concluded that it had relatively poor
predictive validity.
We may not know much about ME, but we seem to know even less about CFS.
Sandra Howes, British Medical Journal, 22 January 1994: 243.
Dr. Charles Shepherd responds to his critics...
Extract 46
Sir,- I disagree with David and Wessely's view that the "important moral victory" in having
myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME) classified under diseases of the nervous system by the world
Health Organisation (WHO) will undermine the progress in understanding the complex
pathoaetiology of this syndrome. In fact, official recognition will probably now stimulate
original research, which should include studies into the virology, immunology, neurology,
and psychiatric components of the illness.[...] Patients with ME strongly welcome this
decision. Their perception is that this classification will allow them to persuade sceptical
doctors, employers, and educational authorities that the illness is genuine. Medical insurance
payments might become more easy to obtain...
Charles Shepherd, The Lancet, 22 January 1994: 243.
Dr Shepherd formulates the consequences of having official recognition of M E as a
separate clinical entity as being the stimulation of original research of all kinds, and as
being beneficial to patients who might have had difficulty in persuading the authorities
that they have a legitimate illness. His formulation works to counter the implication
made available in David and Wessely's article (extract 43), that "the important moral
victory for self-help groups in the UK" represents the vindication of a partisan and
marginal position which does nothing to address the complex relationship between
mind and body.
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"Scientific constructs...the catalogue of official sounds"
In the next issue of the British Medical Journal there were several articles on the topic
of M E. These were introduced by the following comments in the Editor's Choice,
which reflexively attend to the constructive practices involved in defining disease and
arguing about M E, in the press, and in and through the practice of medicine.
Extract 47: Fighting not against but over disease.
Only the naivest medical students think that diseases have some independent, objective
reality. Rather they are social and scientific constructs, and as such they can be fought over.
This week's journal provides us a ringside seat from which to watch the struggle over
myalgic encephalomyelitis.[...] Tony Delamothe reports on a study undertaken by the
organisation Action for ME on how the condition is reported in the British medical press (p
798). The organisation detects a bias against a physical aetiology for the disease. Two
medical authors have undertaken a longer term study of how the condition is reported in the
medical trade press, national newspapers, and women's magazines; they find a bias in the lay
media towards a physical aetiology. [...] We should try to keep an open mind on the
condition. Richard Asher, the English doctor and writer, warned 30 years ago that "we shut
our eyes to observations which do not agree with the conclusions we wish to reach. We close
our ears to bits of history which seems out of place, or to noises coming down our
stethoscopes which are not included in the catalogue of official sounds we have been taught
to recognise."
British Medical Journal, Editor's Choice, 19 March 1994:
In particular Tony Delamothe's paper (referred to in extract 47) had made the
following wry observations:
Extract 48: Look at M E
The supporters of myalgic encephalomyelitis as a discrete entity with an organic cause have
brought off some spectacular coups. They have landed a Myalgic Encephalomyelitis Act on
to the British statute books, requiring an annual report to be made to parliament on its causes,
effects and treatment. And they succeeded in getting the latest revision of the International
Classification of Diseases to include myalgic encephalomyelitis under diseases of the nervous
system. Only doctors now remain sceptical about the condition and wary of accepting
"encephalomyelitis" as the cause of symptoms without evidence of inflammation of the brain
and spinal cord.
Doctors sometimes believe what they read in medical journals. Could the journals be
partly to blame for their doubts? Action for ME, a patient support group, thinks so. After
reviewing the coverage in the BMJ, Lancet, and three weekly newspapers sent to British
general practioners for the 18 months up to August 1993, it concluded that "medical journals
keep doctors in the dark" with their "biased reporting". The main complaints were that
journals confused the chronic fatigue syndrome, myalgic encephalomyelitis, and the postviral
fatigue syndrome and that they preferred psychological explanations of patient's symptoms
"despite growing evidence of abnormal brain and immune function."
The report is best understood as part of a marketing exercise to separate myalgic
encephalomyelitis from a rag bag of chronic fatigue syndromes and to "brand" it as the one
66
with the organic cause.[...] Having defined the condition myalgic encephalomyelitis, its
proponents now want doctors to diagnose it- a previous study by Action for ME suggested
that they are reluctant to do so. Hence the need to police the coverage of the condition in
medical publications, particularly those read by general practitioners.[...] If winning over
doctors is important then the effort should go into proving beyond reasonable doubt that
myalgic encephalomyelitis exists separate from the chronic fatigue syndrome and that it has
an organic cause. Attempting to censor the encephalomyelically incorrect is more likely to
alienate than convert.
Tony Delamothe, British Medical Journal, 19 March 1994: 798.
The first thing to notice about this report by Delamothe is the way that he describes the
activities of the "supporters of M E as a discrete entity", as having "brought off some
spectacular coups". The use of the term "coups" is suggestive of an organised
movement that is politically motivated to make changes in favour of their own
interests. He goes on to list the ways that they have accomplished this: First, by act of
parliament, 31 second by a revision of the ICD, and finally his three-part list32
is completed by the recent report of 'Action for M E' which dealt with 'biased
reporting' in the medical press. This is decribed by Delamothe as a "marketing
exercise", where policing the coverage of M E in the medical press is construed by
him as an attempt at censorship. His comments construct the research activities of
'Action for M E' as politically motivated. In other words, 'Action for M E' have a
stake and interest in policing the kind of press coverage by which doctors "who
sometimes believe what they read in the medical press", might be influenced. The
irony of his claim that "only doctors now remain sceptical" is brought into sharp
contrast with the rhetorical certainty bestowed by the endorsement of two official and
legitimating institutions (parliament, and an official classification of diseases). The
scepticism of doctors who want to rely on scientific evidence is here sharply
contrasted with the definition of disease as a legal accomplishment by a lobby of
interested "supporters".
31 ME is the only disease that has been legitimated by Act of Parliament, through a Private Member's
Bill in 1987.
32 Gail Jefferson (1990) (discussed in Potter, 1996: 195-7) pointed out how three-part lists are used to
construct the listed items as being instances of a more general class of things. In this case, Delamothe's
use of the three-part list constructs a set of separate instances of political action, as part of a "spectacular
coup" to get ME recognised as an discrete entity with an organic cause.
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This vitreolic attack was followed up in a later issue of the British Medical Journal by
a letter from the Director of the Information Unit, International Federation of M E
Associations, who moves to take the high ground by offering a scientist's point of
view.
Extract 49: Distinguish between syndromes...
Editor,- I note that several people writing in the BMJ are still confusing myalgic
encephalomyelitis with the chronic fatigue syndrome. I wish to clarify matters. From a
scientist's point of view, the main problem is not the term chronic fatigue syndrome but the
various diagnostic criteria that go with it. For instance, the strict Australian definition adopted
by Wilson et al is similar to that for myalgic encephalomyelitis. As a result, it is reasonably
certain that in this article the two names probably refer to the same disease.
The "Oxford" criteria used in Britain, however, are far broader, covering all patients
whose severe, unexplained fatigue has been present for at least half of the time and for at
least six months. The only other requirements are that the fatigue must have had a definite
onset and that it affects both physical and mental functioning. [...] Most patients who fulfill
the Oxford criteria suffer not from myalgic encephalomyelitis but from more common
conditions, notably depression, anxiety states, sleep disorders, and fibramyegia.. &eat of
these disorders occur in epidemics, and most are not associated with the neurological and
immunological abnormalities found in myalgic encephalomyelitis.
Does the distinction between the chronic fatigue syndrome and myalgic
encephalomyelitis matter? It depends. According to recent research, treatments such as
graded exercise which are helpful for the chronic fatigue syndrome do not generally benefit
those with myalgic encephalomyelitis. On the other hand, combining all the fatigue
syndromes together, implying that they share a common aetiology, and treating them in the
same way would probably save the NHS and Medical Research Council some much needed
money...
Ellen M Goudsmit, British Medical Journal, 14 May 1994:1297-8.
Goudsmit attempts to reinstate the scientific grounds for the claims of the M E
Associations, and implies that the use of CFS as a catch-all term might potentially be
used as a money-saving device. This makes available the suggestion that there are
some participants in the debate who might have an interest (other than a purely
scientific one) in wanting to resist the separate definition of M E as a disease entity.
A matter of methodology and definitions?
The Director of 'Action for M E' spells out precisely the implications of the different
methodologies and definitions that "inevitably lead to different findings on the degree
to which depression is a perpetuating agent in these conditions."
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Extract 50: ...and study them separately.
The struggle over myalgic encephalomyelitis and the chronic fatigue syndrome is not, as S M
Lawrie and A J Pelosi suggest, whether they are physical or mental illnesses. Both sides in
this debate accept that most illnesses combine organic and psychological factors. The struggle
is about methodology and definition and, in particular, how different methodologies and
definitions inevitably lead to different findings on the degree to which depression is a
perpetuating agent in these conditions.
One side favours studying the chronic fatigue syndrome as a single entity, arguing
that there is insufficient knowledge at present to differentiate between different chronic
fatigue syndromes.This side prefers Sharpe et al's broad definition of the syndrome, which
includes depressive illness, anxiety disorders, and the hyperventilation syndrome.
Unsurprisingly, studies that use these criteria find higher levels of depression (or
"psychosocial disorders"- yet another woolly term).
The other side argues that there is sufficient knowledge to distinguish specific
chronic fatigue syndromes, particularly the much studied myalgic encephalomyelitis, and that
it must be better science in these cases to study such syndromes in their own right.
Furthermore, it argues that the study groups based on broadbrush criteria will have been so
aetiologically heterogeneous as to invalidate the findings. This side, which includes the
national patient organisations, equates myalgic encephalomyelitis with Holmes et al's tighter
definition of the chronic fatigue syndrome, which focuses more on organic symptoms and,
again unsurprisingly, finds lower levels of depression similar to those found in patients with
cancer and multiple sclerosis- that is, the levels that might be predicted in any chronic illness.
Until the various chronic fatigue syndromes are each studied in their own right rather
than as one huge "dustbin" syndrome we shall make little progress...
Nick Anderson, British Medical Journal, 14 May 1994: 1298.
Thus, it is the different disease definitions themselves that promote the categorisation
of collections of symptoms into CFS or M E; Sharpe's broad definition that is
associated with higher levels of depression and psychosocial disorders, or Holme's
tighter definition "which focuses more on organic symptoms" and is associated
unsurprisingly with lower levels of depression, "levels that might be predicted in any
chronic illness". This process can be described as an example of the 'documentary
method'. The categories of M E or CFS have themselves been defined by reference to
two `chinese menu' style collections of symptoms that differ in certain ways from one
another (notably, in the extent to which they include, or exclude psychiatric
symptomology). In the literature, the details of individual cases (outbreaks and so
forth) were demonstrated in this chapter to be diagnosed as conforming to a particular
kind of illness-category, where the details of the cases/outbreaks, and the illness-
categories themselves are ongoingly co-constituted alongside one other.
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In the case of a medical controversy there is (of course) more than one explanation
being worked up by different authors. Therefore, the details of individual
cases/outbreaks are worked up as either belonging to, or being excluded from a
particular category, depending on who is giving the account and which case definition
they are using and constructing as resource. This lack of consensus over definitions
and categorisation has remained a participant's concern right up until the present day,
as this final contribution from the Medical Director of the M E Association makes
clear...
Extract 51: Disagreements still exist over the chronic fatigue syndrome.
Editor- Although the ME Association welcomes the royal college's unequivocal conclusion
that the chronic fatigue syndrome is a genuine and disabling condition 33 , we also agree that
their report will "engender disagreement on both sides of the Atlantic. 34 We have no problem
in accepting that the alternative name for the condition- myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME)- is
pathologically incorrect, and this is a matter that we now intend to address. However, labels
are important to patients as well as doctors, and support groups throughout the world are
unanimous in their view that "chronic fatigue syndrome" is a totally inadequate way of
describing the symptomology and associated disability. The chronic fatigue syndrome may
well become a dustbin diagnosis for anyone with chronic fatigue, and a new name that is
acceptable to both doctors and patients clearly needs to be found.[...] Our main disagreement
with the report concerns its undue bias towards psychological explanations and treatments.
Taking into account the fact that some studies have failed to concentrate on a strict definition
of the chronic fatigue syndrome and that others have used questionnaires that "perform poorly
as screeners for psychiatric morbidity in chronic fatigue syndrome", we cannot agree that the
published literature can be used to justify the conclusion that about three quarters of patients
have a co-existent psychiatric illness. Equally, we are surprised that no mention is made of
the view that when depression co-exists it is possibly a combination of nemobiological 	 (
changes and the psychological distress that so commonly affects these patients.[...]Many of
these disagreements could have been resolved if the working party had consulted more widely
during its preparation of the report. Sadly, an opportunity to create consensus has not
materialised.
Charles Shepherd (Medical Director, ME Association), British Medical Journa4 314.
January 11, 1997.
33 Joint Working Group of the Royal Colleges of Physicians, Psychiatrists, and General Practitioners.
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome. London: Royal College of Physicians, 1996.
34 Straus S.E. Chronic Fatigue Syndrome. British Medical Journal, 1996; 313: 831-2. (5 October.)
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Participants' concerns (as an analyst's narrative device).
One of my aims for this chapter has been to show how M E has been constructed as a
medical controversy by the participants who have written about it, and as pointed out
by the last contributor, "consensus has not materialised". However, the context of
ongoing uncertainty surrounding the 'M E debate' has provided an ideal forum to
show how medical practitioners and research scientists set about the process of both
defining and challenging the idea of a new disease entity in and through scientific
argumentation in research literature and correspondence. What the M E controversy
amounts to has been constituted by the participants as the juxtapositioning of two (or
three) alternative versions or explanations for the 'mystery illness', such that its nature
can be formulated in terms of mind, or body, or a more integrated combination of the
two.
An important feature of any scientific controversy is the threat that competing
versions and interpretations pose to the 'canonical script' of an objective, scientific,
and discoverable truth. This possible breach or 'reality disjuncture' is managed by the
participants here as a practical discursive accomplishment, in just the same way as the
biochemists in Gilbert and Mulkay's (1984) study made use of the empiricist and
contingent repertoires in talk about the everyday practice of science. The empiricist
repertoire has been used by some participants to establish the factuality of the claim
that there is no organic disease mechanism. For example, there are no objective
clinical signs; hysteria is a well documented condition that can explain the symptoms;
and no virus has been isolated. On the other hand, the contingent repertoire has been
used to undermine such claims. For example, studies have been badly designed; the
people who make those claims want to avoid being accountable for the lack of medical
knowledge; they cling to outdated theories; they are prejudiced against theories that do
not agree with their own, and evidence that does not fit their theories is ignored; their
theories are based on a fundamental misconstrual of what M E is, and their work is
confused by heterogeneity in their research samples.
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A further strategy in this controversy has been to challenge the utility of dualistic
reasoning in medical explanation. This is often referred to as the 'post-modern turn' in
medicine, and is glossed as a more sophisticated and complex way to explain disease
processes. It challenges the entire epistemological basis on which medical thinking
around this controversy has been based, and represents a move to take the theoretical
'high ground' in advocating a new conceptualisation of disease process that will be
more useful to explain this and any medical phenomenon. This approach makes use of
the 'Truth Will Out' device, whereby science will eventually be able to provide
rational explanations, even in the face of apparent disagreement and uncertainty.
The second accomplishment of this chapter has been to construct the author's grounds
for what will follow in the rest of the thesis. In other words, it works as a narrative
'scene-setting device'. Specifically, this refers to my later analysis of participants'
concerns that have been identified in and through the pages of this 'dialogue'. For
example:
• The management of 'reality disjunctures' in accounting for illness.
• Diagnostic labels and categorisation as a central issue.
• The use of different models of medicine.
• The categories of mind and body, and the relationship between them.
The next chapter takes the issue of diagnostic labels as its topic, exploring how
participants both deploy different labels in their discourse, and also talk about the
significance of meaning.
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CHAPTER THREE: Labels and Things
"...taxonomic items themselves, if considered in contexts
of use, will always be part of whatever action such discourse
performs, invoking all the norm-referenced accountability
that pervades the analysis of discourse and conversation..."
(Derek Edwards, 1997: 235)
The issue of diagnostic labels has been a central concern to researchers, medical
practitioners, and patient organisations, as participants in the M E controversy. Two
recent 'official' reports have both problematised issues of definition and
nomenclature; a theme that has also been repeated in various review articles (eg.
Richmond, 1989; Wessely, 1990; Archer, 1987; Straus, 1991) in which the authors
have attempted to define (and problematise) their terms of reference. There are
complexities inherent in any discussion of definitions and labels, that relate to, and
emerge from, various different theoretical approaches to the relationship between
language and reality that can be explicitly deployed (or assumed) by both participants
and analysts.
As a prelude to my analysis in this chapter, it is useful to distinguish between some
broadly different approaches to the relationship between language and reality. This
provides a background to the analysis of how participants themselves talk about
labeling and what it does; and also as a way to indexically display my own theoretical
approach to the analysis of 'talk about labeling' and also to the analysis of discourse in
which labels are (merely) used!
Language and Reality.
Traditional notions of word meaning and reference, assume that language is merely a
code for the represention of thoughts and ideas, and a means of describing objects and
events in the world. From this view words stand for things that exist in the world
independently of the way people describe them, so diagnostic labels name
I My analysis does not set out to make any claims about whether any particular label is, or is not, more
or less appropriate than any other. This issue is analysed here as a participant's concern.
diseases/illness phenomena, such as measles, heart disease, cancer, M E, PVFS,
etcetera, that pre-exist the label. This implies a realist assumption that diseases/illness
phenomena are natural sets of things that are 'out there' waiting to be discovered and
given appropriately descriptive names by scientists.
A second approach, that is relevant to participant's discourse in this chapter, is the
'labeling perspective', which derives from the interactionist school in the sociology of
deviance and social problems. This approach is a critique of traditional positivist
sociology, which treats the notion of 'deviance' as a category which simply describes
an aspect of 'social reality' that exists 'out-there' and which can be measured and
explained in terms of causal analysis. In contrast to this the 'labeling' approach argues
that deviance (or social problems) is a matter of social definition. "it [deviance] is
created by society (...) social groups create deviance by making rules whose infraction
constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling
them as outsiders. (...) The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been
applied; deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so label." (Becker, 1963: 8-9).
This perspective was popularised by Howard Becker, but the same kind of claims were
being made by others 2 ( Kitsuse, 1962; Erikson, 1962), and also by Lemert (1951,
1967), who developed the notion of 'secondary deviance' to refer to a process where
people who are labeled as deviant (or a social problem) react in some way to that
label; "the secondary deviant (...) is a person whose life and identity are organised
around the facts of deviance" (Lemert,1967: 5,7), to the extent that 'psychic structure',
'social roles', and 'self-regarding attitudes' are altered. The relevance of the labeling
perspective to this chapter is in its application to medical discourse, and therefore its
availability to be used as a resource by both analyst and participants (including
researchers in the field of M E).
2 My gloss on the labeling perspective in sociology seems to represent it as a more or less theoretically
homogenous approach. To conceptualise it in this way is to oversimplify the subtle and important
theoretical differences between the various contributors to the labeling approach which is beyond the
scope of this chapter. I draw on it here as a background to my analytic interest in the structure of
arguments in historical reviews of M E in particular.
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A third approach to the relationship between language and reality is the radical
relativist position, which argues that in naming things we constitute their essence
(Edwards,Ashmore, &Potter, 1995; Edwards & Potter, 1992a; Woolgar 1985;
Edwards, 1997). This is the position that I am taking to analysing the discourse of
interviewees and participants in the 'M E controversy'. But the other approaches are
not displayed here merely as a debunking exercise. They are important because they
are available to be used as resources by participants when they talk about labels and
labeling. There is a complex interplay between participant's use of labels, labels as a
participant's topic of talk, and the different theoretical approaches to language and
reality which are available as explanatory resources for analyst and participants alike,
in the context of discourse about a medical controversy.
The "Report from The National Task Force on Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) Post
Viral Fatigue Syndrome (PVFS) Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (M E)" (hereafter
Westcare, 1994), has provided a useful starting point to show how the development of
different diagnostic labels has been summarised, along with an account of the research
that defined their criteria.
Summary of Definitions (Extract taken fromWestcare Report, 1994, pp.88-89)
"Definitions and descriptions for the following terms have been proposed by the following
authors or groups.
Benign Myalgic Encephalomyelitis,
Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (ME),
Post-viral Fatigue Syndrome (PVFS),
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS)
CFS (NLAD)4
CFS (Australian)
CFS (Oxford)
Post Infectious Fatigue Syndrome (PIFS)
ME/PVFS ('London')
Acheson, 1959.
Ramsay, 1988.
Behan and Bakheit, 1991.
Holmes et al, 1988. (CDC)3
Schluederberg et al, 1992.
Lloyd et al, 1990.
Sharpe et al, 1991.
Sharpe et al, 1991.
International Federation of ME
Associations (IFMEA) et al, 1993.
"The different names, descriptions and definitions arose in response to different
circumstances...Benign M E was the name given to the Royal Free Hospital outbreak in 1955
and to similar endemic cases that appeared at the same period (Acheson, 1959.) Ramsay
3	 •This abbreviation stands for the 'Center for Diseases Control' in the USA.
4 National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Disease.
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(1988) provided a broader description of M E, describing the cardinal features of the illness
as he observed it. Following in the same tradition, Behan and others preferred the term
"PVFS", for which an initial viral infection was essential. In the USA the path was mainly via
a chronic mononucleosis-like syndrome which was given the name of "chronic Epstein-Barr
virus syndrome" in 1986.
Dissatisfaction with the idea that the EB virus was indeed the cause of the syndrome led
Holmes and colleagues at the Center for Disease Control (CDC), in the USA (1988), to
propose the name of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) and to offer specific criteria for its
use. The criteria given have since been criticised as being too restrictive. Schluederberg et al
(1992) proposed a relaxation of the criteria at a workshop organised by the National Institute
for Allergy and Infectious Disease (NIAID) and the National Institute for Mental Health
(NIMH).5
A further meeting was held at the CDC in September 1993. The term "CFIDS", which stands
for Chronic Fatigue Immune Dysfunction Syndrome, is an alternative name, one which is
much preferred by patient groups in the USA. Meanwhile a wider definition of CFS had been
formulated by Lloyd et al (1990), in Australia. Also in the UK, Sharpe et al produced a
definition of CFS which included a sub-category, PIFS (Post Infectious Fatigue Syndrome)
where the condition followed a definite viral infection. Recently IFMEA, Action for M E, and
the M E Association have proposed 'London criteria' for M E/F'VFS..."
The rhetorical style of this summary is notably empiricist; the absence of agency
allowing labeling to reflect rather than construct events. "The different names,
descriptions and definitions arose in response to different circumstances" (my
emphasis). In this account, the events just happened, and names arose in response to
them, rather than maybe in the process of constructin a `retrespective, disc.awy
account' (Woolgar, 1980).
The process of distinguishing between diagnostic labels is premised on a participant's
concern with causality in two related senses; one being the label and its causes, the
question of how a label 'arose' as a reflection of findings rather than being constitutive
of reality; and another being the question of the disease and its causes. On the one
hand, "...the M E patient organisations, believe that M E is a separate and recognisable
disease of the central nervous system. It is classified as such by the World Health
Organisation (International Classification of Diseases No 10, re. G93.3)..." (ibid. p.3);
further "...The commonest initiating factor [in post-viral fatigue syndrome] was a
severe viral infection, presenting as sore throat, acute gastro-enteritis, acute
5 It was proposed that the criteria should no longer exclude psychiatric disease, apart from the major
psychoses and substance abuse. This meant that depression, panic disorder, and somatoform disorder
were now not excluded for purposes of diagnosing CFS. In other words they were now considered to be
part of CFS.
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labyrinthitis or myocarditis. This initial illness was usually so severe as to confine the
patient to bed." (ibid. p.92) But on the other hand, "Over 20 studies have been
published concerning the role of psychiatric disorder in CFS, of which 11 used direct
interviews to diagnose psychiatric disorders." (R.C.P., 1996)
The discursive construction of the disease therefore involves the conflation of two
levels of causality; the disease and its causes, and the label and its causes. Discussions
about the label and its causes arise as a way to deal with problems and variations about
the disease and its causes.
These variations are here considered in the context of the mundane management of
'reality disjunctures' (Poliner, 1987). Pollner borrows the term from R.D. Laing
(1967: 35-6) to describe people's contradictory experiences of the world. Given the
mundane (and positivist science) view of the world as simply existing 'out-there', then
reality disjunctures pose a problem for mundane (and scientific) reason to resolve,
especially if the notion of an objective reality is to survive. Pollner argues that this
problem is resolved as a matter of routine by mundane reasoners as follows: "reality
disjunctures are potentially explainable by formulating one or another (and perhaps
both) of the competing versions of reality as the product of an exceptional method of
observation, experience or reportage." (ibid: 69).
The misalignments to be resolved by mundane reasoners are of a similar type to those
that are at issue for participants in the 'M E controversy'. Reality disjunctures about
the nature of the disease and what to call it, if indeed it exists as a discrete entity, are
threatening to the notion of an objective reality. These are the issues at stake for the
authors of the summary of definitions taken from the Westcare report. They (as
scientists) are in the business of 'merely' describing how names 'arose' in response to
the objective circumstances of medical research.
The fuzziness surrounding the researchers' definitions of their terms of reference, and
the kinds of phenomena that can be included in their categories, have typically been
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managed in the literature (see chapter two, above) in various ways that work to
dissolve or defuse the notion of a 'reality disjuncture', thereby preserving the notion of
an objective reality discoverable by research. This is also evident in the Westcare
extract (above).There are three analytic moves that have systematically worked to
accomplish such business. For example, scientists can argue that they are labeling
different things (eg.different diseases, different criteria for inclusion in a disease
category, incomparable samples, etc.); or they can argue (as some do in review
articles) that different labels have been used to describe the same thing, or by claiming
that some labels are wrong (eg. chronic Epstein-Barr virus syndrome). In the following
three sections I shall examine the rationale of these different analytic moves as they
are deployed in the literature and official reports.
Heterogeneity, Inconsistency, and Fuzzy Boundaries.
As pointed out above, one way that a 'reality disjuncture' has been managed is by the
argument that they might be labeling different things. The following three extracts
illustrate this kind of analytic move, using arguments about the heterogeneity of the
disease phenomena, a possible overlap with other kinds of syndromes and diseases,
different selection critera in research studies that make comparisons difficult, and the
inconsistencies of findings, which have often been related to the latter point about
non-comparability of research populations.
"As far as symptoms are concerned, people with chronic fatigue syndromes generally
experience both physical and psychological symptoms. What is less clear is whether or not
the causes, in all cases, are similarly a mixture of physical and psychological factors.
Objective physical abnormalities have been demonstrated in some patients with chronic
fatigue syndromes and psychosocial stress has been shown to play a part in some individuals.
There is evidence of heterogeneity; in other words, all cases are not the same"
(Westcare,1994:18).
"In the account which follows we describe the syndrome of CFS(ME) because this is severe
and is central to the wider group. We recognise that there are in addition some patients who
do not exactly fit this description but who are nevertheless severely and genuinely disabled by
chronic fatigue and associated symptoms. Furthermore, there are other syndromes which
overlap with CFS and which may in some cases be impossible to distinguish clearly, such as
depression, fibromyalgia, irritable bowel syndrome and chronic pain" (Westcare, 1994: 25).
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"Some researchers have studied patients who fall into the broader category of "idiopathic
chronic severe fatigue". Others have focused their attention on the sub-group of CFS(ME),
but even amongst these, differing selection criteria have been used [...]
A further block to our understanding of the chronic fatigue syndromes is that though many
abnormalities have been reported, findings have not been confirmed. The one finding which
seems to be consistent is that a significant number of patients with CFS also meet the criteria
for depression. But even here there are differences of opinion over the frequency and
aetiological significance of depression in this situation" (Westcare, 1994: 35).
By the rationale used in these extracts from the Westcare report, it is possible for the
notion of an objective reality to be retained and to make available the upshot that there
is really no disjuncture at all. If CFS(M E) is being used as an umbrella term for a set
of problems that are in fact different categories, or which have fuzzy boundaries and
actually blur into one another, then that works to diffuse the notion of a 'reality
disjuncture', and mitigates the lack of consistent research findings. This kind of
ambiguity can be heard as a way for participants in discourse about a medical
controversy to manage dilemmas of fact and accountability, rather than being 'merely'
a problem for analysts to resolve.6
Historical Reviews and 'Ontological Gerrymandering'.
This next section deals with the second analytic move described above; that different
labels have been used to refer to the same thing. Here are some extracts from journal
articles that attempt to give a historical perspective/review of 'M EVCFS', and
'PVFS'. Many such reviews take the position that there have been different
names/diagnostic labels given to what is treated as the same condition in different
socio-historic contexts. The following extracts illustrate how this kind of analytic
move is accomplished:
" Myalgic encephalomyelitis is a new name for an old disease with an impressive history of
synonyms." ( Richmond, 1989, p.1295)
"The thesis of this essay is that the origins of 'ME' lie not in 1955 or 1934, but in the last
century, and in the condition known as neurasthenia." ( Wessely, 1990)
"Post-Viral Syndrome is the current name for an illness with almost as many names as
symptoms. It is also referred to as myalgic encephalomyelitis and as epidemic
6 According to MacMillan & Edwards (in press) talk of 'fuzziness' and 'overlaps' in the content
categorisation of newspapers may have a systematic importance with regard to how the newspaper
journalists accomplish the business of managing fact and accountability.
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neuromyasthenia, and has been called Alcureyri disease, Iceland disease and Royal Free
disease in the past." (Archer, 1987, p.212)
"It is my goal to review briefly the history of CFS. In so doing, it becomes apparent that CFS
is not of recent origin. Physicians struggled to define it for centuries in the context of their
own comprehension of human pathophysiology. Many names have been given to it, each
reflecting a particular concept of the syndrome's etiology and epidemiology. Most evident
throughout the history of this syndrome is the debate about the relative contribution of
organic and psychological factors to the disease process of CFS." ( Straus, 1991)
Straus goes on to document the list of diagnostic labels that have recently been
compared with CFS. For example; febricula (Manningham, 1750), neurasthenia
(Beard, 1869), Da Costa's (Effort) syndrome (1871), chronic brucellosis (Evans,
1947), Total Allergy Syndrome (Brodsky, 1983), chronic candidiasis (Truss, 1981)
chronic Epstein-Barr virus infection ( Jones et al, 1985), fibrositis/fibromyalgia
(Yunus, 1988) and benign myalgic encephalitis ( Acheson, 1959). Many of these
diagnoses have in common that they have been discredited and re-interpreted in terms
of psychiatric explanations.
Straus concludes;
"By whatever name one chooses to describe this syndrome, careful reading of the older
literature cited here reveals that it is not new and probably no more prevalent now than it had
been..."
The structure of the arguments in these review articles are reminisceht of the
'selective relativism', that was characteristic of the labeling approach to deviance and
social problems (Becker, 1963; Kitsuse, 1962; Erikson, 1962; Lemert, 1951, 1967),
that has since been criticised by Woolgar and Pawluch (1985). They used the example
of Pfohl's (1977) analysis on 'child abuse' (amongst others) to outline an analytic
strategy that Woolgar and Pawluch refer to as `ontological gerrymandering'. A
phenomenon, X, is presented as a constant object throughout history, and Y as the
changing definitions or labels that have been applied to X in different socio-historic
contexts. They describe the structure of Pfohl's argument as follows;
"despite X for a long time, Y is only recent"
They claim that, in the context of Pfohl's analysis, the category X (child-beating) is
taken as fixed and constant throughout the ages. It is treated as referring to a
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description of behaviour, which has been defined or constructed as the category Y
('child-abuse') in the context of specific socio-historic circumstances.7
Woolgar and Pawluch argue that, in this type of argument, the phenomenon X has
been `backgrounded' by a realist assumption that it had always existed, whereas the
phenomenon Y has been selected for a constructivist analysis. 8 They point out that the
analyst's realist definition "despite X for a long time" is essential to the constructivist
account, but fades into the background (like the cheshire cat). So it may not be
immediately obvious that the constructivist analysis is contingent on a realist
assumption. This analytic move is what Woolgar calls 'selective relativism', in that
some definitions are considered to be ontologically given, while others are treated as
relative to the social context. This accomplishes boundary-work between assumptions
that are to be taken as problematic and those that are not.
If we now return and take another look at the extracts from review articles on
`ME/CFS/PVFS' (etcetera), the structure of the authors' arguments are identifiably
similar to those which Woolgar refers to as 'ontological gerrymandering'. The kinds
of accounts provided by Richmond (1989), Wessely (1990), Archer (1987), and Straus
7 Pfohl cites these circumstances as serving the professional interests of three marginal specialties;
paediatric radiology, paediatrics, and psychiatry.
s In response to the criticisms of Woolgar & Pawluch, Pfohl (1985: 230) has argued, "my point was not
that there really was something, which we today call child abuse, and that certain things prevented it
from being seen before 1960". He refutes it by quoting a sentence from his original paper, "Despite
documentary evidence of child beating through the ages, the 'discovery' of child abuse as deviance and
its subsequent criminalisation are recent phenomena"(1977: 310), and he makes his repair as follows
(1985: 230): "In actuality, I had chosen the word "documentary" as reference to the
ethnomethodological concept of "documentary interpretation" (Garfinkel, 1967:78) to qualify the term
"evidence". My intent, although implicit, was to suggest what Woolgar and Pawluch make explicit - that
historical evidence of all sorts is itself a social construction". Schneider (1985:232) has also made the
point that the examples of alleged gerrymandered research cited by Woolgar & Pawluch are more
plausibly formulated as examples of careless talk: "mistakes in applying the definitional perspective".
He points out that, "many who describe their research as constructionist or definitional do have trouble
keeping the study of claim-makers' activities separate from their own sociological definitions of
troublesome conditions." In other words, social scientists often conflate two levels of constructs - the
interpretative work of participants, and their own theoretical constructions. However Woolgar &
Pawluch offer a reading of their critique of the labeling approach that allows for epistemological
inconsistencies to be an inevitable feature both of social problems arguments, and more generally of the
same style of sociological argument as it applies to other areas (including say the historical reviews of
M E in which there is a similar blurring of members' /claims-makers' reasoning and social science
theorising.
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(1991), all resonate with the following short extract taken from an interview with a
General Practioner.
Extract 1 (MHS/Dr Smith/ 8-10)
1. MHS	 when did you first become aware of- of the illness known as M E?
2. (3.0)
3. Dr Smith in the form of M E? (.) or (.) in what we used to know it as?
The phenomenon X, is backgrounded as something that has always existed, or "what
we used to know it as"(line 3). The interviewer's category 'the illness', is constructed
here as shared knowledge, whereas Dr Smith's question at line 3 ," in the form of
M E?" implies that there are other lorms'or diagnostic labels for the same thing. This
response can be heard as an uptake of the phrase, "the illness known as M E" in the
interviewer's question at line 1, where "the illness" seems to be offered as a 'given'
category, but the name is indexed as being problematic. This is accomplished by MHS
saying, "the illness known as M E" rather than just M E, and also by the three second
pause at line 2 (Pomerantz, 1984; Sacks, 1987). The category X (the illness) has been
neatly backgrounded by both participants. It is assumed that X has been around for a
long time. Doctors have always seen this particular group of medically unexplained
symptoms, which although were labelled as Y at the time, they turned out to be the
same category, X.
The analytic move of 'selective relativism' functions discursively in this kind of
exchange, and that of review articles, to background any potentially contentious
questions (or reality disjunctures) surrounding the generic categorisation of a group of
patients with medically unexplained symptoms and chronic debilitating fatigue. From
a historical view, it is difficult to see how any such claims could be made about this
category with any pretentions to objectivity, so this form of gerrymandering helps to
manage some of the tensions and fuzziness inherent in categorising current medically
unexplained conditions in terms of the unexplained conditions of previous eras.
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Selective relativism functions here both to make implicit claims about the category X,
the illness phenomenon, and also to undermine definitional claims about the category
Y - the label. In other words, realist assumptions are backgrounded in the implicit
claim that there really is a phenomenon that has existed over time, that is, a medically
unexplained syndrome; whereas the constructionist argument functions to undermine
the claims inherent in different definitions of that phenomenon as being contingent on
social context.
Of course, in Extract 1 this could just be seen as a way of talking that functions to
manage issues of fact and accountability that arise from the participants' engagement
in discourse about a controversial topic; the form of the interviewer's question
signalling acknowledgement of M E as a controversial category, and the doctor's
response as establishing his footing for making any kind of comment about it. In other
words the participants are indexically displaying the potential for confusion by
attending to questions such as, 'Are we talking about the same illness? Is this the
same illness with a different name?'. This display of fuzziness paradoxically functions
here as an inoculation against being heard as confused or gullible.
The following analysis of 'official' definitional-work continues to build on the notion
that realist and constructionist arguments can be variably deployed by participants
themselves, in making and dismissing claims about labels.
'Official' Definitional-Work.
The following extracts, are taken from a statement made in the most recent "Report of
a joint working group of the Royal Colleges of Physicians, Psychiatrists, and General
Practitioners" (hereafter, RCP, 1996), and represent a 'policy statement' on the topic
of which name is currently claimed to be the most appropriate and which is not. These
claims have been grounded by the authors in two different models of medicine, the
biomedical model, and the biopsychosocial model, which in a later chapter I have
referred to as two 'medical repertoires' that can be drawn on variably in discourse.
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Also included are extracts from the Westcare report, a news item that followed the
publication of the RCP report, and an extract of data from an M E Self-Help Group
discussion.
Extract 2
The joint working group's report firmly dismisses the term ME on three grounds. First
'encephalomyelitis' [inflammation of the brain and spinal cord] describes a distinct
pathological process absent from the conditions included within the term ME. Second, the
term ME implies a single diagnostic entity, which is unlikely and unproved. Third, it ignores
the psychological dimension.
(RCP Report, October 1996, p.44)
In this extract the authors draw variably on the discourse of realism and constructivism
to warrant their dismissal of the term M E. The first thing to notice is that it makes use
of a realist interpretation of language to make the claim that M E is not the correct
name. In realist discourse the correct word is assigned to the thing that has the
appropriate characteristics. Language is taken to be a 'mirror of reality', so that names
are claimed to reflect the properties of things/entities. So by this rationale, if the name
does not reflect the properties of the thing (in this case the conditions included within
the term M E), then it must be the wrong name.
The authors of extract 2 also deploy a constructivist account of how 'entities' are
constituted as such by the terms that name them. They point out that the term M E
implies that there is a "single diagnostic entity" that exists as something separate
called M E. The entity can be dismissed therefore by dismissing the term that
constructs it. This use of a constructivist analysis neatly manages the "unlikely and
unproven" (and even contradictory) nature of current biomedical research claims
which focus on the search for a discrete organic causal pathogen.
The authors then revert to a realist interpretation of the relationship between words
and reality in making the claim that the term M E does not reflect the properties of
"the psychological dimension", which is here constructed as given or known and has
been discursively `blackboxed' 9 by the use of the definite article. It is not construed as
'a psychological dimension', or 'a possible psychological dimension', but "the
9 Latour, 1987; Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Woolgar, 1988.
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psychological dimension" (my emphasis). This packaging of a contentious claim as
'given' information is a common feature of discourse in such settings as law courts,
advertising, journalism and propoganda, as well as in mundane conversation
(Edwards, 1997). It functions here in the context of medical scientific discourse as a
conflation of knowledge and reality that can counter a possible alternative
explanation m, since what is known about is taken in positivist science as equivalent to
what is real.
Extract 3.
The Daily Express printed this next extract on Thursday October 3, 1996, following
the publication of the RCP report. Dr Robert Kendall, a representative of the Royal
College of Psychiatrists (joint authors of the document), was quoted as saying:
People who use the term [ME] are unshakeably convinced that its a physical disease. That's
not just wrong, it is meaningless. ME (Myalgic encephalomyelitis) is natal? appropriate term
because there's no evidence of any inflammation of the brain or spinal cord...nor is there any
reliable evidence that chronic fatigue syndrome is linked to common viral conditions...
There are various things accomplished by this statement. First, Kendall implies that
the term M E is used exclusively by people who hold a particular set of convictions
that
M E is a physical disease. These are convictions (sets of beliefs) that are
"unshakeable" even in the face of a lack of supporting evidence. Second, his claim
that this conviction is "not just wrong, but meaningless" is bolstered by his
construction of M E 'believers' as irrational dogmatists, who continue to hold
unsupported beliefs. This formulation of "people who use the term M E" functions to
discredit them, and to undermine their accounts and their research activities. (Some
organisations which currently use the term M E, for example The M E Association,
and M E Action, also carry out research.)
Again we can see how a contingent repertoire is being used in formulating an account
of error or doubt. Kendall claims that it is particular kinds of people who use the term
io I am thinking here of the counter criticisms that have been made about research that identifies a
'psychological dimension' as a causal explanation for M E/CFS.
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M E - those who have "unshakeable" beliefs about the nature of the illness. This
notion of 'illness beliefs' is being constructed in opposition to a more scientific,
empirical way of talking about illness labels, in which terms (and their implications)
are chosen on the basis of "reliable evidence" rather than 'unshakeable convictions'.
A third aspect of this extract is the way that Dr Kendall establishes his categorisation
of the preferred term CFS. The notion of a physical disease is dismissed again in the
case of the term CFS, "nor is there any reliable evidence that chronic fatigue syndrome
is linked to common viral conditions". Thus any available research evidence into the
organic pathogens associated with the illness is dismissed as unreliable. The rhetorical
force of this statement by Dr Kendall works both to undermine "people who use the
term M E", and the research that has been done on organic aetiology. His comments
work to bolster up the alternative implication that CFS should be treated as a
psychiatric disorder, whilst avoiding the contingency that any counter evidence he
might use to support this implication, would be vulnerable to the same kind of
critique. Rather than making a direct formulation of CFS as a psychiatric disorder,
which might make the psychiatrist's account vulnerable to accusations of having a
stake in constructing a psychiatric category, the account focuses on the reasons why
CFS/M E cannot be considered a physical disease. The rhetorical power of the
argument therefore lies in what is ignored or taken as 'given' or unproblematic, and
can be interpreted as an example of what Jonathan Potter (1996: 184) calls the
"extended sense of ontological gerrymandering; one realm of entities is constituted in
the description while another is avoided."
The following two extracts, from RCP and Westcare, have in common that the authors
formulate reasons for CFS being a preferred term.
Extract 4
The most appropriate term for this syndrome is chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS), which is
accurate and free from unproven aetiological claims. CFS can be operationally defined, which
will aid future research and clarify aspects of clinical practice...
(RCP report, p.5, paragraph 3.1.)
Extract 5
The main merits of the term `CFS' are that it focuses on a major feature of the condition,
namely fatigue, and that it is aetiologically neutral.
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(Westcare, 1994, p.15)
First, CFS is claimed to be "accurate" (line 2, extract 3). It describes a syndrome- a
collection of symptoms for which no medical explanation has been found, where the
central feature is chronic idiopathic' 1 fatigue which lasts for six months or longer. The
term claims to represent the symptoms accurately and neutrally, in a way that is "free
from unproven aetiological claims". In other words it does not implicate causality.
Further, CFS can be "operationally defined", which means that CFS can be diagnosed
by reference to the presence of symptom combinations from a 'symptom-pool' which
are the criteria for defining CFS. 12 Thus CFS is an "accurate" description of the
symptoms that define it; in other words the concept being defined is part of the
definition itself.13
Furthermore, the symptoms that form the criteria to define CFS turn out to be a
collection of symptoms for which no medical explanation has been found, plus
chronic idiopathic fatigue. On page two (paragraph 2.1) of the RCP report it is pointed
out that, "Patients presenting with physical symptoms for which it is not possible to
give a clear medical explanation are not new... 14 Aetiology and classification of these
symptoms and syndromes is controversial. The Royal Colleges have stressed that
approaches to these patients should not be based on simple biomedical models.
Rather, they advocate a combined biological, psychological, and social approach in
formulating what predisposes to, what precipitates, and what perpetuates the
symptoms." However, the biological component of the model is played down in the
case of CFS. See extract 3, "people who use the term[M E] are unshakeably
convinced that its a physical disease. That's not just wrong, it is meaningless...nor is
there any reliable evidence that chronic fatigue syndrome is linked to common viral
conditions". This dismissal of possible physical pathogens rhetorically situates CFS in
the arena of psychosomatic illness and emphasises the role of psychosocial
explanations. The claim that CFS is a "neutral", "accurate" term can therefore be seen
II The term 'idiopathic' refers to symptoms which have no known cause.
12 Two case definitions for chronic fatigue syndrome appear on page 43 of the RCP report, Appendix 3.
13 This is rather like the way that operational definitions of intelligence work. "intelligence is what
intelligence tests measure" (Boring, 1929).
14 For an overview of this the RCP refer to Creed F, Mayou R, Hopkins A. (1992).
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as a discursive device which functions as a move to take the scientific 'high-ground',
and also to manage a potentially hostile response from a lobby of patient organisations
which have 'bought-into' the term M E and its aetiological implications of organic
disease.
The following two extracts resonate with one another in that they both position CFS
rhetorically against M E. Extract 6 is taken from the Westcare report, and extract 7 is
taken from a discussion at an M E self-help group meeting.
Extract 6
'M E' carries the implication of organic rather than of psychogenic disorder, whereas the
term `CFS' is aetiologically neutral..
(Westcare, 1994, p.16)
Extract 7
(MHS/ MEPSYCH/ 45-135)
1. FM	 M E was used a lot initially (.) a lot of writers are changing over to the
2. term Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (.) because M E implies a particular
3. cause  (.) something to do with the nerves and the muscles (.) and
4. because there's no clear cut cause been fo:und (.) then people are
5. saying "well let's not give it a label that implies a cause (.) when we
6. don't actually know what it is yet (.) let's have a general label that
7. implies the symptoms"(.) so most of the articles in the professional
8. journals (.) appear under the name `Chronic Fatigue Syndrome'(.) you
9. don't usually get an article under the name of M E anymore.
The last extract provides an analytic link with the positioning of CFS against M E that
we have also seen in extracts 1-5. In extract 7, FM is a clinical psychologist who is
leading a discussion with members of an M E self-help group. FM has come to the
group to talk to members about CFS, so in this case he is working to justify his
resistance to their use of the term M E. He makes the claim (line 4) that since no cause
has yet been identified that can justify the use of the term M E, then "let's not give it a
label that implies a cause"(line 5). FM argues that this warrants the use of chronic
fatigue syndrome in professional journals as a "general label that implies the
symptoms"(lines 6-7).
FM is here constructing a distinction between the two labels M E and CFS which is
based on the notion that some terms can be merely descriptive, whereas other labels
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are doing some attributional work in naming causes. Rhetorically, this positioning of
CFS against M E works to undermine the attributional work accomplished by the term
M E (and people who use it), that it is a physical illness with an organic cause, and to
imply that the term CFS is neutrally descriptive and therefore performs no such
attributional work.
FM, and the authors of the Westcare Report and the RCP Report are claiming to be
neutral and merely descriptive of the symptoms of the illness in their choice of CFS as
a preferred label. However, in extracts 6 and 7 an asymmetrical analysis of naming
draws on a constructivist account of language I5 , as a device to resist the claim that ME
is an appropriate term, and a realist account of language is a useful device to make an
'unambiguous' claim about the appropriateness of the term CFS as being 'merely
descriptive' of 'what is going on'. In other words, participants can deploy either realist
or constructivist notions of the relationship between language and reality in a flexible
way; realist commonsense to bolster claims of objectivity and neutrality, and
constructivism to undermine that claim in others. Latour (1987) refers to this feature
of scientific discourse as the "two faced Janus character of science". Truth claims are
bolstered by an empiricist (realist) repertoire, whereas doubt or error can be managed
or constructed by deploying a contingent (constructivist) repertoire (Gilbert and
Mulkay, 1984). These kinds of repertoire can be deployed as resources in both
scientific and ordinary discourseI6.
15 From this view language is not taken as a neutral system for conveying information; words chosen to
describe everyday things carry powerful implications for the causal explanation of events or states
(Edwards & Potter, 1992).
16 Including mine! Apparently by avoiding reflexivity, in this chapter, my analysis seems to 'tell it like it
is' concerning their discourse being full of gerrymandering devices. Derek Edwards tells me that rather
than being defeated by a ququoque of this kind, I should be reassured that the devices I am analysing
(and using) are so discursively robust as to be unavoidable. Alternatively, I could use Jonathan Potter's
rhetorical 'opt-out clause' (1996: 84), "This largely unreflexive voice helps to keep the text as simple as
possible..." (And in any case, he assures us that discourse analysis is an inherently reflexive form of
analysis.) Or perhaps I should choose to be reassured by the poetic comments of MacMillan's textual
therapist (Sybil Sleepstone) who advises that "Reflexivity, like hypnotherapy, has various levels. Some
dabble near the surface, dipping into reflexive moments, flirting with the images evoked in the
reflection, before returning to the safety of the mundane. "(MacMillan, 1996: 29).
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The 'action-orientation' 17 of the descriptions which have been analysed in this section
can be summarised as follows: First, categorisations can work to exclude potentially
relevant considerations, for example, calling an illness M E can work to exclude a
psychological aspect, whereas calling the illness CFS can work to `blackbox'
psychological explanations and downplay organic considerations as being of minimal
importance. This effectively draws boundaries around what is important, and is usable
as a form of 'ontological gerrymandering'. Second, the empiricist repertoire is used to
claim the 'scientific high-ground' for those who use the term CFS. Claims of
neutrality, accuracy, and objectivity are made in opposition to the "unshakeable
beliefs" of 'people who use the term M E'. Third, a contingent repertoire is used to
construct error by formulating such people as fanatics who hold irrational beliefs.
'Unofficial' Definitional-Work.
The next section takes a look at the way that General Practioners have not just
deployed, but talked about names and labels and what they do, in the context of
interviews. This kind of data represents a more informal context, in which medical
practioners are responding to a researcher's questions about their own experiences
with patients, rather than in the more formal context of 'official' reports or statements
to the press. The analysis in this section focuses on the use of explanatory repertoires,
a point which was applied earlier to extract 3, representing part of a psychiatrist's
statement to the Daily Express.
In the following extracts the doctors refer to a diagnosis of M E as a category that
patients might be motivated to choose.
Extract 8 (MHS/Dr Brown/150-162)
1. Dr.Brown ye:s 0 yes (.) you see I think the thing is heh I mean obviously when
2. we don't fe:el well and we try to make sense of it (.) and we want a
3. name for it (.) u::m (.) because if you've got a name for it (.) it makes
4. us feel safer (.) that we're not at the whims of some random (.)
5. whatever (.) or we're going mad or (.) so I think we desperately want a
6. name (.) and if it is a name whereby somebody else is going to have to
7. get us better (.) as opposed to sort of saying (.) "yeah I'm running my
17	 •This refers to a feature of discursive psychology where discourse is taken to be primarily a social
activity.
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8. lifestyle (.) or I'm running my marriage or (.) my job (.) in a way that is
9. wearing me out and exhausting me" (.) then the onus is then on me to
10. fix it (.) and it's far easier if somebody else can fix it for me (.) y'know
11. so I think alot of people want the diagnosis of M E because they then
12. think that that's going to (.) either make it easier or somebody else will
13. be able to cure it (.) u::m
Extract 9 (MHS/Dr Smith/100-106)
1. Dr Smith
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
it's a new fad for patients because it's a way of (.) avoiding
responsibility for (.) psychological illness(.) if you've got a physical
label (.) then it's not your fault (.) nor can you do anything about
it (.) whereas the people who we labelled (.) neurasthenia (.) or weak
personalities y'know going back in the old psychiatric textbooks
(.) those at least you could confront (.) so it's a useful label for
avoiding (.) in some patients (.) er (.) for avoiding er (.) internal
conflict
Extract 10 ( MHS/ Dr Kelly/ 72-111)
1. Dr Kelly I think they like to find something that they are happy to accept the
2. title thereof
3. MHS	 = mm
4. 0
5. Dr Kelly now whether the title
6. (2.7)
7. Dr Kelly I suppose you've got to say 'well why do they like the title
8. (1.9)
9. Dr Kelly of M E rather than depression?'
10. (1.5)
11 .Dr. Kelly I thi:nk that there is a (.) a social class element to it as well
12.	 (2.5)
13.Dr. Kelly that prefers the title of M E (.) that dislikes the title of depression
14.MHS	 = what sort of group would you say preferred to be ?
15.Dr Kelly = I think the middle classes prefer to be labelled M E rather than
16.	 depression
All of these extracts have in common that they use a contingent account to formulate
the label M E as a category which is used by patients as an avoidance device. That is,
certain types of patients might want to use the diagnosis of M E to avoid an alternative
explanation for their problems. The label of M E is being constructed by these doctors
as an error, a dubious category, or at least a category that is open to abuse. They each
formulate certain types of patients who might want a diagnosis of M E. Dr Brown
works up an account of the social context and stressful lifestyles of patients who
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would rather not have to get themselves better by changing their lives, Dr Smith
formulates M E as "a new fad" (extract 9, line 1) - a physical label for a psychological
illness - used by patients to avoid having to face up to their problems, and Dr Kelly
uses the notion of social class to categorise people who prefer the label M E rather
than depression. With this group of extracts, a contingent repertoire is being used by
the doctors to construct M E as error, by categorising a group of people who might
want to use the diagnosis as a device to avoid psychosocial interpretations of their
problems.
In the following three extracts, Dr Walker is making available a range of concerns
relating to his own choice of label, in the context of a story about a particular patient.
Extract 11 (MHS/Dr Walker/ 511-518)
1. Dr Walker I think this post-viral fatigue is a medically more popular name (.) in
2. the sense that it implies that you know what's causing it (.) I'm not
3. sure that's necessarily true (.) but it's (.) y'know it's something that I
4. think doctors are sometimes more comfortable with (.) they can say
5. 'well this is a bit like glandular fever (.) it's the aftermath of an
6. infection' (.) and it's a working model if you like (.) which gives some
7. sort of reassurance that it isn't in the mind (.) there is something
8. (.) there's a possible explanation
Extract 12 (MHS/Dr Walker/512-523)
1. Dr Walker yeah (.) I mean (.) I'm trying to think what we actually ( ) said to this
2. case (.) because (.) he had problems over the school (.) being
3. off (.) obviously and having sick notes (.) and I think we
4. agreed to put post-viral fatigue (.) syndrome (.) or just post-viral
5. fatigue (.) rather than actually putting M E (.) on the grounds that there
6. was a lot of emotive feeling about it (.) whether y'know you took the
7. tack that he was trying it on or something like that
Extract 13 (MHS/Dr Walker/608-616)
1. Dr Walker it's something that (.) certainly (.) se:en by patients (.)and I think to
2. some extent (.) would be (.) y'know (.) by doctors as well (.) is this
3. business of whether physical and mental things equate with real and
4. imagined (.) do you know what I mean?
5. MHS
	 = yes
6. 0
7. Dr Walker and I think that's (.) that's the danger of it (.) y'know (.) that you
8. equate stress related things as being imaginary (.) and you equate
9. physical things with being real (.) do you see what I mean?
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First, in extract 11, Dr Walker gives an account of why PVFS is a preferred term for
doctors to use. In formulating this account he constructs two categories in opposition
to one another. The category that "doctors are sometimes more comfortable with" (line
4) is construed as "the aftermath of an infection" (lines 5-6). Such biomedical
explanations are construed here as the bona fide business of medicine, and this
category is used here by Dr Walker to manage his accountability as a GP in his choice
of a particular term. But that is not the whole story. As a GP, he needs to be sensitive
to the patient's needs as publicly accountable, so this biomedical category is being
contrasted with an alternative implied category that is less reassuring: That is, there
isn't anything medically explainable. He formulates his choice of PVFS as
"something we agreed to put"(line 4, extract 12), to avoid the alternative formulations
that might be associated with a diagnosis of M E (which he attends to at line 7 by his
reference to the possibility that the patient might have been "trying it on"). He goes on
to provide a further warrant for using a diagnostic label that implicates a physical
cause (PVFS), by referring to "this business of whether physical and mental things
equate with real and imagined" (extract 13, lines 3-4). Thus, in a narrative formulation
of his patient, Dr Walker gives an account of why he chose to use the term PVFS
rather than M E, which he attributes here to both the doctor's and patient's need to
manage a range of accountabilities relating to the factual nature of the patient's illness.
The participants in these extracts are making relevant two culturally related
constructions. First, as the research literature points out (eg. Wessely, 1990),
psychiatric illness is still associated with a stigma which many patients would prefer to
avoid. Second, one of the central problems or tensions in the 'M E controversy' relates
to the popular (and sometimes medical) categorisation of psychological illness as 'not
real', when contrasted to physical illness as 'real'. Westcare (1994: 18) have also
pointed out that our common understanding and management of diseases takes place
within a cultural context that traditionally distinguishes between physical and
psychological illnesses. "We live in a society which is used to thinking of illness as
'physical' or 'psychological' and which harbours different attitudes towards these."
(ibid: 18)
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The report further points out that the popular notion that psychological illness is not
'real', has its bureaucratic corollary: "a person whose condition is judged to be
'psychological' is debarred from being awarded the higher mobility component of the
Disability Living Allowance. Such an award can only be made if the person's
complaint is 'physical'."(ibid:16). Thus, policing the boundaries between 'physical'
illness and 'psychological' illness is also built into the way that social welfare benefits
are distributed. In view of this, participants might be expected to orient to these kind
of constructions and their practical consequences, when accounting for themselves, or
their patients in both formal and informal talk about illness.
Labels, Categories and 'Boundary-Work'
The next section looks further at this notion of medical 'boundary-work', focusing in
particular on the kind of categorisation that is being done by two General Practitioners
in the following three extracts, and what that accomplishes.18
Extract 14 (MHS/VValker/595-616)
1. Dr Walker heh er yes we were going down this road of physical things
2. and mental things (.) I mean (.) I think it's something doctors are
3. particularly bad at (.) we tend to like to put illnesses into
4. categories (.) and label them (.) there's this scientific thing of
5. y'lcnow (.) attaching labels to things (.) and you tend to gg down (.) the
6. mental illness sort of route or a physical illness sort of route (.) a::nd (.)
7. I think people aren't sure which route to go down (.) and that maybe (.)
8. it may be because the model is wrong (.) do you see what I mean? (.)
9. the model of putting peo-illnesses into these different boxes is wrong
Extract 15 (MHS/ Dr Turner/ 229-244)
1. Dr Turner chronic fatigue syndrome (.) or post-viral fatigue syndrome (.) I
2. don't-I never really liked the idea of syndromes I have to say (.) I
3. canna do with syndromes (.) I prefer disease labels I think
4. MHS	 = why? what's wrong with syndromes?
5. Dr Turner = well syndromes (.) I think technically a syndrome is (.) a group of
6. symptoms that nobody's found a reason for (.) technically that might
7. be more appropriate for this particular disease (.) because nobody's
8. found an underlying cause for it (.) er but I think M E and what it
18 I would like to thank Derek Edwards, Jonathan Potter, Kevin McKenzie, and Claudia Puchta, for their
helpful analytic comments on extracts 14, 15, and 16.
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9. stands for (.) is making a more definite statement about it (.) is
10. recognising it more as a disease entity rather than (.) yeah (.) than as I
11. say a syndrome (.) and y'know there are quite alot of
12. syndromes (.) basically what they are a collection of symptoms that are
13. recognised as belonging together in certain people (.) er (.) a sort of
14. repeated pattern of symptoms but nobody's found a cause for it yet (.)
15. er as I say I prefer what seems to be rather a definite (.) with M E it
16. seems a little more specific (.) a little less nebulous
Extract 16 (M
1. MHS
2.
3.
4.
5. Dr Walker
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.MHS
20.
21 .Dr Walker
22.MHS
23.
24.Dr Walker
25.
26.
27.MHS
28.
29.Dr Walker
HS/Walker/698-742)
do you- do you think that M E's a (.) a new illness? because there's
been so much about it in recent years(.) do you think it's a new illness
or ?
I think it probably isn't (.) er I mean it's (.) I-y'know alot of people
have probably had other diagnoses made (.) I mean there's certainly
over the years there are various
(1.0)
that we've had (.) things put down as I say to glandular fever (.) or to
one sort of illness or another (.) who haven't fitted into diagnostic
categories (.) or have tended to be rather sort of ignored because
people don't want anything to do with them (.) which is something
medicine's really quite good at doing (.) if they don't understand
something (.) you go down two routes (.) you either say 'well
this is something to really find out about' or people tend to rather
ignore it and hope it will go away (.) and I think that's happened over
the centuries
do you think the kind of ignore it and it'll go away kind of equates to
saying 'well (.) there's nothing really wrong is there?'
= yeah
= it's sort of stress related thing ?
that's right yeah (.) that's been a- an (.) attitude about things that
haven't been understood (.) or haven't fitted in (.) with what (.)
certainly in the last couple of hundred years
= so the biomedical model really (.) sort of looking down the (.)
physical lens if you like
= yeah (.) and that's I suppose particularly the last hundred
30. years (.) because I mean y'know sort of (.) particularly sort of scientific
31. model of medicine (.) developed in the nineteenth century
32. (2.0)
33. became the dominant sort of model in the first part of the twentieth
34. century (.) rather to the exclusion (.) of anything that didn't fit into that
35. model (.) and I think the changing attitudes-the attitudes are changing
36. (.) but it's still er (.) it's still (.) er (.) part of the doctor's model in a
37. sense (.) things that don't fit in (.) either need explaining (.) or if you
95
38. can't think of a logical explanation for them (.) they get put into a sort
39. of rag bag of funny illnesses that you can't explain (.) probably stress
40. related y'know
In extract 14, Dr Walker is formulating a critique of an explanatory model in which
illness is categorised as either mental, or physical. This is worked up as "this scientific
thing" (line 4); something that science has set up by putting illnesses into categories
and labelling them. This is marked as something for which doctors are notorious:
"particularly bad at" (line 3). If the doctor isn't sure which route to go down, the
mental or the physical, then that's an indication that this kind of exclusive model is
wrong (line 8-9).This makes available the notion that the uncertainties in medicine,
things that medicine fails to explain, such as the controversial category of M E, might
be an artefact of using the wrong model, rather than necessarily unexplainable by any
criteria. By implication, there might be another explanatory model that would be more
appropriate to solving the problem of categorising unexplained illness phenomena.19
This linking of uncertainty with an inappropriate model functions here to manage a
tension between on the one hand, the concern of medical science to can categorise
diseases according to the facts of their existence, and on the other hand, the fuzziness
of unexplained illness in the context of medical practice. Dr Walker is distancing
himself from the notion of scientific labelling and dualistic categorisation. The model
is derived from science and 'merely' used by medical practitioners. But at the same
time he is part of the medical world that deals with uncertainty and can make
mistakes. There are also a broader set of people allied to the medical world, who are in
the business of explaining and categorising illnesses, therefore the categories are not
invented as such by medical practitioners. However, Dr Walker has to formulate
himself both as a practitioner who is knowledgeable and professional, rather than
merely a technician who applies ready made models to sort out patient's problems. At
19 This implication again serves a similar function to a 'truth will out' device. To re-cap, the notion of a
`TWOD' was introduced by Gilbert & Mulkay (1984) in their study of the discourse of biochemists. It
was used to reconcile two inconsistent repertoires where they occurred together in the context of
informal interview talk. Specifically a TWOD is used as a way of holding on to a scientific position
when there is not yet unambiguous grounds for it. Here it functions to manage the tension between the
demands of science-based medicine and the uncertainty of medical practice.
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the same time he deploys this notion of 'scientific models as resource' to distance
himself, as a practitioner, from personal accountability for the model being wrong.
In extract 15, Dr Turner formulates the category of 'syndromes' (lines 1-3) against the
category of 'disease labels' (line 3), for which he expresses a preference. His
preference orients to the concern that medicine is set up to deal with definite, specific,
recognisable 'disease entities', and causal stories. M E and "what it stands for" (lines
8-9) does that work. It makes a "definite statement" that you are dealing with a disease
entity (lines 9-10). Dr Turner claims that he would rather use the term M E to be more
definite, "a little more specific (.) a little less nebulous" (line 16). This is contrasted
with the notion that syndromes are associated with uncertainty: There is no causal
story, no disease entity, but just a group of unexplained symptoms.
He also appears to be formulating syndromes as an interim category, in which
knowledge is not yet solid, "a sort of repeated pattern of symptoms but nobody's
found a cause for it yet" (13-14) which allows for the possibility that syndromes may
become ontologically solid as disease entities, when medicine finds out what they are.
So in this context, calling something a syndrome is a way of talking that formulates
medical uncertainty as an interim state which could eventually be replaced by a body
of solid knowledge. And in lines 8-10, and 15-16, he seems to be moving towards the
idea that there might be enough solidity to move out of the syndrome category and into
the disease category and call it M E, even though here he seems to treat this process as
a decision based on clinical judgement, rather than 'solid fact'. This categorisation of
an interim state of knowledge functions here as 'boundary-work' to delineate the bona
fide concerns of "definite statements"(line 9) and "recognising it more as a disease
entity" (line 10), as mainstream medicine, and anything else, more nebulous, as
marginal to it. The fuzziness of this interim state of knowledge also appears to be the
point at which various tensions are being managed, for instance between medical
science and medical practice, and between labels and reality.
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Extract 16 occurs a little further on in the interview with Dr Walker, occasioned by the
interviewer's question about whether M E is a new illness. The question orients to the
recent high profile of M E in the media, and also the literature which has defined M E
as an old illness with a new name. 2° This question provides the occasion for him to do
some categorisation and 'boundary-work'.
Dr Walker formulates two generic categories in opposition to one another. These are
"diagnostic categories" (lines 10-11), and "the rag bag of funny illnesses that you can't
explain" (line 39). These two categories implicate the notion of the all-inclusiveness
of medicine. They cover everything that a GP might ever need to deal with in practice.
Diagnostic categories are here given as unproblematic, clear cut medical business, in
contrast to "the rag bag" which is being constructed here as marginal to that, and
routinely functioning to manage uncertainty "if you can't think of a logical
explanation" (line 38).
At lines 10-16, Dr Walker starts to offer a binary formulation of how medicine deals
with uncertainty. Either medicine is knowledge-based, "something to really find out
about", or things that aren't understood are dismissed in an "ignore it and hope it will
go away" style. The interviewer's question at lines 19-20 offers a formulation of the
dismissal strategy, that 'ignoring' is equivalent to saying there's nothing for medicine
to find out, apart from stress-related things. 'Stress-related' and 'nothing really wrong'
are therefore offered here as equivalent categories by the interviewer, and this appears
at first glance like a contradiction- after all, stress is not 'nothing'.
However, in terms of the context of medical talk, stress can be used as a vague
universal sort of category. If something is stress-related, it could be a physical illness
(such as heart disease or ulcers), it could be psychological (such as anxiety disorders),
or it could be more like social hassles; part of the ordinary business of living life, like
financial worries, domestic problems, housing and unemployment, bereavement, and
all the things that make life difficult for people.
2° See for example, Richmond, 1989; Wessely, 1990; Archer, 1987; Straus,1991.
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Therefore, if something is stress-related, then maybe it's a borderline case for
medicine to deal with, or possibly just outside the jurisdiction of medical intervention.
If stress-related is taken to mean the consequence of a difficult life, just normal 'wear
and tear', then in terms of mainstream medical business, that could be equated with
"nothing really wrong". The interviewer's formulation at lines 19-22 offers him that
kind of boundary between stress and medical concerns, which he takes up at line 24,
that's been an attitude". From line 27-36, this "attitude", or way of looking at things, is
worked up as a model of medicine in relation to which things get defined. Thus
unexplained illness becomes an artefact of a particular way of categorising illness. In
other words, it is constructed in opposition to the biomedical and scientific, which is
currently still dominant, and exclusive of things that don't fit.
At this point it is useful to identify the issues that seem to be 'at stake' for the doctors
in the last three extracts. There are contradictions between the working up of scientific
knowledge-based medicine as an ideal model, and the routine of dealing with things
that are controversial or not that well understood. These are common themes in all
three extracts. They are therefore attending to two potentially conflicting demands.
The GP's identity as a professional medical practitioner whose job it is to apply
knowledge-based medical science in trying to advise, treat, and refer patients
appropriately, and also the doctor's accountability for a system of medicine that can
fail to provide clear-cut explanations. This is a contradiction that has been managed in
the discourse in a variety of ways.
Scientific, 'knowledge-based' medicine (by definition) excludes things that are not
understood, or that no-one has yet found a cause for. It is deployed in the talk to
accomplish 'boundary-work'. 'Syndromes', 'the rag bag', or 'stress-related' are
categories that can be used as a medical safety-net to `catch-all' the excluded items.
But these might also be formulated as 'interim categories', which implies that have the
potential to become disease labels either when a cause has been found, or when they
are picked up at the point of physical or psychological crisis, as they might be with a
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heart attack, an ulcer, or a nervous breakdown. Labels, in this context, are to do with
categorising things according to what is known and is medically explainable. Illness
phenomena get identified as entities and given a disease label, which means they are
real, or at least known about within the jurisdiction of scientific knowledge-based
medicine.
The uncertainty of things that are, in practice, not well understood or controversial, is
managed in the talk by two related devices that allow the doctors to reaffirm the
scientific legitimacy of medicine, which pivots on a delicate balance between science,
medical practice, and clinical judgement. First, in extract 14, the uncertainty is
managed by attributing it to the use of the wrong model; in other words, its science
that got it wrong in the first place. Second, in the other two extracts, Dr Turner and Dr
Walker both use a 'truth will out' device as a reconciliation device that allows medical
science, to finally provide sound explanations.
For example, Dr Turner implies that syndromes are an interim category that could
become disease labels when they have found a cause, and has the potential to become
assimilated into knowledge-based medicine. Dr Walker claims that "attitudes are
changing" towards a model of medicine which fails to explain such a lot. He works up
his account of historical time, tying a particular medical "attitude" to a specific
historical time and a particular kind of model. This notion of a 'changing attitude'
orients to a more enlightened approach that will replace the old attitudes in due course,
and hints that this will provide a solution to the current state of confusion which
surrounds the "rag bag of funny illnesses that you can't explain". What is interesting
here is that it's medical science itself that is being given a historical basis, and it
functions here almost like a contingency account for doctors who still use the
empiricist repertoire. In other words, labels and diagnostic categorisation are
contingent on empiricist medical models, which are themselves contingent on the
historical context of medicine.
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To summarise, this chapter has focused on the controversial issue of diagnostic
labels. My analysis has shown how authors and speakers have attempted to define and
problematise their terms of reference. I have examined labels and their meanings as
the topic of discourse as well as being deployed as part of that discourse. Three
different kinds of models of the relationship between language and reality were
identified as part of participants' resources in talk about labels: these were the
representational model, the labeling approach, and a constructivist model. I have
demonstrated how authors and speakers have appropriated these different assumptions
about language in making particular kinds of analytic moves that work to resolve
'reality disjunctures' and preserve the notion of an objective medical reality. For
example, participants have argued that
• they are labeling different things
• they have used different labels for the same thing
• or that some labels are simply not appropriate, since they do not provide an
accurate description of the illness
The chapter has also shown how speakers make use of empiricist and contingent
repertoires to argue that one label (CFS) is more appropriate than others, and that it is
certain kinds of people who are motivated to use labels such as M E.
Finally, the chapter has looked at labels, categorisation, and the kinds of medical
boundary-work that can be accomplished, particularly with reference to the
construction of a division between mental and physical illness categories. Physical
diagnostic categories are equated with clear-cut medical business, and everything else
is marginal to that; part of a `rag-bag' and probably stress-related. Similarly to the talk
in the medical literature analysed in chapter two, different kinds of medical model are
deployed in GPs talk, as an explanatory device. Uncertainty is constructed as being a
product of the biomedical model that explains and categorises illness, and is exclusive
of things that don't fit into its categories. From this view, 'mystery illness' would be
explainable only in terms of a new model of disease that will eventually allow medical
science to provide complex biopsychosocial explanations for all illnesses. This is
again reminiscent of the 'truth will out device' that was deployed by the authors of
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some extracts in chapter two (for example, David et al, 1988; Gill, 1970; Jenkins,
1991) as a way to overcome the 'fruitless dichotomy' of dualistic explanations.
In the next chapter, I shall further examine the participants' concern with the
relationship between mind and body that has been central to the debate about the
existence and naming of a mystery illness. As I have just pointed out, some authors
have drawn on the idea that there are different models of medicine that might be used
to explain illness. The next chapter explores the background to these different kinds of
models, and analyses the way that they can provide the discursive resources not only
for categorising illness as either physical or mental, but also for accomplishing illness
talk as a realm of moral accountability.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Repertoires of Mind and Body
One of the focal participants' concerns in the dialogue of chapter two was an
orientation to the different possible kinds of explanations for the 'mystery illness'.
Specifically, participants in the 'M E controversy' worked to position their claims
against possible alternative explanations. Three broad groups emerged as the major
participants constructing the controversy. There were those who constructed the
phenomena as an organic disease called M E, and worked to dismiss the alternative
suggestion that the illness was hysterical in nature (Ramsay & O'Sullivan, 1956;
Galpine & Brady, 1957; The Medical Staff of the Royal Free Hospital, 1957;
Poskanzer, 1970; Shepherd, 1992; Hume, 1992). Those who adopted the alternative
position worked, on the other hand, to show that there was a lack of reliable evidence
for an organic explanation and proposed a different way to interpret the available
clinical data in terms of a psychosomatic explanation; that is, the reported symptoms
were claimed to be 'conversion symptoms', the somatic presentation of an underlying
psychological disorder (McEvedy & Beard, 1970; Easton, 1978). The third group of
participants took a metaposition in the debate, pointing out the dualistic nature of such
'either/or' arguments, which they claimed &live Itom an unhelpful 	 " ouldaledi
separation of mind and body". In other words, the third group of participants claim
that the other participants in the controversy have formulated their arguments by
stressing either organic or psychological causes for the illness. They, on the other
hand, take the scientific 'high ground' and propose what they consider to be a more
complex "multiaxial framework" for thinking about and explaining disease
processes(Jenlcins, 1991; Gill, 1970; David et al, 1988).
The relationship between mind and body is taken up here, in this chapter, as a
participants' concern in the 'M E controversy', and also as a central and abiding
concern in medical discourse. This chapter therefore aims to examine the rhetoric of
mind and body by looking at the different kinds of 'models of medicine' that have
been written about by practitioners and researchers in the fields of medicine, social
science, and psychiatry. Rather than being conceptualised here as explanatory models
that have provided a framework to guide doctors' diagnostic thinking and practice,
these are reformulated as explanatory repertoires 1 that can be deployed variably by
both lay and professional participants in the rhetorical context of their accounting
practices to accomplish particular kinds of discursive business.
The Legacy of the 'Biomedical Model'
George Engel (1977: 591) has used the language of cognitivist social science to define
the term `model'as a "belief system".2
broadly defined, a model is nothing more than a belief system utilized to explain natural
phenomena, to make sense out of what is puzzling or disturbing. The more socially disruptive
or individually upsetting the phenomenon, the more pressing the need of humans to devise
explanatory systems.[...] Disease par excellence exemplifies a category of natural phenomena
urgently demanding explanation
In his 1977 paper, Engel claimed that the dominant model of disease in Western
society is biomedical and rooted in both philosophical reductionism and Cartesian
mind-body dualism.
The biomedical model reduces disease to disorders that are located in the physical
body, and which can be explained using a language derived from physics and
chemistry. The aim of this approach was therefore to isolate the single smallest
biochemical or neurophysiological factor as the cause of disease. Engel points out that
the biomedical model is a scientific model which embodies a set of assumptions and
rules based on the rationale of the scientific method. On the other hand, explanatory
models, he claims, can also be popular 'folk models' or belief systems which he refers
to as "efforts at social adaptation" rather than scientific investigation. He makes this
distinction to call attention to the possibility of cultural differences in the kinds of
i The term 'repertoire' is used here in the same sense as conceived by Gilbert & Mulkay (1984) and
developed by Potter & Wetherell (1987).
2 His reference to a "belief system [...] utilized to explain natural phenomena" implies a cognitive
process, where 'beliefs' are formed as a result of our cognitive-perceptual experience, and thereafter
guide or influence our thinking. The terms "natural phenomena" also imply an objective reality that
exists independently of our constructive practices.
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'folk models' that lay people might use to explain illness. 3 He goes on to make the
claim that not only has the biomedical model become the dominant folk modelt in
modern Western societies, but also in medicine it has acquired the status of a dogma,
demanding that anomolies should either be forced to fit the model, or else be excluded
entirely. In other words, all disease should be explainable in terms of physical
mechanisms, otherwise it should not be included in the category 'disease'.
The biomedical model is also inherently dualistic, in the sense that it distinguishes
between a physical body and a mental sphere, excluding the latter from its
explanations of disease mechanism. The origin of this dualism is usually attributed to
the philosopher Descartes who (in line with the Christian church's doctrines)
distinguished between the material body as a vessel for the spiritual soul that inhabits
it. In Descartes time, the human mind therefore came within the domain of the
spiritual, which was conceptualised as an entirely different kind of substance from the
material and, as such, could not (and should not) be investigated and explained in the
language of scientific investigation. Engel points out that "the Church's permission to
study the human body included a tacit interdiction against corresponding scientific
investigation of man's mind and behaviour"(ibid: 593).
An historical legacy of this restriction (coupled with the Enlightenment endeavour
towards scientific rational explanation) was that the biomedical model tended to focus
on the physical body to the exclusion of the psychosocial. This is not to say that the
spiritual, or psychosocial had previously been considered unimportant as an influence
on people's state of health (see Ackerlcnecht, 1982), but rather that the Enlightenment
project aimed "to 'disenchant' nature and see 'God's world' as a mechanism,
composed of physical matter obeying natural mechanistic laws rather than spiritual
ones" (Gordon, 1988: 24).
3 In so doing he constitutes the very duality of folk versus scientific models, where these are construed
as having a differential ontological status.
4 Which implies that the epistemology/ontology divide dissolves or, rather, that lay people have
internalised the biomedical model to the extent that it informs and blends with their commonsense 'way
of knowing'. (Of course, from the perspective of ethnomethodology, scientists and social scientists
frequently take members commonsense practices and work them up as theoretical constructs in the first
place, therefore the degree of resonance between commonsense and theory is likely to reflect that.)
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Engel's Critique of the Biomedical Model
The main focus of Engel's contribution was to call into question the adequacy of the
biomedical model. He accomplished this by challenging the grounds of both the
reductionist and exclusionist positions - that disease does not exist as such unless
some biochemical evidence can be identified to explicate a phenomenon in terms of
cause and effect. In other words, all phenomena not meeting these criteria should be
excluded from the category of disease.
He uses the examples of diabetes mellitus and schizophrenia to demonstrate how
biomedical reductionism and the exclusion of the psychosocial can "distort
perspectives" and even "interferes with patient care". As Kety (1974:957) points out
Both are symptom clusters or syndromes, one [diabetes] described by somatic and
biochemical abnormalities, the other [schizophrenia] by psychological. Each may have many
etiologies and shows a range of intensity from severe and disabilitating to latent or borderline.
There is also evidence that genetic and environmental influences operate in the development
of both.
In both of these disorders, it is considered possible to have a biochemical defect
which provides the potential for the disease, without actually experiencing the illness.
"Diabetes and schizophrenia have in common the fact that conditions of life and living
constitute significant variables influencing the time of reported onset of the manifest
disease as well as of variations in its course." (Engel, 1977).
In other circumstances, (say, for example, in the case of M E) someone may continue
to complain of feeling ill when biomedical investigations have failed to identify any
biochemical abnormalities that can explain the reported symptoms as disease. Engel
points out that by focusing exclusively on the measurement of clinical signs and
laboratory testing, the biomedical model fails to take into account the cultural, social
and psychological context that he considers necessary to analyse the meaning of the
patient's verbal account of illness experience. The relationship between the doctor and
the patient is also argued to have a powerful influence in the process of treatment and
healing, and it is claimed that an appreciation of psychosocial contingencies can
facilitate a positive therapeutic outcome. For example, "...insulin requirements of a
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diabetic patient may fluctuate significantly depending on how the patient perceives his
relationship with his doctor." (Engel, 1977). In other words, the biomedical model
does not provide a basis for understanding the complexity of disease, its causation and
treatment.
"The crippling flaw of the model is that it does not include the patient and his attributes as a
person, a human being. Yet in the everyday work of the physician the prime object of study is
a person, and many of the data necessary for hypothesis development and testing are gathered
within the framework of an ongoing human relationship and appear in behavioural and
psychological forms, namely, how the patient behaves and what he reports about himself and
his life. The biomedical model can make provision neither for the person as a whole nor for
data of a psychological or social nature, for the reductionism and mind-body dualism on
which the model is predicated requires that these must first be reduced to physico-chemical
terms before they can have meaning." (Engel, 1980: 536)
The Clinical Application of Systems Theory: A Biopsychosocial Model
Engel therefore proposed that a new kind of model should be introduced into clinical
practice to address the deficiencies of the biomedical model, and this he derived from
the rationale of systems theory. General Systems Theory was developed by the
biologists Paul Weiss (1959, 1969) and Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1968, 1969).
According to Engel, systems theory overcomes the limitations of the biomedical
model by "providing a conceptual framework within which both organised wholes and
component parts can be studied" (ibid: 536). More specifically, the natural world is
understood as a "hierarchically arranged continuum" which ranges from subatomic
particles, upwards through atoms, molecules, organelles, cells, tissues, organs/organ
systems, the nervous system, the experience and behaviour of the person, within two
person relationships, family, community, culture-subculture, and in the context of
society-nation, and biosphere. Each level of the hierarchy has its own distinctive
properties and characteristics, and therefore requires particular kinds of study and
explanation; on the other hand each of these systems is also a component of higher
systems. As Engel formulates it, "Nothing exists in isolation. Whether a cell or a
person, every system is influenced by the configuration of the systems of which each is
a part, that is, by its environment." (ibid: 537).
A criticism of reductionist biomedicine is that the physician's exclusive focus on the
body and disease has resulted in a neglect of the patient as a whole person within the
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social context. It was for this reason that Engel proposed the adoption of a new
conceptual model, the biopsychosocial model, to take into account the complex
interplay between the biological, psychological and social environments in the
explanation of disorders and the treatment of patients.
As we have seen, this approach takes a process, or systemic understanding, rather than
a linear causal explanation of disease as previously taken in the biomedical model.
The upshot of this kind of explanatory model is that all illness/disease process is
potentially explicable in terms of the interplay of multifactors, which are biological,
psychological, and also socia1. 5 The psychosocial aspects of this process have been
investigated by the application of social science theories to medicine and to the study
of health and illness.
Social and Psychological Factors and Health
Any textbook on the sociology or social psychology of health and illness informs us
that there has been an enormous amount of research into the social and psychological
aspects of health. Sociologists and social psychologists have identified a wide variety
of factors that can have a potential influence on people's health. For example,
Scambler (1991) identifies three broad types as (i) socio-environmental, (ii)
behavioural, and (iii) psychological; "Socio-environmental factors include poverty,
social support and relationships with others, work and unemployment; behavioural
factors include smoking, exercise and dietary practices; and psychological factors
include personality type, coping capacities and health beliefs." (ibid: 21)
The first category, socio-environmental factors, represents a whole set of influences on
people's health whose causes cannot be directly addressed by health practitioners,
even though their effects are generally understood as `stressors' with which the patient
has to cope. The second category, behavioural factors, represent a set of influences
5 The biopsychosocial model is thus `multifactorial% which is to say that two more kinds of
factors/variables (the psycho-social) have been added to biological factors to explain disease. This is
fundamentally different from the way that the social is conceived of in constructionism where the social
is constituted rather than being treated as a variable. From this view the biological and the psychological
are also social constructs. There is nothing that stands outside of the socially constructed world.
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that can be addresssed by medical practitioners in practical ways, to the extent that
they are able to educate people about the likely consequences of their habits and
lifestyle. For example, they might try to persuade patients to give up harmful habits,
such as smoking , and adopt healthier ones, such as taking appropiate amounts of
exercise. Doctors might wish to convince their patients to cooperate with a plan for a
healthier lifestyle, especially as this relates to a presenting medical problem, say for
example, heart disease.
The third category, psychological factors, represents a set of influences that are
deemed to be internal to the individual and are drawn on to explain a causal
relationship between disposition (personality), perception, and experience of pain6,
stress, or susceptibility to disease; or between cognitive health beliefs (explanatory
models), illness attributions, and illness behaviour.
Also, as pointed out before, the factors described in the first (socio-environmental)
category, such as poverty, lack of social support, difficult relationships, and problems
with work and unemployment, all represent ' stressors' that the individual has to find
the resources with which to cope. The extent to which people are able to manage stress
has become a major focus for cognitivist social psychology research, which has
investigated the dimensions of people's 'coping styles' as a potential means to identify
styles that are typically more or less effective at coping with stress (e.g. Folkman &
Lazarus, 1980; Folkman et al, 1986a, 1986b; Amirkhan, 1990; Endler & Parker, 1990;
and Rohde et al, 1990).
Dialogue Box 7
DE:	 Of course, the identification of factors and variables and their subdivision is itself a
feature of members practices and is analysable as such. Being able to distinguish between
socio-environmental, behavioural and psychological can be a way of not having to comment
6 See, for example, Ogden's (1997) discussion of the role of perceptions and interpretations in the 'gate
theory' of pain, and transactional theory.
7 This dialogue is based on a tape recorded discussion between the author (MHS) and her supervisor,
(DE) in the context of discussing an earlier draft of this chapter (October 8th, 1997). As I pointed out in
the synopsis outlined in chapter one (page 23), I have used an 'alternative literary form' to perform the
construction of parts of my text as a dialogic and intertextual practice, rather than simply presenting the
product of such practices. This activity mirrors a rhetorical move I made in chapter two, where I chose
to call attention to the constructive processes that are normally obscured in the craft of \ yr ting a review.
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on the socio-environmental if you're a doctor. And w there may be a blurring of this
distinction, to the extent that the socio-environmental can be made relevant via the
mechanism of psychology (in, for example, the relationship between stress, coping and
personality). Categories can start to merge and interfere with one another. If that's the case,
then this raises the question 'What are the categories there for in the first place?' Are they
categories, not so much that describe the world 'out-there', but conceptual resources for
saying what doctors are able to deal with. In other words, they're indexical 8 categories for
the practice of medicine rather than descriptive categories for the etiology of disease.
MHS: Yes- that's the route I was going down. I want to say that the models- reformulate
them as repertoires that do things- they  function in particular ways. Especially the
psychological aspects- including things like health beliefs, disposition of the patient, coping
style etcetera. And the behavioural ones are things like smoking, exercise diet, lifestyle, and
illness behaviour- all things for which the patient can be held accountable.
DE:	 So this does moral categories as well- being held to account is more mind and body
isn't it? You can only be held accountable for something if you have a choice -free-will.
MHS: Yeah, that issue comes up in the next section- where Kirmayer uses a case study of
conversion disorder (hysteria) to illustrate psychosomatic theory and practice. One of the
categories he describes is 'biological psychiatry', where you get this collapsing of mind and
body into.., the same substance.
DE:	 It's the brain!
MHS: Yeah- and so they (the patients) aren't accountable, and yet they are!
DE: That's the kind offlexibility for which you would  requireflexible cowcepts- medical
concepts that are designed to cover every aspect of accountability.
MHS: Exactly!
The Influence of Psychosomatic Medicine
Another way that the influence of psychosocial factors on people's health has been
constructed has been in and through the discourse of psychosomatic medicine.
Ackerknecht (1982:17) introduces his "history of psychosomatic medicine" thus:
Psychosomatic medicine begins with the Greeks. It finds a place in Galen's system as
diseases of passion, a concept current until the middle of the nineteenth century. The great
French and German clinicians of the nineteenth century were all familiar with psychosomatic
diseases. During the twentieth century the field was for a while monopolized by
8 Indexicality' is a feature of discourse in which the meaning of an utterance depends on its context of
use. " Descriptions...are not to be regarded as disembodied commentaries on states of affairs. Rather, in
the ways in which they (1) make reference to states of affairs and (2) occur in particular interactional
and situational contexts, they will unavoidably be understood as actions which are chosen and
consequential. Like other actions, descriptions are 'indexical' and are to be understood by reference to
where and when etc. they occur." (Heritage, 1984a: 140, emphasis added)
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psychoanalysts. The psychosomatic specialist is essentially the doctor who listens to the
patient.
He points out that psychosomatics has been around for 1700 years, under the label of
'passions' (products of the vital soul that could both produce and also cure disease),
and which were included in the six non-natural causes of disease in the Galenic system
(Galen, 1821). The 'passions' were also discussed by philosophers such as Plato 9 who
criticised Greek physicians for treating the body whilst neglecting the 'fair words' for
the soul that were deemed necessary for a cure (in Hermann, 1919). It was not until
1929 that the term 'passion' was replaced by the term 'emotion' in the Index catalogue
of the Library of the Surgeon General.
Despite evidence to the contrary I °, Ackerknecht claims that the emergence of
psychosomatic medicine is commonly dated to around 1900, and was at that time
dominated by the Freudian concepts of psychogenic neurosis, and symptom
conversion.' I In 1978, Shepherd commented about Dunbar's (1943) writings in his
text, Psychosomatic Diagnosis; "much of what passed for psychosomatic medicine
was little more than a scientifically naive attempt to impose psychoanalytical
theorising on physical illness in an attempt to demonstrate psychological causation:'
However, the most recent 'official' emergence of the psychosomatic movement in
Britain was marked by the appearance in 1956 of the Journal of Psychosomatic
Research. I2 Despite the current existence of many different theories about the genesis
of psychosomatic disease, and different techniques of psychotherapy, Ackerknecht
claims that a consensus appears to have emerged at least on the following point
the basic element of psychosomatic medicine represents a dialogue between doctor and
patient, their cooperation, the rediscovery of Dunbar's 'gentle art of listening' and the notion
of the 'doctor as placebo' (Lain Entralgo, 1956, p. 173). In this way the gap created by the
progressive mechanization of medicine may be filled. Our own age, which tends to solve all
problems through the creation of new specialities, has reinstated this basic element of
10 He claims that medieval psychogenic explanations of plague survived into the 17th century, and
continued into the 18th century, (Ackerknecht, 1973; 1981) as did psychogenic explanations of
pulmonary tuberculosis, fever, consumption, gout, scurvy, as well as hysteria and hypochondriasis.
II One of the explanations offered in chapter two (McEvedy & Beard, 1970, extract 18, page 41) is
based on the Freudian notion of hysterical symptom conversion.
12 Although the Journal of Psychosomatic Medicine had been published in the USA in 1939.
9 And of course later by Descartes whose treatise on The Passions of the Soul' was published in 1656.
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medicine by creating a new speciality. The psychosomaticist seems above all to be the
physician who specializes in listening to the patient (ibid: 23).
On the other hand, Kirmayer (1988) argues that, in practice, psychosomatic medicine
has had little impact on the fundamental organisation of biomedicine. Rather than
seeing all disease as psychosomatic, in the sense that the disease process involves both
mind and body, a view supported by the World Health Organization (1964), he claims
that psychosomatics has been marginalised as a category of 'not quite legitimate
illnesses' that are equated with the imaginary and 'best handled by mental health
practitioners' (Kirmayer, 1988: 64).
To illustrate his claim he uses the case history of a patient who had two overlapping
episodes of illness; the first which was diagnosed as a CVA I3 , where there was "a
satisfying fit between history, physical findings, and a specific neurological diagnosis"
(ibid: 68), and the second, where the patient experienced symptoms that resembled her
initial stroke, but was later diagnosed as suffering from a conversion disorder
(hysteria).
she had symptoms that followed the conventional lay person's representation of the body
rather than established neuroanatomical pathways. Thus it appeared that the problem involved
Mrs. D's mind rather than her brain. Of course, the neurologists, if questioned, would state
that her mental symptoms were ultimately caused by the brain. But hers was a disorder in
brain function not structure, akin to learning bad habits, and of little neurological interest
except as a difficult diagnosis to make.
Mrs. D's bouy was seen by the doctors as alternately suffering from a disease of the
imagination or no disease at all. Depending on what level of self-awareness the physicians
attributed to her, she was then viewed as pitiable and incompetent or as foolish and histrionic.
Either way her sense of self was challenged and she perceived rightly when she thought that
some of the housestaff physicians were laughing at her (ibid: 68).
Kirmayer describes the way that the 'real' disease of the first episode held the interest
of the biomedical practitioners, who treated the patient with care and attention. In
contrast , during the second episode, he claims that the illness was not treated as
legitimate; since there was no identifiable disease, the biomedical practitioners lost
interest and the patient felt as though her distress was not being taken seriously.
13 Cerebrovascular accident (Stroke).
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Kirmayer identifies three different models of psychosomatic illness that were
eventually used by psychiatrists in this case, to explain the patient's second episode of
illness. The first model; 'biological psychiatry', explains her illness as being the result
of organic vulnerability following the CVA. From this view, the conversion symptoms
were either a consequence of reduced ability to cope due to brain damage, or hysteria
associated with biologically determined personal traits. In this account, the dichotomy
of mind and body are eliminated to the extent that both neurological disease, and
psychological disorder, are reduced to the activity of the central nervous system and
are therefore construed as being the same material substance. However, the contrast
between mind and body is preserved in this account, to the extent that reason and
emotion are mapped onto brain structures; the cerebral cortex being responsible for the
co-ordination of higher mental function such as rational thought, whereas the more
primitive brain structures being the origin of bodily responses such as emotion,
arousal, and motivation. This anatomical hierarchy of the brain is argued, by
proponents of this approach, to parallel the ascent of man from mammals driven by
passion and aggression, to civilised beings capable of rational thought and reflection.
From this view, psychosomatic symptoms such as conversion symptoms are therefore
attributable to irrationality; "an infantile expression of distress" taking the form of
somatic symptoms rather than rational verbal expression. Kirmayer points out how the
organic explanation of biological psychiatry implicates the patient in a lack of social
competence, whilst managing to avoid the construal of psychological distress as a
form of social protest, thereby implicating a moral dimension which v, ould otherwise
suggest the possibility of a blameworthy victim. However, in this case, access to the
'sick role' does implicate the patient in a tacit agreement that their competence is
diminished due to a disordered or malfunctioning brain.14
The `psychodynamic approach' explains hysterical conversion symptoms as the result
of conflicting desires that are not directly accessible to the conscious mind." The
14 See earlier comments in the dialogue between DE and MHS (page 110), this chapter.
15 DE: I see you've included 'hysteria' in the category 'psychosomatic' here. Some persectives in
medicine would want to distinguish psychosomatic disease from hysteria- psychosomatic can be
113
rational/irrational split is relocated from the structure of the brain, to the division
between the conscious and unconscious mind. Treatment aims to overcome the 'self-
destructive irrationality' of the unconscious urges in terms of rational conscious
control by the development of self-knowledge. In other words, emotions are to be
controlled by verbal description and scientific explanation, rather than by suppression
and symptom conversion. Kirmayer describes how one of the psychiatrists interpreted
an angry outburst by the patient, as further evidence of her psychodynamic problem
rather than as anger and frustration at the prospect of yet another psychiatric
evaluation of her illness. He points out how the clinician's account is privileged over
the patient's in interpreting the 'symptom'. Since the psychological conflict is not
deemed to be accessible to the patient's conscious mind, the clinician must therefore
claim 'authorship' of the meaning of the patient's symptoms in terms of an underlying
psychodynamic disorder.
Dialogue Box
DE: Psychodynamic explanations sort of mess up attribution theory don't they?
There's a kind of  crude notion of external and internal causes and it's like you're
accountable for internal causes but not external ones. But the trouble is- you can't
help it if it's the way your brain is, or the way your unconscious is- after all your
unconscious isn't accountable! This makes rather flexible, what in attribution theory
is meant to be clear-cut - internal/ external.
MHS: So... the question of accountability becomes dependent on the willingness of the
patient to co-operate (or not) with the doctor's therapeutic intervention...
The third approach to psychosomatics, described by Kirmayer, is 'behavioural
medicine', which derives from learning theory in academic psychology (Skinner,
described as stress-induced breakdown of the autonomic nervous system that led to actual physical
diseases that needed treating but the causes were psyclwlogical(eg. skin rashes, and hypertension),
whereas hysteria refers to  false physical syndromes- like paralysis with no physical basis. You seem to
be using it (the term psychosomatic) as any kind of presenting symptom that a GP might come across
that has a psychological cause.
MHS: I think it depends who you read as to how these things get categorised
DE: But it's of  interest in your project that someone might want to include things like ulcers and skin
rashes in the same category as hysteria: why put them in same category? It's to adopt the approach
that the mental/physical causation is so important as to obliterate differences. From one perspective in
medicine someone wouldn't vt,ant to have them in the same category!
MHS: I think it relates to whether you wanna talk about things being real or imaginary. I think
Kirmayer wants to call attention to the distinction that's often made between 'real' as physical and
psychosomatic as 'it's all in your mind'. But there's no neutral way to list/categorise things is there?
However I choose to categorise things I'm doing some business!
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1971; Seligman, 1975). From this view, the psychosomatic symptoms of the patient's
second episode of illness are interpreted as a result of learning that illness elicits care-
giving from other people. This is not seen as happening at the level of the individual's
awareness, but as having been acquired by means of the normal psychological
processes of learning, and maintained by external environmental contingencies.
'Stress' is also formulated as the demands of the environment to which people can be
more or less vulnerable. Stress is seen as related to lifestyle, as determined by
economic necessity, character, or moral choice. In other words, individuals may
choose to subject themselves to stress in pursuit of goals that can be judged either
morally good or questionable. As pointed out earlier, many of the social origins of
stress are taken as `givens'(which cannot be directly addressed by medical
practitioners), therefore the treatment emphasis is on individual lifestyle change and
psychological coping.
Kirmayer argues that the three models of psychosomatic illness used by the
psychiatrists to explain the patient's second episode of illness clearly occupy a moral
realm of accountability. In Western culture, where it is claimed that the biomedical
model has become the dominant 'folk model'(Fabrega, 1975), 'real' disease is equated
with things that 'just happen to us', for which we are not responsible and cannot be
held accountable. The unexplained phenomena of an illness that has no clinical signs
and therefore cannot be categorised as disease in terms of the biomedical model, can,
on the other hand, be accounted for in terms of psychogenic explanation as illustrated
by the three types of psychosomatic explanation outlined here.
The diagnosis of a psychosomatic condition transforms the real into the imaginary, the
innocent into the culpable. This is well brought out in the range of informal terms used to
label psychosomatic patients and their conditions.[...] They range from causal dismissal of the
problem as not real ("It's all in your head," "imaginary," "pseudoseizures," "pseudoangina,"
and so on) to frankly moralistic labels. [such as "malingering", "Green poultice syndrome,"16,
"fake" etcetera]
(Kirmayer, 1988: 66)
16 "symptoms that are relieved when paper money is applied directly to the affected region" (Kirmayer,
1988: 66).
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The responsibility is thereby shifted to the patient, rather than being a reflection on the
skills of the physician who has been unable to supply a biomedical, scientific
explanation for their disorder. This observation has led to the accusation that the
speciality of psychosomatics functions to protect the legitimacy of the biomedical
model by "siphoning off cases with which it is unsuccessful"(Lock & Gordon, 1988:
11).
The main thrust of Kirmayer's argument is that the speciality of psychosomatics
reproduces the dualistic relationship between mind and body that is central to
biomedical explanation. He claims that "psychosomatics expresses its holistic
perspective in dualistic terms that ultimately invoke the same values of rational control
and distance from passion and bodily-felt meaning that are part of the mechanistic
world view of biomedicine." (Kirmayer, 1988: 58)
This formulation also reproduces the distinction between 'objective' scientific
evidence, and 'subjective' personal experience, as two ways of knowing, where in the
tradition of empiricist biomedical science the medical 'reality' of disease is
ontologically definable by means of the identification of 'objective' clinical evidence,
whereas the patient's subjective feelings of illness are symptoms that need to be
interpreted within that framework in order to be legitimated as the symptoms of 'real'
disease. This kind of distinction between subject and object is of course itself a
construction that has its origins in the broader empiricist and scientific rationale of the
Enlightenment project, where a distinction is made between ontology and
epistemology or between scientific evidence and personal experience. The mind-body
dichotomy, re-worked as a kind of epistemological dualism, (rather than the Cartesian
dualism of two different substances for mind and body) is a variant of that same
rationale (DiGiacomo, 1992).
This kind of epistemological dualism of two different 'ways of knowing', is manifest
in the distinction that is often made between disease and illness (Eisenberg, 1977),
where disease refers to pathological changes in the body (or at least, the physician's
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biomedical interpretation of those changes), and illness refers to the patient's personal
experience of distress. As pointed out earlier, these two are attributed a different
ontological status in biomedicine which is discursively accomplished using the
empiricist and contingent repertoires in order to construct one as factual, and the other
as a construction, with reference to illness attributions, personal beliefs, disposition
etcetera.
If we return to the biopsychosocial model that was described earlier as being a
challenge to the biomedical model, we can see that the bio-psycho-social components
of this model roughly correspond to the categories of disease, illness, and sicknessI7
where the latter term, sickness, refers to a social condition, status, or role that is
adopted or attributed to the person suffering from a disease or illness. I8 Of course the
distinction between these three categories is very central to the way that people talk
about disorders in general, and especially a controversial disorder such as M E. In
chapter two, we saw how the patients' symptoms of illness, as manifested in the
reported outbreaks, was variously interpreted as being either an example of physical
disease or a case of psychiatric illness such as hysterical conversion. Thus, symptom
reporting (of the illness experience itself) is not necessarily equated with the incidence
of disease, and this whole question of whether or not the mystery illness could be
defined as a new disease entity was seen to have a bearing on the legitimacy of the
patient's illness and consequently on the status of the patient as a 'sick' person. 19 In
other words, in the context of the dominant biomedical model, accounting for oneself
as legitimately 'sick' appears to involve the definition of one's illness experience in
17 See chapter one, pp 2-6 (above) for a discussion of these categories.
18 DE: What's at stake in your thesis is what is the extent of the domain of the social? Why don't you
just discuss social  factors in ME? Why don't you be the second and third variables?
MHS: Whereas what I want to do is say, 'What are the second and third variables doing? What have
they been constructed to do?
DE: But you have to look at how all of the variables (including the biological) are constructed and
what they do.
MHS: I tried to do that in chapter two.
DE: But it's worth spelling out that you aren't the second and third variables- given that there's
such a thing, in your topic, as the social (or the psychological), you have to state that you're not
actually investigating that or using that as your resource, but you're studying the whole 'ball game'.
19 See also chapter 6, Angela and Joe's illness narrative, where the discursive processes of accounting
for oneself (or one's relative) as legitimately 'sick' are analysed in more detail.
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terms of the category of disease. Or at least it involves the patient in a tacit agreement
that their psychological competence is diminished, and therefore that their subjective
experience of illness symptoms has a dubious status.
This argument provides the grounds to support a claim that there may be a cultural
basis for somatisation 20, which has been constructed as an "idiom of distress" (Katon,
Reis and Kleinman, 1984: 208), whereby a psychological disorder can be presented in
terms of bodily symptoms. It has been claimed that approximately 60% of primary
health care involves psychosocial distress which is presented to the physician as
physical symptoms (ibid: 209). The psychological dimensions of illness are often felt
by patients to be addressed by doctors most commonly in the context of 'dismissive
rhetoric', so that patients may become anxious about presenting such problems to the
doctor. This could be formulated as an interactional basis for somatisation:
the presentation of disorder in bodily narrative [...] precludes discussion of the psychological
dimensions of illness except when in reference to the moral or mental ineptitude of the
patient. Such cultural values may be reflected in medical discourse in a dismissive rhetoric
that labels the person as 'a crackpot', a 'neurotic female', a 'hypochondriac' .(Parsons &
Wakeley, 1991: 127).
This kind of observation is supported in the literature by a survey of general
practitioners' categorisations of "Trouble' and Types of Patients", in which Stimson
(1976: 50) noted that "whereas references to physical illness were likely to be made in
the context of least trouble, references to psychiatric illness and psychological
problems were made, with the exception of one doctor, entirely with reference to
patients who cause the most trouble." Stimson goes on to point out that
Some patients are seen to be 'genuinely ill', or are 'really ill'. A real illness is a physical or
organic illness. The 'real' patients are 'medical patients, that is, with real pathology'. From
the point of view of doctors one advantage with a physical illness is that it can be diagnosed
because it is a 'definite clinical disease'. Psychiatric illness is not so genuine, may not be
medical, and is often hard to diagnose.[...] For doctors the trouble with vaguer illness, and
especially psychiatric, is that people very often will not accommodate to their illness. Indeed
the attitude of the patient to the illness may be seen to be part of the illness: 'Patients who
cause the most trouble are patients complaining of vague ill health or symptoms who after
intensive investigations with negative findings, cannot come to terms with their symptoms,
20 White (1982) discusses the link between cultural explanations of illness and `somatisation' and
`psychologisation'. He points out the differences between the Chinese and Americans in making
interpretations of symptoms of depression; the Chinese using somatic or situational explanations,
compared with the Americans being more likely to use psychological explanations.
118
and fail to respond to reassurance or medication'. Finally in the context of 'trouble' there is
the matter of time: Patients with psychiatric illness are seen to take up much more of the
doctor's time. They are more demanding and they have to be seen more often. (Patients who
cause most trouble are) 'People who are basically depressive and not prepared to see it, who
deny any psychogenic factors in their illness, who feel that they have an exclusive right to
take as much time as they want to talk about themselves and their ailments'(ibid: 51-2).
The Psychologisation of Illness
On the other hand, some researchers have complained that physicians all too readily
attribute patients' symptoms to a psychological disorder. Goudsmit and Gadd (1991:
449) give the following definition of psychologisation,
Psychologisation, i.e. the exaggeration of the role of psychological factors when considering
the aetiology and treatment of illness...". They go on to give a range of examples in which
they argue that health-care professionals have, "shown a clear preference for psychological
explanations [...] where the available evidence does not justify such an emphasis; where
alternative explanations are ignored or dismissed, or not even sought.
For example, they describe a study of patients with subacute encephalitis, where "The
bizzarre behaviour induced physicians to ignore neurological findings, to overlook
evidence of organic syndromes (such as intermittent lucidity and markedly abnormal
electroencephalograms) and to make functional diagnoses." (Himmelhoch et al, 1970).
They point out how in the early history of AIDS, "Doctors frequently missed the
damage to the central nervous system, writing off the often vague symptoms of
dementia as related to stress or depresssion" (Shilts, 1988: 207). Other illnesses that
are often mistaken for a psychiatric disorder are myasthenia gravis (Nicholson et al,
1986), and multiple sclerosis (Easton, 1989), where in the latter case "its early
symptoms- fatigue, loss of sensation, weakness and visual changes- are frequently
misdiagnosed as psychoneurosis or even a more severe psychiatric disorder, such as
hysteria, particularly in women." And, as Robinson (1988) has observed from his
study with MS patients "the disclosure of the diagnosis gave back to many
respondents their credibility and legitimised their strange behaviours which had
previously been labelled as neurotic, hypochondria, malingering or drunk".
M E/CFS and Repetitive Strain Injury (RSI) are two more conditions in which the
patient's symptoms are often interpreted as an indication of an underlying
psychological disorder. In her study of CFS sufferers, medical anthropologist Norma
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Ware (1992) formulated their illness experience as "delegitimation" because their
subjective experience of illness had been disconfirmed, trivialised and "defined as
either non-existent or psychosomatic" (ibid: 347). "Thus, the absence of observable
evidence of pathology, together with the ambiguous status of the illness in
professional medicine, precluded the possibility of a physical diagnosis for many
chronic fatigue syndrome sufferers. And if the illness is not physical , it must, it
follows, be mental." (ibid: 351). In chapter two of this thesis, I constructed a 'plausible
history of M E', where hysterical conversion was one of three types of explanation that
were positioned against one another in the controversy about the status of the mystery
illness. Similarly in RSI ("a non-specific and controversial constellation of work-
related hand arm and neck symptoms") there have been different schools of opinion
about its status, ranging from work related injury, compensation neurosis, normal
fatigue, a form of conversion disorder, or a complaint of malingerers (Reid, Ewan &
Lowy, 1991).
Moreover, it has been argued that the practice of psychogenic dismissal, has itself led
to iatrogenic injury2I
 (Rippere, 1991). In other words, when doctors dismiss people's
symptoms as being 'all in the mind' there can be serious consequences that include
lack of treatment, or inappropriate treatment, delegitimation of the patient s illness
experience, stigma and loss of credibility, disaffection from medical care, and damage
to social functioning, to name but a few. Rippere has even referred to psychogenic
dismissal as "a significant threat to public health and safety", and "the ultimate health
fraud" (ibid: 146). On the other hand, Woods & Goldberg (1991: 908-18) have warned
physicians against "iatrogenically perpetuating disability" by colluding with "patient's
attempts to avoid the psychological aspects of their illness".
Legitimacy and the Subject-Object Dichotomy
The question of the relationship between the nature of illness and its legitimacy (and
inextricably also the legitimacy of medical practice, and the credibility of diagnosis)
21 Iatrogenic injury refers to injury "caused by the process of medical examination or treatment"
(Concise Oxford Dictionary, seventh edition, 1983).
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are very clearly issues that are at stake for doctors, patients, and those participants who
engage in discourse about illness/disease. The research on `somatisation' has claimed
that there may be a tacit mutual orientation on the part of doctors and patients to the
notion that 'real' disease corresponds to bodily signs. On the other hand, other
research on `psychologisation' has suggested that in certain circumstances health-care
professionals have a "clear preference for psychological explanations", especially in
cases of uncertainty where symptoms are vague and confusing. This sounds somewhat
similar to Kirmayer's earlier claim that psychosomatic explanations function to
"protect the legitimacy of medicine".
The question of what is legitimate and what is not is worked up (and made relevant) in
the distinction that is made between object-subject, where legitimacy is warrantable in
terms of objective empirical evidence, and lack of legitimacy is construed as based on
the subjective, and contingent on personal experience, internal attributions and beliefs,
and needing to be evaluated in relationship to the findings of empirical science.
That's been my experience [with doctors] over and over again. They really try. They really
listen. And then they try a whole bunch of things that they think might turn something up, and
when everything fails, they just think you're nuts. And then they get sort of angry [...] 'you
can't be experiencing what you are experiencing. You need to see a psychologist. you're not
as sick as you think you are' [...] 'there's nothing wrong on your X-ray'
(Quotation from CFS patient, cited in Ware, 1992: 351).
Subject and Object as Discursive Accomplishments
Discursive psychology construes both objectivity and subjectivity as discursive
accomplishments. The 'objective as factual' is constructed by means of an empiricist
repertoire, which works to delete agency; whereas the 'subjective as a personal
construction' (that is likely to be innaccurate or biased) is constructed by means of a
contingent repertoire, which works to construct error in terms of social processes and
the disposition and cognitions of the agent. In this context (of illness talk) the
'subjective' dimension could be made relevant by drawing on a range of psychological
concepts such as: personality, or the notion of health beliefs, and illness attributions,
otherwise referred to in the literature as lay explanatory models.
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Lay Explanatory Models/ Illness Attributions
The work on illness attributions and explanatory models in health and illness studies is
derived from the rationale of attribution theory in social psychology (Heider,1958).
The rationale for this is is based on a cognitive-perceptual approach that explains how
human beings try to understand their experiences and perceptions by assigning causes
to them (Shaver, 1975). According to Stoeckle and Barsky (1981: 230) illness
attribution refers to both the cognitive processes by which a patient arrives at an
explanatory belief, and also to the explanation itself.
Their specific content, then, is shaped by the person's personality, prior knowledge and
experience, cultural beliefs and characteristic defense mechanisms. A clue to a patient's
predominant defenses may be suggested by his attributions. For example, persons who tend to
blame themselves when things go wrong also view illness as their own fault as something
they have brought upon themselves; those who typically see themselves as helpless and at the
mercy of their environment tend to see illness as something externally inflicted upon them.
This is a type of analysis which places patient's illness attributions as a centrally
important concern for the doctor's work, precisely because they reveal the meanings
that patients attach to symptoms, disabilities or bodily signs that they bring to the
medical consultation. 22
 These meanings are considered to be important because they
help to determine the patient's illness behaviours, coping responses and emotional
reactions (Lipowski, 1969; 1974). When a patient's illness attributions are taken into
account (by acknowledgement, interpretation, or redefinition) this is supposed to
facilitate the caring tasks of the doctor. For example, it is argued that a patieat's
attribution itself "may produce an anxiety state more discomforting than the bodily
distress itself. In many instances, the patient only seeks help because of his worry over
his own diagnosis" [...] "Doctor, I want to know if it's my nerves or my heart."
(Stoeckle & Barsky, 1881: 228).
The 'illness attribution' literature is distributed throughout both social science and
clinical literature, often under headings other than attribution. For example,
sociologists have written about 'lay knowledge of illness'. Mabry (1964) has
22 See Edwards (1997) for a discussion of three types of analysis that can be performed on discourse.
Edwards refers to 'type 2' analyses as being based on a fundamentally cognitivist rationale, where
participants' accounts are treated as evidence of what is going on in the mind. Illness attribution studies,
of the type described by Stoeckle and Barsky (1981), fall into this 'type 2' category.
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documented typical causal attributions as exposure to elements, germs, being run
down, nerves, and diet; Samoral (1962) investigated the public knowledge about heart
disease and cancer; Monteiro (1979) contributed to the literature on heart disease.
Generally, such studies report the degree of congruence between lay explanations and
those held by doctors, and any incongruence has been used to explain why the public's
health practices may diverge from doctor's recommendations and also provide
grounds for improving the education of the public.
The beliefs of patients with specific diseases have also been studied. For example,
Elder (1973) identified etiological explanations of rheumatoid arthritis that were
related to ageing, climate, working conditions, and exposure to the elements; Markson
(1971) showed how arthritic patients commonly offered similar kinds of explanations
of their joint disease, using a combination of vulnerability (things that lower resistance
and increase susceptibility) plus external causal agents, to explain their condition;
Bard and Dyk (1956) noted how attributions of blame were directed at either
themselves or at an external force. For example, internal attributions of blame
included acts, habits or thoughts for which the patient held themself accountable, or
external occurences such as interpersonal friction, hostility of others, or supernatural,
or environmental events. Similarly, Abrams and Finesinger 's (1953) work on the
attributions of cancer patients showed that the attribution of blame to self or others
was common to many accounts.
Medical anthropologists document the 'health and illness beliefs' of other cultures,
and clinicians give accounts to their colleagues in the form of patients' case studies on
the 'personal meanings of illness'(e.g. King, 1962; Fabrega, 1973; Kleinman, 1973). It
is claimed that a patient's particular illness attribution is often embedded in older
culturally determined systems of belief about health and illness. In addition to a
scientific belief system that assumes biomedical causes for disease, it is claimed that
both primitive (supernatural) and also folk beliefs persist in the attributions of modern
'well educated' patients. Herzlich (1973) found that illness attributions were either
exogenous forces such as; way of life, crowded cities, bad air and food, or endogenous
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individual factors such as temperament, constitution, or disposition. Such studies on
the 'personal meaning of illness' claim that meaning is the basis for the patient's
affective, cognitive, and behavioural response to illness. Lipowski (1979) identifies
five of the most prevalent categories of personal meanings as: illness as enemy, as
weakness, as punishment, loss or damage, or a challenge. Each of these meanings is
taken to have psychological and behavioural consequences, ranging from anxiety,
anger, denial, resignation, hostility and depression, or appropriate adjustment and
coping.
A number of studies have looked specifically at the relationship between patient's
illness attributions and the Chronic Fatigue Syndrome. Susan Abbey (1993) examines
the relevance of illness attributions, personality characteristics or styles, somatisation
and illness behaviour to the initiation, maintenance and perpetuation of CFS. She cites
Wessely and Powell's (1989) findings; that 86% of a group of 21 patients with post-
viral syndrome attribute their illness to physical factors, and further, that this is
associated with a poor outcome in a Cognitive Behavioural Therapy treatment
programme.(Wessely, et al, 1991; Butler, et al, 1991). Also Sharpe et al, (1992)23
studied a group of M E patients in an infectious diseases clinic and found that patients
who attributed their ongoing symptoms to physical causes (and also belong to a
support group) were more likely to remain disabled at two-year follow up. A caveat
points out the ambiguous interpretations of this data; that is, the attributions and
advice of support groups may be linked to a perpetuation of disability, or, as argued by
Charles Shepherd in chapter two, extract 38, the results may indicate that a more
severely ill group of people (who might have M E rather than CFS) are seeking the
support of other sufferers in the absence of effective medical treatment. Powell et al,
(1990) have also warned that (given the uncertain ontological status of CFS) "one
cannot overemphasise that it is impossible to judge the 'correctness' of the
attributional style found in CFS ".
23 See chapter two, page 57, for an outline of this study.
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Nonetheless, (and regardless of the circularity of the argument) the 'evidence' on the
role of patients' illness attributions (their 'dysfunctional cognitive distortions') in the
prognosis of CFS, have been used by clinicians as the basis for prescribing cognitive
behaviour therapy. Wessely et al, (1991) describes how the attributions that CFS
patients make about the causes of their ongoing illness, (eg. all symptoms are the
result of a virus, physical activity is harmful and likely to result in a set back, etcetera)
are linked to behavioural avoidance (of activity) and physical deconditioning.
Treatment by a CBT programme is designed to specifically change the way that
patients think about their illness and how to manage it. The rationale of this
programme is not based on the assumption that a patient's disorder necessarily has a
psychological origin, but seeks merely to "optimize patients' level of physical and
psychosocial functioning" (Abbey, 1993: 243). Control over symptoms is taken to be
an important factor in the rehabilitation process and the concept of 'learned
helplessness' (Seligman, 1975) has been appropriated to construct patient's problems
as a downward spiral of events in which the patient has learned to e /clime( Co (3e. u.aabk.
to control the symptoms of their illness, and CBT is designed to help them to regain a
sense of self-efficacy and control. Where the programme fails to help patients, "six out
of the seven patients who attributed their illness to exclusively physical causes having
a poor outcome"(Abbey, 1993: 243), this is attributed by the authors to 'the strength of
physical illness convictions' and untreated depression.
The rhetorical force of this last statement functions in the same way as the
psychoanalytic concept of 'resistance' that was mentioned earlier in this chapter (page
114) in the context of the psychosomatic repertoire and the CVA patient. That is, the
patient's accountability for being sick depends on the extent of their co-operation with
the medical 'authorship' of their illness and therapeutic intervention. In the case I have
described here (cognitive behavioural therapy with CFS patients) the patient's
physical illness attributions (like the CVA patient's 'angry outburst') are interpreted as
constituting part of the illness cycle itself by working to guide the patient into
'abnormal and dysfunctional' illnesss behaviour patterns. The failure of CBT is
attributed by the authors to the resistance of the patient to therapeutic intervention - an
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unwillingness to change their illness attributions and behaviour, rather than to any
doubt about the legitimacy of the treatment itself. This is regardless of the
controversial nature of CFS, and the claims of other researchers in the field who have
emphasised the need for rest and moderating activity in managing the illness (e.g.
Dawes, 1991; Gantz & Holmes, 1989; Jenkins, 1989; Spracklen, 1988). Ho-Yen
(1990: 38) has argued that chronically ill patients read their symptoms of fatigue on
exertion as a warning light, and "far from being maladaptive, their behaviour shows
that they have some insight into their illness".
From the claims made by the researchers in the above studies, there is clearly more
than a degree of uncertainty and disagreement about the appropriate balance of rest
and activity in CFS, which means that the patient's illness behaviour and level of
activity is likely to be made relevant as an accountable issue by researchers, medical
practitioners, and patients alike. The following quotation from a patient (cited in Ray
et al, 1993: 385) displays an orientation to that accountability, "...it's the whole thing
of how far to push yourself to keep that level of fitness, and how far you push yourself
because you're pushing yourself over the limit and consequently making yourself feel
worse again.".
Moral Accountability and 'Type 3' Analysis
At this point, I should again like to emphasise the difference in rationale between the
type of analysis that takes as its analytic topic the perceptions and cognitions of 'minds
at work', and discursive psychology (a 'type three' analysis24) that takes as its analytic
topic discourse as social action (Edwards and Potter, 1992). In the former analytical
framework, the illness attributions of patients reflect their cognitive sense-making
practices, which are derived from stable beliefs and models that guide their thinking.
In the latter analytical framework, people's illness attributions are made in the social
and rhetorical context of accounting for themselves or other people. Attributions from
this view are therefore not seen as linked to stable beliefs, but rather they are
discursive resources that are drawn on to accomplish some interactional business.
24 See Edwards, 1997: 271, for an outline of three types of analysis that can be performed on discourse.
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Similarly to the claims made by Kirmayer about theories of psychosomatic illness,
illness-attribution talk (and diagnostic talk) clearly occupies the realm of moral
accountability. Nonetheless, many of the general conclusions made by cognitive-
perceptual theorists ignore the rhetorical context in which attributions are made,
defining them as stable and internal cognitions that can explain people's responses,
coping, and illness behaviour, rather than analysing the discursive actions that such
attributions perform in an interactive context.
Repertoires of Mind and Body (A Summary)
In this chapter, the participants' concern with the relationship between mind and body
in explanations of illness, have been brought forward from chapter two where they
were central in the 'M E controversy'. Here, my concern (as analyst) has been to look
at how the rhetoric of mind and body is constructed in and through professional and
lay explanatory models of disease/illness: but also to look at how authors have drawn
attention to the potential for these models to be used to accomplish certain kjimis of
business.
First, the biomedical model was introduced as being 'the dominant model of disease in
Western society', and rooted in reductionist and dualist philosophies. Engel's critique
construes this model as being inadequate to explain the complexities of disease
processes. He offers an alternative model for clinical practice; the biopsychosocial
model, which derives its rationale from systems theory in biology. This new
conceptual model promises to take into account the complex interplay between the
biological, psychological and social environments in the explanation of disorders, and
indicates that all disease is potentially explainable (and treatable) in multifactoral
terms.
The psychosocial elements of this new model are addressed by social science research
in, for example, the sociology of medicine, the social psychology of health and illness,
and in the application of psychosomatic medicine. Three types of social scientific
endeavour were identified from the textbooks as socio-environmental, behavioural,
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and psychological. The latter two are individual, that is, things for which the patient
can be made accountable. The first (socio-environmental) category cannot be directly
addressed by medical practitioners, but can be made relevant under the psychological
category of 'coping' with stressors. The second category includes illness behaviour,
which is also construed by cognitive psychology as being related to people's internal
beliefs.Therefore, for the purposes of medical practice, the clinical application of the
biopsychosocial model boils down to a concern with the interplay of body and mind in
the explanation and treatment of disease/illness.
It was also argued that although psychosomatic medicine can be traced back (in some
form) around 1700 years, it has had little impact on the recent move to re-organise
biomedicine, but rather, it has been marginalised into the category of 'not quite
legitimate'. Thus, rather than all disease being conceptualised as psychosomatic, only
certain disorders have attracted this kind of explanation. Three kinds of model are
described, all of which occupy the realm of moral accountability, whereby the
responsibility for illness can be shifted to the patient by using internal psychological
explanations. It was argued that psychosomatic explanations function to protect the
legitimacy of biomedicine by "siphoning off' cases of uncertainty, where a biomedical
explanation for illness cannot be identified.
The notions of dualism and the object-subject distinction remain central to the kind of
arguments that derive their rationale from psychosomatics, and the biopsychosocial
model. I am referring here to an epistemological distinction that has been constructed
between two ways of knowing (objective and subjective) that are attributed a
differential ontological status within the discourse of empirical scientific investigation.
These different ways of knowing correspond to the distinction that has been made
between the terms 'disease' and 'illness', and are implicated in the task of accounting
for oneself as legitimately sick, where legitimacy corresponds to one's illness being
'objectively' definable in terms of the biomedical category of disease, or is dependent
on accepting a view of ones own experience as having a diminished relevance and
currency.
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This notion of a realm of moral accountability is one of the grounds that has been
drawn on to construct and explain `somatisation', which is constructed by authors as a
phenomemon where psychological problems are presented as physical ailments. This
explanatory model works particularly well alongside the claim that psychology is
addressed by medical practitioners in a 'dismissive rhetoric'. In other words, the claim
that psychological disorders have been marginalised as 'not quite legitimate' in
mainstream medicine works to explains why patients' might want to avoid having
their ailments construed in this way. On the other hand, some have argued that
physicians use psychological explanations far too readily (e.g. Goudsmit & Gadd,
1991). Psychologisation (as this has been called) is construed as a way to delegitimise
illness in the context of uncertainty, and the question of whose account can be taken as
correct is played out in the subject/object distinction between empirical evidence and
subjective experience.
Both of these categories (subject/object) can be re-worked by discursive psychology as
discursive accomplishments that are constructed by means of empiricist and
contingent repertoires. An empiricist repertoire is used to construct factuality, and a
contingent repertoire is commonly used to construct or account for doubt,error or bias.
One example of the way the 'subjective' dimension has been constructed in terms of
the contingent repertoire would be through the cognitive psychology notion of the link
between patients' illness attributions and personal health beliefs that may be construed
as inaccurate. An outline review of three realms of attribution studies has indicated a
range of exogenous forces, (including those that can 'invade' the body, such as germs)
and endogenous individual factors, that are commonly drawn on to explain disease or
illness in general, and also to explain specific kinds of diseases or illnesses. This kind
of study has also been applied to the field of CFS and M E where patient's illness
attributions and related illness behaviour have been made an accountable issue in the
perpetuation of disability. The theoretical concepts of health beliefs and illness
attributions can be made relevant by medical practitioners to formulate contingent
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accounts of error (or non-legitimacy) based on the notion of inappropriate cognitions,
and this can function discursively to psychologise illness25.
A critique of the cognitivist approach, from the viewpoint of discursive psychology,
links such attributional discourse to moral accountability in the rhetorical context of
interactions (such as interviews or medical consultations). Throughout the following
analyses of both lay and professional discourse on the topic of M E, I shall be
concerned to examine the following aspects of participants' discourse:
• The next chapter looks specifically at how the categories of mind and body and the
relationship between them is ongoingly constituted in and through the activity of
talking about M E and CFS.
• Chapter 6 examines the relationship between attributional discourse and moral
accountability in the context of an illness narrative26.
• Finally, chapter seven focuses on how psychosocial issues are made relevant in
patients' stories and doctors' case constructions.
25 See 'Labels' chapter, where doctors make use of the contingent repertoire in their talk about patients'
who use illness labels such as M E to avoid the definition of their illness in psychological terms.
26 See chapter 6, where I analyse Angela and Joe's story.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Authorship of Meaning in 'Mind and Body Talk'
"When / use a word", Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I
choose it to mean - neither more nor less!"
"The question is", said Alice, "whether you can make words mean different things!"
"The question is", said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be the master - that's all!"
('Alice Through the Looking Glass', Lewis Carroll, reprinted 1962, p.75.)1
The previous chapter looked at the rhetoric of mind and body as it has been worked up
in the way that different kinds of 'medical models' have been formulated and justified.
I showed how psychosomatic, and psychosocial repertoires, from within the
disciplines of medicine, psychiatry, and the social sciences, are explanatory resources
that can be used by both lay and professional participants to make people's actions
accountable in the context of explaining, and treating illness. In this chapter, rather
than address the distinction that is made between mind and body as an analyst's
concern, to be taken up and potentially resolved, I shall analyse how the categories of
mind and body and the relationship between them is ongoingly constituted in and
through the activity of talking about M E and CFS.
In the previous chapter I referred to a concern expressed by Kirmayer (1988), that the
specialty of psychosomatics reproduces the model of a dualistic relationship between
mind and body that he claims is also central to the biomedical model. Jane Ogden
(1997) has recently extended that observation to include "psychosocial theories of
health" in health psychology and medical sociology, where she questions their
effectiveness in developing an alternative way of thinking about the causes of disease.
She argues that although the disciplines of health psychology and medical sociology
describe themselves as presenting a challenge to biomedical dualism, there has in fact
been a fundamental failure to do so. She locates this failure in the underlying
assumptions of the model of etiology (the science of the causes of disease), where
psychological and social factors are treated as both contributing to, and mediating
I See also Fromkin & Rodman (1988) for further appropriation of this quotation.
bodily processes. Such a model essentially prioritises the physical, regarding the mind
and body as separate rather than integrated categories. In other words, "The physical
body is presented as the essential hardware to be moderated by the optional
psychosocial software." (ibid: 26).
For example, the Gate Control Theory of pain only points towards an inter-action of mind and
body, not an integration of these components of the individual. Likewise, the transactional
theory of stress examines how perceptions may impact on the body, but the mind and body
are defined as separate entities which interact: they are not one. The mind/body boundary
remains intact. In its call for a disintegration of this boundary, health psychology
contextualises its analysis of a need for an holistic individual alongside philosophers such as
Plato and Descartes who are seen as the enemy to be challenged and Aquinas and St.Paul who
are cited to reflect the golden age of holistic medicine (Hippocrates appears to have an
ambiguous relationship with the mind/body problem as he is frequently cited as belonging to
both camps). This retrospective construction of a time of both dualism and holism provides
health psychology theorists with an object to be challenged and a faith that this challenge is
possible. In addition, this construction creates a separation between the discipline of health
psychology and the problem of mind/body dualism. However, perhaps the mind/body divide
is not a reflection of a biomedical perspective to be challenged by health psychology but a
problem created by the very existence of these two disciplinary frameworks (ibid: 27)
Here, Ogden is claiming that the mind-body divide might be an artefact of different
ways to conceptualise the 'object' of study, and the model of etiology used to explain
the significance of these 'objects'. Therefore, it could be argued that psychosocial
theories of health ongoingly help to constitute the very 'problem' that they purport to
solve. This is reminiscent of Alan Radley's argument 2 that the separateness of the
categories of 'disease', 'illness' and 'sickness', has itself been constructed to "justify
the different interests of social science as compared with medicine" (1994: 5). In other
words, the physical body, individual experience, and the social context, constitute the
focal analytic concerns of the separate disciplines of biomedicine, psychology, and
sociology.
I would like to suggest that it is the very separateness of these kinds of categories that
itself signifies their general indexical usefulness as discursive resources. The so called
'failure to challenge dualism' that has been identified by authors such as Kirmayer
2 Alan Radley's discussion of the social constructionist approach to health and illness is referred to in
chapter one of this thesis.
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(1988) and Ogden (1997), might therefore be re-interpreted as evidence that indicates
the robust discursive utility of the separate categories of mind and body to accomplish
rhetorical work. 3 By this rationale, it is not so much that "present controversy [about,
say, M E] rests on a false dualism and an outdated separation of mind and body" that
will eventually be overcome by a more sophisticated way of explaining disease
processes (David et al., 1988)4, but rather that categories of mind and body are used as
discursive resources to manage sickness as a practical realm of moral accountability.
In other words, if being sick (or treating the sick) is a morally accountable issue, as has
been claimed by Parsons (1951a), then explanations of sickness and its appropriate
management and treatment are always (and have always been) worked up in that
context.
Parsons' concept of the 'sick-role' (1951a) is frequently cited to explain health and
illness in terms of its social, as well as its biological dimensions (see, for example,
Radley, 1994).5 The 'sick-role' describes a 'bargain' that is struck between the sick
3 Harvey Sacks (1989: 280-1) has argued that "formulating in terms of two-class sets is a method of
doing things". It is not just that there are two classes of things; for example, male, female; young, old;
rich, poor; mind, body; etcetera. The important point is that these are binary oppositions, and therefore
lend themselves to the situated production of comparisons and contrasts. As Derek Edwards points out,
contrast structures are not "simply a built-in feature of cognitive sense-making, nor a reflection of how
the world itself happens to fall naturally into two-set classes. Rather, it is a powerful, general-purpose
discursive device for constructing the world as such. That makes it ideally suited to ideological,
dilemmatic, and rhetorical discourse (Billig et al., 1988), and to the mundane, situated production of
contrasts anu alternatives (Atkinson and Drew, 1979; Smith, 1978)" (Edwards, 1997: 237)
4 See extract 33, chapter two (above), where David et al. (in their article entitled "Post-Viral Syndrome:
Time for a new approach") make such a claim. In doing this they take up a metaposition and claim for
themselves a transcendent view that is a more sophisticated, complex level of analysis that takes account
of both mind and body explanations. ( See Pels ,1996: 282, for a discussion of "analytic third
positions", where it is claimed that "a symmetrical approach invariably subverts the dominant view, and
strengthens the side of the weak and the marginal. Symmetry is often a 'cool' and detached way of
siding with the oppressed. In this fashion, it still conspires with the established authority of value-free
science, even while moving to attack it.") The case represented here is not quite the same as the kind of
'third position' that Pels has in mind, where analysts of scientific controversies claim for themselves a
position of methodological relativism (as / do in chapter two!). Rather, David et al. themselves enter the
controversy as participants and move to take the 'theoretical high ground', conceptually re-working
previous arguments by means of a 'paradigm-shift'. This is a move to retain the idea of scientific truth
and knowledge, by postulating a new model, in the face of a controversy that threatens the basis of
medical and scientific reality. As I pointed out in chapter two, this parallels Gilbert and Mulkay's 'truth
will out device' (TWOD).
5 Parsons (1951a) developed a functionalist perspective on society as a social system. This view
appropriates the rationale of systems theory in biology to explain how the social system is made up of
interrelated parts that function to maintain the society as a whole. One of the central concerns in
functionalist theory was therefore to explain the nature of social order, since that was seen as crucial in
the survival of the social system. This can be explored further by defining the concepts of norms, roles,
133
person and society, where sickness is treated as a form of deviance from the social
norm. If one's health status affects one's ability to carry out normal social duties, then
the adoption of the 'sick-role' is a way to legitimate that deviance. The 'sick-role'
therefore implicates a moral dimension of accountability, in which sick persons have
both rights and obligations (for example, the right to be excused from the social duties
of their normal roles, and not to be held personally responsible for their illness). In
return, they are expected to seek out medical help, adopt the status of a patient, and
comply with the doctor's advice or treatment. Frank (1997) has recently argued that in
Parsons' account the patient's agency is reduced to such compliance, whereas the
physician is construed as the active agent, both 'policing' access to the 'sick-role', and
providing suitable advice and treatment that will help patients to return to their normal
roles as soon as possible.
The concept of the 'sick-role' has been criticised for its Jack of explanatory power jn
cases of ambiguity, such as with chronic, psychological, or lifestyle related illness (for
example, Blackwell, 1967; Segall, 1976; Twaddle, 1969). In the case of chronic or
psychological illness, people do not always withdraw from their normal duties, whilst
the latter case of lifestyle related illness calls into question the accountability of the
patient for their own condition. The categories of psychological illness, psychosomatic
illness, and psychosocial factors can also be used as a way to make patients
accountable for their own illness, as we have seen from my analysis in earlier chapters.
and values. From a functionalist view, the norms of any given society are the rules/guidelines that
specify appropriate actions. These norms are taken to be enforced by sanctions that are either informal,
such as approval and disapproval, or formal, such as official legislation. The norms of a given society
are said to be defined in terms of underlying values; or in other words, beliefs about what is important,
worthwhile and desirable. Values therefore occupy a moral category which defines what is good and
what is not. The idea is that a social system cannot operate successfully without shared values and
norms, and that the absence of these would threaten the social order. Each member of a society is taken
to occupy a number of social positions, for example, an occupational status, a family status, a gender
status, etcetera. These different social positions are related to the social roles that people are expected to
play in relationship to others. Thus, the social position/status of a doctor is accompanied by their role in
relationship to patients, and vice-versa. The role of a doctor or a patient can be defined by a set of
norms (informed by underlying values) that specify the appropriate actions for a person who occupies
that social position/status. The idea is that people who have been socialised into a common culture share
the same kinds of values, follow the same norms, and adopt the appropriate kind of behaviour for each
role that they play. People also have shared knowledge of one another's roles, and are therefore able to
understand and predict the behaviour of others. According to functionalist theory, all this makes for the
perpetuation of a well ordered and stable society.
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In effect, accountability is built into the assumptions that inform psychosocial
explanations for illness, along with the kind of medical interventions deemed
appropriate for its successful management. These matters inform questions such as:
'Could the illness have been avoided by making changes to lifestyle?', 'Has the sick
person been instrumental in their own misfortune?', 'Could they be coping better with
the stressful circumstances of their lives and their illness?', and 'Is their illness
behaviour informed by a set of misattributions and false beliefs about the nature of
their illness?'. Such questions, that help to define mental illness as a form of personal
weakness, or social and mental incompetence, indicate why mental illnesses have been
commonly associated with the sort of social stigma that people work to avoid.
The kind of anomalies created by the concept of the 'sick-role', can be re-considered
in the light of an objection to the assumption that norms or rules are something that
specify people's actions (Wittgenstein, 1958; 1967; 1978). An ethnomethodological
treatment of this matter would work along the lines that the norms of the 'sick-role'
operate not as a set of rules that govern conduct, but rather as a resource to make
patient's actions 'account-able' in relation to health and illness issues. 6
 Therefore,
rather than seeing the separate categories of mind and body as merely artefacts that
emerge from different kinds of repertoires that have been constructed to serve the
interests of different disciplinary frameworks, perhaps it would be more useful (and
empirically tractable) to conceptualise them as indexical categories7
 that are primarily
constituted in and through the activity of everyday accounting practices, and in the
second place are an analyst's distillation of those commonsense categories that have
been re-formulated as philosophical dualisms and psychosocial theories of health.
Such theoretical distillations have been dealt with in the previous chapter by
6 I am using the term 'account-able' (Garfinkel, 1967) here in the sense that people's actions are made
both describable and morally sanctionable (by participants). The Wittgensteinian sense of rule-
following is that norms are something that people can appeal to in making justifications, and
explanations for their actions. Rule-following, for ethnomethodology, is therefore a feature of common-
sense reasoning, by which people constitute the sense of their actions.
7 Indexicality is one of the fundamental precepts of ethnomethodology, whereby descriptions "are to be
understood by reference to where and when etc. they occur." (Heritage, 1984a: 140) In other words, the
meaning of an expression alters with its context of use.
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examining various forms of medical repertoire, whereas accounting practices can be
analysed here in the context of participants' talk about M E.
The first analytic task of this chapter is to examine a collection of extracts from the
talk of doctors in interviews and participants at self-help group meetings. My analytic
focus will be to identify a variety of possible ways that the categories of mind and
body, and the relationship between them, can be constituted in talk. I am interested in
how participants' categorisations of mind and body work variably either to make
_
relevant or to obviate agency, and thereby either to avoid the implications of personal
accountability or to provide for its relevance. This is not, however, to imply that there
is likely to be a one to one correspondence between the category of 'mind' and
personal agency; but that (as topics) both the mind and the body are indexical
categories that are constituted in situ, where meaning and its implications for personal
responsibility are worked up on and for the specific occasion of use.
[At this point, there is a rude interruption from one of the fictional characters in the
quotation at the beginning of the chapted
ALICE:	 Ah! but the question is whether you can make words mean different things!
MHS:	 We:11...I was just thinking of the way that an ethnomethodologist
would theorise the in situ constitution of meaning.. .did you read my
footnote 7...or what ?
DA:	 Yes...we:11 the trouble is of course.. .if you just take the ethnomethodological
insistence on indekicality, it's not clear how meaning is possible! It can't be
just indexical otherwise it wouldn't matter which word you used. To take the
argument to its extreme would reveal an absurdity...we'd only need one word
and we'd just have to say it all the time and it would take its meaning entirely
from its context! This word is 'flug'...so... "fluTg, flulg, flug,  flu::g, flug!
flug?"
[sound of suppressed sniggering from Alice and MHS]
ALICE:	 It's kind of obvious that we need different words!
DA:	 Well my point is that the mind and the body are concepts that are somewhat
ready-made. ..as well as indexical
MHS:	 Now / want to clarify this...in what sense can we say that categories such as
mind and body are ready-made?
8 The following textual dialogue takes place between Lewis Carroll's fictional character, Alice, MHS
(the author), DA (a discourse analyst), and HD (Humpty Dumpty). It is based on (but not identical to) a
similar conversation that the author had with her superviser, after he had commented on the first draft of
this chapter. Any resemblance to real or fictitious characters is ...constructed here in the text!
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DA: We:11...if you look mind up in a dictionary, you're going to find something to
do with, say, 'things in your head'. After all, there is still the dictionary! But
we have to re-theorise what 'ready-made' means...
...it doesn't mean classical categories, or logical categories, or ready-made
cognitive packages. You've got to have an awareness of a whole range of
semiotic affordances, as well as the actual situated use.. .there and then. ..The
point about situated use is... that the word 'mind' is useful because you're
going to use it to say that something's mind and not body...or something's
mind and not real...that's what it's for! The word 'mind' enables you to do all
kinds of descriptive and rhetorical stuff...that's why we have the concept in
the first place so the concept 'mind' isn't to be considered separately from its
uses. It is in fact a part of a set of ways of talking, where it's contrasted with
other ways of talking...see your footnote 3... so the way to get into the
question "what does the word 'mind' mean?" is to look at the settings in
which it's used.9
MHS:	 Yes...I think I've assumed that in the next section of analysis...so are you
just picking me up on this rather extreme statement about indexicality?
DA:	 Ye:ah...exactly! Mind talk is going to be part of mind-body talk, part of
medicine, embedded in a set of contrasts, its meaning worked up and
deployed by these folk, here in the [talk]
HD:	 [muttering impatiently]	 [in fa]ct...just what they choose it to mean,
neither more nor less!
ALICE:
	 [gleefully] Ah! But that's not to say that the word 'mind' can mean elephant,
filing cabinet, door handle, or whatever...!
MHS:	 so...let me get this straight...there's a broad set of semiotic affordances that
come.. .kind of pre-packaged with the word 'mind'. ..but its precise meaning is
worked up locally.. .in situ...?
(6.0)
[DA glances at his watch and drums his fingers on the table]
MHS:	 er_Jcoughs]
(3.0)
I'm still a bit worried about the idea of categories being somewhat teady -
made...
DA:	 [sighs]
MHS:	 ...and there's this spectre of 'out-thereness'...I can imagine somebody reading
this and saying "So you're claiming that categories exist 'out-there' and
people can draw on them as ready-made resources!"
DA:	 Well I said that people deploy them, not that they draw on them!
Anyway...why don't you just delete 'out-there' (as if it was there to delete
in the first place!) and say it's part of people's competence that they know
what these words mean and they can use them?
MHS:	 But 'knowing' is 'in-there'...so that's cognitivist!
DA: ah well.. .I'm quite happy with the word 'knowing' except that it can bring a
lot of baggage with it.. .just using the word 'knowing' might sound as though
you're committing yourself to a cognitive theory of talk.. .but so long as we
know that the word 'know' can be defined the way Wittgenstein does it.. .(I
9 The Concise Oxford Dictionary (Seventh Edition: p.643) includes the following entries for the term
'mind': `way of thinking and feeling', 'consciousness', 'thought', `volition and feeling', `soul as
opposed to body', and 'intellectual powers as opposed to will and emotions'. The latter two examples,
even as part of a dictionary definition, conceptualise the 'mind' in terms of its contrast to alternative
categories such as 'body', or 'will and emotions'.
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mean of course. ..later Wittgenstein). ..in terms of its uses and contrasts...then
you can use it. ..I mean, I don't wanna ban these words from my vocabulary
just because psychology uses them in a certain way!
[phone rings]
DA: One angle is.. .1 wanna be like Humpty Dumpty and say "When / use a word,
I don't mean it with all that theorised psychological baggage...I want it to be
re-defined by what I say in use
HD:
	 [rather smugly]
Like I said... 'the question is, which is to be the master - that's all' !
What follows in the next part of the chapter, serves as a point of departure, to display a
range of mind-body constructions and their rhetorical affordances (thank you DA).
Later, I shall be concerned to show how such categorical resources are constructed,
deployed and ongoingly re-formulated in the context of managing some interactionally
sensitive business.
The management of agency in constructing categories.
1. The mind as a reflection of the body
This first extract is taken from a discussion at an M E self-help group meeting (which
is analysed in greater detail later in the chapter), where FM, a clinical psychologist, is
working to introduce the idea that psychology might have something to offer, in the
treatment of chronic fatigue syndrome.
(FM/M E group)
the mind comes from the brain (.) the mind isn't separate from the body the mind is just a
reflection of what's happening in the brain 
Here, FM is working up a definition of what he, a psychologist, understands the
'mind' to be. There are three important points here. First, the brain is given primacy;
second, there is no separation of mind and body; and third, the processes of the brain
io The bracket at the end of this dialogue indicates that something has been left out, and signifies the
potential for the next turn at talk. The unfinalised dialogue, as a textual device, allows me (as author) to
display the conversational turns of a controversy or dispute, without necessarily having to resolve it by
writing a definitive statement. Since meaning is definable by 'what I say in use', and also in terms of
uptake (in the next turn at talk) then the next turn can always challenge, re-define, and ongoingly
constitute meaning. In other words, a controversy is not finally resolvable, and a conversation is not
finally ended because there is always the potential for the next turn.
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are treated as the reality, whereas the mind is 'just' the reflection of real processes that
are going on in the brain. This is somewhat analagous to a representational model of
language as a representational system, that is employed to describe real events and
objects that have an existence prior to and independent of human constructive
practices. In the context of FM's efforts to overcome any resistance to a psychological
approach to illness (which I shall analyse later in the chapter) this formulation of the
mind as a reflection of brain processes can be heard as working to obviate human
agency from the notion of the mind, and to construct psychological illness as a purely
neurophysiological phenomenon. In other words, this kind of formulation of the mind
works to make the category of psychological processes equivalent to bodily processes,
and lends itself conceptually and rhetorically to avoiding any suggestion of personal
agency, and therefore, responsibility for illness.
2. The body as a reflection of the mind
This next extract is taken from a talk given by a general practitioner to a different ME
self-help group. The topic of the talk was "A GP's view of M E", and Dr Brown is
working here to explain the relevance of the mind in the production of physical
symptoms.
the other concept I'd like to put across to you is that you can only actually know what's
happening in your mind because of what you can feel in your body (1.0) cause the only
reason that I know that I'm anxious is perhaps because I'll feel myself sweating (1.0) so we
rely on our bodies to tell us what's happening in our minds
(Dr Brown/M E group)
Here, Dr Brown explains the body as a kind of 'text' or 'barometer' of the processes
of the mind. What you "feel in your body", is construed as the outward signs of
something that is really going on elsewhere, to which we do not have direct access. In
contrast to FM's formulation, mind processes are being given primacy by Dr Brown;
but here the mind processes are construed to be at the level of unawareness. Since the
machinations of the unconscious mind are outside the realm of our control, and we
have no direct way to know about "what's happening in the mind", Dr Brown's
formulation does not provide for the relevance of agency. In the context of his talk to
the self-help group, this works to place psychology on the agenda as a candidate
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explanation for some of the physical symptoms of its members, whilst at the same
time managing to avoid the implication that they could be in some way personally
accountable for their illness.
3. Mind over matter
The following piece of data is again taken from Dr Brown's talk to the self-help group,
where he uses a specific example to construct an image of the mind.
a classic one, if you like, is the couple who go through about ten years of fertility
investigations (.) and nothing found (.) and they adopt- this happened to one of our friends er
(.) they adopt and within three months the wife's pregnant (.) an- and y'know there's this
cruel trick of nature that once you just relax about it and stop having the pressure on you then
you conceive (.) and so it really is mind over matter
(Dr Brown/ M E group)
As with his formulation in extract 2, Dr Brown construes the mind and the body as
separate, with the mind taking primacy over the body. Here, the common expression
"mind over matter" conjures up images of the material world being mysteriously
subdued by force of will-power, as with telekinetic spoon-bending, or levitation.
However, here in this context, Dr Brown seems to work up a more passive role for the
mind, in which being tense or being relaxed could be treated as something that is not
under conscious control. His use of nominalised event descriptions, where the inability
to conceive is put down to "this cruel trick of nature", and you are "actually having the
pressure on you" rather than 'putting yourself under pressure', constitutes events as
agentless. On the other hand, the expression "once you just relax about it" implies that
there might be a space for someone to actively effect such a change. Such descriptions,
coupled with the magical phrase, "mind over matter", work ambigously, to make both
kinds of implication available. In the context of Dr Brown's talk to an M E group,
where the suggestion of mental illness is a sensitive issue, this vagueness works to
manage the implications of suggesting to people that the mind can have a powerful
influence on bodily processes. In both extracts 2 and 3, Dr Brown trades on an
inferential ambiguity in his use of the category 'mind', which is hearable as both
equivalent to, and also beyond the realms of personal will-power.
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4. 'All in the mind' : a dangerous category?
The following extracts are taken from an interview with a GP on the topic of M E.
a.
y'know it's something that I think doctors are sometimes more comfortable with (.) they can
say "well this is a bit like glandular fever (.) it's the aftermath of an infection" (.) and it's a
working model if you like (.) which gives some reassurance that it isn't in the mind (.) there is
something (.) there's a possible explanation for it
(Dr Walker/MHS)
The category of 'in the mind' is being constructed here, as a contrast to the category in
which "there is something", like "the aftermath of an infection". The medical category
of an infection is constituted here as a reality that is comforting and reassuring, and
this necessarily involves the implication of its opposite, an absence of such a reality
(see Sacks, 1989). In other words `it is in the mind'; if it isn't real, then it does not
exist. By contrast, "it isn't in the mind" means "there is something".
b.
I think what is a difficulty (.) I think it's this (.) I think it's something that (.) certainly (.)
see:n by patients (.) and I think to some extent (.) would be seen by doctors as well (.) is this
business of whether physical and mental things equate with real and imagined (.) do you
know what I mean (.) and I think that's the danger of it
(Dr Walker/MHS)
In a different part of the same interview, Dr Walker problematises the kind of
explanation of M E that he offered in extract 4a. That is, he takes up a metaposition in
commenting on the consequences of the kind of categorisation where physical is made
equivalent to real. In 4a this is described as being a position that "doctors are more
comfortable with", whereas here in extract 4b Dr Walker is constituting this kind of
categorisation as being "a difficulty", and points out "the danger of it". He specifies
here the precise nature of the relationship that was implicated in extract 4a; that is,
"this business of whether physical and mental things equate with real and imagined".
The equation 'mental equals imaginary' constitutes mind as a realm of fantasy, fiction,
or dreams. The category of imaginary is here contrasted with the category 'real', and
Dr Walker is working to distance himself from the potential implications of
categorising the mind and the body in this 'dangerous' manner. For example, he is
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orienting to a concern that mental illness might not be given serious attention, or, as
pointed out in the previous chapter, giving primacy to physical illness might encourage
patients and doctors to collude with each other in the definition (or expression) of
illness in purely physical terms.
5. "something nice and physical"
The danger of this kind of categorisation is itself topicalised by both Drs Brown and
Walker in the following two extracts (5a, and 5b).
a.
and there's still this in people's minds they link nerves with the fact that somehow the doctor
is gonna be dismissing it (.) and that they're being fobbed off er and these sort of things (.) so
again something nice and physical like your heart attack or your broken bone (.) you feel that
your doctor's going to give you much more (.) you're higher up in his importance scales
(Dr Brown/M E group)
Dr Brown works up his explanation for why patients might prefer to present their
doctor with "something nice and physical". Nerves are not taken seriously, whereas
physical things place you "higher up in his importance scales". In the context of Dr
Brown's talk to the M E group, this description works to mitigate the suggestion he
has already made available (in extracts 2 and 3) that M E sufferers might be
somatisers." His explanation lays out what might be taken as their reasonable
grounds for preferring to have a physical diagnosis. On the other hand, it is the
patients who are construed as projecting this kind of prejudice onto their doctors;
"there is still this in people's minds". Even the category of "nice and physical" is
hearable as Dr Brown's gloss on what he construes, in the first place, as a patients'
naive category. He is thus able to produce this version of doctors' prejudices about
patients' beliefs, whilst at the same time distancing himself both from the category,
and the Other's use of it. Nevertheless, his description also does the work of
u Somatisation is defined (see, for example, Kleinman and Kleinman, 1985) as a process by which
people express psychological distress in the form of physical symptoms (which is of course itself a
dualistic construction, since the processes of the mind are thereby treated as prior to, and having an
effect upon bodily symptoms). The counter rhetorical move is the 'exposure' of the medical practice of
`psychologisation' (in chapter four, above, referring to a claim that physical illness is sometimes
interpreted in terms of psychological distress). This kind of explanation similarly implies a dualistic
separation of mind and body.
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constructing common knowledge of heart attacks and broken bones as physical
phenomena that are easily identifiable as bona fide medical concerns.
The following extract, taken from an interview with Dr Walker, further demonstrates
how the activity of distinguishing between mind and body is taken up as a topic of
concern and treated as problematic.
b.
people are searching desperately to find a physical cause of it (.) an- when- when y'know it
may well be that there are physical causes (.) but there may be mental causes as well (.) but
people see a mental cause of it as being somehow (.) less adequate (.) as having sort of (.) less
currency y'know
(Dr Walker/MHS)
The activity of "searching desperately for a physical cause" is mitigated here again in
terms of a differential value that people place on mental and physical causes for
illness. Mental causes are seen as having "less currency"; which implies that there is
less 'buying power' in having their distress defined as mental illness. Dr Walker's
gloss on how people generally construe the categories of mental and physical, orients
to the idea that attributing causes for illness is an activity that takes place in the
context of justification, where mental causes are somehow thought of as being less
justifiable as explanations for illness than physical ones. Dr Walker's own
formulation, "it may well be that there are physical causes (.) but there may well be
mental causes as well", itself constitutes a separation of mind and body where
different causal factors contribute to the illness, and mental causes are construed as
additional to physical ones.
6. 'the devil's own job'
In the next extract, Dr Brown talks about the relationship between the mind and the
body in the context of his talk to an M E group.
there are both physical and emotional mental components (.) and trying to figure out which is
which is the devil's own job at times (.) but I suppose what I would say is "it really doesn't
matter" because er (.) if you actually look I would say that it isn't really mind versus body it's
mind and body and the two are completely intertwined
	 (Dr Brown/M E group)
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Dr Brown's formulation of the mind and the body is rhetorically positioned against an
alternative account in which these categories might be depicted as mutually exclusive,
competing explanations. He retains the dualistic construction of factors or "physical
and emotional mental components", whilst drawing them so closely together that they
might be almost impossible to pick apart. The use of the phrase "the two are
completely intertwined" itself constitutes the mind and the body as separate, but they
are woven together like the threads of a cloth, and difficult to disentangle. Dr Brown
has been working to make available the possibility that there might be a psychological
component in M E, but has to manage both the problem of uncertainty, where there is
no definitive medical knowledge about the nature of the illness, and also the resistance
from his audience to the idea that there might be a psychological explanation for their
illnesses. His construction of two separate parts that are "the devil's own job" to
disentangle, works to avoid having to make any precise, or contentious claims about
the role of the mind in the illness process, and also justifies the vagueness surrounding
the whole area of explaining M E in the first place.
7. Physical things; physical processes.
In this extract of talk, where Dr Turner is discussing one of his patients, there is an
interesting distinction being made between physical things, and variable physical
processes.
one has a lot of gynaecological problems (.) predominantly hormonal (.) you're not talking
about physical things like fibroids or cysts or anything like that (.) predominantly related to
irregular periods (.) and things of variable duration and intensity (.) er (.) if they're generally
hormonal (.) there's a sort of input from the pituitory gland in the brain C. so stress can
influence that as well
(Dr Tumer/MHS)
Physical things are construed here as solid objects that one might be able to see and
touch, like fibroids, and cysts. These are being distinguished from variable
biochemical processes such as hormonal activity, that can be affected by stress via the
action of the pituitory gland in the brain. As pointed out earlier, stress related illness
can be made an acccountable issue via the rhetoric of coping. The realm of "physical
things like fibroids or cysts" is constituted as a different category, which has a more
solid ontological status than the fluctuating processes that are "of variable duration
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and intensity". In a way, this is reminiscent of Dr Brown's construction of "something
nice and physical", like heart attacks and broken bones. Although heart disease might
be medically considered as a result of various lifestyle related problems, such as stress,
diet and smoking; the category of 'heart attack' is hearable in this context as an event
that happens to the physical body in the material world. That is in contrast to physical
processes, which are construed as being more nebulous, changeable, and being more
closely linked with psychosocial influences such as stress.
In the previous section, I have analysed some of the ways that mind and body have
been categorised by medical practitioners. These categorisations work in the contexts
of illness talk to make people's illnesses more or less physical and real, and their
actions either more or less accountable. I do not mean to imply that the categories of
mind and the body have a prior one to one relationship with accountability or the lack
of it. Rather, I am arguing that the precise meaning of the categories, and their
implications for agency are worked up together on and for the occasions of talk. These
constructions differ from one another in various significant ways; such as for example,
whether it is the mind or the body that is given primacy; whether, the processes of the
mind are constructed as under conscious control, or unconscious; and how far the
speaker works to construct the mind and the body as separate or integrated. An
interesting feature of this talk is the way that the mind itself can be constituted as
either having an equivalent ontological status with the physical body, or otherwise.
Participants appear to construct a continuum of more or less ontologically solid
members of the category 'real' (solid physical objects at one end, imaginary processes
at the other, and mental processes somewhere in the middle), where physiological
processes constitute a rather nebulous realm of transformations, where the one can
either affect the other, or even become the other. Such variability constitutes a rich
resource for the management of accountability as a practical activity, and my analysis
of it here has served as a context to inform the following analysis of an extended piece
of dialogue.
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Managing the Potential for Confrontation in Mind and Body Talk
( A 'struggle for the authorship of meaning')
In this following analysis I shall show how the mind and body are constructed in the
situated context of a dialogue between the speaker, FM, and his audience, the
members of an M E self-help group. In this context, the construction of meaning and
its implications for personal responsibility for illness, are constituted in and through,
the situated activity of managing the potential for confrontation.
Now prior to this next turn at talk by FM, he has introduced himself as a clinical
psychologist. 12 He has provided for the relevance of a possible misalignment with his
audience (the M E self-help group) by raising the contentious topic of labels. 13 He has
announced his intention to speak about CFS, and queried the members' understanding
of its equivalence with, or its distinction from M E. However, there is a tacit
understanding that FM has been invited to talk to the group about the role of
psychology, and in particular cognitive behavioural therapy, in the treatment of
chronic fatigue syndrome.
Extract 8: 'What / mean by the mind'
Here, my analytic focus is to look at what FM constitutes the category of 'mind' to be,
and how he deploys this meaning as a resource to manage some interactionally
sensitive business. Specifically this refers to the explanation of disease facts and the
accountability of sufferers.
1. FM I mean (.) I get the impression that er (.) not from this group (.) but
2. generally (.) there's unease about the application of the psychological
3. approach to Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (.) I mean (.) I suspect that's for
4. two reasons (.) one is the fact I- I think some people have difficulty with
5. the idea that the mind
6. (0.6)
7. FM they like to see the mind and the body as two separate things (.) we've got a
8. body that's physical (.) and we have a mind that's separate (.) and of course as
9. a psychologist I mean that doesn't make any sense (.) the mind (.) and the
12 This is an extract of 'naturally occuring' data, in the sense that the tape recording was made as part of
the normal activities of the self-help group, and is freely available to members of the group as a library
resource, rather than having being set up and recorded especially for the purposes of research.
13 See chapter three (above) for an analysis of labels as a participants' concern.
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10. body are two halves of the same thing (.) the mind comes from the brain (.)
11. the mind isn't separate from the body the mind is just a reflection of what's
12. happening in your brain er if anything happens to your brain like a stroke or an
13. injury (.) then the mind changes (.) the personality changes (.) your way of
14. seeing the world changes (.) the mind is the bra: in and the brain is an organ of
15. the body like any other organ of the body (.) and your brain is linked to every
16. y'know every other organ in your body
17. (0.8)
18.FM la the nervous system (.) and by your hormonal system (.) the brain's got
19. hormone glands in it- the adrenal gland that releases hormones that control
20. various aspects of your bodily functioning (.) so I msonally don't have any
21. difficulty in understanding how the mi:nd and the body can affect each
22. other cause they aren't two separate things (.) the mind's the brain and the
23. brain's a part of the body so to me
24. (0.6)
25.FM y'know I (.) whatever the problem is I can quite easily understand how (.) the
26. mind and the body affect each other and I suppose you see that in illnesses
27. like (.) stomach ulcers (.) most people accept that stomach ulcer's (.) a real
28. physical problem caused often by stress (.)'cause the stress increases the
29. nervous activity, to the nerves to the stomach, the stomach produces more
30. acid, the acid burns holes in your stomach (.) and you've got a stomach ulcer
31. (.) so there's no suggestion that people imagine the pain of stomach ulcers- it's
32. real pain but it's caused by a psychological problem originally (.) in a lot of
33. cases- not in every case but in a lot of cases (.) so I mean it's quite easy to see
34. how the mind affects the body (.) er (.) and there's evidence in other areas as
35. well for instance heart- research into heart disease (.) that shows that type A
36. personalities have a much higher risk of heart disease than type B
37. personalities-type A's aheh y'lcnow high achi:eving (.) people who are under
38. a lot of time pressure more than most people do- very high standards for what
39. they want to achieve
40. (0.6)
41.FM in your Type A's that are much higher risk it's something to do with (.) no
42. one really quite knows how that mechanism works whether it's affe:cting (.)
43. the blood vascular system directly or (.) quite how it wo:rks but it's a well (.)
44. it's a fairly world widely accepted finding (.) so ah- I personally don't have
45. any difficulty with the idea that the mind (.) affects the body and the body
46. affects the mind-how your body is affects how you feel mentally as well (.)
47. er
In this extract of talk, FM addresses his comments regarding an "unease about the
application of the psychological approach to Chronic Fatigue Syndrome"(lines 2-3),
toward a non-specific group, distinguishing between that and the present audience
(lines 1-2). The unease about psychology is construed as happening in a different
place, and not in the present context. This manages the potential for FM's comments
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to be heard as directly oppositional to the concerns of this particular group, and works
here to minimise the possibility that members might take his comments as being
confrontational. This allows FM considerable rhetorical space to present his case for
the 'acceptable face of psychology', which is represented by his own definition of the
mind and its relevance for their illness.
He does this by starting to formulate his "two reasons" why some people should be
uneasy about psychology (line 4). In the first place, he suggests that they have a basic
misconception of the relationship between mind and body. This is construed as a
preference whereby "they like to see the mind and body as two separate things" (line
7, emphasis added). This conveys the idea that their conceptualisation of the mind and
body as separate is a prejudice, based on what they want to see rather than empirical
evidence. FM then goes on to offer a 'correct' explanation of the relationship between
mind and body, which is discursively underwritten by citing his status as a
psychologist, who is entitled to speak with authority on this topic; "as a psychologist I
mean that doesn't make any sense (.) the mind  (.) and the body are two halves of the
same thing" (lines 9-10); "the mind is the brai:n and the brain is an organ of the body
like any other organ of the body (.) and your brain is linked to every y'know every
other organ in your body (0.8)la the nervous system (.) and by your hormonal
system" (lines 14-16).
The relationship between mind and body that FM develops in these remarks is
hearable as a materialist formulation, which is premised on the assumption that the
mind is not a separate non-material substance from the body, but is in fact the same
thing as the brain. This is not to claim that FM's formulation of the mind and the brain
indicates that he holds a specific philosophical position 14 . Rather, the language of
neuropsychology and monism provides a resource to dismiss dualistic separations like
the one that FM attributes to those who are uneasy about psychology. He is thereby
able to offer a mechanism by which the category of psychological can be construed as
14 Materialism is a philosophy which reduces mental events to physical ones. Identity theory is another
form of materialism which claims that consciousness is a brain process.
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being synonymous with the category physical, and in this case dispose of the
'dangerous category', which is the one that makes people feel uneasy. In other words,
the mind is conceptualised as a mere reflection of bodily processes, of "what's
happening in your brain", which is constituted here as being one and the same thing.
At the same time the use of the term "reflection" lends itself to an ambiguous reading,
since there would necessarily have to be an ontological reality to be reflected in the
first place.
Now, although FM's equation of the mind with the body might, at first glance, appear
to be a conciliatory move that works to make his audience less uneasy, I would like to
point out the more subtle implications of such a formulation. When FM makes the
claim "the mind is the brain" (at line 14), it is deployed as an indexical marker that
'defines his terms' for the rest of his talk. In other words, he is telling the audience,
'from now on, when I say "mind"; you shouki hear "brain")' Effectively, therefore,
FM (in the style of Humpty Dumpty) has both defined his own meaning of the word
'mind', and also made it more difficult for his audience to use the term without further
re-definition. This point will be taken up later, when a member of the self-help group
responds to FM's comments. For now, (as analyst) I shall treat FM's remarks as being
both an indexical marker that works rhetorically as a conciliatory gesture to manage
the potential for confrontation between himself and the members of the group.
FM's use of intransitives 15 , such as "happens" and "changes", works further here to
obviate agency, and construct processes of the mind-brain as things that just happen to
people (lines 11-14); "what's happening in your brain er if anything happens to your
brain like a stroke or an injury (.) then the mind changes (.) the personality changes (.)
your way of seeing the world changes". In using this kind of grammatical construction,
by which agency is obviated, FM's account works to further avoid imputing personal
15 Critical linguistics (such as Kress & Hodge, 1979) explicates the role of transitive, intransitive, and
passive verbs in action descriptions, such that structures are accounted for with reference to social
relations of (assymetrical) power. (In transformational linguistics, this can be contrasted with the
Chomskian view of structures that are hardwired into the brain).
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responsibility for psychological changes whilst retaining the category as a means to
account for illness.
Flaying set up the rationale for his explanation of illness, he is next able to apply this
to the details of a specific case. He chooses the example of stomach ulcers to lay
emphasis on the physical processes that are a consequence of psychological stress,
"cause the stress increases the nervous activity, to the nerves to the stomach (lines 28-
9), the stomach produces more acid (lines 29-30), and "the acid burns holes in your
stomach" (line 30). FM positions this explanation against the realm of imaginary
pain, where someone might 'conjure up' a symptom or delude themselves that they
have an illness. Here (at line 31), FM introduces this as if he were fending off a
potential accusation that psychology might be used as a way to define people's
ailments as being imaginary rather than real; "so there's no suggestion that people
imagine the pain of stomach ulcers". In his use of this implicit (and somewhat
gerrymandered) analogy, FM can make his point about the relationship of psychology
to M E, whilst avoiding the necessity of being openly committed to a precise
explanation that might be applied to anyone's specific problem.
FM goes on, at lines 34-46, to formulate an argument in which both stress and
personality are brought into his explanation of heart disease; "type A's aheh y'know
high achieving (.) people who are under a lot of time pressure more than most people
do- very high standards for what they want to achieve" (lines 37-9). Having defined
the business of psychology as a concern with physical processes, FM now introduces
the idea that there are types of personality (type A's) that are associated with a higher
risk for some kinds of illness. The implication of his statement at lines 37-9 is that the
source of stress ("time pressure") might be something self-imposed because they have
"very high standards for what they want to achieve". On the other hand, "time
pressure" is something that they are "under", so this is also hearable as something
imposed upon them. In either case, the problem of heart disease is formulated as
something to which people of a certain type are susceptible, rather than as something
that strikes in any kind of arbitrary way.
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FM's use of the term 'personality' is nicely ambiguous because it makes available a
range of inferences that might be used to construe someone as more or less
accountable. It could be heard as a way to introduce the idea that people might have a
degree of control over the physiological processes of their bodies, via their typical
behavioural responses. Although, "no one really quite knows how that mechanism
works whether it's affe:cting (.) the blood vascular system directly or (.) quite how it
wo:rks " (lines 41-43 ), it can be construed as a way that personal tendencies, can
somehow mediate the physiological functioning of the bodily systems. On the other
hand, 'personality type' could easily be construed as something that people have little
control over, after all, being "high achieving" having "high standards" are some of the
defining characteristics of 'type A's' in the first place, so maybe personality can be
taken as a dispositional tendency that determines how people act. Paradoxically, the
use of the concept of personality in this context works ambiguously to avoid
implicating people in blame for their own state of health, whilst leaving a rhetorical
space for FM's later claims about therapeutic interventions (such as CBT) that are
designed speccally to help patients to gain a sense of self-efficacy and control over
the contingencies of their lives.
Extract 9: Fending off the Category of Mental Illness
At line 48 in the next section of transcript, JJ, a member of the group, responds to
FM's formulation of the mind and its implications for the explanation of illness.
48.JJ = I think what has upset some people with M E in the past (.) is that some
49.	 doctors say M E is caused by mental problems
50.FM = ye::s well [that's]
51.JJ	 [er..tha-thati has been disproven (.) it annoys people with
52.	 M E when they hear this said and it is occasionally it's still said today
53.FM =well nobody[...I think it is still] said now and I think that is still said
54.JJ	 [(	 )]
55.FM when you're in a condition where nobody knows (.) the real reason.Well in
56. a way everybody's gonna have their theories and it's very hard to say who's
57. right and who's wrong (.) because there isn't anything known
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JJ responds to FM's construal of the mind/body relationship (in extract 8) by
formulating some justifiable grounds for being uneasy about psychological
explanations; "I think what has upset some people with M E in the past (.) is that
some doctors say
M E is caused by mental problems" (extract 9, lines 48-9). Notice here JJ's choice of
the term 'mental problems', rather than for instance, 'the mind', which FM had earlier
defined as equivalent to the brain. The use of the term 'mental problems' differentiates
what JJ is talking about in a way that makes it more difficult for FM to dismiss Jr s
complaint on a point of definition.
JJ manages the potential for misalignment with FM by attributing this explanation of
M E as "caused by mental problems" to "some doctors" (lines 48-9); the emphasis of
which contrasts with FM's status as a psychologist. When FM replies with an
equivocal "ye;:s well", JJ is quick to head off the potential for disagreement by
refuting the claim, in a manner suggesting that, rather than this being merely a
statement of personal opinion, there is actually some research evidence to support his
claim, "that has been disproven" (line51). FM's attempt at mitigation of the doctors'
claims, "when you're in a condition where nobody knows"(line 55), are a direct
contradiction of JJ's claim that "that has been disproven". Contrary to what FM is
suggesting, JJ works to support the argument that there is in fact a justification for
taking a position about who is right and who is wrong and what is known.
Extract 10: Taking the Epistemological High-Ground: 'people know'.
Then follows a section (lines 58-70) where two members of the self-help group jointly
claim the 'epistemological high ground' by constructing an experiential claim about
the status of their illness.
58.JJ	 people who have(.) experience of M E
59. kno:w
60. (0.3)
61.JJ know (.) somehow or other within themselves that it's not true
62.FM = yeah
63.JG = that's right people know (.) they know they've got a physical illness
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64.JJ = they know
65.JG = when (they've been passed off by) their doctors as psychosomatic it makes
66. her very angry and that's why we don't really want anything to do with this
67. sort of psy- psy- psychiatry
68.JJ I think that's what I was trying to say (.) this is what's upset some people with
69. M E the fact that they've been told (.) or they've read (.) that it's purely a
70. psychological illness (.) and they know very well it isn't
Not only do JJ and JG collaboratively construct an experiential claim, they also do this
by reference to the general experience of people who have M E rather than just their
own personal experience. This construction of experience as something that members
of the group share as common knowledge, is reinforced by repetition and emphasis of
the word 'know' by different speakers; "people who have (.) experience of M E kno:w
(0.3) know (.) somehow or other within themselves that it's not true" (lines 58-61),
"that's right people know (.) they know they've got a physical illness" (line 63) "they
know" (line 64), and " they know  very well it isn't" (line 70). When positioned against
FM's earlier remarks about M E being "a condition where nobody knows" (line 55),
the combination of an evidential claim (at line 51), an experiential claim, and the joint
construction of common experiential knowledge (at lines 58-70), are powerful
rhetorical devices that work to dismiss a view of M E as "caused by mental
problems", that JJ has first problematised at line 49. JJ and JG's comments at lines 58-
70 display that they take FM's comments at lines 55-57 (extract 9) to allow for a
possible psychologised reading of their illness. So whatever else FM wishes to say
next about the category of the mind or psychology in the context of talking about M E,
he must work to manage these issues of "mental problems" (line 49),
"psychosomatic" (line 65), "psychiatry" (line 67), and "purely a psychological illness"
(lines 69-70) that have been constructed by the participants as contentious. In the next
section FM addresses these issues by returning to his work on defining meanings in
the realm of psychology.
Extract 11: Managing the 'dangerous category'.
71.FM = I suppose this is the other area that(.) I think gets very confused- what do you
72. mean when you say something's psychological? Are you're saying that (.)
73. people think there's nothing physically wrong with you at all (.) that you're
74. sort of in a way imagining it ? (.) Is that what they mean? (.) Or do they mean
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75. that it's (.) like a stomach ulcer- nobody (.) you could say a stomach ulcer is a
76. psychologically caused problem but that doesn't mean you imagine the pain
77. do you? Because (.) if you look in your stomach you can see the hole there (.)
78. but that is psychosomatic as much as it's caused by the mind affecting the
79. body (.) so it's very confusing what you mean when something is- is
80. psychological are you saying that it's all imagined (.) there's nothing
81. physically wrong with the body it's all in the mind (.) are you saying that the
82. mind affects the body (.) and therefore things could be partly psychological (.)
83. y'know an- and that to me when I (>talk about it being psychologicak) that's
84. how I think of it (.) that the mind and the body affect each other
85. (1.2)
86.FM I don't- I certainly wouldn't seriously suggest that people (.) ima:gine the
87. symptoms that they have and they are genuine physical symptoms
88. (1.2)
At the start of the sequence (extract 1, lines 2-4) FM had referred to his "two reasons"
why "there's unease about the application of the psychological approach to Chronic
Fatigue Syndrome". His first reason was that people "like to see the mind and the body
as two separate things" (line 7). At lines 71-2, FM starts to fonnaJate his second
reason in reponse to the increasing misalignment between himself and the group
members in the previous section; "I suppose this is the other area that (.) I think gets
very confused-what do you mean when you say something's psychological?". The
"unease about the application of the psychological approach" is now being treated by
FM as hearable in the talk of the members of the group, rather than existing vaguely
elsewhere.
FM responds to this by addressing the members personally and tying his comments
into the references he made generally at the start of the session, where "people have
difficulty", and "they like to see", and "there's unease" (extract 1, lines 2-4). This he
delicately manages by interweaving the pronouns `you'and 'they', and using phrases
like; "what do you mean", "are you saying that", and weaving them together with
more general terms of reference like, "is that what they mean", "do they mean". The
term "you" (at lines 71-3) is ambiguous, between the audience, and people in general,
and the use of "they" (at line 74) moves its meaning to the latter. This discursively
works up the idea that there may be a more general level of misunderstanding of
psychology, in which the people in the group might also be implicated. FM finds a
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delicate way to avoid the difficulty of having to suggest to JJ and JG that they
personally are confused, by offering psychology to them as a category that generally
"gets very confused" (line 71).
FM works up his own formulation of what that confusion might consist of by making
a distinction between two categories; the imaginary, and the psychosomatic, where the
imaginary implies that the illness is not real, "there's nothing physically wrong with
you at all" (line 73), and the psychosomatic is explained in a cause and effect way as
"the mind affecting the body" (lines 78-9) and as with the example of a stomach ulcer,
there are observable bodily signs, "if you look in your stomach you can see the hole
there". FM aligns himself with the latter explanation , "when I (>talk about it being
psychological<) that's how I think of it (.) the mind and the body affect each
other"(lines 83-4) and then works to distance himself from those who might suggest
the 'dangerous category' of imaginary illness, "I certainly wouldn't seriously suggest
that people (.) imagine the symptoms that they have and they are genuine physical
symptoms". He thus distances himself from the rhetoric of 'all in the mind'
explanations for M E and in using the term "genuine physical symptoms" he works to
re-align himself with the group as 'the acceptable face of psychology'; he is someone
who is prepared to take their problems seriously as physical problems, albeit caused by
the mind and the body affecting each other.
Now, at different parts of his talk FM has worked up two different positions on the
relationship between the mind and the body. In extract 8 he formulates the mind as
equivalent to the brain, whereas in extract 11 he formulates an interactionist model,
where the mind and the body affect each other. This latter position is a dualistic
formulation where the causal relationship can be effective in either direction. Being
able to take two different positions on the relationship of mind and body enables him
to accomplish some important and sensitive interactional business. First, it allows him
to formulate psychology as non-threatening (mind equals body); second, it allows him
to define away people's potential grievances; and third (mind and body affect each
other) allows him to suggest that, in some cases, physical symptoms are caused by
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psychological problems. If the direction of causality becomes an issue for the
audience, then he can always respecify his previous arguments, calling on the 'mind
equals body' construction as a resource to re-theorise the problem away.
JJ responds to this gerrymandering in the next section by reinstating the primacy of the
physical over the mental.
Extract 12: Mental problems: Cause or Consequence?
89.JJ but so often though people with M E have found that the M E (.) the physical 
90. part of the M E has come on before the mental problems the mental
91. problems have followed on (.) as a result of the physical problems (.) not the
92. other way around
93. (1.5)
94.FM well I think there have been (.) chronic fatigue syndrome is principally a
95. physical based syndrome- the main symptoms are the fatigue (.) you might
96. sometimes have other (.) lack of concentration, dizziness, and other
97. symptoms which is a physical (.) actual muscular pains (.) er (.) well not
98. everybody gets muscular pain (.) everybody gets the fatigue and some people
99. get pains as well (.) as fatigue
100.JJ = well I'm convinced that there is a psychological element in M E (.) I'm
101. certain of it (.) but I don't think it's a-I-I think it's a consequence rather than a
102. cause
103.KH = well with any long-term illness (.) you're bound to get psychological
104. effects (.) you're bound to because (.) M E primarily affects active go-ahead
105. people (.) it doesn't affect couch potatoes
At line 89, JJ rhetorically positions his comments against a linear cause and effect
explanation of mind and body, where the physical problems of M E are caused by
mental problems. In doing so he is responding as if FM's explanation either makes
such an interpretation available, or at least fails to address it. He replies by challenging
the direction of causality, where mental problems and physical problems are being
construed as separate components of M E, where the physical part takes place before
the mental part which 'follows on'. This works against a possible psychosomatic
explanation of illness where real physical symptoms are either the result of stress (as
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with the example of the stomach ulcer), or might be interpreted as the physical
manifestation of mental disturbances (such as depression or anxiety). 16
FM responds to JJ at line 94 by conceding that "chronic fatigue syndrome is
principally a physical based syndrome", but then goes on to differentiate between
people's symptoms; "well not everybody gets muscular pain (.) everybody gets the
fatigue and some people get pains as well" (lines 97-9). His use of the word
principally at line 94, his reference to "physical (.) actual muscular pains" at line 97,
and his move to distinguish between people with CFS who have different collections
of symptoms, allows him to retain a space for at least some instances of CFS to be
defined as psychosomatic, where the direction of causality is psychological to
physical.
'Talking past each other'
Notice also the switch from JJ's use of the term M E to FM's use of the term CFS,
where (as pointed out above in chapter three, on labels) the use of the category CFS
enables the speaker to claim a more 'neutral' stance with respect to what causes the
illness, and also allows there to be a differentiation between Nations categories of
illness that might come under the umbrella term CFS. As I argued in chapter three, one
way to manage the threat that a 'reality disjuncture' (Pollner, 1987) poses to the idea
of an objective reality is to claim that people might be labelling different things. In this
case, throughout the dialogue, FM's use of the term CFS, and the group's use of the
term M E allows for them to be talking about different categories that are more or less
physical in nature, rather than to be disagreeing about the same category. 'Talking
past each other' thus avoids the potential for the dialogue to turn into an acrimonious
16 This section of talk all assumes a linear model of causation, versus (say) a synchronistic (or process)
explanatory model. (The interesting point for this thesis is not to adjudicate between such models, but to
show how linear and process models are rhetorically useful for different discursive purposes. Also, as
pointed out in chapters two, three, and four, an appeal to a different kind of model can form the basis for
making a 'truth will out' claim (see Dr Walker, chapter three: extracts 14 & 16); or to claim the
theoretical 'high ground', a metaposition (see, for example, chapter two: extract 33); or as an appeal to
complexity to mitigate uncertainty of knowledge in the current interaction, and in medical science itself
(see Dr Brown, this chapter: extract 6). Cause and effect models work to make a definite claim in either,
or both directions, whereas complex synchronistic/process models work to constitute and celebrate
uncertainty.
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debate between FM and the group members about the nature of their own illnesses and
the status of FM's knowledge and opinion.
'Active go-ahead people'
JJ responds to this at line 100 with "well I'm convinced there is a psychological
element in M E (.) I'm certain of it (.) but I don't think it's a- I- I think it's a
consequence rather than a cause", which claims for M E the status of a primarily
physical condition with an ontological solidity existing prior to any psychological
effects. KB intervenes to elaborate JJ's point, "well with any long-term illness (.)
you're bound to get psychological effects" (line 103-4). Here, the psychological effect
of long-term illness is worked up as an ordinary phenomenon, which is an inevitable
consequence of chronic illness. Not only is this effect defined as ordinary (Sacks,
1984) the sort of thing that anyone would normally be expected to suffer, thereby
aligning M E/CFS with medically conventional diseases, but also as something for
which any single individual could not be held personally or dispositionally
accountable.
KB goes on to formulate some reasons why people with M E are likely to suffer in this
way. "because (.) M E primarily affects active go-ahead people" (lines 104-5). Not
only does this explain the reason why people who are disabled by long-term illnesses
should suifer psychological effects, as a rational, commonplace response to the
restrictive conditions imposed by their illness, but also defines for us a typical kind of
person who suffers from M E. This positive image of "active go-ahead people" is a
valourised account that is being contrasted here with a more perjorative image of the
'couch potato'. ICH is here working to dismiss an image that is oriented to here as
being another dangerous one for M E sufferers; that of a malingerer, or someone
whose illness is purely functional. The image of "active go-ahead people" works here
as a kind of 'stake inoculation' 17 , constructing the natural disposition of M E sufferers
as running counter to the circumstances of their illness. The formulation of "active go-
ahead" people who are more likely than most to experience psychological effects from
17 See my reference to 'stake inocculation' in chapter one, page 15.
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enforced inactivity works here to dismiss any suggestion that they are really just couch
potatoes who are naturally lazy.
The Spectre of Blame in Talk about Depression
"you're bound to get psychological effects"
As pointed out earlier, in the analysis of extract 12 above, KB had offered the
suggestion that psychological effects are a consequence or an ordinary experiential
reaction that is inevitable in the circumstances of long-term illness. However, even
though KR has formulated such 'psychological effects' as normal, there is still a
danger here that this category could be construed as pathological rather than normal.
There might be grounds for claiming that there are degrees of difference between
people, in the strength of such effects, on a scale of normal to pathological. For
example, 'active go-ahead people' might be rather more susceptible than most to
experience the frustrations of enforced inactivity. In any event, even the ordinarily
understandable psychological effects of chronic illness could be made an accountable
issue by means of the rhetoric of coping.
At lines 107-110, JJ re-specifies the "psychological effects" mentioned by KR at iines
103-4. He does this by elaborating an alternative account of depression as a physical
category, which is subsequently taken up as a topic of talk by other participants. In the
previous extract (12), and the three that follow (13, 14 and 15), there are a total of five
different categories of depression worked up in the dialogue. These categories are
ongoingly constituted by appealing to different constructions of the mind, and the
relationship between the mind and the body. At stake here, as before, is the issue of
different versions of reality about the nature of the illness, and the accountability of
sufferers.
Extract 13: "A chemical in the brain isn't it?"
107.JJ I think it's a bit sleeper than that though with M E (.) I know-I know physical
108. illnesses cause psychological problems but I think with M E there's a closer
109. link (.) it's not just the fact that you've got M E that makes you feel
110. depressed
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111.KH = well there is becau[se there]
	
112.JJ	 [there's *loser link (.) I think it's something affecting
	
113.	 the brain itself
114.EC = a chemical in the brain isn't it?
115.KH = it's quite possible but (.) I mean M- MS is the same (.) because they get
	
116.	 personality changes and all sorts of things
JJ goes on to qualify KH's comments (lines 103-4) about the psychological
consequences of illness, arguing that "it's a bit deeper than that" (line 107), "there's a
closer link (.) it's not just the fact that you've got M E that makes you feel depressed"
(lines 108-10). JJ here distinguishes between two kinds of depression that M E
sufferers might experience. The first is an ordinary reaction to a chronic physical
illness; that is, "you've got M E", and "that makes you feel depressed"(lines 109-10),
and the second is "something affecting the brain itself' (lines 112-13), which EC then
elaborates as "a chemical in the brain" (line 114). There is quite a subtle difference
between these two accounts in terms of defining the nature of depression itself. In the
first account, M E is being conceptualised as a separate physical illness that makes
people feel miserable, whereas in the latter version, M E has a direct action on the
chemistry of the brain. As pointed out above, there is a danger with the first account,
that sufferers could be made accountable for feeling miserable about their illness, via
the rhetoric of coping. JJ's construction works to counter that possibility by providing
an account of a physical mechanism to explain depression.
This work is further corroborated in KH's comparison with multiple sclerosis (lines
115-6), "I mean M- MS is the same (.) because they get personality changes and all
sorts of things". The implication in citing MS as an analogous case is that personality
changes in MS are said to be a consequence of chemical brain states resulting from a
physical illness. This therefore works to position M E within the category of physical
medical conditions and also offers a way to align KH's earlier remarks about
psychological effects with the idea of a physical illness, via brain states. This means
that both accounts can be heard as plausible physical explanations that work to dismiss
any possible suggestion of a prior mental problem, and relatedly, personal
responsibility for illness.
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Extract 14: Is M E some type of depression?
117.	 (0.5)
118.FM you see you get chemical changes in the brain in anxiety and depression
119.11K = is this (.) is this where doctors give M E sufferers anti-depressants?
120.FM = well (.) when people have done research (.) looking at Chronic Fatigue
121. Syndrome or M E sufferers they do find if you give them standard psychiatric
122. interviews (.) they have a much higher level of depression (.) than say another
123. group with a chronic health problem, chronic heart disease, or other problems
124. so that's why (.) it's not by any means all people but it's higher than you'd
125. normally expect there's a higher incidence of depression that is one suggestion
126. is that y'know that (.) is there some type then of depression (.) is it (.) that
127. chronic fatigue (.) the actual symptom of fatigue is a symptom of depression
128. (.) >there are other symptoms as well< with depression (.) but that is a
129	 symptom of depression (.) and so there has been an interest in giving anti
130. depressants and again it's been one of these things where there's been some
131. positive studies that show benefit in some people and other studies that
132. haven't found much (.) maybe it depends on which group of chronic fatigue
133. syndrome people you happen to get (.) that does seem to be (.) when people I
134. think present with a chronic fatigue syndrome problem you are- will be
135. assessed for symptoms of depression- there's other symptoms of depression as
136. well (.) early morning wakening, low mood, bouts of tearfulness, (.) and you
137. are likely to be offered anti-depressants by- whether it's the physician or
138. your GP
In the previous section (extract 13), KH and JJ have worked to establish the idea that
M E is purely physical, and any depression is purely a result of the separate illness,
M E. FM's response to this, after a significant pause indicating a dispreferred response
(Pomerantz,1984), is to suggest an alternative explanation; that is, there are other
conditions, apart from M E, that are associated with changes in the brain. The
implication of this is that maybe anxiety or depression are the only explanations that
are necessary in the first place. He follows this up (lines 119-125) by formulating
some grounds that effectively dismiss KH's earlier account about depression being a
normal reaction to chronic physical illness; he points out that M E sufferers have "a
much higher level of depression (.) than say another group with a chronic health
problem, chronic heart disease". He then goes on to offer an explanation for this
higher level of depression "than you'd normally expect" (line 124-5)by suggesting
"y'know that (.) is there some type then of depression". Effectively, in this turn at talk,
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FM has neatly rearticulated M E as not itself being a separate category from
depression, and has thereby attempted to remove the concept from his lexicon. This is
similar to the move he performed earlier on the meaning of the term 'mind'.
Next, FM attends to HK's comment at 119, as a request for information about the
prescriptive practices of doctors in treating M E sufferers. First, FM aligns the two
categories of M E and CFS as being one category for the purposes of his explanation,
"research (.) looking at Chronic Fatigue Syndrome or M E sufferers" (lines 120-21).
This works to anticipate the possibility that group members might claim that CFS
research findings do not apply to them as M E sufferers. Second, FM gives an account
of the findings of such research, "if you give them standard psychiatric interviews (.)
they have a much higher level of depression (.) than say another group with a chronic
health problem, chronic heart disease, or other problems" (lines121-23), which is used
as evidence upon which doctors might base a claim that CFS or M E is "some type
then of depression" (line 126) and might wish to offer anti-depressant treatments to
patients. FM again constructs a differentiation within the category of CFS in order to
manage the inconclusiveness of the research results, "maybe it depends on which
group of chronic fatigue syndrome people you happen to get" (lines 132-33), where
the inconclusiveness itself provides enough rhetorical space for the explanation of
depression to be inapplicable in some cases of M E or CFS.
This is an elegant piece of discourse, where FM is attending to the mutually
implicative consequences of either providing for the claim that research is
inconclusive, or treating CFS and M E as belonging in the same research category, as
he had done earlier (lines120-121). Research that is inconclusive threatens his grounds
for making any kind of a claim at all about the nature of M E, CFS, or its treatment.
For instance, there could also be objections from the group members that
antidepressant drugs had not cured their illnesses. But having different categories
within CFS allows for the researchers not to have been comparing like with like. In the
context of this interaction, FM's re-definition of M E as a type of depression can
remain implicitly available as "one suggestion"(line 125), without having to spell it
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out as his own opinion in so many words; thus avoiding a direct confrontation with his
audience.
Extract 15: latrogenic injury' 18 : Shifting the blame
139.HK = but I think a lot of the sort of (.) depression side of M E in sufferers comes
140. from the fact that we become depressed trying to convince the doctors, the
141. medical profession that there's something wrong with us
142.A1l (laughter)
143.SB I told my doctor 'I am not depressed (.) I am bloody fed-up with it (.) I am not
144. depressed' (.) but he still wanted to give me (.) anti-depressants
145. (0.5)
146.FM well I ye:s [y'see]
147.SB	 [how ]do you get round getting through to some of these doctors
148. you get annoyed with the pain 
liK responds to FM s gloss, on the doctors' rationale for treating M E as some kind of
depression, by re-working the category of depression as the consequence of injury
caused in the first place by interaction with the medical profession, "we become
depressed trying to convince the doctors, the medical profession that there's something
wrong with us" (lines 140-41). This claim is produced by ICH as ironic. Iatrogenic
injury is of course a serious matter, but also humorous as indicated by the laughter,
since medical intervention is supposed to provide healing rather than harm. The
rhetorical force of this irony is to account for doctors' diagnoses by turning the tables,
such that the doctors' insistence of a diagnosis of depression becomes itself the very
cause of depression. This effectively shifts the accountability for the patient's state
back to the doctor who 'caused' it in the first place.
In support of this claim, SB gives an account of her consultation with the doctor , "I
told my doctor 'I am not depressed (.) I am bloody fed-up with it (.) I am not
depressed' (.) but he still wanted to give me (.) anti-depressants". This neatly
constructs the injury as being in this case a consequence of having one's experience of
illness denied, or disregarded. "I am bloody fed up with it" works up her mind state as
being an ordinary (and perfectly normal) response of anger or frustration such that
18 Iatrogenic injury refers to injury sustained by patients as a result of medical or therapeutic
interventions.
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anyone might experience, rather than being a medical category of depression. SB's use
of the phrase,"but he still wanted to give me (.) anti-depressants" works to support the
implication made available through this remark and HK's earlier remarks (lines 139-
141), that they have a hard time convincing the doctors that there is anything wrong or
having their own version of their mental state taken seriously.
Extract 16: Masked depression - A 'catch-all' category?
149.FM	 you've got a very tricky problem there (.) you see the
150. doctors also have categories they call 'masked depression' (.) and they view
151. that depressions present in different ways (.) and in some people where you've
152. got masked depression (.) this is a recognised condition well before chronic
153. fatigue syndrome came on the scene (.) er you get masked depression you can
154. have some of the symptoms of depression (.) but not others (.) so you might
155. have the early morning wakening, and loss of appetite, er an- and slowing
156. down (.) y- you might still feel quite ch:eerful..now they call that masked
157. depression you've got some symptoms but not others (.) so you can
158. easily adapt that to Chronic Fatigue Syndrome- well (they could say to you )
159. 'well you've got the chronic fatigue, you just haven't got ffie other ones (.) so
160. this is an unusual way of presenting- presentation of depression
FM responds to HK's and SB's table turning device of iatrogenic injury, by making a
similar kind of counter move. He formulates their grievance as "a tricky problem"
(line 149) that patients have to negotiate with their doctors. Then he points out to the
group that "doctors also have categories they call 'masked depression' (.) and they
view that depressions present in different ways" (lines150-51). The category of
'masked depression' is formulated here as a doctors' category, rather than his own,
which allows FM to tackle a very delicate issue at the same time as avoiding a serious
misalignment with the members of the group.
Masked depression is constructed here as a rather less controversial category than CFS
or M E, that is recognised as an established diagnosis, and about which doctors can
claim to be knowledgeable, and have solid medical grounds for treating patients. He
defines it as a medically "recognised condition well before chronic fatigue syndrome
came on the scene" (lines 152-53). The category of masked depression is suggested
here as one that doctors might call on to explain why patients can be depressed,
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without actually feeling depressed, "you might still feel quite ch:eerful" (line156), and
it is represented here as "an unusual way of presenting- presentation of depression"
(line 160). One implication of the category of masked depression is that by definition,
sufferers no longer have any grounds to speak about themselves from experience,
since "you might still feel quite ch:eerful" even though you are depressed. On the one
hand, this category can be used (as it is in this dialogue) as a rhetorical counter to
undermine experiential claims (see extract 10), since it is a way of implying that
personal experience is likely to be misleading. On the other hand, the lack of self-
awareness inherent in the concept of masked depression reduces the potential for this
to be heard as a way to blame the victim for their own medical condition.
For doctors (and for FM, in this context) masked depression constitutes a 'catch-all'
category 19
 that completes the all-encompassing circle of types of depression that can
explain people's health problems in terms of psychological processes. Having such a
'catch-all' category is a way of being able to sustain a basic explanatory model for all
contingencies, even those that are anomalies. In this context, whatever symptoms the
patient presents can be interpreted as an example, or at least a hidden example of
depression. As I pointed out earlier, a final twist in the argument is that if ME patients
are defined as suffering from masked depression, they are in a sense disenfranchised,
since they have no grounds on which to speak about their own experience. 20 But even
further than this, if symptoms, and their experience of them cannot be taken at face
value patients also risk being implicated in the even more 'dangerous category' of
imaginary illness or delusions. Rhetorically, the category of masked depression is
therefore well designed for maintaining medical control over the meaning of the
patient's illness, and in the context of this dialogue it works to disenfranchise the other
participants thereby allowing FM to have the 'last word'.
"The question is", said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be the master- that's all!"
19 This works in a similar way to the categories of 'stress', and 'the rag-bag of funny illnesses' that
featured in chapter 3: extract 16.
20 This is rather like the rationale of psychodynamic explanations, where patients are deemed not to
have access to the workings of the unconscious mind.
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To summarise, this chapter sought to analyse how categories of mind and body and
the relationship between them is ongoingly constituted in talk about M E and CFS. In
the introduction I suggested that the constitution of mind and body as separate
categories in previous theoretical and philosophical conceptualisations, might itself
signify the discursive utility of those categories. I argued that they are in the first place
constituted in and through commonsense accounting practices, and are useful as
resources to manage sickness as a realth of moral accountability.
The co-implicative construction of categories and the management of agency was
explored in the first part of the chapter by looking at some formulations of mind and
body that have been worked up by medical practitioners in the context of talk about
ME. What is important is the rhetorical context of using the term 'mind'. In other
words, it is defined by what those who employ the term say in use. Constructions
differed in various significant ways: for example, whether the mind or the body is
given primacy; whether the mind is afforded conscious or unconscious control, or an
equivalent ontological status with the body; and how far the speaker works to deploy a
linear cause and effect model of mind and body, or a process model of mind and body
as integrated. Such variability constitutes a rich resource for the construction of
different versions of illness, and the management of accountability as a practical
activity.
In the second part of the chapter, I looked at the use of mind and body constructions in
the context of a participants' dialogue, where participants work to avoid becoming
implicated in the 'dangerous' category of 'all in the mind' explanations for illness.
The construction of meaning and its implications for personal responsibility for illness
are constituted in and through the situated activity of managing the potential for
confrontation. Mind and body as categorical resources are constructed, deployed and
ongoingly re-formulated in the context of managing some interactionally sensitive
business. These categorisations work in the context of talk about illness to construct
people's illnesses as being more or less physical and real. The precise meanings of
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categories and their relationship to each other, and their implications for agency are
worked up together on and for the occasions of talk.
The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated how different models of mind/body are
rhetorically useful for different discursive purposes. A linear cause and effect model
was useful for the participants in the dialogue of this chapter, to make a definite claim
in either or both directions. On the other hand, a complex process model works both to
constitute and celebrate uncertainty. Three examples of the latter can be drawn from
the analysis of data so far in this thesis. First, in this chapter, Dr Brown (extract 6)
deploys such a model to mitigate and account for uncertainty in the current interaction
of the interview, and also to claim that in the wider context of medical science,
complexity may obscure rather than enlighten; second, David et al. (1988) (see
footnote 4, this chapter) deploy a process model to claim the theoretical high ground in
the M E controversy; and third, in chapter three (above) Dr Walker appeals to a new
kind of model as a basis for claiming that `the truth will out' in the end (chapter 1
extracts 14 and 16).
One of the reasoning practices that was also employed by doctors in chapter three (and
by some of the contributors to the extracts in chapter two, and also by the attribution
theorists in the previous chapter) was the use of a contingent repertoire to explain why
patients might want a physical diagnosis for their illness. The assumption built into
this argument is that an interpretation of their ailments in terms of bodily processes
makes them less acccountable for their illness, and therefore the deployment of such
explanations is a move to avoid facing up to their 'real' problems which are deemed
by the doctor to be psychological. Of course, this account fails to acknowledge the
reciprocally contingent explanation that doctors might want to interpret their patients'
symptoms as psychological in order to make themselves less accountable for
understanding and treating the illness. As one M E sufferer put it, "It's a cop out!"21
21	 •This quotation is taken from Angela and Joe's narrative, which is analysed in detail in the following
chapter (six).
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The assumption underlying these kinds of commonsense constructions is that there
might be a one to one correspondence between psychological explanations and high
accountability of patients, and physical explanations and low accountability of
patients. In other words, the argument itself would lead to the conclusion that physical
diseases of the body are associated with things that just happen to people, whereas
psychological or psychosomatic illnesses are associated with a sense of a morally
accountable agent, who might somehow be subverting the presentation of an actual
mental dysfunction, (such as anxiety or depression) as a physical symptom.
The analyses of this chapter have indicated that there is not such a perfect fit between
the mind as a realm of personal accountability, and the body, as a passive or acted
upon object. These two are, in the first place, participants' categories, and although
they certainly can be used in this way, as indicated in the above examples of doctors'
and patients' reasoning practices; a closer look at mind and body talk in different
contexts tends to work against such a neat and tidy categorisation.
As the analysis of dialogue in this chapter has demonstrated, the dualism that is built
into linear models of illness explanation, the interaction of mind and body in process
models, and the monism of FM's approach where the mind is made equivalent to the
body, are well designed to manage some rhetorical business. In the dialogue between
FM and the members of the group various bids for authorship of the meaning of
categories (such as mind and depression) are made in and through various moves and
counter moves. At stake in this dialogue is the meaning of the illness and the
implications of that for personal accountability, and the potential for misalignment and
confrontation with other participants. On way to summarise this would be to argue that
the definition of M E is itself a product of the interactional dynamics within which that
struggle for authorship takes place.
The next chapter analyses the relationship between attributional discourse, and moral
accountability in the context of an illness narrative, where the identity of the sufferer
and the nature of M E are co-constituted in situ.
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CHAPTER SIX
The Narrative Construction of 'Self' and M E.
The aims of this chapter are two-fold: First, to examine the way that M E and identity
are co-constituted in and through the management of competing concerns in an illness
narrative; second, to show how the theoretical approach of discursive psychology
(Edwards and Potter, 1992) differs from other approaches and can make a contribution
to the analyses and understanding of illness narratives and the discourse of medical
practitioners.
A discursive psychology approach to narrative has been elaborated by Derek Edwards
(1997), whose comprehensive critique of cognitivism l in psychology includes a
chapter on "Narrative: Stories and Rememberings", where narrative analysis is re-
worked from the perspective of discursive psychology. He distinguishes between three
types of analysis that have been applied to narrative (ibid: 271). A type one analysis is
common to much of ethnography and oral history, where the aim is to collect stories as
a route to finding out about events. Language is treated as a representation of reality,
and people's descriptions are taken as being more or less accurate accounts of 'what
happened'; they are deemed to be a route to a world of reality beyond the talk, which
is discoverable within the limitations of human memory, error or bias. A type two
analysis aims to discover people's perceptions of, or understanding of events; in other
words it treats their discourse as revealing something about their internal psychology,
their world-views, beliefs, cognitions and attitudes etcetera. Much of narrative
psychology, especially as it applies to health and illness, takes this second approach
which aims to identify people's personal views of the world, or how they, as
individuals, make sense of the events and experience of their illness. The next section
briefly outlines the rationale of some of these approaches with reference to a recent
review by Murray (1997).
I 
6'Cognitivism is a perspective that reduces all of psychological life, including discourse and social
interaction, to the workings of cognitive, or even computational, mental processes." [It is] "currently
psychology's dominant theoretical and methodological perspective" (Edwards, 1997: 19).
Murray has summarised the main aims of a narrative approach to health psychology as
a way to study people's experiences, and a way to gain insights into people's identity
and culture. These aims are described as being inherent in a 'humanistic' or
`antipositivist turn' in psychology, which is concerned to develop "an understanding
of human experience" and how people make sense of their own and other people's
identities and life experiences.
Murray has identified attribution theory as a precursor of narrative psychology, since it
has been argued that there is a human tendency to seek causal connections between
events (Heider and Simmel, 1944; Heider, 1958). In other words, from this view
"Narrative thinking is, therefore a type of causal thinking." (Robinson and Hawpe,
1986: 111). Apart from this interest in individual cognition, some analysts have sought
to understand storied accounts as a product of the interpersonal context (see for
example Baumeister and Newman, 1994), where the central claim is that interpersonal
and interpretative motives influence how stories are told. An example that is relevant
to the context of illness talk is Riessman's (1990) study of an MS illness narrative in
which Goffman's theory of `self-presentation'(Goffman, 1959) is used to interpret
interview talk. The participant's use of a 'narrative genre' is treated as motivated to
create a particular image of self; that is, a 'competent self' in the reconstruction of a
biography which had been disrupted by multiple sclerosis and divorce. Riessman
points out that 'how the story is told' is as important as its content. The 'narrative
genre' is rhetorically powerful because it draws the listener into the author's version of
the world. The narrator's authorship of himself and his version of events are
inextricably related, as he constructs a 'reality' and a 'self that are "sealed inside the
narrative".
Narrative has also been used as a "root metaphor" (Sarbin, 1986) by different schools
of psychotherapy. The central claim is that people can organise their experience in
such a way as to create personal distress, or in ways that emancipate them from
psychic suffering; in other words, it is possible "to articulate the subtext that
undergirds the plot of the client's life and to help him or her experiment with new
plots that open possibilities for fresh chapters" (Neimeyer, 1995b: 22). This can be
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contrasted with "cognitive theorists who seek to dismantle distorted automatic
thoughts irrational beliefs, and illogical inferences". Both of these approaches have in
common the notion that the story "resides inside the head of the individual and is a
personal construction" (Murray, 1997: 14). They also make the assumption that it is
possible for the therapist to identify constraining stories or irrational beliefs and
distorted thoughts. These are taken to be the source of the client's troubles, needing to
be worked on by therapeutic intervention and replaced with a 'better story'; a more
rational explanation. This argument, necessarily presupposes a bottom line of better
stories and more rational explanations against which to make this kind of judgement.
The idea that people begin to make sense of illness by creating a story about it is a
common theme in narrative psychology. For example, typical cancer narrative
structures (Murray, in press) tell the story of before the diagnosis and after, where it is
claimed that the narrator is attempting to cope by gaining control over the crisis by
constructing stories of re-adjustment. In other words, they are using a 'progressive
narrative' 2 to enable them to "redefine the crisis as an opportunity for rebirth and
growth" (Frank, 1993)
In contrast to these kinds of approaches that have informed narrative work in health
psychology (which are all to some extent underpinned by cognitivist assumptions),
discursive psychology (the third type of analysis outlined by Derek Edwards, 1997:
271) represents a non-cognitive approach to narrative. It does not seek to discover the
nature of events, nor to find out about people's internal cognitions, but rather treats
narrative accounts as discursive actions. Essentially this approach treats any kind of
2 Gergen and Gergen (1986) proposed three broad narrative structures (progressive, regressive and
stability) that they argue govern popular discourse and also scientific discourse. They claim that this
classification covers the dominant Western narrative genres of comedy, tragedy, romance and satire
(Frye, 1957), which have been more recently cited by others, such as the historian, Hayden White
(1973) as being dominant narrative types in Western cultures. White's point was that such narrative
structures (used by historians) lend plausibility to accounts of the past, by showing the reader "how the
data conform to an icon of a comprehensible finished process, a plot structure with which he is familiar
as a part of his cultural endowment." (White, 1978: 86) In other words, in order to be convincing
historical reports about "the way things really were" (ibid: 122) facts about the past have to acquire a
kind of coherence by being embedded in a narrative form that is familiar to the reader. The narrative
forms of history (and literature) are treated as a kind of 'deep structure' that lie beneath the surface of
texts and are characterised as "part of the psychological endowment of members of a culture" (Potter,
1996: 169).
171
discourse (including narrative) as a petformative domain of social action. This differs
from the other two types of analysis in that it does not assume a bottom line social (or
psychological) reality of either events and objects in the external world or internal
cognitions that are more or less discoverable via the analysis of people's talk.
However, discursive psychology does not necessarily debunk all of the other work on
narrative analysis, but rather re-specifies its findings in the analytic context of a
'discursive action model'. 3 In discursive psychology the order of the three types of
analysis is reversed. Although it seems to be commonsense that events in the social
world are prior to our (distorted) perceptions and understandings of them, and that this
is followed by our 'best effort' descriptions of those cognitions, a type three analysis
inverts this order by taking discourse as the starting point. That is, the world ('external
reality'), and our understanding of it ('internal reality') then become analysable only as
participants' concerns, in the sense that they appear (or are attended to by participants)
as the topic of their talk. In other words, in constructing a version of reality, people's
internal psychology (memory, attributions, identities, beliefs and attitudes, etcetera)
are precisely the issues that are at stake for speakers in the telling of narrative. From
this view, therefore, the analytically interesting thing about an illness narrative would
be the way that reports of past events (memories) are accomplished with reference to
issues of accountability (causal attributions), and how this relates to identity talk. This
is managed on two levels; both in the narrative, and in the current interaction of the
interview itself (Edwards and Potter, 1992; 1993).
Edwards (1997) has emphasised that the task of discursive psychology is neither to
enter the world of the narrative, thus more or less accepting its authority as a 'best
effort' representation of a reality beyond the account (as do type one and two
analyses), nor to disagree with it, but rather to analyse its workings as a discursive
accomplishment. This is not to be confused with treating people's accounts as
motivated by dishonesty, insincerity, or `face-saving'; but rather to argue, as analyst,
that issues of factuality, sincerity, and personal identity are the very issues that are
3 This is the model described by Edwards & Potter (1992: 154) that I have outlined in chapter one,
above.
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oriented to by narrators as discursive concerns, and are therefore part of what needs to
be analysed. In this chapter I take the approach of discursive psychology to analyse
how an illness narrative is formulated, and how it functions discursively; particularly
in the way that narrative descriptions, attributions and identity formulations are linked
together in lay accounts of illness.
It has also been noted that discursive practices that are made explicit in courtroom
talk, are implicit in everyday conversation (Atkinson and Drew, 1979; Edwards and
Potter, 1992). As Edwards and Potter have pointed out:
Courtroom testimony is a special kind of talk, but it is developed from, and draws upon, the
resources of mundane talk. It is a routine feature of conversation, and a special feature of
courtroom dialogue, that establishing 'what happened' is done with regard to issues of
personal responsibility, such that the psychological categories of memory and attribution have
to be seen as intimately connected, even as mutually constitutive. Reportings of events carry
their attributional implications with them, and are constructed precisely to do that. (ibid: 53)
Descriptions are marshalled and facts are produced in so far as they have, or can be seen to
have, bearing on specific accounts and narratives. That is so, whether we are dealing with
courtroom dialogue or any ordinary conversation. It is a matter of constructing suitable
descriptions of events, for the pragmatic business at hand (such as establishing blame). What
counts as appropriate descriptions, relevent events and proper criteria for them, including
criteria apparently outside the current talk (physical evidence, corroborating testimony and so
on), are also issues that participants address in talk. One of the central goals of discursive
psychology is to explicate this process. (ibid: 51-2)
The analysis that follows takes the form of a case study of Angela and Joe's M E
narrative.4 A courtroom metaphor seems particularly applicable to the following
analysis of Angela and Joe's narrative for several reasons; first, it is the legitimacy of
Angela's illness as a real disease that is being constructed5 ; second, in constructing a
theory of M E, they are also building a 'case for the defence' of Angela's illness as
real and physical, and third, the 'voices' of other people are recruited as 'eye-witness'
4 Angela and Joe are a married couple who kindly agreed to tell me the story of Angela's long-term
illness. I am indebted to them for their co-operation with my research. My analysis of their story is
intended to be an acknowledgement of their struggle (and that of other sufferers and carers) for the
recognition and definition of an illness that has blighted so many people's lives.
5 Bruner has pointed out how one of the important elements of a narrative is "a sensitivity to what is
canonical and what violates canonicality in human interaction" (Bruner, 1990: 77). The term `canon'
can be defined as a "general law, rule or principle" (Concise Oxford Dictionary). From this (and its
occasion of use in Bruner's writing), the term canonical can be inferred to mean that which is regarded
as authoritative, standard, or accepted. However, as I pointed out in the previous chapter (five), in the
Wittgensteinian sense, norms are something that people can appeal to in making explanations and
justifications for their actions.
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and 'character-witness' accounts and 'expert-testimony', in the corroboration and
'defence' of their case.6
In the analysis that follows, I shall be concerned to show how an account of past
events is constructed in a way that relates a particular set of attributions about the
nature of Angela's illness, and to her identity as sufferer. The 'theory of M E' that is
formulated, and the accounting for 'self as sufferer' of (or 'self as believer' in) M E
can be seen as functionally inter-related in a narrative that establishes their version of
reality against a background of on-going controversy, and possible competing
explanations (Billig,1987).
'A Case for the Defence' 
An Analysis of Angela and Joe's Story
How it all began.
21.MHS
	 mm and how did it (.) can you remember much about how it started?
22.Joe
	 =heh heh
23.	 ...
24.Angela
	 it started off with
25.Joe
	 = it started with a sore throat
26.Angela
	 = I had a sore throat and I had the very worst headache I've ever had in
27.	 my life (.) it was one evening
28.Joe
	 = go back to where we believe it was caught at the swimming baths in
29.	 (town)
30.Angela
	 = yeah
31.Joe
	 = we'd been going down in the evening (.) swimming once a week (.)
32.	 and er it was after one of our sessions
33.Angela
	 = yeah we thought we'd picked it up
34.Joe	 = I went swimming one week (.) you didn't feel up to it (.) then the
35.	 following week
36.Angela
	 = you were alright weren't you?
37.Joe	 = yeah and this ties in because it's now known that M E is caused by
38. er (.) an enterovirus which is a prime place to pick up an enterovirus is
39. a swimming baths (.) it's also the classic(.) used to be the classic place
40. to catch polio in the old days (.) hot summers (.) and I think with
6 I am, of course, not suggesting here that the interview discourse is equivalent to courtroom
interaction, only that some discursive practices are common to courtroom and everyday discourse.
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41. swimming (.) kids being in the bath all through the day (.) at the end of
42. the day the water wasn't getting through the cleansing plant quick
43. enough (.) I suspect if you'd gone first thing in the morning it would be
44. absolutely spot on clean (.) but er I suppose by the time we got there (.)
45. I suppose the enteroviruses were still there (.) yeah (.) just unfortunate
At the beginning of this sequence of talk, occasioned by the interviewer's question
(line 21), Angela has started to tell her story (line 24) with prompting by Joe at line 25.
She continues (lines 26-7) until Joe's interruption at line 28 where he directs her to
"go back to where we believe it was caught". This joint re-construction of events is
indexed by Joe, at line 27, as the rehearsal of a familiar tale, and the repetitive pattern
of lines 24-26 accomplishes a display of consensus, which helps to build the factuality
of their account (Edwards and Middleton, 1986a; Tannen, 1989).7
At the beginning of any narrative there is likely to be a sequence that provides some
background 'scene-setting' detail; this is what Labov (1972) has referred to as
'orientation'. Rather than interpreting such a sequence as merely giving information
that sets the story in its proper context in order that it makes sense to the reader or
listener, discursive psychology analyses 'scene setting' to see what interactive
business it may perform. 8 For example, beginning a story at one point in time rather
than another sets the parameters for what is to be made relevant. This has profound
consequences for the kind of causal account that the speakers go on later to construct,
and in this case provides the grounds for what will follow in the narrative as Joe's
contribution to the story. Riessman (1993) has pointed out that where people start a
story is rhetorically powerful for the management of causality and accountability, and
that competing kinds of narrative are likely to differ in terms of when and where they
begin; "Where one chooses to begin and end a narrative can profoundly alter its shape
and meaning." (ibid: 18). For example, Angela's problems are here being dated very
specifically to a point in historical time, and grounded in the activity of a visit to the
swimming baths. Joe constitutes this as part of their normal routine by categorising it
7 Edwards & Middleton (1986a) Joint remembering: Constructing an account of shared experience
through conversational discourse Discourse processes, 9, 423-459. Also, Deborah Tannen (1989)
Talking Voices: Repetition, Dialogue and Imagery in Conversational Discourse. Cambridge University
Press.
8 See, for example, my own use of chapter two as a 'scene setting' device, which sets up the grounds for
what follows in the rest of the thesis.
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as "one of our sessions" (line 32). Life events that pre-date this point are not, in this
case, being made relevant to the process of becoming sick. This account could be
contrasted with the kind of description that might draw on a psychosocial repertoire to
make relevant the effects of traumatic life events and personal psychology as
predisposing factors in the origin of her illness.
The device of starting and ending stories in a particular place, and ordering events in
ways that makes links between them, can be seen as one way that people construct one
version of events and their causes rather than another. This is more than just the
representation of some kind of internal cognitive 'sense-making', where people's
illness narratives are treated as their best effort at explaining their 'world-view', health
beliefs or illness attributions. Rather, the narrative ordering of events, and the causal
links that are made between them can be seen as accomplishing rhetorical business in
constructing a particular version of social reality. From this view, descriptions of
events and causal attributions are inextricably linked together, since the giving of a
particular description of events necessarily implicates the construction of particular
kinds of causal links and accountabilities.
A 'theory of M E' as a medically recognisable organic disease caused by an
enterovirus (formulated by Joe at lines 37-45), and the sequence of events that link
Angela's illness with the ordinary everyday event of going to the swimming baths, are
being constructed here as uncontroversial in the first instance. This is accomplished by
means of Joe's scientific explanation (lines 41-5) for why enteroviruses might be in
the water at the baths, which resonates with his earlier assertion about the baths being
the classic place to catch polio. His theory is being worked up here as not a new or
untested idea; his claims are warranted by the authoritative voice of established
science, which is represented at lines 37-40 as the 'classic' script 9 of a polio story. Joe
is here blending the detail of Angela's personal narrative with a classic narrative of
how people used to catch polio in the old days. This accomplishes alignment between
9 The term script is being used here in the same way that Derek Edwards uses it in chapter 6, 'Discourse
and Cognition', and in contrast to 'script theory' in cognitive psychology: "Events are described as
scripted, as instances of some general pattern, or as anomolies or exceptions. At stake in such
descriptions are the normative basis of such actions, and the accountability of the actors."
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the two accounts, and makes her personal story more easily recognisable as an
instance of an organic disease phenomenon.
Why she never recovered: 'Catch-22'
This next part of the narrative builds an account to explain why Angela has been ill for
such a long while (over twenty years).
76.Joe	 one of the problems which caused (.) we suspect which pushed the
77. M E (1.0) was (coughs) she had a friend in the village (.) the same
78. friend who's now got a grand-daughter with a funny name (.) and she
79. came round to see Angela (.) I think your mother had gone back (.) or
80. your mother had gone back because she'd begun to become very
81. slightly better but she was still ill when she arrived (.) but Janet came
82. round and said 'oh you wanna get out you wanna fight it y'know'
83.Angela	 = 'push yourself (.)[you push yourslelf you'll be alri[ghe]
84.Joe	 ['push yourself]	 [and] she did
85.Angela	 = and I did (.) and I got worse and worse and worse after that
86.Joe	 = and I'll always remember the time I came home from work (.) the
87. kids were out (,) the house (.) when I opened the back door the house
88. was dead silent y'know (.) and I knew she was back in bed again and
89. that really was the thing that pushed her [into]
90.Angela	 [push]ed it over the top
91.Joe
	
= my Mum came back again (.) she thought Angela was ill (.) she
92. came back for three weeks initially I-I-initially was off work for two
93. weeks anyway (.) that was special leave to look after her (.) so there
94. was two weeks and then another three (.) both parents (.) that brings it
95. to nine weeks =
96.Angela	 = well this can't[ go on forever can it? (.) so in] the end everybody had
97.Joe	 [and then she pushed herself]
98.Angela
	 gone back (.) Joe was at work (.) cause I've got two children there's
99. alot of washing isn't there? I used to crawl round the floor and hang
100. over the sink and the washing machine trying to do a bit of washing (.)
101. and of course now we know this is the last thing you must ever do is to
102. push yourself when you first go down with M E (.) and I was doing all
103. the wrong things (.) and I think that's why I've never ever recovered
This is an attributional story that begins at line 76 ("one of the problems which caused
(.) we suspect which pushed the M E") and is resolved at line 103 ("and I think that's
why I've never recovered"). Having earlier established an external, but invasive
organic cause for her illness (rather than, say, an internal psychological one) the
question of possible blame and personal accountability is oriented to at this point as a
participants' concern.
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The severity and chronicity of her illness is explained here as being the result of
following bad advice from a friend. Joe uses the voice of the friend, "oh you wanna get
out (,) you wanna fight it y'know" (lines 81-82), and Angela also uses the voice of the
friend (line 83) to emphasise Joe's point, "push yourself (.) you push yourself you'll be
alright". This sequence of joint construction (lines 83-4, and 89-90) functions again to
build consensus and corroboration into the account of events. Joe's story about coming
home from work (lines 86-89) is the dramatic consequence of the story, "the house
was dead silent y'know (.) and I knew she was back in bed again".
At lines 95-102 Angela goes on to fill in the narrative details of her struggle to fulfill
the obligations of her normal role "I used to crawl around the floor and hang over the
sink and the washing machine trying to do a bit of washing" (lines 99-100), and in so
doing she elaborates the severity of her worsening condition. From a realist
perspective the problem would be to establish how far Angela's description of events
is an accurate representation of reality. The question of accuracy and authenticity in
people's narrative accounts, such as this one, is often construed as a major issue which
threatens to undermine the validity of 'type one' analyses. As Robinson (1990) points
out;
Personal accounts of illness are often viewed with considerable ambivalence as a research
resource. On the one hand they provide a density of texture, a depth of personal meaning, and
an insight into the experience of illness not readily available through other means. On the
other hand these very qualities seem to make any systematic, valid and reliable attempts to
create generalisable propositions difficult, if not impossible. (ibid: 1173)
However, factuality and authenticity is only considered relevant to a discursive
analysis as either a discursive accomplishment, or a participant's topic. This is not to
agree with Robinson's concern that systematic analysis might be impossible. My
detailed analysis of Angela and Joe's narrative is itself a display of the many
discursive devices that (have been identified by discourse and conversation analysts)
and are commonly used by participants in mundane, everyday talk to accomplish
authenticity.
For example, one such device is the construction of fact through the inclusion of
contextual detail. This has been well documented in ethnographic literature on 'I-
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witnessing'(Geertz, 1988) 10 , and also on the textual construction of eye-witnessed
reports in studies of courtroom cross examination of witnesses testimony (Atkinson
and Drew, 1979; Drew, 1990; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Molotch and Bogen, 1985).
This work is relevant to my analysis here to the extent that, Angela's account of
struggling to manage her household chores (lines 98-103), Joe's provision of details
about the day he came home from work to find Angela in bed (lines 86-88), and his
account of the care arrangements (lines 91-95) provide vivid detail which constitute
the factual and authentic nature of their descriptions. The provision of such detail
works to give some assurance that the account is not inaccurate or fictional.
Their account also constitutes a paradox which attends to the 'double-jeopardy' ll of
illness management talk. In citing the friend's 'bad advice' Joe has made relevant a
particular notion of 'illness management'; that people should try not to 'give way' to
illness. But Angela also deploys the notion of shared knowlege as a discursive
resource "of course now we know that this is the last thing you must ever do is to push 
yourself when you go down with M E." Although the use of the term "we" is not
specific, it does convey the sense of an authoritative consensus about the management
of M E. In this case the speakers are making available the explanation that fighting the
illness has itself created the conditions for going down with M E and that Angela's
case is a recognisable instance of a typical ME story. in a similar way to Joe's account
at lines 37-40, the blending of personal narrative with the classic script is co-
constitutive, and each serves to reinforce the other. Stories of illness can be seen as
being constructed in such a way that the single instance (the details of the case)
conform to a 'typical illness script', where both the details of the individual case, and
the normative order of the script are constructed alongside each other in a co-
implicative way. The case fits the theory, and the theory is further evidenced by the
case. 12
10 See also my reference to 'I-witnessing' in chapter two, above, where contributors to the
correspondence in medical journal deployed detailed 'eye-witness' accounts of the 'Royal Free'
phenomenon.
II See Radley and Billig (1996) for a further explication of 'double-jeopardy' in illness talk.
12	 .This example of 'scripting' is also an example of the 'documentary method' as outlined by Garfinkel
(1967). For further explication, see chapter one, above.
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In accounting for herself as an M E sufferer, Angela would ideally need to strike a
balance between 'giving in' to illness, which could implicate her in discrediting
definitions of malingering; or 'fighting' the illness, by which she risks being blamed
for a self-inflicted worsening of symptoms. And of course, one of the things that
makes her case recognisable as M E in the first place, is the worsening of symptoms
following a period of 'soldiering on'. This is constructed here as a 'Catch-22' dilemma
in which she admits "I was doing all the wrong things" (lines 102-3). Of course,
'doing all the wrong things' is by definition a morally accountable issue, and her
statement is therefore rather a dangerous admission. But the virtue of not 'giving in' to
illness has also been made relevant by Angela's reference to the advice of her friend.
Therefore, the account functions interactionally, both as a direct refutation of any
possible suggestion that this could be a self-serving illness, and also as a way to
account for her worsening condition without having to directly apportion blame.
In the following section of talk, Joe supplies further evidence to support the theory of
M E they are building, by citing another case which corroborates their own experience.
106.Joe	 we know of somebody who lived or lives in (name) who was a nurse
107. who's got it (.) and she's worse than Angela (.) the reason being that
108. she was mistreated at hospital
109.Angela = at the hospital 
110.Joe	 = they put her on physiotherapy (.) she's in a wheelchair most of the
111.	 time now after that (.) so sure you've gotta rest
This is a moral tale of someone who got worse because of being given the wrong
medical treatment; "she's worse than Angela the reason being she was mistreated at
hospital"(107-8). Angela echoes part of this line, "at the hospital", which works to
raise the question of medical competency for the first time in the narrative.This
ironising of medical authority is made available in her emphasis of the word
'hospital'. Joe continues with the consequence of the story at lines 110-1, "they put her
on physiotherapy (.) she's in a wheelchair most of the time now after that (.) so sure
you've gotta rest". This was both a cautionary tale, and a display of evidence to back
up the theory of M E that they are building. In other words, the consequence of the
hospital treatment, that the patient is now in a wheelchair, backs up their own
180
experiential claim which in this narrative cautions Angela, and other M E sufferers to
rest and 'give in' to the illness.
Corroborating Evidence for the Theory
Jonathan Potter (1996: 158-9) has pointed out that the production of reliable
independent witnesses who provide consensus reports, is one way to transform a
description of events into a more solid factual account. One way that people can
display the voices of such witnesses in the construction of narrative is to use
quotations. The point is not whether they actually are quotes, but rather, that they are
designed to be heard as such in the context of the narrative. Quotations or "active-
voicing", as Robin Wooffitt (1992) terms this device, can provide corroborative
witness accounts that work to support the speaker's narrative version of events. The
following sections of transcript and their analyses illustrate the processes by which
Angela and Joe have assembled an array of corroborating evidence to support the case
they are building.
The Naive Eye-Witness as Stake Inocculation
51.Angela	 Jane was ten (.) nine (.) Steven was [six]
52.Joe	 [Jan]e0Jane would have been
53.	 about ten and Steven would be about six
54.Angela	 = no (.) she'd be nine (.) he'd be six (.) er yeah because Steven didn't
55. seem as he'd been at school very long and he, was alwaus a VJCA, little
56. boy (.) and I'll always remember he'd started acting up at school and
57. the teacher asked him 'why are you being so naughty Steven (.) you're
58. such a good little boy?'(.) and er she wanted to get to the bottom of it
59. (.) and he says 'I think my Mum's dying' (.) I was so ill he thought I
60. was dying (.) nobody had said much to him about it I suppose
61 .Joe	 =(clears throat)
62.	 0
63.Angela	 and I was like that for a very long while
In this extract (line 51) Angela resumes her account of the illness narrative that she
began at the start of the interview. She tells the story of how six year old Steven's
teacher discovered the reason for his uncharacteristically bad behaviour at school. In
this account the quotation, "I think my Mum's dying" is the voice of an eye-witness to
corroborate the severity of her physical symptoms. For several reasons, the child's
voice is a more powerful rhetorical device than if Angela were to give a simple
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account of how severely ill she had been. First, it works against the possible inference
that her account is exaggerated; second, Steven's 'voice' is here appropriated as a
response to his teacher's (rather than Angela's) question "why are you being so
naughty Steven"(line 57); and third, the child's naivete is precisely what underwrites
his credibility as a witness in this case. With consensus accounts (such as the one that
is jointly constructed by Angela and Joe at the beginning of the narrative) there is
always the potential for it to be heard as collusion. On the other hand, in the context of
this narrative where "nobody had said much to him" about his mother's illness (line
60), Steven is an untutored, innocent witness with no stake in what he says. Further,
Steven's behaviour at school is formulated in his teacher's voice as untypical of him;
"you're usually such a good little boy". The implication of this is made available by
standard attributional reasoning; that his behaviour is explainable by his circumstances
(his mother's illness) rather than by his character.
The Expert Witness and 'scripting the illness'.
In the next section, Joe continues the narrative by calling on the testimony of an
'expert witness' to back up his account.
113.Joe	 have you heard of Betty Dowsett? (.) because she's quite an
114. expert on it (.) and one of the things she says is that people who get it
115. most are women (.) not men (.) women 
116. (1.0)
117.Joe	 usually get it when- usually round about mid-thirties (.) which is
118. exactly the reason being in the mid-thirties they've got young children
119. beginning to grow up (.) they go downhill and they force themselves
120. because the husband's at work (.)[they force themselves to <carry on>]
121.Angela	 [it's a very demanding time isn't it?]
121.Joe	 and look after kids and that's why men tend not to get it so much
122.	 because they tend to say go to work and [generally they get a sick
123.Angela	 [they go to bed (.) they get
124.Joe	 certificate and they stay] off work until they're fit enough to go in (.)
125.Angela	 looked after don't they?]
126.Joe	 which gives them that little bit of respite so I suspect
127.Angela = the [women]
128.Joe	 [so it's e]asier for men to be looked after
129.Angela	 = it is
130.Joe	 = well yeah (.) because women have got that classic role (.) the men go
131. work (.) the women look after the house and the children (.) a man
132. sick so he stays at home to get well because he's unfit to go to work (.)
133. he gets a certificate and stays off until he feels like it (.) and even
134. though he may not be one hundred percent when he goes back (.) I
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135. suspect he's got over that critical period where he would have
136. regressed if he did go in
In his choice of Betty Dowsett 13 , Joe introduces the evidence of a notable authority
within the field of medical research into M E. This effectively reinstates the credibility
of medical science and again formulates a 'typical M E script' in comparison to their
own case.The testimony constructs women in general as more vulnerable to illness
because of their role in the family. Angela's case is constructed here as being just a
typical example of a more general pattern that has been recognised by an expert. This
scripting functions to exonerate Angela from any suggestion of individual weakness or
personal responsibility, especially as this might relate to the question of why she and
not Joe, should have been susceptible to the illness. This also supports the 'theory of
M E' that is being built in the narrative, in which rest at the early stages is seen as
crucial to better recovery. Angela has already given vivid details of her struggle to
fulfill her role as mother, which they argue has been a contributary factor in her
illness. Joe then uses the notion of a critical period to explain the difference in men's
and women's experience of illness: "by the time a man goes back to work he's got
over that critical period when he would have regressed if he did go in" (line 135).
Susceptibility to illness is thus being linked with the different demands placed on men
and women, rather than being an inherent female or personal weakness.
In his deployment of hearsay evidence (the friend who was mistreated by the hospital)
and corroborative expert testimony (the microbiologist who is an M E expert), Joe has
also made available the suggestion of a divide between two different medical points of
view. The hospital is cited as treating an M E patient with physiotherapy, and the
microbiologist is cited here by Joe as advocating complete rest from the outset of the
illness. In this context, the hospital has been construed as incompetent and the
microbiologist as expert. Thus, the seeds of confusion are made apparent in the
tension between these two 'medical voices' each "demanding that we acknowledge it
(.) with it's authority already fused to it" (Holquist 1981: 342). But here in the
narrative, this division of the medical world into two contrary camps (which in this
13 Dr Betty Dowsett is both a microbiologist/researcher into the organic causes of M E (e.g. Dowsett et
al. 1990), and a President of the M E Association.
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case correspond to science and practice) works rhetorically to undermine the solidity
of medical opinion. It cannot be considered an ipso facto guarantee of what is real or
advisable and can therefore no longer provide a credible counter case to the one that
Angela and Joe are constructing.
Introducing the psychosomatic version
In the next part of the narrative, Angela and Joe give an account of a crisis when
Angela was first acutely ill.
163.Joe	 the doctor sent for the specialist (.) the actual consultant physician
164. from (town) hospital came to the house (.) which was a bit unusual
165. 'cause he usually sees people (.) and they did all sorts of tests (.) took
166. blood tests and all sorts of examinations (.) they went in the bathroom
167. and went sort of quiet (.) it was obvious they were testing for all sorts
168. of (.) all the classic things like tumour on the brain (.) MS and various
169	 other things (.) weren't they? (.) which would have been (.) brought
170. this on because her legs were definitely been very very weak and
171. immobile (.) and then really it was a case of 'well that's really it
172. y'know'(.) she used to go and see the doctor (.) as time went on his
173. sympathy dropped away and it was a case of 'well [you should be
174.Angela	 ['why aren't you
175.Joe	 getting better by now']
176.Angela	 getting better?'y'know]
177.Joe	 = and that's when this attitude of ['oh (.) psychosomatic!']
178.Angela	 iso ' oh I w onder if it' s) aii in tht
179.	 [mind?']
180.Joe	 [yeah he] [said]
181.MHS	 [did he] actually say that to you?
182.Joe	 =he didn't say that to Angela (.) but he said it to me (.)[he was]going to
183.MHS	 [did he?]
184.Joe	 examine her and he asked her to go and get undressed (.) and while she
185. was doing that he said to me (.) 'the m::ind's a funny thing you know!'
186. I said 'it's nothing to do with the mind (.) it's physical'(.) but I mean
187. he didn't see it
This extract does the same kind of rhetorical work as the deployment of Steven's 'eye-
witness' testimony. However, in this case, the consultant's testimony is that of 'expert
eye-witness', drawing attention to the severity of the illness she suffered: "the actual
consultant physician from (town) hospital came to the house (.) which was a bit
unusuanlines 163-4). This is given as evidence that the GP must have acknowledged
the severity of Angela's illness at the outset, since consultants do not normally pay
housecalls. Thus, it was not just Angela and Joe's opinion that she was seriously ill.
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The narrative continues from lines 165-169, to describe how tests were done for
various serious diseases, and at line 170, "well that's really it" implies that the tests
did not identify any clinical signs that might indicate an organic disease, and there was
nothing more to be done. So the outcome after a while was that "the doctor (.) his
sympathy dropped away and it was a case of 'well you should be getting better by
now' (.) and that's when this attitude of `oh (.) psychosomatic!'..." (lines 172-3). This
part of the narrative works to introduce the controversial aspects of the status of her
illness. Their parody of the GP's `voice', "this attitude of 'oh (.) psychosomatic!'"
sets up his response as stereotypical of the medical profession, and in order to distance
themselves from it, they introduce a mocking tone. Joe recalls how the GP said to him
"the m::ind's a funny thing you know".
There is considerable ambiguity in their use of this story. First, it backs up their claim
that Angela was seriously ill but second, it introduces a competing psychosomatic
explanation for the first time.To offset the challenge that this type of explanation
represents for the case they are building, they are working to achieve two things by
parodying the GP's 'voice'. First, they are exposing his lack of knowledge, since he
cannot explain why she does not get better: "well that's really it y'know"(lines 171-2).
Second, they are ironising and thereby dismissing his use of 'crude' psychological
explanations. The implication of line 177: "and that's when this attitude of 'oh (.)
psychosomatic!'.." is that such explanations are typically used by doctors who fail to
find any clinical evidence. At a later point in the narrative (in the next extract, below),
the issue of disagreement between members of the medical profession is again raised,
but unlike the earlier story of hospital incompetence, the hospital consultant is being
given higher status for being open-minded or not voicing an 'unwarranted' and
'discrediting' psychiatric explanation: "to his credit (.) the consultant never did voice
that thought" (line 198).
A very important aspect of this story is that the whole of the narrative pivots on a
'breach of the implicit canonical script'- which in this case is oriented to as the
scientific biomedical explanation of illness. As pointed out earlier (in footnote 5) one
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element of a well formed narrative is "a sensitivity to what is canonical and what
violates canonicality in human interaction" (Bruner, 1990; 1991: White, 1980). In the
Wittgensteinian sense, however, norms are something that people can appeal to as a
resource to explain and justify (or legitimate) their actions and those of others. This
means that in the context of an illness narrative such as Angela and Joe's, the
participants can constitute the sense of their own actions, and those of medical
professionals, by reference to a set of rules or principles about the scientific status of
medical knowledge and practice.
A breach of canonicity is therefore constituted here by Angela's claim that, despite the
tests being negative, she has been suffering from the effects of an organic disease.
However, the 'voices' of the medical profession are also being deployed as
inconsistent, confused and contradictory, and of course, the rhetorical force of the
work that Angela and Joe do in the whole of this narrative rests on the implicit
assumption that although there is much confusion between practitioners and experts,
medicine could (at least theoretically) account for M E as an organic disease. It is
therefore not only Angela and Joe's persistent claim, but also the failure of medical
practitioners that is being made relevant here as an accountable matter. In the case that
Angela and Joe are building, there are two competing versions that have been made
available in and through their account. In their preferred version, the breach of
canonicity is constituted by the failure of medical practitioners to diagnose and treat
her illness in the light of available knowledge about M E. This is positioned against
the dispreferred version, which is that their own persistent claims about the organic
nature of Angela's illness constitute a breach because they are inconsistent with what
is medically known about her case - the lack of positive clinical evidence to identify a
medically recognisable disease.
The Character-Witness.
At this point in the narrative, the introduction of the suggestion that Angela might be
suffering from a psychosomatic illness, has made available an alternative
interpretation of events that could undermine the case that Angela and Joe are
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building. In the next section of talk, Angela works to re-establish her credibility to the
listener, since her very identity is at stake.
189.Angela I think my mother was around at one of these times when that was
190. mentioned too (.) my mother said 'I know my daughter'(.) I can always
191. remember my mother saying that 0 'I know my daughter'0 because I
192. was always so active heh heh hyperactive in some respects
193. actually (.) because my Mum used to say to me 'for goodness sake
194. Angela sit down' (.) this was before I went down with M E (.) I never
195. wanted to sit down (.) I wanted to be on the go all the while (.) I was
196. happy that way (.) but er (.) things change (.) you're forced to sit
197. down
198.Joe	 = to his credit (.) the consultant never did ever voice that thought
199.Angela = no (.) he didn't believe that
Here Angela tells a story using her mother's 'voice' to construct herself as being the
kind of person who is unlikely to have a mental illness, or to be a malingerer: (189-
190) "my mother was around at one of those times when that was mentioned too (.)
my mother said 'I know my daughter". She continues to qualify this by supplying the
details of what her mother knows, so that her mother's 'voice' is heard to sound within
her own. I4 But there is also a rhetorical danger in the use of her mother as a character-
witness. Although she knows her daughter well, she can also be dismissed as biased.
Furthermore, the mother's statement (lines 190-191) is quoted as a retort to a
damaging accusation made by the doctor, and this context threatens to weaken the
status of her claims as an independent witness. These. tensions we managed at tines
193-4, by also quoting what the mother used to say prior to the illness, before there
was a need for her to defend her daughter. The way that the pre- M E story is
formulated as a direct speech quotation, which constructs the opposite of her current
M E state rather than just its absence, neatly performs that function.
In this section of talk, the links between scripts, attributions and dispositions are made
clear. Script formulations (that were applied earlier in the narrative to the construction
of Angela's illness as conforming to a typical M E script) can also be used to construct
one's own, or other people's identities in particular ways. People's actions can be
scripted as being in or out of character as the kind of actions they are likely or unlikely
14 The discursive function of 'stylisation' is discussed in Morson & Emerson (1990:149) with reference
to the work of Mikhail Bakhtin. "The styliser adopts the discourse of an earlier speaker or writer whose
way of speaking is regarded as essentially correct and in accord with the task to be accomplished."
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to perform (for example, the scripting of Steven's bad behaviour as out of character).
In the context of narrative accounts, this scripting accomplishes rhetorical business
that attends to issues of blame and accountability. This can be further illustrated with
reference to the following extract from the illness narrative of a person who suffers
from multiple sclerosis:
I used to enjoy dancing, gardening and general 'busyness'. I now sit down all day either in a
chair, wheelchair or motor car and I am fed up with having to ask people to do things for me
and pass things to me... (Robinson, 1990: 1183)
This example resonates with the account that Angela has provided, above (using her
mother as witness) and earlier (lines 98-103) where Angela gives an account of her
struggle to do her household chores. Even Joe's earlier remarks about "one of our
sessions" at the swimming baths (line 32), feed into the normative image of Angela as
a naturally active person.
In narratives of biographical disruption (such as Angela's, and the example from
Robinson's study) what is at stake for the person telling the story is what Charmaz has
referred to as a "fundamental loss of self'. She expresses this idea as follows:
Over time many debilitated chronically ill persons become dependent and immobilised. As
they suffer losses of self from the consequences of chronic illness and experience diminished
control over their lives and their futures, affected individuals commonly lose not only self-
esteem, but even self-identity. Hence suffering such losses results in a diminished self.
(Charmaz, 1983: 168-195)
However, rather than making inferences from such narratives in the way that
Charmaz's account suggests, my analysis has looked at the way that people draw on
the notion of identity interactively as a resource to manage their own accountability
for telling tales of an increasingly restricted and dependent existence. In the context of
a narrative of biographical disruption, such as an M E narrative or an MS narrative, the
personal narrative is hearable as a way that the narrator can script herself as being a
particular kind of person- one who would not normally choose to live a restricted
existence: "I used to enjoy dancing [...] I now sit down all day..." (Robinson, 1990:
1183). This is similarly represented in Angela's account: "I never wanted to sit down
(.) I wanted to be on the go all the while" (lines 194-5). Thus, the 'sitting down all
day' is constructed here as deviating from the normal routine of life before M S (or M
E). This effectively manages the dilemmatics where "illness talk carries with it the
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threat that one might be seen as a potential malingerer or even a habitual complainer"
(Radley and Billig, 1994).15
Challenging the Canonical Script.
199.Joe	 as time went on he saw her (.) he basically gave (.) he couldn't give
200. an answer (.) you begin then to sort of search around for other
201. things (.) we went to a herbalist in (city) (.) we went (.) eventually after
202. three years we went to the Royal Homeopathic Hospital (.) but before
203. that (.) it was after about eighteen months (.) two years having been to
204. the herbalist (.) I'd picked up and read it (.) and there was a disease
205. called 'myasthenia gravis' which sounded very very much like this
206. (.) I was trying to get a name (.) find out what it was(.) and we went to
207. see the consultant again after about two years (.) and er well again (.)
208. she was getting undressed and this is the (.) this is the expert (.) he said
209. 'what do you think she's had?'(.) what did I! (.) so obviously he must
210. have thought 'well (.) he must have thought about it and read about it'
211. (.) so I said 'I think she's either had polio and got over it because she's
212. had the polio jabs (.) innoculations (.) 'no (.) it wasn't polio' he said
213. 'it wasn't polio'(.) I think he was a bit out on that because it's since
214. been discovered that the M E virus is very similar to polio (.) so
215.MHS	 = did they test for polio?
216.	 0
217.Joe
	
well presumably all the tests they did (.) presumably that's what they
218.	 were (.) yeah
After Angela has dismissed any suggestion of malingering and re-established her
credibility using a character-witness, Joe then continues with her defence by
dismissing the consultant as being unable to supply an answer, and describing how
they turned to alternative medicine for help. The temporal sequencing of events is
important here because it implicates a cause and effect story which justifies their
actions in eventually consulting alternative medicine. A damaging counter argument to
their case might be that Angela and Joe are the kind of people who have no respect for
conventional medicine and readily resort to fringe alternatives. However, their
challenge to the 'canonical script' is formulated here as a justifiable consequence of
the consultant's failure to supply an answer after three years had passed.
15 See also chapter five, above, for an analysis of how participants formulate the category of "active go-
ahead people" as a valourised account that works to counter any possible suggestion that they are
malingerers or 'couch potatoes'. This constructs their dispositional tendencies as being counter to the
conditions of their illness.
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Joe gives an account of events that took place when they returned from the Royal
Homeopathic Hospital to see the local hospital consultant. He deploys a biomedical
repertoire ambiguously to construe the consultant as lacking in expertise and to display
himself as someone knowledgeable who has read widely in an attempt to understand
his wife's illness. At lines 208-9, Joe uses parody to ironise the consultant's lack of
expertise, "this is the expert  (.) he said 'what do you think she's had?' (.) what did I!"
The doctor's 'voice', requesting Joe's opinion, functions to undermine the consultant
who has no answers and also warrants the giving of Joe's opinion, thereby placing Joe
_
on a par with the consultant in this context, thus lending greater status to Joe's opinion
as a truth claim. This piece of reconstructed dialogue again raises the question of what
constitutes a breach of canonicity. In this context the consultant's entitlement to expert
knowledge is being challenged, but as Joe's ironisation would indicate, not to the
extent that this undermines the whole of medical expertise.
'Truth Will Out'
Given that Angela and Joe's case is that Angela suffers from an organic medical
condition, for the point of the narrative to be successful medical knowledge and
expertise must be finally reinstated and made available to legitimate their case.
229.Joe	 after another year we went down to the Royal Homeopathic
230. Hospital in (city) and they really spent more time than most (.) they
231. spent about an hour and a half altogether with you (.) and then with me
232. and they asked question after question about all the symptoms in the
233. early days (.) and at the end of it (.) two doctors as well (.) it was said
234. 'well it's difficult to diagnose anything after a three year lapse (.) but it
235. sounds to us as though you might have had viral encephalitis (.) in
236. which case you're lucky to be alive' (.) and looking back (.) it is like
237. that because you (.) I remember you saying it was almost as though
238. you felt you were going to die (.) and at the end of it when you began
239. to pick up (.) it was almost like being a tiny baby (.) no strength
240. y'know (.) er and we had to leave it like that (.) but at least we began
241. to think that 'well there's some sort of a name to this peculiar
242. disease' (.) it wasn't until about ten years ago we began to see this new
243. thing called M.E (.) or myalgic[encephalomyelitis]
244.Angela	 [someone was]putting a name to it at
245.	 last
246.Joe	 = we used to say 'someone in this country must know what you've
247.	 got!'
248.Angela = but in the mean time (.) before that (.) we got so much disbelief (.) I
249.	 mean you lose friends
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The important narrative function of this account of their consultations with the Royal
Homeopathic Hospital is that the retrospective (if tentative) diagnosis of viral
encephalitis fits in with and legitimates the 'theory of M E' that they are now building.
It is formulated as a kind of contradiction (reality disjuncture) that is resolved within
the narrative. This is reconstructed at line 246-7, "we used to say 'someone in this
country must know what you've got", and provides further justification for going over
their doctor's head. More importantly it functions, in the trajectory of the narrative, to
resolve the tension inherent in the simultaneous deployment of two versions of reality
(represented by empiricist and contingent repertoires), both of which are central to the
rhetorical success of the narrative.
They have drawn on a scientific biomedical account to explicate a 'theory of M E' as
an organic disease. But part of doing that, within the narrative, has been to manage the
threat to their account occasioned by the failure of scientific tests to identify any
observable clinical signs that would explain Angela's illness in organic terms. So
whilst Angela and Joe have been able to provide a causal story within the narrative for
a physical illness, there are no scientifically solid grounds for Angela's illness being
clinically defined as organic.
They have dealt with this ambiguity ongoingly by challenging the authority of medical
knowledge and expertise, in the shape of their local GP and hospital consultant; but
this in turn to some extent threatens to undermine the status of any claims they might
make about Angela's illness having been medically legitimated. How can the medical
profession legitimate her illness if they have been constructed as lacking in appropriate
knowledge and expertise? Thus, the 'canonical script' of scientific biomedical
expertise, which has previously been undermined by the use of a contingent repertoire,
is also essential to the medical legitimation of Angela's illness and the case they are
building.
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At this point in the narrative, this contradiction is partially resolved by something that
resembles a 'Truth Will Out' device 16 : "someone in this country must know what
you've got", and also by the suggestion of the two doctors at the Royal Homeopathic
Hospital that she might have had viral encephalitis. An important aspect of how the
contradiction gets managed is the suggestion that there must be someone in the
medical profession, who possesses sufficient knowledge to diagnose Angela's
condition. So the knowledge or truth about M E is itself assumed as given, whilst the
different members of the medical profession are constructed as being variable in
expertise and knowledge. In other words 'truth will out' if we can only find someone
who has sufficient expertise."
The tentative nature of the diagnosis is further bolstered by Joe's account of Angela's
illness experience, which meshes with the doctor's assertion at line 236 that: "you're
lucky to be alive". So at lines 236-8 Angela's case can be identified as an example of
that: "and looking back (.) it is like (...) you felt you were going to die". The
interweaving of the doctor's and Joe's references to the respective severity of viral
encephalitis and Angela's illness, followed by the linking of this with "this new thing
called M E (.) myalgic encephalomyelitis" (line 242), constructs some solid grounds
for the legitimacy of Angela's illness as a real, physical disease, which was even
potentially life threatening. The remarks that construct Angela's illness as life
threatening, (lines 236-238) also work to confirm the validity of medical diagnostics.
As Joe points out - they were right "you felt you were going to die"(line 238). This
manages the extent to which medical expertise has been challenged, such that it can
still be held accountable for a 'proper' diagnosis. It is within the interactional context
of the management of this contradiction that the participants' talk about M E is itself
constituted.18
16 The 'Truth Will Out' device (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984) has been explicated earlier in chapter one,
above.
17 As a device, this is rather similar to the way that medical scientists have appealed to a more
sophisticated explanatory model to resolve the reality disjuncture constituted in and through the 'M E
controversy', referred to in chapter two, above.
18 This mirrors a claim I made in chapter five, above, where I argued that the definition of M E is itself
a product of the interactional dynamics within which the struggle for authorship takes place. In chapter
five, the context was a dialogue, where participants managed the potential for misalignment and
confrontation in the activity of defining the meaning of their illness and the implications of different
versions for personal accountability.
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'Labels and Things' revisited.
This point in the trajectory of the narrative (lines 240-2), is indexed as the point at
which Angela and Joe "began to think that ' well there's some sort of a name to this
peculiar disease'. This is emphasised by Angela's repetition of what Joe has said:
"someone was putting a name to it at last"(lines 244-5). Implicit in their formulation is
the notion that something does not properly exist unless it has a name, or that by
giving it a name one recognises it as being a medical disease entity and that confers a
more objective reality. 19
 But also they are implicitly suggesting that scientific
biomedical techniques had previously simply failed to identify the disease, which was
there all along, waiting to be discovered.
The controversial issue of the name now occasions an account of how Angela and Joe
suffered before they had a name for the illness. Accounting for 'self to others is
bound up with one's right to be sick, in terms of what is acceptable as a genuine or
false claim to illness. In this case, the right to be sick is being related to the existence
of M E as a 'real' disease entity: (248-9) "but in the meantime before that we got so
much disbelief (.) I mean you lose friends". This is oriented to later on in the narrative:
258.Angela and I think one or two
	
259.	 (2.0)
260.Angela probably thought 'it's all in my mind (.) it's all in my mind' 0 they
	
261.
	 become almost frightened of it..
This theme recurs frequently in M E narratives, and again relates to the 'pivotal
theme' of legitimacy and a 'breach of the canonical script'. In this context, Angela is
orienting to the biomedical explanation as if it had a greater power to define what
counts as a legitimate claim to illness, and also to a narrative concern with having to
persuade others (including the interviewer) that her illness is 'real', and has a name
and a biomedical, scientific explanation.
19 See chapter three, above, for a further analysis of participant's discourse about labels.
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Gergen and Gergen (1986) have pointed out that narrative construction is never a
private matter. The narrator needs to persuade the listener of the veracity of the
narrative, and the maintenance of a given narrative depends on the teller's ability to
negotiate with others about the meaning of events. Active negotiation, or challenges,
are especially likely in circumstances where the narrator's actions depart from
common frames of understanding (or at least those that are constituted as such within
the narrative). However, the narrator typically avoids having to negotiate such
'breaches', by taking prior account of potential criticisms (such as illness that is not
socially or medically sanctioned) or competing explanations (Billig, 1987) such as for
example, 'all in the mind' accounts of illness.
Getting it on her Records/ Legitimating the Illness.
303 .Joe	 one day she (just gave) up (.) her legs just wouldn't take her
304. round there (.) and that was sort of in eighty nine I suppose () and I
305. don't think her mother really [understood]
306.Angela	 [it caught up] with me in the end (.) it
307.	 was the [lack of]
308.Joe
	
[she had] a regression (.) that was when we realised that you
309.	 could actually get this
310.Angela = it was the first time I had a relapse actually (.) and I didn't even
311. know that you could relapse (.) that's why I thought 'oh it's alright as
312. long as I'm [sat' and]
313.Joe	 [but at that] point we joined the ME Association and got
314. alot of information about it and found that yes you can relapse (.) it
315. was at that point we decided (.) having got different doctors (.) at least
316. two who she felt were sympathetic (.) we thought it was about time we
317. laid this on the line and got this thing out into the open and got it on
318. her records (.) so when we went to see Doctor Wilson who was a
319. man (.) the other one Doctor Hill was a lady but she's very
320. sympathetic (.) we saw Wilson and went in and basically said to him
321. 'look (.) do you recognise and accept the condition known as myalgic
322. encephalomyelitis (.) and does the practice?' (.) to which he replied 'I
323. can't speak for the practice but I do' (.) and then he made a confession
324. which I thought was appalling for a doctor to say tut what I know
325. about M E is only what I've read in women's magazines'
326. (2.0)
327.Joe	 he got out her records which were about this thick by then (.) and went
328. through and eventually found a letter from this hospital consultant
329. dated ten years previously in which he talked about all the visits
330. we (.) Angela had had with him (.) he went through it and he
331. talked about (.) encephalitis cropped up again (.) not myalgic (.)
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332. because I don't think even he knew (.) in the end (.) Doctor Wilson
333. (.) having gone through all the things and talked to us both about the
334. symptoms and said 'yeah (.) you've got the classic symptoms' he said
335. 'definitely M E you've got because it started with a virus (.) most
336. people who come just say "don't feel well (.) tired" but you've had it
337. all these years' (.) so it's on her records she's got M E and that's great
338. that it's recognised by the doctor
Angela's relapse is represented here in the narrative as a crisis which prompted them
to get an 'official' diagnosis from orthodox medicine. Past events are here again being
reconstructed and interpreted in terms of current knowledge: (313-18) "at that point
we joined the M E Association and got alot of information about it and found out yes
you can relapse (.) it was at that point we decided (.) we thought it was about time we
laid this on the line and got this thing out in the open and on her records". The
implication here is that the medical profession had so far avoided making an official
diagnosis, and that Angela and Joe now wanted Angela's illness named as M E by her
own GP who could confer legitimate status by recording it on her notes. Getting it 'on
her records' is different from just giving it a name and recognising its existence. It
makes it part of her medical biography, that can be referred back to in the future as an
official written history. This can be contrasted with a tentative opinion or deniable
diagnosis, such as the one provided by the Royal Homeopathic Hospital earlier in the
narrative.
At lines 321-322, Joe describes how he confronted the doctor, "we went in and
basically said to him 'do you recognise and accept the condition known as myalgic
encephalomyelitis..and does the practice?". In posing this question Joe makes
relevant the suggestion that there are controversial aspects of M E and also displays an
awareness of medical scepticism.
A Witness for the Defence?
The previous story of how the GP came to diagnose M E sixteen years after the onset
of Angela's illness has elements of a confrontation: (lines 316-7) "we thought it was
about time we laid it on the line". But it also functions to set up the GP as a 'witness
for the defence' who confirms the diagnosis of M E: "yeah, you've got the classic
symptoms (.) definitely M E you've got (.) so it's on her records she's got M E and
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that's great it's recognised by a doctor". However, it is paradoxical that Angela's M E
has been recognised by a doctor who has already shocked them by his ignorance: "he
made a confession which I thought was appalling for a doctor (.) 'but what I know
about M E is only what I've read in women's magazines' ". Thus, the doctor's
testimony functions ambiguously both to support their 'case for the defence', and also
again to discredit the medical profession on the grounds of ignorance. The problem
with this is that the epistemological warrant of medical practioners is again at stake in
Angela and Joe's account. This is reminiscent of the earlier part of Joe's account (line
207) where the hospital consultant was construed as being unable to make a diagnosis:
"this is the expert (.) he said 'what do you think she's had ?"
The M E Bandwagon.'
The next short observation by Angela functions both to bolster the reality of her
illness, and also to soften the criticism of the medical profession that Joe delivered
earlier.
336.Angela I can understand the dilemma the doctors are in at the moment though
337. because I think there's alot of people jumping on the ME
338. bandwagon (.) they get a bit of fatigue and tiredness
339.MHS	 = yeah
340.Angela = they've got M E (.) y'lcnow it's so ridiculous (.) I can understand
341.	 the doctors being a bit edgy over it
First, Angela concedes the problems that doctors have in making a definite diagnosis
of M E, and second, she goes on to make a category distinction between people who
make false claims, and thus implicitly, people like herself who are really sick. She is
here arguing that an inherently problematic diagnosis is further complicated by people
who make trivial claims to illness by jumping on "the M E bandwagon" if "they get a
bit of fatigue and tiredness" (lines 337-8). The term 'bandwagon' is suggestive of a
more general level of misunderstanding of M E by the public who might think that
ME is just "a bit of fatigue". Angela's comment here works to inform us that genuine
cases of M E are more than that, but that in view of this ambiguity it is perfectly
understandable why doctors should need to separate the 'sheep from the goats'. This
neatly functions to limit the scope of medical scepticism so as not to extend to cases
such as her own.
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A 'Before and After' Story.
480.Joe	 mm (.) it has had (.) 'cause it's altered my way of life really (.) I feel at
481. times frustrated y'know (.) after all this time (.) frustrated (.) I suppose
482. you could say 'yes we could go out and have a walk' but er (.) you feel
483. there's things to be done perhaps (.) but you get out of the habit of
484. doing that [anyway]
485.Angela	 [because]we did it together you see (.) we always used to go
486.	 fell-walking [and hik]ing cycling heh heh heh heh heh
487.Joe	 [cyclists]
488.MHS	 = outdoor people
489.Angela = yeah (.) swimming (.) physical things 'cause I know some couples
490. aren't in to that sort of thing (.) they're quite happy to stop at home and
491. sit (.) aren't they?
492.MHS
	 = yes
493.Angela = well we were never like that (.) but we've been forced to be like that
494. in a way (.) to be sedentary instead of active 0 so it affects the other
495. one as well
496.MHS
	
= quite disruptive then really
497.Angela = and of course I'll tell you how it does affect you very badly (.) er
498. with me with having it (.) it's the grandchildren (.) now it's repeating
499. itself because I can't play with them and my arms at the moment are so
500. weak I can't even lift the baby d'you know?
501.Joe	 = well we (.) the [only]
502.Angela
	
[which] is awful
At lines 480-84, Joe begins an account of how Angela's illness has affected him as her
husband and carer, and how it has restricted his lifestyle. At line 485 Angela
intervenes io provide corroborative details of the vigorous outdoor leisure activities
they used to enjoy. This is made relevant as a contrast to the sedentary lifestyle they
are now forced to accept because of Angela's M E.2°
This 'before and after' story, corroborated earlier (page 187) by Angela's account of
her mother's character-witness testimony, works rhetorically in the narrative to
manage the 'double-jeopardy' of illness talk. 21 In any kind of talk about illness one
risks being construed as the type of person who is looking for secondary gain. This
kind of construal is a particular threat to an illness narrative in which the legitimacy of
2° This account resonates with other narratives that people have told, both in this study and also in
others (see for example, Robinson, 1990: 1183), about active/hectic lifestyles prior to the onset of their
illness, as a contrast to the restricted lives they are forced to live when they have M E. For a more
comprehensive analysis of this kind of data, see chapter seven, below.
21 The notion of the 'double-jeopardy' of illness talk is explicated in Billig & Radley (1996).
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the illness is itself 'at stake'. The account orients to, and works against, alternative
explanations that it is a 'self-serving' illness, or that Angela is malingering or making
some kind of trivial claim to illness (like the people she earlier described who jump on
'the M E bandwagon'). Her account counters such motive explanations by working up
as prior to the illness, an active 'self' who was not the type to enjoy or wish for a
sedentary lifestyle (lines 485-95). She formulates the consequence of her illness as
being now deprived of the things that are most enjoyable to her: their physical sports
and leisure activities as a couple, and (at lines 497-502), her relationship with her
grandchildren. Her account constructs the implicit rhetorical question: What possible
motive could she have to give up all the things that would make her life more
enjoyable?
Summing up.
In my case study of Angela and Joe's illness narrative, I have used a courtroom
metaphor as a framework to organise my analysis. This was not merely to impose an
analyst's gloss, but rather to recognise a set of discursive phenomena that are
demonstrably participant's concerns in the data. Examples of these are the joint
construction of consensus, the use of corroborating 'witness' accounts, and the
undermining of 'hostile' witnesses, that are common to both courtroom and ordinary
talk. These, and such devices as script formulations, work to construct the factuality of
the account and to establish their 'theory of M E' and the identity of the sufferer.
In chapter three (above), names were argued to be not merely descriptive but also
implicative of causal attributions. So also in Angela and Joe's account, narrative
descriptions and attributions of cause, or blame and responsibility, are inextricably
linked together. In other words, the narrators' authorship of identity and the events
and meaning of the illness are linked together in this co-implicative, action
performative way. Angela and Joe's story, like all other illness narratives, cannot be
taken as a mere description of their experiences (as with 'type 1' analysis), or even as
a route to finding out something about their internal psychology, (as with 'type 2'
analysis). Instead the account that they have constructed has been analysed as an
occasioned production, which performs interactional business in the telling, thereby
attending to dilemmas of stake in building the factuality of their case. Angela and
Joe's narrative can be seen as functioning rhetorically in a way that constructs M E as
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a physical disease entity, and Angela as it's victim. The legitimacy of Angela's claim
to physical illness has been 'defended' by 'building up a case' in which a particular
'theory of M E.' has been jointly constructed, and supported by credible
witnesses.This 'testimony' has been constructed in a way that dismisses alternative
explanations that Angela's illness might be psychosomatic or merely functional. These
are the very issues that are 'at stake' for Angela and Joe. The charges of ignorance and
lack of consensus against the medical profession function here in the narrative to
reduce the discursive force of medical scepticism about Angela's illness. However, the
legitimacy of medical science itself is one of the central issues that is 'at stake' in
Angela and Joe's narrative, functioning both to undermine and support their case. One
of the most sensitive things about the construction of the narrative, is their
management of the simultaneous breach and reinforcement of 'the canonical script' of
medical science. Within the narrative, Angela and Joe (like Gilbert & Mulkay's
biochemists) are deploying two kinds of repertoire in their story of her illness, their
encounters with the medical profession, and the diagnosis of M E. First, they deploy
an empiricist repertoire to establish her illness as physical and real- a position that is
underwritten by 'expert' medical research. This account is positioned rhetorically in
the narrative against a competing psychosomatic explanation for her illness. But the
doctors who make such claims are formulated here, in terms of a contingent repertoire,
as ignorant, lacking in expertise, yet to learn the medical truth, or understandably
misled by patients who make false claims. Their criticism of the medical profession
has carried with it the rhetorical risk that the credibility of medical opinion might be so
far undermined, to the extent that they could no longer use it as a resource to
legitimate Angela's illness. In their use of empiricist and contingent repertoires, and
the management of such contradiction, it is ultimately not medical science itself that
is undermined, but only some of its practitioners. The next chapter goes on to analyse
doctors' case narratives about their patients, and compares these with patients' stories
about their illnesses. Rather than making contrasts between lay and professional
accounts, I shall demonstrate how doctors' case narratives can be analysed in the same
way as patients' illness narratives, especially in constructing claims about the nature of
illness and the identity of sufferers.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Doctors' Cases: Patients' Stories.
The psychosocial repertoire as a flexible resource.
In the previous chapter I took a discursive psychology approach to the analysis of an
illness narrative'. My concern was to explore how people construct narratives that give
rhetorical support to the legitimacy of their claim to illness 2. Angela and Joe's story
was shown to be constructed in ways that 'built up a case' to defend the legitimacy of
Angela's illness as both 'real' and organic, and was positioned rhetorically against
possible alternative (psychosomatic) attributions.
In this chapter I shall analyse the way that doctors' talk about individual patients
similarly functions as discursive action. Earlier (in chapter four) I described two
different models of medicine, the biomedical, and the biopsychosocial, which I
reformulated as culturally available interpretative repertoires that can be deployed as a
discursive resource, rather than being cognitive/schematic models that guide doctors'
reasoning and diagnostic practices. I argued that these repertoires can be deployed by
both professional and lay people alike in constructing claims about the nature of
illness, the identity of its sufferers, and the skills of medical practitioners to diagnose,
treat, heal, and advise.
My analysis of Angela and Joe's story (in chapter six) showed how psychosocial
information and a biomedical 'theory of M E' had been woven together in a co-
implicative way to produce a particular version of the events of the illness and the
identity of the sufferer. The psychosocial repertoire functioned rhetorically in their
account to warrant the construction of a biomedical explanation for Angela's illness
and their dismissal of a psychogenic one. I shall continue along the lines that doctors'
case narratives about their diagnostic practices can be analysed in the same way as
patients' stories about their illnesses.
I A "discursive action model" is outlined in Edwards & Potter (1992: 154).
2	 •This specifically relates to an illness narrative in the context of an interview on the topic of M E,
which is a controversial category. However the principles of such analysis could be applied to any kind
of account or description.
Doctors' talk in medical contexts has previously been analysed by writers and theorists
such as Montgomery Hunter (1991), and Atkinson (1995). Hunter claims that in the
everyday practice of medicine, a "diagnostic circle" (ibid: 9) operates which resembles
the 'hermeneutic circle' described by Dilthey (1972) as the process of reasoning from
part to whole to part again. This is said to be characteristic of the way that texts are
interpreted by readers. Hunter claims that medicine's way of determining the 'facts' of
a case and making sense of them is similar to Glaser and Strauss' (1967) method of
'the discovery of grounded theory', in which theory is drawn from the data as it is
collected, and the emerging hypothesis directs the further collection of data.3
From Hunter's view, the goal of medical investigation is to find a narrative
explanation for the patient's problems. She describes how physicians who are
presenting papers at medical seminars typically begin with a narrative of a single case
that first inspired their interest, "there was this one guy" (ibid: xii). She claims that
medicine is fundamentally narrative. Patients' stories are 'pared-down'
autobiographical accounts of the events of their illness and commonsense aetiology
that are taken by physicians and reformulated into medical information before
returning them to their patients as diagnoses 4. Patients are likened to 'texts' to be
examined and 'read' by physicians, such that the 'plot' of the illness is located by the
physician in a taxonomy of similar narrative cases. The patient's formulation of
his/her story is construed as the preliminary 'reading' of the illness, and the physician,
like a literary critic, is said to arrive at the 'text' laden with theory, assumptions, and
hypotheses. To take the literary metaphor a step further, the 'patient as text' can be
'read' in terms of the author's past, life events, lifestyle, diet, personal disposition and
3 One objection to this formulation of the diagnostic process in terms of grounded theory, would be that
the analytic categories are, in this instance, prefigured by medicine's catalogue of diseases and
treatments, rather than each individual doctor developing his/her own categories inductively from the
data.
4 Hunter points out (ibid: 13) that the doctor's reformulation of the patient's story might be
unrecognisable to the patient as a version of their own story. In the context of a contestable illness such
as M E, the doctor and patient can draw on various kinds of explanatory repertoires to construct
different and possibly competing interpretations of the illness. This is manifest as a 'reality disjuncture'
of the type described by Laing (1967) and Pollner (1987) and I referred to in chapter three on 'Labels'.
Hunter construes such possible tensions between doctors and patients in terms of a struggle for the
interpretation of life events - a "silent tug of war" (ibid: 13) over the authorship of the story of the
illness. (For further analysis of this 'struggle for authorship', see also chapters five and six.)
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habits etcetera, and the story can also be compared with 'earlier works by the same
author' to look for common themes. Medical interpretation then creates a `metastory'
of the illness, which is authored by the doctor from a reformulation of the events of the
patient's narrative, observation of clinical or physical signs, and the history and events
of the illness.
The point of Hunter's metaphor is to make the claim that although the notion of
scientific rationality has become central to our ideas about medical knowledge,
medicine has an essentially narrative structure and can be thought of as a
fundamentally interpretative activity5. Atkinson makes a similar point in reference to
case presentations in the context of weekly ward conferences in a hospital setting.
Narrative is not confined to the interpretative methods of lay people in their construction of
illness experience...Disease is accomplished through narrative as well. Most importantly, it is
precisely the narrative that establishes the story as a case. For a story to count as a case, it is
not merely a listing of signs, symptoms and test results. The narrative provides a framework
within which that story takes shape; it furnishes sequence and consequence for the recounted
phenomena, it constricts the case as a topic of medical discourse, and establishes the
parameters of what is noteworthy. (Atkinson. 1995: 108-9)
From the analytic viewpoint of discursive psychology (with its roots in
ethnomethodology), medical reasoning, or accounting can be seen primarily as a
constructive activity in the same way as the illness narrative I analysed in chapter six.
In terms of ethnomethodology, Hunter's notion of a "diagnostic circle" (and also
Dilthey's notion of a 'hermeneutic circle', and Glaser and Strauss' method of 'the
discovery of grounded theory' 6) can be reformulated as examples of the 'documentary
method' 7 in which: "Not only is the underlying pattern derived from its individual
documentary evidences, but the individual documentary evidences, in their turn, are
5 See Bniner's distinction between two types of thought/language; narrative and paradigmatic, where
paradigmatic thought/language refers to scientific or philosophical discourse which is abstract,
generalised and logical, and the narrative mode is described in terms of literary fiction and ideal types.
Bruner draws a dichotomy between "two modes of cognitive functioning, two modes of thought, each
providing distinct ways of ordering experience" (Bruner, 1986: 11).
6 Dilthey's (1972) 'hermeneutic circle' can be reinterpreted as an example of the way that theorists have
taken member's mundane reasoning practices, and worked them up into a type of social scientific
methodological construct like 'the discovery of grounded theory' (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
7 Garfinkel (1967) derived the term from Mannheim who proposed that the documentary method
involves the search for "an identical homologous pattern underlying a vast variety of totally different
realisations of meaning" (Mannheim cited in Garfinkel, 1967c:78). Garfinkel elaborated this as "the
method consists of treating an actual appearance as the 'document of', as 'pointing to', as 'standing on
behalf of a presupposed underlying pattern" (ibid).
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interpreted on the basis of 'what is known' about the underlying pattern. Each is used
to elaborate the other"(Garfinkel, 1967c: 78). As this rationale applies to medical
reasoning, the details of the single case fit the diagnostic theory, and the theory is
further evidenced by the phenomena of the case, for example, clinical signs, medical
history, events, personal disposition etcetera.
The processes of the 'documentary method' were explicated in my analysis of Angela
and Joe's narrative, where the blending of the narrative details of Angela's illness with
the 'classic illness script' is co-constitutive- each serving to bolster the solidity of the
other. On page 177 (chapter six) Angela's illness is constructed as being a typical
example of a more general pattern that has been recognised as a physical condition by
an expert research microbiologist. 'Documentary evidences' of the details of Angela's
illness are constructed as instances that point to an underlying pattern of a
recognisable medical condition, and instructions are provided in the text that lead the
reader to a particular conclusion about the evidence provided. However, within the
narrative, Angela and Joe reflexively attend to the possibility that if the same
'documentary evidences' were given a different emphasis and significance, they could
combine to form a different underlying pattern. They do this, for example, on pages
184-5 (chapter six) where they give an account of how the 'psychosomatic version'
was introduced by the medical profession as an alternative explanation for Angela's
illness. This is the alternative against which their whole account is rhetorically
positioned.8
Smith (1978) has shown how versions and their documentary evidences are worked up
in her analysis of how a young student came to be defined by her friends as mentally
ill. In the narrator's account, the co-constitutive processes of the 'documentary
8	 •Without the analytic stance of discursive psychology, which attends to the "rhetorico-responsive"
nature of discourse, the documentary method is typically interpreted by analysts as 'perceptual sense-
making'. In other words, the (level two) analyst is likely to take the narrative as being evidence of how
the participants actually make (cognitive) sense of their illness experience in the context of their social
world. This type of analysis leads to claims being made about people's health beliefs and illness
attributions, which ignores the interesting complex, rhetorical, constructive work that goes into the
telling of narrative, and can also be the basis for certain kinds of 'therapeutic' interventions which seek
to encourage people to change their 'inappropriate' cognitions and 're-invent' themselves by telling a
'better' story.
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method' work to construct the factuality of the claim that `K is mentally ill'. Smith
points out how initially the narrator's account could be read for the 'mental illness
effect' in such a way that any possible alternative account was hardly discernible to the
reader. But like the 'figure-ground' effect of visual illusions 9 , she was later able to
impute a different interpretation and significance to the cited instances of K's
'mentally ill type behaviour', and reformulate them as part of a "communal freezing-
out process" I ° in which K's behaviour was being formulated as anomolous il when
contrasted with the norms of a social reality that is being defined in situ by the narrator
of events.
Smith's analysis of the constructive processes involved in building the account of 'IC
as mentally ill', works to emphasise the notion that social reality itself is a discursive
accomplishment. A feature of any description of events is that it 'could have been
otherwise' (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Edwards, 1997) and that in any description there
is constructive work going on that functions to accomplish some kind of business.
There are two senses in which alternative versions of social reality might be relevant.
The first is where the analyst might be able to imagine how an account could have
been different. The second (and more empirically tractable) is where the participants
themselves attend to those alternatives and the possibility of denial, in the way that
they talk.
What follows in the rest of this chapter attends to the latter as a participants' concern,
and also analyses how the co-constitutive processes of the documentary method work
in a similar way in both doctors' case narratives and patients' stories. I am particularly
interested in the use of the psychosocial repertoire and how this functions as a flexible
resource in doctors' arid patients' mundane reasoning practices, in the context of talk
about M E. More specifically I am interested in the way that 'documentary evidence'
of a psychosocial nature, and the underlying pattern that it points to, are aligned
9 A
 frequently quoted figure/ground visual illusion is Rubin's vase (Rubin, 1915; Fig. 9.9.) which can be
seen as either a vase or two profiles, depending on what is taken as the figure and what is backgrounded.
I° This process was described by Lemert (1962) in an article entitled, "Paranoia and the Dynamics of
Exclusion".
II Anomolous behaviour is described by Smith (1978) as behaviour for which no rule or set of
instructions can be found.
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together in a co-implicative way that functions to make a particular interpretation of
the patient's illness available whilst dismissing other possible kinds of explanation.
My analysis focuses on three kinds of participants' concerns that are common in the
case narratives of doctors and in the illness narratives of patients. These are: 'before
and after stories', a concern with 'where the story starts', and the process of
categorising people as mentally or physically ill.
'Before and After Stories'
The first part of my analysis focuses on doctors' and patients' use of 'before and after
stories', in which a contrast is worked up between the patient's lifestyle and activities
before and after the onset of illness. The first three extracts are here compared with
one another to see how Dr Evans, Dr Brown and Dr Butler formulate their grounds for
categorising the patient's illness as physical or psychological.
Extract 1. (MHS/Dr.Evans/ 24-46)
1. MHS	 yeah (.) can you describe a particular case that you had ?
2. 0
3. Dr Evans ri:ght er (.) that's why I was going to get these notes out (.) probably
4. the (.) I mean one that I see quite a bit of is (.) a girl of about (.) or girl
5. as she first was (.) she was probably late teens (.) nineteen twenty when
6. she first started with it and she's now about twenty four twenty
7. five (.) I'm sure she's been coming to see me as long as I've been in
8. the practice (.) er (.) and hers did- she was a (.) fit (.) sort of active
9. young lady when she- before she had it (.) working in a shop in town
10. as a dress sales woman (.) that sort of thing (.) er (.) well dressed and
11. sort of always going out and about
12.MHS
	
= how old would she be?
13.Dr Evans = she'd be late teens (.) very early twenties I think (.) when she first
14. started with it (.) very outgoing and everything (.) she had a definite
15. (.) recognisable viral illness (.) er I think she actually had positive
16. monospot12 at the time (.) for glandular fe:ver (.) or at least she had
17. some- a blood picture that suggested viral illness (.) at the time (.)
18. and then really also at that time (.) she had a lot of (.) pain in the upper
19. right hand side of her abdomen (.) which (.) everyone was thinking was
20. either gallstones or some liver problem (.) or (.) in the end turned out to
21. be inflammation of the rib cartileges I think and she had them injected
22. and all this sort of thing (.) but around about that time when she got the
'2 A ,monospoe is a blood test for infectious mononucleosis which indicates the presence of the
glandular fever virus.
23. initial pnful illness (.) she also had a viral picture which er (.) seemed
24. to go along with that (.) and then ever since then she ha:s (.) been a
25. different mson really
First, at lines 4-7, Dr Evans gives a description of his patient in which she is identified
as a familiar case: "one that I see quite a bit of", which displays his entitlement to
speak with some authority about the patient. His description of the patient at lines 4-11
formulates a detailed identity ascription which makes available some information
about her, the length of time she has been ill, and what kind of a person she was before
her illness. This constructs a scenario in which a fit, active, outgoing, teenage girl who
is smart and hard working is suddenly laid low by a viral illness.
The inclusion of such `scene setting' detail has a crucial bearing on the kinds of
actions that the narrative performs (Edwards, 1997: 264). The account functions as
more than just a neutral display of information giving or 'scene setting' - it is a
reformulation of the patient's 'before and after' story. In this case the 'before and
after' story is the patient's adequate grounds for claiming that she is sick and is
reconstructed here by the doctor as part of his adequate grounds for making a
diagnosis of a physical illness.
Alongside this identity ascription, at lines 14-24, Dr Evans also constructs his
formulation of the clinical events of her illness using the biomedical repertoire. She
had "a definite recognisable viral illness"; " a positive monospot"; "a viral picture";
"pain in the upper right side of her abdomen"; and " inflammation of the rib
cartileges". Her illness is in this way constituted as a recognisable medical condition,
with objective clinical signs (a positive monospot), which indicates a recognisable
viral illness - glandular fever. The physical `reality' and cause of her illness is thus
constructed rhetorically, both in the way that she is ascribed a particular kind of
identity, and in the formulation of a biomedical narrative. The doctor's endorsement
of her illness and his construction of it as a recognisable medical category with an
identifiable cause are linked together. If the doctor endorses the patient's illness as
fitting into a physical diagnostic category, then ideally he needs to warrant this in
medical terms. But, in the case of a long term chronic fatigue state, the biomedical
explanation alone is an insufficient and inconclusive one 13 , so he also needs to provide
additional grounds for making such a claim. The formulation of her identity that he
offers - 'fit, active, well dressed, outgoing'- works in this case to constitute her as
someone to whom he can credibly attribute a physical diagnosis. The account is
descriptively produced in a way that works to counter any possible alternative
explanation for the patient's illness - for example, that she might have a psychological
illness or that she is a malingerer who is looking for time off work.
The next extract can be analysed in a similar way to extract 1 in the sense that in both
cases, an account of identity is interwoven with a biomedical narrative.
Extract 2. (MHS/Dr Brown/23-39)
1. MHS	 can you remember a particular case
2. Dr. Brown = m[m]
3. MHS
	 [can you describe a particular case to me of somebody that (.) came
4. to you like that?
5. Dr.Brown = mm WELL YEAH like this chap (.) he::'s I suppose (.) early forties
6. who came in and-actually he had-his k212 had been tough for a couple
7. of years (.) but he'd sort of coped with that and he was (.) he went on
8. holiday (.) and he got this urine infection (.) it burned and scalded 0
9. so it was fairly (.) quite definite (.) and then shortly after that he sort of
10. came back and sort of said "Hey I'm not quite sure what's happened
11. but I don't seem to have got o:ver that (.) it's left me completely
12. exhausted (.) a::nd er if I try and do anything I'm just worn o::ut (.) and
13. my muscles ache 0 y'know (.) previously I think he'd taken part in
14. fun-runs (.) and he said there was just no way that he (.) even if he just
15. walked up and down the stairs a couple of times (.) all his muscles
16. would sort of ache (.) a::nd he was finding that he would have to go to
17. bed at eight or nine o'clock at night (.) couldn't keep awake in
18. meetings
19. (0.5)
20.Dr Brown and this was (.) quite a change for-for him
Dr Brown also begins his narrative by 'setting the scene': "this chap (.) he::'s I
suppose (.) early forties" (lines 4-6). As with the last extract, some information is
given about the patient's age, occupation and identity. Similarly to Dr Evans' account,
Dr Brown is formulating a 'before and after' story which functions as more than
neutral 'information giving' about psychosocial aspects of his patient's case. At lines
13	 •	 •
This is because chronic fatigue can be a symptom of many conditions - both organic and
psychological.
8-9 Dr Brown's account of an infection that led to symptoms of fatigue and muscle
aches, is worked up as a biomedically recognisable post-viral illness. The grounds for
an organic causal story are built up by the doctor in a narrative sequencing of events:
"He went on holiday (.) and he got this urine infection (.) it burned and it scalded (...)
then shortly after that he sort of came back and said It's left me completely exhausted
(...) I'm just worn o::ut (.) and my muscles ache"
Sharp contrasts are formulated between the patient's physical activity before and after
the infection: "previously I think he'd taken part in fun runs", and afterwards, "even if
he just walked up and down the stairs a couple of times (.) all his muscles would sort
of ache"(lines 13-20). The formulation of 'before and after' around the pivotal event
of the infection works to establish adequate grounds for the patient to claim that
something is wrong, and also for the doctor to warrant the diagnosis of a genuine
physical illness. The psychosocial repertoire is used here as a resource by Dr Brown,
(in the same way as in extract 1 by Dr Evans) to provide additional grounds for
making a physical attribution for his patient's illness.
The previous `before and after' formulations are now compared with how Dr Butler
talks about her patient in this next extract.
Extract 3. (M
1. Dr Butler
2.
3. Dr Butler
4.
5.
6.
7. Dr Butler
8.
9.
10.Dr Butler
11.
12.MHS
13.Dr Butler
14.
15.
16.Dr Butler
17.
18.
19.MHS
HS/Dr Butler/353-387)
I can remember one particular lady (.) who
(2.0)
I felt she probably had got M E (.) and referred her on (.) and I don't
know how that lady's getting an actually because she's rnover5 col tif
the area
(2.0)
a:nd her symptoms came on when she was about three months post-
natal
(1.5)
and again (.) I find it difficult to pull out how much could have been an
element of post-natal depression with her
= right (.) did you suggest that to her as a possible?
= oh yes I mean y'lcnow (.) we discussed that-I mean she wasn't overtly
depressed (.) as some of them seem
(1.5)
but er (.) and y'know she'd got more symptoms of just the lethargy 0
the myalgia bit and (.) which is why I went sort of more down the M E
line with her
= what sort of things (.) er y'lcnow in addition to the lethargy (.) what
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20. other things indicated to you that it might be M E (.) rather than just
21. post-natal?
22.Dr Butler = I think with her it had again followed 0 y'know a distinct systemic
23. illness as well (.) er
24. (1.5)
25.MHS	 like a viral illness?
26.Dr Butler = yeah (.) she'd had like a sort of (.) y'lcnow a grotty fluey bug
27.MHS	 = right
28.	 (2.6)
29.Dr Butler the other thing that made me (.) wonder more about the depression side
30. was her ba:by had got ear deformities and was going to need surgery
31. and things like that (.) I wondered y'know whether [interruption]
32. y'know (.) I wondered how much (.) was this y'know (.) whether she
33. was possibly expressing
34. (1.2)
35.Dr Butler almost like a grief reaction
In this account Dr Butler is formulating the identity of the patient alongside her two
candidate explanations for the illness; one being that she had MB fonowjng a vjra)
illness, and the other that it was post-natal depressive illness brought on by a grief
reaction.
The case narrative begins, like the previous two extracts, with a 'scene setting' device
at lines 7-8: "her symptoms came on when she was about three months post-natal". As
before, this functions in the narrative as more than just a bit of background
information. Dr Butler is situating the beginning of the patient's illness story in the
context of an earlier event, the birth of her baby. This effectively makes relevant the
patient's identity as the mother of a new baby, which turns out to have problems: "her
ba:by had got ear deformaties" (line 30). The description "three months post-natal" at
line 7, (rather than say 'three months after the birth') does the work of setting up the
diagnostic category of "post-natal depression". Rather than merely setting the
patient's problems into a time frame of when the illness began, the formulation of
"three months post-natal" tells us something about the condition of the patient herself
- suggesting the strong possibility that she was vulnerable. In other words, this
psychosocial 'information giving' provides reasonable grounds for the doctor's
candidate explanation that "it could have been a bit of post-natal depression"(lines 10-
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11), and that, "she was possibly expressing (1.2) almost like a grief reaction" (lines
32-35).
On the other hand, at lines 13-14, Dr Butler formulates a disjuncture between this case
and typical cases of post-natal depression: "she wasn't overtly depressed 0 as some of
them seem", and also: "she'd got more symptoms than just the lethargy 0 the myalgia
bit"(lines 16-17). In other words, she is not scripting the patient's illness as a simple,
clear cut, classic instance, such that it neatly fits the category of post-natal depression.
Therefore, this lack of matching fails to entirely warrant the giving of a psychiatric
explanation for her patient's illness. Here the working up of complexity is part of a
retrospective accounting for her statement at lines 1-3: "I felt she probably had got
M E", and provides grounds for both her diagnosis and its tentativeness, which is
further bolstered by an appeal to a higher authority, "and referred her on"(line 3).
When asked to account for the diagnosis (lines 19-21), she offers an alternative
candidate explanation where the patient's illness may have been triggered by a
"distinct systemic illness" (lines 22-23), and more specifically a "grotty fluey bug
(line 26).
When Dr Butler's account is compared with those of Dr Evans and Dr Brown, we can
see that all of the narratives supply the same kind of biomedical information about a
possible or likely organic explanation for the patient's illness. Dr Evans refers to a
"positive monospot (...) for glandular fever (...) a blood picture" (extract 1, lines 14-
15). Dr Brown claims that his patient "got this urine infection" (extract 2, line 7). And
Dr Butler refers to a "distinct systemic illness (...) a grotty fluey bug" (extract 3, lines
22-23, 26). However, the accounts differ in the way that this biomedical information is
interpreted in terms of the patient's identity and life events. In other words, the
psychosocial repertoire is drawn on as aflexible resource (in the context of the
interview) to interpret similar biomedical events in different ways. Dr Evans and Dr
Brown construe their patients in a way that makes available psychosocial 'evidence'
that warrants the giving of an organic medical diagnosis, whereas Dr Butler makes
available psychosocial 'evidence' that might also back up a claim that her patient's
illness is psychiatric.
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'Where the story starts'.
The format of Dr Butler's account can be distinguished from the kind of contrast
structures used by Dr Evans and Dr Brown. These 'before and after' structures
function in the doctor's narratives to build up their grounds for making a diagnosis of
physical illness, and to dismiss alternative psychological or 'motive' interpretations
for the patient's condition. Dr Butler's case is not worked up using exactly the same
structure as the other two. Instead of positioning a formulation of her patient's
disposition and activities before her illness against her behaviour after the onset of the
illness, Dr Butler makes available the details of life events that happened before the
patient became ill.
Where the story starts is an important part of how causes can be attributed to
illnesses. I4 As pointed out in the previous chapter, Angela and Joe's narrative begins
with a specific life event. Their account dates Angela's health problems specifically to
a particular time, place, and origin - that of 'picking up' a virus during a visit to the
local swimming pool. By starting the story at this point, they do not make available
any life events that may have happened three months prior as Dr Butler does here in
the case of her patient who was "three months post-natal". In either case, 'where the
story starts' is a powerful rhetorical device that functions to accomplish the business
of grounding an attribution about the cause of the illness by 'establishing the
parameters for what is to be taken as noteworthy'(Atkinson, 1995:109). Angela and
Joe's story starts in a place that allows them to make narrative sense of a physical
attribution, whereas Dr Butler's story is rhetorically organised to make available the
alternative suggestion that her patient might have been vulnerable to post-natal
depression.
"Reissman (1993: 18) points out that where people start a story is rhetorically powerful for the
management of causality and accountability, and that competing kinds of narrative would differ in terms
of when and where they begin. See also Edwards (1997: 277) "Where to start a story is a major, and
rhetorically potent way of managing causality and accountability, it is an issue not only for personal
narratives, but for accounts of all kinds, including histories of nation states" Where a story starts is also
an issue for scientists in the construction of 'discovery accounts' (see chapter two ,this thesis, "A
Plausible History of M E", where competing causal explanations for outbreaks of a mystery illness,
variously described as "a new clinical entity", and "epidemic hysteria", are managed by this narrative
device).
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A comparison can now be drawn between the 'before and after stories' of M E
sufferers in the following extracts (4,5, and 6) and the accounts of doctors about their
patients in extracts 1 and 2.15
Extract 4 (MHS/A&J/189-199)
189.Angela I think my mother was around at one of these times when tha was
190. mentioned too (.) my mother said 'I know my daughter'(.) I can always
191. remember my mother saying that (.) 'I know my daughter'(.) because I
192. was always so active heh heh hyperactive in some respects
193. actually (.) because my Mum used to say to me 'for goodness sake
194. Angela sit down' (.) this was before I went down with M E (.) I never
195. wanted to sit down (.) I wanted to be on the go all the while (.) I was
196. happy that way (.) but er (.) things change (.) you're forced to sit
197. down
198.Joe	 = to his credit (.) the consultant never did ever voice that thought
199.Angela = no (.) he didn't believe that
In extract 4, Angela's comment at line 189 follows on from Joe's earlier account of
how the GP made suggestions that her illness might be "in the mind". 16 I have argued
(in chapter six) that Angela is working here to re-establish her credibility as a
particular kind of person - one who is not given to psychosomatic illness or
malingering. Her personal disposition is built by scripted formulations such as "my
Mum used to say to me 'for goodness sake Angela sit down" (lines 193-4), and "I
never wanted to sit down" (lines 195-6). Her pre-M E activity (or hyperactivity) is
built up as an abiding dispositional trait, something she always did, which allows her
current state of inactivity to be easily read as 'out of character' and the following
attribution of a situational cause to be made, "things change (.) you're forced to sit
down" (lines 196-7).
The next extract is taken from a television debate - "The Esther Rantzen Report"
entitled "M.E: A modern plague, or a malingerer's charter?" (An invited audience
15 This is a general comparison between the discourse of doctors and patients, rather than a matching of
patients to doctors, which would have compromised the doctors' ethical stance on patient
confidentiality.
16 Extract 4 is more fully analysed elsewhere - in chapter six, page 188, where it is set in the context of
Angela and Joe's illness narrative.
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consisted of members of M E self-help groups, general practitioners, consultants,
researchers, and a medical journalist.)
Extract 5 (The Esther Rantzen Report / August 5 1996, BBC1)
1. ER17	= so you think its a kind of depre:ssion?((hostile audience response))
2.
3. TS 18	I think it may well be a kind of depression
4.
5. ER	 Right (.) right (.) finish what you're say Ting
6. TS	 [[I
7. ER	 [[you think it may well [be?]
8. TS	 [eh-]er (.) m-may we:11 be >a form of
9. depression< because patients will not realise (.) that depressed
10. (.) patients become ill (.) and therefore they resent being described as
11. (.) >having depression< (.) [listen to them (.) li::sten to them you see]
12.ER	 [well clearly (.) clearly some people do] do
13.	 you resent it?(.) being described [as depression]
14.P1	 Ewell its not th]at I resent it but I mean
15. I don't really look very depressed do I ? (.) I mean I was a head
16. teacher (.) and I loved my job (.) and I played squash (.) and I produced
17. concerts with the children (.) and overni:ght I was like a vegetable (.)
18. suddenly (.) in the most terrible pains [...] I couldn't think properly and
19. I couldn't speak properly and I lost so much power in my muscles (.)
20. the only way I could comb my hair (.) was to rest my elbow on
21. something like this and this was what it was like for me
[...]
146.ER	 now sir your wife (.) Ellie
147.P4	 = yes
148.ER	 = had this illness (.) did she not?
149.
150.P4	 she had it for six years in total
151.
152.ER	 now we have a picture of Ellie as we can see she was a nurse (.) it does
153.	 seem to strike a lot of nurses doesn't it?
154.P4	 = it does (.) medical profession and dental profession as well
155.
156.ER	 what kind of person was she? was she depressed at all before [she]
157.P4	 [not[ at
158. all (.) not at all and she just loved life (.) she lived for the family and
159. she lived for her nursing (.) she wasn't what you would call a high
160. flyer (.) she was a hard worker (.) you have to be if you're going to be a
161. mother and a-and a nurse at the same time
162.ER	 = now she died tragically young did she not?
163.P4	 = she died at fifty two
17 Esther Rantzen chaired this television debate.
18 Dr Thomas Stuttaford is a medical correspondent for 'The Times' newspaper.
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164.	 (.)
165.ER	 and (.) do you feel the death was connected with the M E?
166.P4	 = yes it was (.) it was-obviously you don't die a M E (.) you die as a
167. result of M E (.) and she died from a deep leg thrombosis (.) for the
168. simple reason that she was bedridden (.) for the last- well (.) she was
169. bedridden for four years (.) the last three of those years she was
170. unable- she was so ill that she was unable to see (.) urn our youngest
171. daughter (.) e::r
The following extract is taken from an interview with an M E sufferer.
Extract 6 (Bev/MHS/1293-1304)
1. MHS	 I suppose you would have found it difficult to understand it
2. Bev
	
= sure (.) I most certainly should (.) I mean people used to say to me
3. 'don't you ever walk anywhere (.) do you always run?' (.) y'lcnow
4. because I was always going up and downstairs and the boss used to say
5. to me 'good gracious Bev you're up and down again' heh y'know this
6. sort of thing (.) well I was that sort of person (.) I'd get up in the
7. morning and clean and tidy all up before I went to work (.) come back
8. and then meals (.) the ironing (.) whatever (.) I'd be working 'til late at
9. night (.) it's always been me (.) I used to dig the garden (.) mow the
10. lawns y'know and (.) that was just me (.) and so nobody in their right
11. mi:nd would want to give up all that
A comparison of the data in extracts 4, 5, and 6 supports the claim I made earlier that
'before and after' stories are rhetorically positioned against a particular kind of
interpretation of the illness. For example, in extract 5 lines 8-11, TS offers a
psychological explanation of M E as a "form of depression". At line 14, a member of
the audience, P1 (in response to a direct question by ER) makes a denial that she (as
an M E sufferer) resents the attribution of depression that has been worked up by TS.
She continues (at line 15) by appealing to the audience to judge for themselves: "I
don't really look very depressed do I ?" The basis for her rejection of depression is
thereby rhetorically based on what anyone can see for themselves, rather than being
due to resentment, and her denial of this works to contradict the implication of a prior
motive to prefer a physical explanation for her illness, and to reject a psychological
one. P1 goes on (at lines 15-21) to construct her 'before and after' story, which is
rhetorically constructed to dismiss precisely the suggestion that has been built up from
lines 1-13, that M E might be a "form of depression" (lines 8-9). Similarly, P4 (line
157) works to dismiss this kind of interpretation being placed on his wife's illness. In
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the same way that P1 describes her pre- M E self as an active head-teacher and
sportswoman, who loved her job, P4 describes his wife, Ellie as a hard-worker who
loved life and lived for her family and her nursing.
In both cases, psychosocial 'evidence' functions to build up the grounds for making a
claim of physical illness. Descriptions of active lifestyles and dispositional traits, such
as hard-working and cheerful (someone who "loved life") are blended together by P4
to dismiss the suggestion that his wife Ellie might have been suffering from a
depressive illness. In both cases, this kind of psychosocial 'evidence' is contrasted
with the post-
M E state of being "like a vegetable (.) suddenly" (lines 31-2), or being "bedridden for
four years" (line 165). For P1 the dramatic overnight change is from an independent
active head-teacher, to a 'vegetable' who can't think or speak, or look after herself
properly. Similarly, for P4's wife Ellie, the change is formulated as being from hard-
working nurse and mother, who lives for her family, to being bedridden and unable
even to see her daughter.
Similarly in extract 6, Bev's account accomplishes the same kind of business. She
scripts herself as a person of a particular type of disposition: "I was that sort of
person" (line 6) "I'd get up in the morning and clean and tidy all up before I went to
work" (lines 6-7) "I'd be working 'til late at night (.) it's always been me (.) I used to
dig the garden (.) mow the lawns y'know and (.) that was just me". The upshot of her
script formulations (at lines 10-11) works against any possible suggestion that her
current inactivity (documented in a different part of the interview) might be
symptomatic of any dispositional trait that might predispose her to a self-serving
psychosomatic illness or malingering. At lines 10-11 she dismisses such a 'motive'
explanation for her condition by making an appeal to the consensual nature of
commonsense; "nobody in their right mi:nd would want to give up all that", where "all
that" has been worked up in terms of 'extreme formulations' (lines 3-6) which
describe her as not just a willing worker, but an outstandingly enthusiastic one who
would choose to run rather than walk, and do the garden and the housework as well as
going to work.
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Tales of frenetic lifestyles prior to M E (and I would argue all other kinds of disabling
illnesses and conditions) are common themes in literature where researchers have
collected illness narratives (eg. Kleinman, 1988; Robinson, 1990; Ware, 1992). One of
the discursive functions performed by such accounts is to do the contrastive
accounting business that allows a situational rather than internal causal attribution to
be made as we have seen in the above extracts. Another function of these kinds of
account is to 'script up' the individual case as a recognisable instance of a more
general pattern - in this case, a 'typical M E story', where the pre- M E activity stands
in stark contrast to highlight the disabling effects of the illness. Of course such 'M E
scripts' are fact-constructive as well as normalising devices, and being typical is what
constructs it as ME in the first place.
In previous research, when illness narratives have been taken at face value (as with a
type 1 analysis 19) these participants' tales of hyperactive people and frenetic lifestyles
have provided the 'evidence' for an analysts' gloss which has been offered as a
theoretical interpretation of the causes or social meaning of the illness. For example,
Norma Ware (1992) uses tales of frenetic lifestyles in M E narratives as evidence to
explain the profound fatigue of M E and CFS as a symptom that is meaningful in the
context of a highly stressful existence in the twentieth century. The illness, she claims,
allows sufferers to 'opt-out' of their previous frenetic lifestyle to adopt a less stressful
one characterised by a slower pace and lower activity levels. In treating accounts as a
face-value representation of reality, this kind of explanation ignores the complex
rhetorical work accomplished in such narratives by the work to dismiss precisely such
a 'motive' account of their illness. In working to dismiss such an interpretation,
sufferers paradoxically implicate themselves in a further range of damaging
interpretations about the nature and cause of their illness.20 Simon Wessely makes a
19 See chapter six, where I outline three types of analysis cited in Edwards (1997).
20 Kevin McKenzie (1997: 2) makes a similar point with respect to the analysis of British and
American expatriates' interview talk recorded during the aftermath of the Persion Gulf Conflict of 1990-
91. He points out how (in talking about the Gulf conflict) speakers attend to a range of competing
demands, such as their "accountability to be neither prejudiced nor unaware of cultural difference". A
display of awareness to cultural difference could easily be hearable as evidence for racial prejudice.
Paradoxically, if a speaker works to avoid being heard as prejudiced, this could be heard as evidence for
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similar point in a transcribed discussion following Ware's paper at the CIBA
symposium (Wessely,1993) suggesting that such face value interpretations by theorists
have reinforced the unhelpful media stereotype of "yuppie 'flu" as a self-inflicted
illness of the young, upwardly mobile.21
In view of such culturally available media stereotypes, accounting for oneself (or one's
relative or patient) as a sufferer of M E, is likely to implicate the narrator in something
of a dilemma. What is 'at stake' in theillness narrative (or in the doctor's case
narrative) is that in order to dismiss the possible interpretation of malingering or
dispositional weakness, it is necessary to script oneself (or one's relative or patient) as
a previously active, busy person who is thoroughly involved in every aspect of social
and working life, and not given to a sedentary lifestyle. In fact these scripts are often
worked up as extreme and exceptional, rather than just normal.(Pomerantz, 1986) The
scripting up of this particular kind of identity (as Wessely has observed) clearly risks
implicating an equally discrediting interpretation - for example, that the illness is self-
inflicted through overwork, ambition, and 'living in the fast lane'. This dilemma can
be heard as a participants' issue (rather than an analysts' gloss 22) for P4 in extract 5,
where he gives his account of his wife's pre-M E activities, "she wasn't what you'd
call a high flyer (.) she was a hard worker" (lines 159-160), where "hard worker" can
be heard as commendable, as against "high flyer" which suggests motive, ambition
and stress. His statement therefore works against a possible interpretation of Ellie as
cultural insensitivity. McKenzie's analysis explores speakers' efforts to manage this dilemmatic tension
in the context of interview talk.
21	 •Simon Wessely goes on to give his own cognitivist 'motive' account of how and why people try to
persuade others that their illness is not a psychological one in order to avoid the stigma associated with
that kind of explanation. "I wonder if in fact these people were overemphasizing these aspects of their
lives to prove to you how physically and psychologically robust they were before they became ill, in
order to remove any suggestion of a psychological aetiology to their illness. They are emphasizing a
point rather than giving a true description." (p.77: CILIA Symposium 137, 1993)His explanation also
draws on realist notions of a 'true description' of achievement, ambition and personality, by way of a
contrast to these 'exaggerated' accounts of CFS patients. This notion of a 'true description'
corresponds to a 'type l' analysis of narrative, where accounts are more or less accurate descriptions of
events and actions.
22 Taking the dilemma as a participants' concern (one that is oriented to by them in their talk), avoids
having to make a realist claim (prior to analysis) that there is a stigma associated with psychological
explanations (or that this notion is part of people's world view), and this is what participants are
actually motivated to avoid. The point is that both the 'stigma' and their 'avoidance' of it are
constituted by participants in the talk itself, and the way that their formulations are constructed
accomplishes precisely that kind of rhetorical business.
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being a case of "yuppie 'flu". P4' s account does the work of formulating Ellie as hard
working but ordinary, (Sacks, 1984) rather than someone who was pushing herself so
hard that she made herself susceptible to a physical or mental breakdown.
The main point of this section is that the stories in extracts 4 and 5 have the same kind
of 'before and after' contrast structure as those of Dr Evans and Dr Brown in extracts
1 and 2. They also perform the same rhetorical business that Bev's account (in extract
6) accomplishes when set in the context of her narrative as a whole. In each of the
accounts there are clear links between the way that psychosocial 'evidence' is used as
a warranting device for the formulation of a particular kind of explanation. As with the
previous analysis of Angela and Joe's story, the scripting up of the patient's identity or
internal disposition can be seen as inextricably linked to a particular 'theory of illness'
or causal attribution that the narrative is rhetorically designed to build. In other words,
the identity of the patient and the causal attribution for their illness are co-constituted
in these accounts by means of the 'documentary method'.
The following analysis examines one doctor's narrative construction of different
categories of patient. I shall focus on the way that the different patients are compared
and how psychosocial 'evidence' is deployed in order to categorise them in terms of
either mental or physical illness. This can be seen as distinct from the kind of
attributional reasoning that is claimed to be informed by complex process models of
disease, such as the biopsychosocial model (Engel, 1977; 1980).
'Separating the Sheep from the Goats'
Extract 7.(MHS/Dr Mason/ 1-19)
1. MHS	 I understand you have some experience with M E patients
2. (3.3)
3. Dr Mason Apart from James and his wife we've had (.) one two three
4. (2.8)
5. Dr Mason three others who've
6. (1.9)
7. Dr Mason achieved consultant diagnosis (.) and one other who
8. (1.0)
9. Dr Mason who may have done
10. (3.5)
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11.Dr Mason and that was with er (.) the chap who was dubious was seen
12. by (.) ourselves and eventually (.) a haematologist in [city] with some
13. interest (.) er but he's so polysymptomatic (.) a:nd (.) the psychiatrist's
14. also seen him (.) and reached other diagnoses (.) he's the one in doubt
15. whereas I've had another chap who's (.) an overwhelming
16. Glandular fever (.) in his mid-twenties (.) came down with the true
17. viral fatigue syndrome
18. (1.0)
19.Dr Mason we're in the eighth year (.) a-and he is getting better
20.	 (1.9)
21.Dr Mason but it taken a long time (.) it's actually- he's tried very hard and he's
22. done
23. (1.0)
24.Dr Mason done an MA while he's been off work (.) he's coped with the ups and
25. downs
26. (2.2)
27.Dr Mason his symptoms seem very
28.	 (2.0)
29.Dr Mason very physical (.) although latterly
30.	 (4.0)
31 .Dr Mason to help him cope with the idea of
32.	 (1.5)
33.Dr Mason the frustrations what have you (.) he's actually been assessed with a
34. view to going to- into therapy
35. (3.7)
36.Dr Mason I mean any chronic illness
37.	 (1.5)
38.Dr Mason is going to cause problems (.) to deal with it (.) depressive
39.	 side of breast cancer and stuff like that so
In extract 7, MHS's question at line 1 provides the occasion for Dr Mason to
categorise his patients. He gives a list (at lines 3-9) which he breaks down into several
people who have "achieved consultant diagnosis" (line 7), and one "who may have
done" (line 9). His listing of "one two three (2.8) three others" at lines 3-5 displays
that this is careful, accurate recollection, and that he has some specific knowledge of
these cases on which to base his categorisations. The listing also allows him to do
some boundary work in which he sets up the latter case as a "dubious" category (line
11) when compared with the others. His category of people who have "achieved
consultant diagnosis" accomplishes some important discursive business by setting up
the diagnosis of M E as being one that has been made by consultants rather than by
himself. The term 'achieved' is suggestive of a motivated accomplishment on the part
of the patients, rather than a result of his own diagnostic practices. M E itself is being
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constructed here as a diagnosis that is pursued by patients who have to be referred
through the hospital system to achieve it, rather than it being a conclusion that he, as a
general practitioner, would make as a matter of routine, as perhaps with diseases such
as measles. This works to tell us that diagnosing M E is the business of consultants
rather than general practitioners, and allows him to bolster his account by medical
consensus, and also to distance himself somewhat from the fait-accompli of the
consultant's diagnosis without having to risk being heard as a doctor who is generally
dismissive or unsympathetic to patients who claim to have M E. Having a list of
patients who are bona fide, consultant-diagnosed cases of M E works to accomplish a
contrast to his category of "dubious" without having to say that he himself has a set of
criteria for identifying "dubious" cases.
This contrastive talk works in a similar way to the "cutting out" procedure23described
by Smith (1978) in "K is mentally ill". Dr Mason's initial categorisation list draws
boundaries around which cases are to be read as 'genuine' and which case is to be
problematised and excluded from the set of 'genuine' cases. Two consequences of this
discursive boundary work are that the "dubious" case "may not be treated as a source
of normative definition" (ibid: 34), and therefore the patient's version of this case (or
at least the one that the doctor's version is rhetorically positioned against) can be more
easily discounted from the outset.
Dr Mason's grounds for separating out this dubious case are explicitly set out at lines
11-14. First, "the chap who was dubious was seen by (.) ourselves", second he was
seen by a "haemotologist in [city] with some interest"(lines 12-13), and third "the
psychiatrist's also seen him (.) and reached other diagnoses" (lines 13-14) which
gives retrospective support to earlier misgivings about the patient. The dubiousness of
this case is partly bolstered by plurality - that is, "ourselves" (line 12) and the
psychiatrist who "reached other diagnoses" are aligned in Dr Mason's account.
However, the suggestion of disagreement between doctors is also built into the phrase
23 Smith (1978) describes a "cutting-out" procedure in which the narrator of events draws boundaries
around those who recognise and share a version of social reality, to exclude someone who they
formulate as being unable to recognise that social reality. "The cutting out operation thus involves
showing how K's behaviour is not properly instructed by the definitions of the rules or situations which
are provided." (ibid: 39)
"reached other diagnoses", and that poses a possible threat to the legitimacy of
medical opinion.
This tension is managed in the narrative by Dr Mason, who attributes the
accountability for doubt onto the patient himself, "he's so polysymptomatic"(line 13).
This effectively construes him as someone who is difficult to categorise one way or
the other, given that his symptoms fail to conform to a discrete and recognisable
disease category. The use of the term `polysymptomatic' implies that the patient's
symptoms are many but haphazard. In other words they defy categorisation in terms of
any medically recognisable disease or syndrome. Describing the patient as
`polysymptomatic' is therefore a way to define the features of this case as an example
of anomolous illness behaviour.24
Dr Mason's separation of 'sheep from goats' is further warranted by associating
'genuine' cases with the "achievement" of consultant diagnosis, and the 'dubious'
case with a diagnosis from a haemotologist "with some interest" (lines 12-13). The
implication is that only when a patient has "achieved" a consultant diagnosis, will
their illness be medically recognisable as a bona fide case. The haemotologist, on the
other hand, is construed as a dubious 'witness' who may have a stake or interest in a
diagnosis of M E, and is positioned in the narrative against a psychiatnst who has
"reached other diagnoses" (line 14).
The formulation of one of the patients as a 'dubious' category is positioned
rhetorically in the narrative as a contrast case against Dr Mason's example of "the
true viral fatigue syndrome" at lines 16-17. As previously seen in Dr Evans' and Dr
Brown's 'before and after' stories, the description of this 'genuine' case is interwoven
with a formulation of the patient's personal identity. He is described as one who has
"tried very hard" (line 21), "done an MA while he's been off work" (line 24), and has
"coped with the ups and downs" (lines 24-25). Primarily this account functions to
offer an organic explanation for the patient's illness, which is warranted in terms of
psychosocial 'evidence' about the patient's personal disposition and his illness
24 See footnote 11.
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behaviour. He is being construed as the sort of person who does not easily give way to
illness, and has a positive coping style. As with the accounts given by Dr Evans and
Dr Brown, this formulation of psychosocial 'evidence' serves both to bolster the
factuality of the physical diagnosis, and rhetorically counters any possible alternative
explanation for the patient's illness, thus managing the doctor's accountability in
endorsing it as 'genuine'.
At this point, it is possible to identify two kinds of 'M E narrative' that are used by the
doctors (and are also common in patients' narratives). The first is a 'before and after'
story, where 'after' is formulated as extremely debilitated and inactive as a contrast to
an active (or hyperactive) lifestyle 'before' the illness (e.g. extracts 1 and 2). The
second type of narrative is exemplified by Dr Mason's example of the patient who has
"the true viral syndrome" (extract 7, line 16-17), where the patient makes strenous
efforts and achievements despite currently suffering from the illness. Both types of
narrative work against a `dispositionar account of illness by formulating the illness as
unwanted or resisted, and out of character with the victim's personal disposition.
Paradoxically, if the two types of narrative were to appear in the same context, the
second type would undermine the contrast that is being worked up in a 'before and
after' account. The important point to notice about this is that the different types of
narrative are used by participants in a different rhetorical context - even though they
accomplish the same kind of business.
Later on during the same interview Dr Mason further explicates his warrant for
treating "the chap who started with glandular fever" (line 1) as a 'genuine' case.
Extract 8.(MHS/Dr Mason/34-40)
1. MHS
	
this chap who started with glandular fever (.) would you see that as
2. being er typical of er what you've seen with patients with M E or?
3. Dr Mason = no (.) so:me
4. (2.6)
5. Dr Mason er that's the one that you 0 you expect from the literature
6. (1.0)
7. Dr Mason true post-viral chronic fatigue (.) er
8. (4.6)
9. Dr Mason two of them are cases I know well
10. (2.1)
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11 .Dr Mason and there's another lady (.) in her mid fifties now and
	
12.	 (2.0)
13.Dr Mason she's had years of susceptibility to common depression
	
14.	 (1.2)
15.Dr Mason er
	
16.	 (3.0)
17.Dr Mason she seems depressed and comes across depressed...
In extract 8 (lines 3-9) Dr Mason categorises the glandular fever patient as being
atypical of M E patients, but typical of "true post-viral chronic fatigue". He marks this
at line 5 as "the one you (.) you expect from the literature", which scripts this case as a
bona fide instance of a medically recognised and legitimated condition. He further
bolsters his account of this case by a reference to his own clinical experience: "two of
them are cases I know well"(line 9). So his entitlement to distinguish this 'genuine'
case is not based on academic knowledge alone but also on its medical application in
at least two cases that he has treated. In giving his grounds for distinguishing between
these cases, he is displaying his ability to separate 'sheep and goats' in accordance
with his experience of "cases I know well", and his familiarity with scientific
literature that informs his clinical judgement.
This 'genuine' case is contrasted with another case which he categorises at line 13 as
"common depression". Dr Mason seems here to be making a distinction between
patients who have post-viral syndrome and M E, only the former being acknowledged
as 'genuine' and recognisable as a separate medical category. The second case that he
describes indexes his inclusion of people with "common depression" in the
interviewer's category, "patients with M E" (line 2). At lines 13-17 he builds up his
warrant for his explanation of this patient's problems by dividing the claim into a
three-part list25 : "she's had years of susceptibility to common depression (1.2) er (3.0)
she seems depressed and comes across depressed", but otherwise he provides no
further clinical evidence for his claim. Her depression is worked up here as an abiding
dispositional trait, and in the style of classic attributional reasoning (Heider 1958) his
use of psychosocial 'evidence' leads to the conclusion that it's safe enough to attribute
her symptoms to "common depression".
15 The rhetorical force of a 'three part list' (Jefferson, 1990) in this context is that it is suggestive of a
more general set of reasons and grounds on which observations are being made in the current context.
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It is notable that in the case of the "chap who's (.) an overwhelming Glandular fever"
(Extract 7, lines 15-16) the issue of depression was raised as being a 'reactive' type of
depression (lines 36-38) "I mean any chronic illness (1.5) is going to cause problems".
The depression is formulated in situational terms as a consequence of having a 'true'
post-viral illness, and the direction of causality is thus defined as illness—depression,
rather than the depression being the illness itself, as in his formulation of the contrast
case which he seems to cite here as a more typical instance of M E as distinct from
post-viral syndrome. The interesting thing in this account is the way that for the
patient with glandular fever, the illness itself becomes citable as psychosocial
'evidence' to warrant a secondary diagnosis of reactive depression, whereas for the
patient with "common depression" the argument is reversed, and the psychosocial
'evidence' is worked up as a dispositional state.
The next extract appears further on in the same interview with Dr Mason, and allows
us to analyse, in more detail, how he formulates the case he earlier referred to in
extract 7, line 11 as "the chap who was dubious".
Extract 9. (MHS Dr Mason/ 97-126)
1. Dr Mason well the one chappy (.) in his mid-forties
2. (3.4)
3. Dr Mason who
4. (3.8)
5. Dr Mason changed his practice because
6. (1.4)
7. Dr Mason this practice in [town] that didn't want to know (.) and he was fed up
8. with being fobbed off (.) he used to do the advertising in one of the
9. papers and (.) just couldn't cope with it (.) and
10. (5.6)
11 .Dr Mason I listened and was sympathetic
12.	 (4.8)
13.Dr Mason he started coming up with gastro-intestinal problems (.) we got-he had
14. lots of (.) physical (.) type problems (.) y'know (.) we picked them off
15. one by one (.) but eventually you start getting frustrated letters back
16. from the specialists saying 'we've <scoped this we've scoped that>
17. y'know we've done this reading (.) we've looked at the bowels (.)
18. we're just getting nowhere'(.) and er it's what he makes of it and er
19. (6.7)
20.Dr Mason when people are very polysymptomatic (.) y'know heh y'lcnow it's
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21. quite-it's quite difficult to deal with (.) a:nd
22. (4.8)
23.Dr Mason this will sound very unprofessional really (.) it tweaks a sort of a sixth
24. sense that says heh er
25. (2.1)
26.Dr Mason I always (.) when I'm dealing with people lay out an agenda that's both
27. the physical and psychological (.) and say 'these are the areas it can be
28. in (.) in both'(.) er
29.MHS	 = do you say that to the[m] ?
30.Dr Mason	 [oh] and I do it also-it's not just M E patients
31.	 (2.3)
32.Dr Mason and the people who immediately
33.	 (1.5)
34.Dr Mason go 'no way Jose' on the psychological front
35.	 (2.3)
36.Dr Mason it's usually more suspicious heh (.) er
37.MHS	 = because there is this conviction that the symptoms do have a physical
38. origin?
39. C)
40.Dr Mason yeah
41.MHS	 = this is quite a topic
42.Dr Mason = well yes that's er
43.	 (3.5)
44.Dr Mason that's right (.) although
45.	 (5.0)
46.Dr Mason just to stick to this particular advertising chap I mean he er
47.	 (1.7)
48.Dr Mason he has been the most resistant (.) he's fought against this assessment
49. (.) he's fought against psychiatrists (.) and yet (.) in the letters (.) there
50. are clear (.) psychodynamic issues in the family (.) powerful ones too
51. (.) but there's just no going up that road
First, Dr Mason's introduction to his description of his patient is interesting and
possibly ambiguous. At line 1 the patient is referred to as "the one chappy", where Dr
Mason's use of the term `chappy'might be heard as informal and friendly, or perhaps
even indulgent or patronising. He then goes on to take the moral high ground in
contrasting himself "I listened and was sympathetic"(line 11) with doctors in another
practice who "didn't want to know" (line 7). This works to manage his accountability
as an attentive doctor, and counters any possible suggestion that he might be
unsympathetic or cynical, particularly on the topic of patients who claim to have M E.
His account works in the opposite direction to this, since he formulates himself as
open-minded, sympathetic and indulgent even when there is prior 'evidence' (line 5)
that the patient may be troublesome 26. This works rhetorically both to build the
factuality of the interpretation that he offers in his narrative, and simultaneously to set
up his patient's version as more easily dismissable.
Second, Dr Mason builds up the identity of his patient as someone who can't cope
with his job: "he used to do the advertising for one of the newspapers (.) and just
couldn't cope with it" (lines 8-9). Again this is more than just a bit of 'scene-setting'
for the story he is telling. It is displaying his adequate grounds for interpreting the
patient's "physical (.) type problems" (line 14) in psychological terms. This
interpretation is then further bolstered and warranted by his account of how the
processes of medical investigation drew a blank. At lines 14-15, "we picked them off
one by one" is an expression that gives a retrospective account of prior scepticism
about the patient's "physical (.) type problems", and is suggestive of a row of targets
that were 'shot down' one by one.
This kind of 'we knew all along' claim lets the doctor have his cake and eat it. On the
one hand he has displayed his willingness to take the patient's "physical (.) type
problems" seriously by carrying out a battery of medical tests, but on the other hand he
is able to indicate that he was never really taken in by the patient's claims right from
the start. Dr Mason's talk about this patient is full of externalising devices and
objectifying formulations that are achieved by grammatical choices. For example, the
use of the pronoun "we" (lines 13, 14) works to construct the notion of consensus
between members of the medical profession. Specifically, it indicates that it was the
practice in general who were sceptical, rather than just Dr Mason, and thereby allows
him to retain his status as an open-minded, sympathetic doctor, whilst also displaying
his ability and expertise (and that of other doctors) to discriminate 'genuine' physical
illness from "dubious" cases. Avoiding agentive formulations in this case works to
dismiss the possibility of being heard as personally prejudiced prior to 'evidence'. The
exception to this would be his normative accounts of a good doctor at lines 11 and 26,
where that entails being openminded and reasonable.
26 See Stimson (1976) "Trouble and Types of Patient" in which he details various types of patients that
doctors have categorised as troublesome.
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An interesting comparison can be made here with Dr Mason's earlier account in
extract 7, lines 16-17, where he describes a patient who "came down with the true
viral fatigue syndrome". This account formulates the patient as a `cope whose
symptoms are interpreted as primarily physical, although there is no clinical evidence
brought to bear in the narrative to explain why the illness has lasted eight years. "he's
coped with the ups and downs (2.2) his symptoms seem very (2.0) very physical"
(lines 24-29). Any psychological problem is formulated as attributable to a post illness
consequence rather than a stable pre-disposition that is scripted up in extract 9 for the
'dubious' case.
Dr Mason's psychological interpretation of this 'dubious' case in extract 9 is further
warranted by reference to his clinical experience and judgement, which is introduced
here at lines 23-24 as a "sort of a sixth sense". At line 23 "this will sound very
unprofessional really" he distinguishes his "sixth sense" from another more
professional, medical and scientifically rational mode of reasoning, thereby
foreclosing any possible accusation of 'quackery'. However, Dr Mason can still make
legitimate use of his "sixth sense" to warrant his diagnosis, since it is not just an
ordinary or even paranormal intuitive category, but rather it is based on years of
clinical experience with similar cases. A 'sixth sense' is here constructed as a kind of
connoisseur-ship - an expertise that is grounded in empirical experience and provides
a bona fide basis for clinical judgement. Dr Mason's use of it here functions to display
himself as a sensitive healer and attentive doctor who is able to notice and interpret
subtle cues about his patients. This non-agentive formulation of his own cognitions at
lines 23-24 ("it tweaks a sort of sixth-sense") works against the possible accusation
that he has prior convictions or prejudices. The "sixth-sense" is not being formulated
as a prejudice, but rather as an expertise that needs to be "tweaked" by an external
stimulus, such as cues about his patients. Later at lines 49-50, his "sixth sense" is
supported by the letters from the psychiatrist who has identified "clear psychodynamic
issues in the family". Therefore in the narrative that he is building, Dr Mason's
intuition turns out to be well-founded, and his construction of the patient's illness as a
psychiatric category is thereby supported.
Furthermore, within the narrative, the theoretical framework of the psychodynamic
explanation itself neatly militates against a possible refutation, since the more the
patient's version resists this psychiatric definition of his problems, the greater the
warrant for such a diagnosis becomes. He is constructed, at line 34, as a "no way
Jose" type, who irrationally denies a psychological interpretation of his problems. And
of course, from a psychodynamic perspective, someone who is in 'denial' (by
definition) does not have a grip on reality, so their version of events can be
legitimately discounted.
At lines 30-36 Dr Mason formulates the "no way Jose" type as a general category that
is applicable more widely than just to M E patients. The expression "no way Jose" is
an way to claim that a person's basis for refusing something is irrational, dispositional,
and prejudiced. Resistence to the psychological agenda by some patients (lines 30-36)
is being scripted here as a recognisable part of Dr Mason's everyday practice, and it is
being contrasted here with the doctor's own 'openmindedness' in 'laying out' the
physical and psychological agenda as a matter of routine (lines 26-27). The "no way
Jose" type is formulated here as a general phenomenon and this case as an easily
recognisable instance of it. The scripting up of this patient as a recognisable 'type'
works here to dismiss an alternative explanation which would offend against the
canons of empirical science - that Dr Mason might have prior convictions about his
patients before there is any solid evidence on which to base his judgement. And
paradoxically, that is precisely the nature of his claim about the "no way Jose" type.
This claim is packaged at lines 48-50 as a two-part structure:
(i) a feature of the patient's attitudes and behaviour is his prior conviction, and
active refusal to accept a psychological explanation (lines 48-49).
(ii) and yet everyone else (the medical practitioners) can see clearly (from the
evidence) that a psychological explanation is appropriate (lines 49-50).
The structure of this claim is such that (ii) supplies the defining context for (i) to be
interpreted as yet more evidence of the patient's psychological problems.
Smith (1978) has shown how the attribution of mental illness behaves like the
attribution of colour blindness. It is the state of not being able to recognise the social
reality which is there for anyone else. In this case, social and medical reality is being
defined by the medical profession, and as pointed out earlier this 'polysymptomatic'
patient defies categorisation in terms of a recognisable disease, or at least in terms of a
syndrome where there are symptoms that typically go together. "Polysymptomatic"
suggests that the patient's symptoms are haphazard, with no cohesiveness or
relationship to each other. It is therefore being construed here as anomolous illness
behaviour - symptoms that he "started coming up with" (line 13), and that he interprets
inappropriately as physical: "it's what he makes of it" (line 18).
The two-part claim outlined above (lines 48-51) perhaps more accurately describes a
'reality disjuncture', in which the patient's physical illness attributions sharply
contrast with the doctor's definitions of his symptoms as psychological. However,
what is at stake for the doctor in this account is the very status of the medical reality
that he uses as a defining context. He has concluded here that the patient's "physical
type problems" are psychological on the grounds that diagnostic testing proved
negative, but a possible alternative account - that the doctors might have missed
something - is not even considered. The "no way Jose" type is thus formulated as
someone who is in 'denial'. He will keep coming up with physical type problems, and
keep making something of it, even when he has been reassured by the doctors that
there is no evidence of physical disease. A lack of 'objective' clinical evidence implies
a medical reality of the absence of organic disease, so the patient's persistent illness
attributions are hearable in the doctor's account as inappropriate and a breach of the
implicit 'canonical script' that defines 'normal' illness behaviour.
An alternative version is that the medical profession might possibly have missed
something, or that the patient is suffering from something that medical science does
not yet understand. But that kind of explanation would have the potential to undermine
the legitimacy of the scientific medical reality that the doctor here defines as a context
for formulating his patient's problems as psychological. The doctor's account is
rhetorically designed to exclude precisely that kind of alternative explanation in a
229
similar way that Angela and Joe's account is constructed to dismiss a psychological
interpretation of Angela's illness. Some theorists (e.g.Yardley, 1996: 495) have argued
that psychosomatic explanations have been commonly used as a moralistic device to
'shift the blame' for medicine's 'failure' to diagnose and treat illness in the context of
uncertainty. In Dr Mason's account (above), the patient's persistent behaviour,
changing doctors, coming up with "physical type" symptoms, being polysymptomatic,
making something of it, refusing to go up that (psychological) road, and not accepting
the doctor's definition of his problems, are presented as documentary 'evidence' that
combines to form an underlying pattern, that he is a "no way Jose" type whose
problems are in reality psychosomatic. The construal of the patient as a "no way Jose"
type provides an account to explain why the medical profession can make a 'correct'
diagnosis, but fail to achieve a successful treatment, because "there's just no going up
that road" (line 51). Doubt, contradiction, and confusion are externalised to the object
(the "polysymptomatic" patient), rather than being a threatening feature of medicine
itself, where diagnoses, rather than symptoms, might be construed as haphazard or
even contradictory. This is the kind of externalising rhetoric that sustains medical
science, and this particular doctor's clinical judgement against criticism or error
(Latour, 1987; Woolgar, 1988b).
The conclusion of Dr Mason's story further bolsters the implications that could have
been heard from the beginning of his account, where the patient had changed from
another doctor's practice that "didn't want to know" (line 7). The indexing of 'trouble'
at the start of the story is retrospectively vindicated by the turn that the narrative takes
and by its conclusion. This functions discursively to provide the doctor with additional
grounds to warrant the construction of a damaging statement about his patient as a
self-deluding and unco-operative character, who deserves to be categorised as a
'dubious' case (extract 7, line 11).
The claims made by Guggenbuhl-Craig and Micklem (1988) suggest that
psychosomatic explanations for illness are associated with /ow accountability for
doctors. The issues at stake were argued to be the legitimacy of medicine, and the
doctor's responsibility to diagnose and treat illness according to scientific, medical
knowledge and clinical experience. In the context of uncertainty and lack of clear
medical knowledge, doctors become more acutely accountable to provide a warrant for
their clinical judgement in medical terms. One way to manage this tension is to
construct a narrative which is associated with low accountablity for doctors, and high
accountability for patients - that is, a psychological explanation. In other words, the
patient's illness is attributed to the psychological weakness of the patient rather than
being due to an organic disease process that is not currently well understood by
medicine. Scripting up patients as recognisable 'types' to whom doctors can credibly
attribute a psychological diagnosis can be seen as part of the way that doctors are able
to accomplish this 'shifting the blame' in their discursive categorisation of patients.
Summary
In this chapter, I have focused on the analysis of doctors' case narratives using a
discursive psychology rationale. Comparisons have been made between the accounts
of doctors about their patients, and the accounts of patients about their illnesses. Two
outcomes have been that:
• When analysed as discursive action, the accounts of doctors and patients are similar
to one another in certain important respects.
• Specifically, both doctors and patients employ psychosocial 'evidence' to warrant
their claims about the nature of illness.
In patients' accounts, the psychosocial repertoire functions rhetorically to warrant the
construction of a biomedical explanation for their illnesses. In doctors' case stories,
the psychosocial repertoire functions rhetorically to warrant a diagnosis of either a
physical or a mental illness. As I argued in the introduction to this chapter, such
reasoning can be counted as an example of the 'documentary method' of reasoning
(Garfinkel, 1967), where the details of psychological and social factors are worked up
alongside either a physical or a psychological diagnostic version of the illness. This
demonstrably retains a dualistic formulation of mind and body as a way to reason
about the causes of illness.
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An important outcome of the analyses of this chapter relates to the way that doctors
use psychosocial information in their reasoning about patients' illnesses. In chapter
four (above) I traced the origins of two models of medicine - the biomedical model
and the biopsychosocial model. The biopsychosocial model was proposed by Engel
(1977; 1980) as a way to conceptualise disease as a process rather than an entity - the
idea being to re-work the whole approach to the diagnosis and treatment of disease.
The biopsychosocial model derived its rationale from systems theory in biology, and
promised to take into account the complex interplay between the biological,
psychological, and social environments in the explanation of disorders. The rationale
of such a model therefore leads to the assumption that all disease is potentially
explainable (and treatable) in complex multifactoral terms. However, the analyses of
this chapter indicate that, in the context of interviews, doctors employ quite different
ways of reasoning about cases. The psychosocial repertoire is deployed as a flexible
resource to warrant the giving of either a psychological or physical diagnosis.
There are two ways that the `psychosocial repertoire' can be used to construct M E as
a physical illness.
• 'before and after' stories use 'extreme formulations' to do contrastive work
about the patient's lifestyle and activity before and after the onset of the illness (e.g.
Bev's account of her hardworking lifestyle in extract 6). If taken at face value, these
'extreme formulations' could be interpreted as a cause of the illness (e.g.'opt-
out'(Ware, 1992) or `burn-oue(Wessely, 1993). Patients, carers and doctors orient
to this dilemma of 'double-jeopardy' in the way that they manage the conflict
between accounts of 'frenetic lifestyles' and 'ordinariness' - in other words one
way to solve the dilemma is to construct the patient as hardworking but ordinary
(e.g. Ellie's story, in extract 5).
• stories abourfighting', coping, or resisting illness are told by both doctors
and patients, for example, Angela's struggle to carry on despite her illness (chapter
six, page 177), the patient who did the MA, and coped despite the 'ups and downs'
(extract 7, this chapter).
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Two contradictory repertoires?
Although both kinds of story construct the patient's disposition in a way that works to
dismiss psychological or 'motive' explanations of illness, the 'fighter' story threatens
to undermine the 'after' part of a 'before and after' story. The debilitated 'after'
formulation only works in the rhetorical context of its contrast with the 'before'
formulation. Like the empiricist and contingent repertoires, which are contradictory
and therefore problematic if used together, these two kinds of contradictory 'M E
stories' can be managed when they appear within a single narrative. For example, in
Angela and Joe's account (chapter six) a 'vicious cycle'of effort and relapse leads to a
relapsing cycle of 'before and after' stories. A cycle of 'effort and relapse' is one of
the central features that constitutes an illness narrative as a typical 'M E script'. They
appear frequently in patients'narratives and also in the M E literature.
These two kinds of M E stories can be contrasted with the way that doctors use the
`psychosocial repertoire' to warrant the giving of a psychological explanation for
illness. In this kind of story (e.g. Dr Mason's patient in extract 9) the personal
disposition of the patient is worked up such that he has psychological problems that
are denied. He is constructed as a 'type' who uses physical symptoms and illness
attributions to avoid personal responsibility. This kind of explanation is worked up
alongside an account of fruitless medical investigation. It functions to dismiss an
alternative explanation - that medical science, or this particular doctor, might have
failed to identify an organic disease, or that they do not yet understand the physical
nature of the illness.
Managing Accountability in doctors' and patients' accounts.
For doctors psychological accounts of illness can sustain medical science in the face of
doubt and inconsistency. This is especially relevant where the relationship between
medical science, practice, and clinical judgement needs to be delicately handled as an
accountability issue such that the legitimacy of medicine is what is 'at stake' for
doctors, and for the profession. An external attribution (a psychological one) does the
work of 'shifting the accountability' onto the patient in the context of controversy
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within the profession about the illness M E. It is patients who are dubious and
polysymptomatic, rather than their diagnoses that are doubtful, etcetera. This is not
some new entity that is not well understood, but 'old wine in new bottles' (Wessely,
1990). In other words, some psychological phenomenon that the medical profession
has been seeing for years and understands very well. As Dr Mason puts it - doctors see
such patients frequently. They are a 'type' that signal trouble.
For patients a physical illness attribution manages personal accountability and works
against a psychological account. The illness has an external rather than an internal
cause. Patients explain doctors' psychological attributions as a 'motive' account. They
argue that doctors are motivated to use those explanations because medical science
doesn't understand the illness. In Angela and Joe's account the doctor's diagnosis 'oh
psychosomatic!' (chapter six, page 184) is construed as 'a cop out' - a way for doctors
to avoid medical accountability for doubt, error and uncertainty. This mirrors the
claims of some authors (e.g. Kirmayer, 1988; Yardley, 1996) who have argued that
psychosomatic medicine has been marginalised into a category of the 'not quite
legitimate' in which accountability is shifted back to the patient. This has been argued
to 'protect the legitimacy of medicine' by 'siphoning off cases of uncertainty' when
medicine fails to find a biomedical explanation for illness. Reciprocally, doctors talk
about patients' physical illness attributions as a 'motive' account - physical attribution
is a way for patients to avoid personal responsibility for their illness.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
An Analyst's Gloss.
This thesis is an analysis of the discursive construction of a controversial medical
condition (M E) and a discussion of some of the issues that have been made available
in and through the discourse of medical scientists, general practitioners, and M E
sufferers. The controversial topic of this thesis has provided an ideal forum for
examining both lay and professional reasoning practices about illness in general, in a
context where the 'objective world of medical facts' threatens to disintegrate into
merely subjective points of view. At stake in this dialogue has been the meaning of the
illness, and the implications of that for personal accountability and the status of both
experiential and expert medical knowledge.
Scientific truth and medical knowledge can be seen as socially constructed and
continually changing. At any given point in time there are likely to be disputes and
controversies that co-exist alongside a category of `blackboxed' explanations that are
treated as factual and correct (at least for now). Controversies and disputes exist at the
cutting edge of the dialogical production of scientific 'truths' and medical knowledge,
and yet (at the same time) they are somewhat marginalised from the rhetoric of
mainstream medical applications. It is therefore at the controversial boundaries of
medicine - the area of 'medicine in the making' that we are more easily able to discern
how its categories are constituted and deployed.
From the analytic perspective taken in this thesis, the constructive practices of
scientists are not treated as distinct from the situated production of factual accounts in
lay people's narratives, self-help group discussions, and diagnostic reconstructions.
Explanations about the status of M E and its causes are embedded in accounts of the
identity of sufferers, the nature and status of medical explanation, and the
competencies of medical scientists and practitioners. One way to look at this would be
to say that the definition of M E is itself a product of the interactional dynamics within
which a struggle for authorship of the illness takes place.
I have analysed various kinds of texts and talk, using the rationale of discursive
psychology to show that the meaning of M E is a product of participants' constructive
and dialogic practices. My own writing of a thesis on "The discursive construction of
M E" has been treated as a part of this reality construction process, which is celebrated
through a variety of textual forms that display the dialogical construction of meaning
in the thesis.
The main body of the thesis has been organised around three main themes that are
glossed here as follows:
• A 'plausible history of M E' that serves both to constitute the controversy and also
to provide a background for later analyses.
• An analysis of the discursive categories that are both constituted and deployed by
participants in the controversy; for example, diagnostic labels; different models of
medicine; and mind and body explanations for illness.
• A 'struggle for authorship of the illness' as displayed in the illness narratives of ME
sufferers and in the narrative re-constructions of doctors in talking about their
patients.
Although these themes have been organised in the text of the thesis as a linear
structure, in practice they overlap and are present in all areas of the thesis and in the
participants' discourse.
This concluding chapter gives an overview of the main contributions of the thesis,
showing how the issues and findings can generalise beyond the topic of M E to the
wider contexts of the production of medical knowledge, the situated use of medical
models, and the social scientific study of health and illness. These contributions have
both a theoretical significance, and also practical implications for further dialogue in
medical training and health and illness research in the social sciences.
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A 'Plausible History of M E' revisited.
The textual dialogue of chapter two displayed the context of ongoing controversy and
provided an ideal forum to examine the way that medical practitioners and research
scientists have set about the process of defining and challenging the existence of a
'new disease entity'. The dialogical processes were displayed, in this chapter, in and
through scientific argumentation in research literature and related correspondence. An
important feature of scientific controversy is the threat that competing versions and
interpretations have posed to the 'canonical script' of an objective, scientific, and
discoverable 'truth'. This possible breach or 'reality disjuncture' (Pollner, 1974) has
been managed by participants in the debate as a practical discursive accomplishment.
My analysis showed how an empiricist repertoire was used by scientists to establish
the existence of a new disease entity, and also later, by others, to counter that claim. A
contingent repertoire was also used to undermine the arguments of the 'disease entity'
lobby as motivated, and in a counter move, to discredit such arguments as lacking in
scientific rigour. A further move in this debate has been to challenge the utility of
dualistic reasoning in medical explanation by using a 'Truth Will Out' device which
suggested that a more complex process model would eventually be able to provide a
more sophisticated explanation for the mystery illness.
Discursive categories as resources
1.Diagnostic labels
Chapter three focused on the controversial issue of diagnostic labels. In particular, my
analysis showed how authors and speakers have attempted to define and problematise
their terms of reference. The chapter looked at labels and their meanings as the topic
of discourse as well as being deployed as part of that discourse. Three different kinds
of assumption about the relationship between language and reality were identified as
part of participants' resources in talk about labels.
• A representational model of language assumed that diagnostic labels are descriptive
of disease entities that exist prior to scientists'constructive practices.
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• The labeling perspective used the device of 'selective relativism' to argue that the
same phenomenon has always existed, but has been labeled differently in different
socio-historic contexts
• A relativist treatment of language (the approach taken in this thesis) argued that in
naming things we actively construct their essence. Thus, reality is constructed in
and through our descriptive activities.
In chapter three I have demonstrated how medical authors and speakers have
appropriated these assumptions about language in making different analytic moves
that work to preserve the notion of an objective medical reality. For example, speakers
argue that they are labeling different things, or that different labels have been used to
describe the same thing, or that some labels are simply inappropriate as a description
of reality. The chapter also showed how speakers use empiricist and contingent
repertoires to argue that one label (CFS) is more appropriate than others, and that
certain kinds of people are motivated to use particular labels (such as M E) that are
claimed to be inaccurate.
Finally, the chapter looked at labels, categorisation, and the kind of medical
'boundary-work' that can be accomplished, particularly with reference to the division
of mental and physical categories. Physical diagnostic categories are equated in
doctors' talk with clear cut medical business, and everything else as being marginal to
that: "a sort of rag-bag of funny illnesses that you can't explain" (extract, 16, chapter
3) that are probably stress related. The fuzziness of this 'dustbin' category when
contrasted with the unambiguous business of diagnostic categories is well designed to
manage the tension between medical science, knowledge and everyday practice.
Different kinds of medical model are again deployed as an explanatory device in the
GPs talk. The construct of unexplained illness is explainable as a product of the
biomedical model which categorises illness and is exclusive of things that don't fit
into its categories. From this view, mystery illness is explicable only in terms of a new
model of disease that will eventually allow medical science to provide complex
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biopsychosocial explanations for all illnesses. This is again reminiscent of the 'truth
will out device' which was suggested (in chapter two) as a way to overcome the
"fruitless dichotomy" of dualistic explanations (Jenkins, 1991).
2. Models of medicine
In chapter four, a participants' concern with the relationship between mind and body
was brought forward from chapters two and three where it had emerged as a central
issue in the debate about the existence and naming of a mystery illness. My concern,
as analyst, has been to look at how the rhetoric of mind and body is constructed in and
through professional and lay explanations of illness, and also to analyse the way that
some authors have drawn attention to the potential for different models to be used to
accomplish certain kinds of business.
Two kinds of model were outlined in this chapter. The first was biomedical and rooted
in reductionist and dualistic philosophies; the second was biopsychosocial, and derives
its rationale from systems theory in biology, promising to take into account the
complex interplay between biological, psychological, and social processes in the
explanation of disease. This new model has recently (over the last 20 years) been taken
up in primary care practice as the so called "triple diagnosis" (e.g. Cohen-Cole, 1991)
and its psychosocial aspects have been addressed by social science research into topics
such as illness behaviour; people's internal psychological states (such as personality,
and cognitive states such as health beliefs, and illness attributions, etcetera); and
socio-environmental factors. The first two categories are clearly individual. In other
words they are things for which patients can be held accountable. The third can be
drawn on as a resource to explain internal states such as stress, for which the
individual can be held accountable via the rhetoric of coping, or lifestyle change.
Three models of psychosomatic illness (biological psychiatry, psychodynarnics, and
behavioural medicine) were also outlined in chapter four. Rather than all diseases
239
being conceptualised as psychosomatic (in the sense that all disease can be treated as a
product of complex biopsychosocial processes), only certain disorders have attracted
this kind of explanation, thus marginalising them into a separate category of 'not quite
legitimate'. Some authors have claimed that this protects the legitimacy of
biomedicine by "siphoning off cases with which it is unsucessful" (Lock and Gordon,
1988:11). Others have further argued that psychosomatics simply reproduces the
dualistic relationship between mind and body that is central to biomedical
explanations of illness (Kirmayer, 1988; Yardley, 1996).
The theoretical constructs of somatisation and psychologisation have also been
discussed in this chapter, as being two sides of the same coin and related to dualistic
conceptualisations of illness. Somatisation is defined by authors as the presentation of
psychological problems as physical ailments (e.g. Katon, Reis and Kleinman, 1984:
208). The concept is well designed for the medical explanation of idiopathic
symptoms, and has also been deployed as a counter move to dismiss such explanations
as motivated by physicians who are unable to explain the patient's symptoms using the
rationale of biomedicine (e.g. Kirmayer, 1988; Goudsmitt and Gadd, 1991).
The main thrust of the argument in chapter four has been that the relationship between
mind and body is a central concern in medical discourse. Different explanatory models
are re-conceptualised here as repertoires that can provide the resources with which to
categorise illness as either mental or physical. The psychosocial aspects of such
models have the potential to be made relevant as a realm of moral accountability in
explaining and treating illness.
3. Mind and Body
In chapter five, I do not address the distinction between mind and body as an analyst's
concern, to be taken up and potentially resolved in the context of theorising about the
causes of illness. Instead I have analysed how the categories of mind and body and the
relationship between them is ongoingly constituted in and through the activity of
talking about M E and CFS.
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I have suggested that the constitution of mind and body as separate categories in
previous theoretical and philosophical conceptualisations (such as those described in
chapter four), itself signifies their discursive utility. I argued that such categories are in
the first place constituted in and through commonsense reasoning practices where they
are useful as resources to explain illness as a realm of moral accountability. In the first
part of the chapter I looked at different ways that medical practitioners have
constructed the categories of mind and body on specific occasions of use. For
example, either the mind or the body can be given primacy; the mind can be afforded
conscious or unconscious control; the mind can be afforded an equivalent or distinct
ontological status with the body; and finally, speakers can deploy different models of
the relationship between mind and body - a linear cause and effect model (in either or
both directions) or a process model of mind and body as fully integrated. These
examples have indicated the variability that can be constituted in talk, and how this
provides a rich resource for the construction of different versions of the nature of
illness, and the management of accountability in the context of discussion about
illness.
In the second part of the chapter, I looked at the use of mind and body constructions in
a dialogue between a clinical psychologist and members of an M E self-help group.
Mind and body as categorical resources are constructed, deployed, and ongoingly re-
formulated through the interactional activity of managing some sensitive business. For
example, categorisations of mind and body work to construct people's illnesses as
being more or less physical and real. Noteably, the guest speaker, and members of the
M E self-help group work to avoid becoming implicated in the 'dangerous category' of
'all in the mind' explanations for illness.
The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated how different models of mind and body
are rhetorically useful for different discursive purposes. The precise meanings of
categories, their relationship to each other, and their implications for personal agency
are co-constituted on and for the occasions of talk. A linear cause and effect model
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was useful for making a definite claim in either or both directions. On the other hand,
a complex process model works both to constitute and celebrate uncertainty. Three
examples of the latter can be drawn from the analysis of data in this and previous
chapters of this thesis.
First, in this chapter, Dr Brown (extract 6) used a complex process model to mitigate
and account for not being able to give a definitive explanation in the current
interaction of the interview, and also to indicate that a more sophisticated
understanding of complexity is likely to obscure rather than enlighten medical
explanations for illness. Second, in chapter two, David et al (extract 33) deployed a
process model to claim a metaposition in the M E controversy. Third, in chapter three,
Dr Walker appeals to a new kind of model as a basis for claiming that 'the truth will
out' and medicine will be able to explain idiopathic symptoms when they use the
correct model.
The conclusion of this chapter was that the dualism built into linear models of
explanation, the interaction of mind and body assumed in process models, and the
monism of approaches that constitute the mind as equivalent to the brain, are all well
designed for the management of rhetorical business. It was found that, in practice,
there is not a perfect fit between the mind as a realm of personal accountability, and
the body as a passive or acted upon object, even though this kind of reasoning has
been used by doctors explaining why patients might prefer a physical diagnosis for
their illness. A closer look at mind and body talk in the context of a discussion shows
how members of the group made various bids for authorship of the meaning of
categories (such as mind and depression). It is argued here that the authorship of M E
was itself a product of the interactional dynamics that take place within the group.
A reflexive feature of this chapter is the 'fictional' dialogue that appeared on pages
136-138). One of the main arguments has been that the meaning of categories is
definable by how they are used, and in terms of uptake in the next turn at talk. The
unfinalised dialogue explores and highlights the theoretical implications of making
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any kind of claim to authorship of meaning. As a textual device, the unfinalised
dialogue allows me (as author) to display the conversational turns of a theoretical
controversy without necessarily having to resolve it (as I did in chapter two). The topic
of the dialogue (the constitution of meaning) can also be heard as a reflexion of the co-
constitution of meaning by participants in the dialogue that is also represented later in
the chapter. As such the `fictional' dialogue is a reflexive comment on the authorship
of meaning in the thesis itself.
A Struggle For the Authorship of the Illness
The final section of the thesis has looked at the narrative construction of illness in
patient's stories and doctor's cases.
The Narrative Construction of 'self' and M E.
Having previously (in chapters 3, 4 and 5) discussed and analysed the categorical and
discursive resources that can be used in talk about illness, chapter six demonstrated
how the approach of discursive psychology can make a theoretical and methodological
contribution to the analysis of illness narratives. Specifically, this chapter has
problematised narrative analyses that are based on cognitivism and a representational
model of language, and instead examines an M E illness narrative as discursive action.
Current approaches to narrative analysis in health psychology have been summarised
as a way to study people's personal experience and a way to gain insights into people's
identities and culture. The descriptions of events in such narratives has primarily been
analysed as a way to discover the details of events that happened, or to find out about
the sick person's personal experience, health beliefs, and illness attributions. From a
discursive psychology view such approaches to analysis reiterate the participant's
explanations rather than analyses them as discursive action.
The rationale for the discursive psychology approach to narrative has been outlined as
a prelude to my analysis of Angela and Joe's story, where the aim was to treat their
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account as a discursive activity which itself constitutes the meaning of the illness and
the sufferer's identity. 1 have used a courtroom metaphor as a textual device to
organise my analysis of the illness narrative. This was not simply an attempt to impose
analyst's gloss, but rather to recognise a set of discursive phenomena that are made
available in the data, for example, the joint construction of consensus; the use of
corroborating witness accounts and the undermining of 'hostile witnesses'. These are
features that are common to both courtroom and also to ordinary everyday talk
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979; Edwards and Potter, 1992). In the illness narrative,
descriptions and attributions of cause or blame were found to be linked together in a
co-implicative way to construct the factuality of the account, and to establish a
particular 'theory of M E' and the identity of the sufferer.
The legitimacy of Angela's claim to physical illness was defended by 'building up a
case' in which Angela and Joe's 'theory of M E' was supported within the account by
credible witnesses. Within the narrative, Angela and Joe (like Gilbert and Mulkay's
biochemists, 1984) deploy two kinds of repertoire in their story of Angela's illness and
medical encounters. An empiricist repertoire was deployed to establish a biomedical
explanation for her illness as physical, real, and acknowledged by medical expertise.
This account was positioned rhetorically in the narrative against a competing
psychosomatic explanation for Angela's illness. Using a contingent repertoire, this
was attributed to medical practitioners who were formulated as ignorant, lacking in
expertise, and yet to learn the medical truth, or understandably misled by patients who
make false claims. It is therefore not medical science itself that has been discredited in
their account, but only some of its practitioners. The management of competing
concerns to both undermine and uphold the expertise of medical practitioners is
pivotal to the success of what is at stake in their narrative, that is, its power to
persuade the listener of the medical legitimation of Angela's illness.
The Narrative Construction of a Diagnosis
In chapter seven, I have continued along the lines that doctors' case narratives can be
analysed in the same way as patients' stories about their illnesses. I have emphasised
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the similarities between doctors' and patients' accounts and the discursive practices
employed, rather than focus on the differences between lay and professional accounts
of illness. More specifically, I have shown how 'documentary evidence' of a
psychosocial nature and the underlying pattern that it points to are co-constituted in
the narrative in a way that makes a particular interpretation of the patient's illness
available, whilst dismissing other possible kinds of explanation. This is similar to the
way that the psychosocial repertoire functioned in Angela and Joe's account to warrant
a biomedical explanation for Angela's illness and to dismiss a psychogenic one.
Three kinds of concern were found to be common to both the case narratives of
doctors, and the illness narratives of patients.
• Before and after stories.
• A concern with 'where the story starts'.
• Categorising people as mentally or physically ill.
The first of these concerns can be related to certain theoretical claims that have been
made by some researchers about the causes of ME and CFS (e.g. Ware, 1992), and
can also be related to media stereotypes of 'yuppie flu'. Tales of frenetic lifestyles
prior to the onset of illness have previously been taken at face value and interpreted by
researchers as evidence for either a self-inflicted vulnerability to the illness, or to
explain the meaning of the symptoms of fatigue as symbolic of life in the fast lane.
From this view, illness has been interpreted as a way to 'opt out' of the 'cult of
business'(ibid).
The assumption underlying either of these interpretations is that 'before and after
stories' in illness narratives should simply be taken as a representation of reality.
However, I have pointed out in chapters six and seven that there are likely to be some
important issues at stake in both doctors' diagnostic narratives and also in illness
narratives. For example, these might be the doctor's concern to justify the giving of a
particular kind of diagnosis in the context of uncertainty, or the patient's concern to
dismiss the dangerous categories of malingerer, or prior psychological weakness.
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When analysed as discursive action, 'before and after stories' can be interpreted as
attending to such concerns in the way that they build up a contrast between the prior
condition of an 'active go ahead' individual who has been completely changed by a
debilitating illness. My argument is that assumptions about the nature and cause of
ME or CFS that are based on 'before and after stories' fail to take account of the
actions that discourse performs. I have noted elsewhere (see chapter seven, page 216)
that 'before and after stories' are also a common feature in illness narratives of all
kinds (Kleinman, 1988; Robinson, 1990; Ware, 1992) I have argued that this is
because of the 'double-jeopardy' of illness talk in the world of the healthy (Radley and
Billig, 1996). These observations have important implications for research in the
sociology and social psychology of health and illness, especially those studies that are
in the business of investigating people's illness experiences with a view to influencing
policy-making and treatment.
A concern with 'where the story starts' was also common to the accounts of both
doctors and patients in talking about M E. As I pointed out earlier, this relates to a
concern with what kind of information is being made relevant in the story. Typically,
stories that make available the detail of prior life events, such as stress or
bereavement, build up the speaker's grounds for making a psychological interpretation
of illness. On the other hand, stories that start with the sudden onset of illness in an
otherwise untroubled and active life are well designed to sustain a physical
interpretation of illness.
This brings me to the third issue that was at stake in the narrative accounts of both
doctors and patients, which was the categorisation of people as either mentally or
physically ill. As with Angela and Joe's illness narrative, I found that doctors used
psychosocial evidence as a warranting device to make either mental or physical
diagnoses. This was rather different from the suggested use of a complex process
model to explain all disease in biopsychosocial terms (Engel, 1977; 1980), and seemed
to maintain and perpetuate dualistic explanations of illness. This finding might have
further implications for the practical instantiation of the 'triple diagnosis' so that an
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interesting question for further research would be: How is the biopsychosocial model
constituted and deployed in the diagnostic practices of doctors in primary care?
The main contributions of this thesis can be glossed as follows:
• The topic of M E has been used as a forum to display the dialogical construction of
a the meaning of illness as a practical accomplishment in text and talk.
• This has provided the opportunity to explore the rhetoric of mind and body
categories in the context of illness talk.
• I have provided an in-depth example of how a discursive psychology approach can
contribute to the analysis and understanding of illness narratives, and how that
constitutes a challenge to other types of analysis and has implications for
theorisation about the nature and meaning of illness.
• My analysis of doctors' narratives also poses questions relating to the practical
instantiation of the biopsychosocial model in constructing primary care diagnoses.
Author's (end)note
In the title of my thesis the term `authorship' refers to the process of defining meaning,
both in the M E controversy, and in the dialogical construction of my own textual
version. To reiterate:
I have indicated my own use of 'alternative literary forms' in certain parts of the text, where
they work to (de)construct my own version as reflexive; highlight its intertextual properties;
or display the `rhetorico-responsive' nature of discourse (...) They constitute a form of
analysis which can not only highlight the textual and dialogical construction of reality, but
can also make explicit the alternative 'voices' that are implicit in a single utterance, account
or argument. (Horton-Salway, 1998: 20)
Then there's the question of whether or not we (should) have a dialogue at all. Or indeed of
what counts as a dialogue (...) I would guess that you also need to include some notion that
the sentences represent different turns by separate speakers. This is what would distinguish it
from ordinary connected prose. But then again, you might argue that it is quite possible to
arrange what is actually dialogue in the form of connected prose: that is, although it appears
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like prose, it is actually dialogue. Or vice-versa. So you could say that this is a dialogue. Or
even that it is not! (Woolgar, and Ashmore, 1988)
A (Dialogical) Postscript
Analyst	 What do you make of the whole M E thing ?
Dr Smith	 In the form of M E, or what we used to know it as ?
Analyst	 uh?
Dr Turner	 I was sceptical initially..I have to say. .for a while it seemed to
.	 be..y'know this decade's thing..and went along the same sort of lines as
Total Allergy Syndrome and things like that...
Dr Walker	 I think the attitude towards the term M E will probably change. .1 think
it's going through a process of becoming. .legitimate if you like. ..we
may be confused in what we understand about it. .but there probably is
something there that actually is a separate illness of some sort.. .post-
viral fatigue is a medically more popular name. .in the sense that it
implies that you know what's causing it...I'm not sure that's
necessarily true...
FM	 M E was used alot initially...alot of writers are changing over to the
term CFS..because M E implies a particular cause..something to do
with the nerves and the muscles...and because there's no clear cut
cause been found...then people are saying 'well let's not give it a label
that implies a cause'..when we don't actually know what it is yet...
CR	 Well I was told by the physician at the hospital..that CFS..or post-
viral..was what alot of people got after suffering from a very bad
virus..and this would probably last for about eighteen months. .two
years. ..and then if that person didn't recover..er and continued with the
symptoms or got worse..er..they then say you've got M E..er but
initially it would be diagnosed as CFS or post-viral syndrome.. .and
that's how I was led to believe...
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Dr Turner	 Well syndromes.. .1 think technically a syndrome is. .a group of
symptoms for which nobody's found a reason for...technically that
might be more appropriate for this particular disease.. .because
nobody's found an underlying cause for it..er but I think M E and what
it stands for.. .is making a more definite statement about it. .is
recognising it more as a disease entity rather than...yeah..than as I say a
syndrome (...) M E seems a little more specific. .a little less nebulous...
HK Well ray GP says he believes there's something...but he doesn't really
understand why it's called M E...he doesn't feel that's the right handle
for the illness..
Dr Kelly	 It's the label that I don't like...and it's the enforcement of the label
...well myalgic...muscle pain...encephalomyelitis...as a
pathological description it's a bit of a nonsense really isn't it? Because
you can't really define that..how can you define encephalomyelitis...is
there any pathological evidence for it ? I don't think there ever was any
evidence...
Dr North	 Evidence...mm...I don't really know what to make of it heh still to be
honest...it's er...even when you go away and try to find some
information on it...what there is is very vague er..and... I don't really
understand what it is...I'm gill very undecided...you just think `oh they
still haven't made their minds up...they don't know what's going
on'..so you reject it as well I suppose...
Dr Butler	 The typical one's this viral trigger isn't it ?
Dr Mason	 er...that's the one that you...you expect from the literature...true post-
viral fatigue...
EC	 Well y..J started with a virus..er which was worse than anything I've
ever had before...
BH	 Mine started I'm fairly sure...when I had what was classed as Asian
'flu..and er I just had continuous infections for six months...it took me
to bed...and that's yery unusual for me..and I just didn't seem as if I
could really throw it off.. .it was just one infection after the other (...)
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and I just got more and more exhausted...and I thought 'there's
something wrong here' y'know 'this is not me at all'..because I'm a
very very active person...
JG	 Well y'know..M E is now recognised as being caused by an
enterovirus..it's been called non-paralytic polio in some areas...now
that's totally different...totally different from post-viral
fatigue..or your chronic fatigue...
FM	 I don't think...there isn't a virus that's been isolated yet is there ?
Dr Turner	 Well no. .1 still think stress plays an important part in it.. .now whether
it's positive or whether it's something which affects the symptoms
once you've got them..er I think is er..and area which is probably quite
debateable..er certainly people..patients I've seen..patients with quite
highly stressed life styles..er stressed jobs.. .stressful situations.. .when
the diagnosis has been made...
Dr Evans	 I must admit. .1 mean in part it tends to be a ...you think they might
have a bit of co-existent depression.. .this sort of pseudo-theory that
possibly it is some sort of chemical imbalance of neurotransmitters in
the brain...that happens after the viral illness..y'know seratonin and
noradrenalin and stuff like that...probably that's how M E works ...but I
mean that's more of a hunch than proven fact...
JJ	 What has upset some people with M E in the past..is some doctors..say
M E is caused by mental problems..er that has been disproven...it
annoys people with M E..when they hear this
FM	 The problem is..when people have done research with CFS or M E
sufferers.. .they dofind.. .if you give them standard psychiatric
interviews. .they have a much higher level of depression than say
another group with chronic health problems. .chronic heart disease or
other problems..so..that's why...it's not by any means all people..but
it's higher than you'd normally expect...there's a higher incidence of
depression...that's one suggestion y'know that...is there some type of
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depression. .is it?. ..you see another thing is that chronic fatigue. .the
actual symptom of fatigue is a symptom of depression...
JJ	 You see the trouble is.. .one of the troubles with M E is that nobody
knows the answers..nobody can say categorically 'I wouldn't have..it
wouldn't have happened to me anyway no matter what state of mind I
was in'...
FM	 But there's something psychological there...why should it affect one
personality more than another...if it's a virus ?
JJ	 Y'know some people say that the depression causes M E...but I think
it's the M E that causes the depression..or at least that the two things
linked together. .they're tied together. .but there are some people who
believe that M E is caused by depression...that your mind..it's all in the
mind y'know...they actually told me that at the hospital...
Dr Butler I suspect there's alot of overlap...and I think some people with genuine
M E. .get labelled as depression.. .and I think that some people with just
depression either label themselves..or get labelled as haNiag IntL E...
HK	 But I think alot of the sort of ...depression side of M E in
sufferers. .comes from the fact. .that we become depressed trying to
convince the doctors...the medical profession..there's something wrong
with us..
JJ	 Well I'm convinced there is a psychological element in M E. ..I'm
certain of it...but I don't think..I think it's a consequence rather than a
cause (...) what's upset some people with M E..the fact that they've
been told ..or they've read ..it's purely a psychological illness...and
they know very well it isn't...
FM	 It depends what you mean when you say psychological...if you're
saying that people think there's nothing physically wrong with you at
all „that you're sort of in a way imagining it ..is that what you mean ?
(...) it's very difficult to see what you mean when you say something
is-psychological...are you saying that it's all imagined..there's nothing
Particularly wrong with the body..it's all in the mind ?...or are you
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saying that the mind affects the body. .and therefore things could be
partly psychological..y'know I mean..that to me..that's how I think of
it..that the mind and the body affect each other...I don't seriously
suggest that people imagine the symptoms that they have.. .they are
genuine physical symptoms...
JJ	 I think it's a bit deeper than that though with M E..I know physical
illnesses cause psychological problems but I think with M E there's a
closer link...it's not just the fact that you've got M E that makes you
feel depressed...it's something affecting the brain itself...
Dr Walker	 Right..er..okay..for what it's worth..okay it's not my field but..! mean I
would have thought it's something to do with the reaction of the
immune system...I was going to say i stresses'..but not stresses in the
sense of mental stresses...stressors in the sense of infections ...things
that upset the immune system in some way. .and upset the control of
that ..and that's some things are going wrong then because it's..I mean
the way the immune system works and so on is still not that well
understood ..and the more people find out about it the more
complicated it looks...
Dr Turner	 I'd like there to be a nice acid test that you could do heh heh (...) it's the
nebulousness of it that puts alot of doctors off (...) I think even just
having er...an accepted disease entit y . .we could do a test for. .that
proved  it..would be a start...
Dr Evans	 Right er...there was this one girl..she'd be late teens..very early
twenties. .when she first started with it..very outgoing and
everything..she had a finite.. .recognisable viral illness...er I think she
had a positive monospot at the time for glandular fever. .or at least
(...) she had a viral picture which er..seemed to go along with that. .and
then ever since then she has. .been a different person really...
Dr Walker	 Y'know..this is something that I think doctors are sometimes more
comfortable with. ..when they can say 'well this is a bit like glandular
fever..it's the aftermath of an infection'..and it's a working model if
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you like. .which gives some assurance that it isn't in the mind. .there is
something..there's a possible explanation for it..the problem with
that..I'm not at all sure that is the explanation..that may be
oversimplistic and I'm not sure how honest it is...
Dr Brown	 You see..I think the thing is heh I mean obviously..when we don't feel
well and we try to make sense of it. .and we want a name for
it..um..because if you've got a name for it...it makes us feel safer..that
we're not at the whims• of some random whatever...or we're going mad
(...) y'know so I think alot of people want a diagnosis of M E because
they then think that's going to...either make it easier or somebody else
will be able to cure it..er...
FM	 I mean it may be that there's a number of sub-illnesses..all with
different causes. .some caused by viruses. .some caused by immune
changes..and no-one presents in similar ways..I mean I don't pretend to
be an expert anymore than anybody else..er..but I mean that. .the
psychology approach can still have a role to play..really regardless of
what causes it because there's two things...one is what causes it and
the other is what helps it to get better.. .and there's an interest in a wide
range of illnesses. .looking at how the psychological approach can be
used to enhance people's recovery..I mean that's applied to cancer and
heart disease or whatever other. .regardless of what the actual cause is...
Dr Mason	 Yeah..if you look at the. .mental well being of the rest of the
community..it isn't that surprising that people need help..er I mean..the
regional figures are..one in eight people working for that service
need. .psychological outpatient treatment (...) we see so much
psychosomatic presentation that it's difficult to pull it apart..and..the
other thing is that.. .it's widely known that. .overwhelming tiredness is a
symptom of psychological distress...but it may also be a symptom of
..er organelle failure...
Dr Kelly	 You see. .you can't argue with their symptoms. .the symptoms are what
they perceive and experience. .but to actually label it. .as 'it is not
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depression..it is M E'..to my mind is er..not right..(...) I suppose you've
got to say 'well why do they like the title. .of M E rather than
depression?'.. .1 think there is a social class element to it as well. .that
Defers the title of M E than the title of depression.. .1 think the middle
classes prefer to be labelled M E rather than depression (...) it's
er..people are picking up on different labels and accepting those they
find...pallatible..and ignoring those that are unpallatible...it makes the
treatment of it very difficult because if people come in with this
rigidity of notion that it is M E..and that is it...then that's difficult to
treat...
Dr Brown	 Well yeah...but they also want to be taken seriously ...and there's still
this in people's minds...they link nerves Nv311.1 the fac.t.that somehow the
doctor's gonna be dismissing it...and that they're being fobbed off..er..
these sorts of things
Dr Turner	 It's a very frustrating area for everybody involved in it...
"This is what we have so far. I'm afraid things are still very obscure. And I'm not at
all sure about this ending. Do we need to start again?"
I Woolgar and Ashmore (1988: 11).
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APPENDIX
Transcription Conventions
The transcription symbols, used in this thesis are based on the system developed
mainly by Gail Jefferson (see Atkinson and Heritage, 1984).
[	 A left hand square bracket indicates overlapping speech at the point
where the overlap begins-.
I	 A right hand square bracket indicates where the overlap ends.
=	 An 'equals' sign indicates 'latching' of successive talk.
0	 A dot in brackets indicates a hearable pause that is too short to
measure.
(0.3)	 Numbers in brackets measure pauses in seconds (for example, three-
tenths of a second).
T1	 Vertical arrows precede rising and falling intonation.
> <	 Indicates speeded up talk.
CAPITALS Mark speech that is obviously louder than surrounding speech.
underlining indicates emphasis
Ye:ah	 A colon indicates elongation of the vowel sound that it follows.
(...)	 Indicates where some talk has been omitted from a data extract.
?	 Rising intonation.
°speech°	 'Degree' signs enclose obviously quieter speech.
Bu-u-	 Hyphens mark false-starts.
.hh
	 A dot before an'h' indicates speaker in-breath. The more h's
the longer the in-breath.
hh	 An 'h' indicates out-breath. The more h's the longer the
outbreath.
(single brackets) 	 Utterance unclear, best guess presented.
((double brackets)) 	 Some non-verbal action performed.
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